NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3054-23
CARLIA M. BRADY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE JUDICIAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Respondent-Respondent. ______________________________
Argued October 1, 2025 – Decided November 12, 2025
Before Judges Berdote Byrne and Jablonski.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Judicial Retirement System, Department of the Treasury, JRS M/S No. xx971.
Arnold C. Lakind argued the cause for appellant (Szaferman, Lakind, Blumstein & Blader, PC, attorneys; Arnold C. Lakind, of counsel and on the briefs).
Yi Zhu, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Donna Arons, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Yi Zhu, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Carlia M. Brady, a former Superior Court judge, appeals from
a final agency decision of the Board of Trustees of the Judicial Retirement
System (JRS), which ordered Petitioner to forfeit her prospective disability
pension benefits because of dishonorable service. Petitioner first argues the
State House Commission (the Board) lacks jurisdiction to order pension
forfeiture pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(c) after a judge has already been approved
for disability retirement by the Governor and the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
as Petitioner was here. See N.J.S.A. 43:6A-12. Second, even if the Board has
jurisdiction, Petitioner argues the eleven-factor balancing test set forth in
N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(c) does not apply to her because her misconduct was unrelated
to her employment, which, she contends, is a threshold requirement for
application of the test. Finally, Petitioner argues the Board's application of the
balancing test was arbitrary and capricious. Having reviewed the facts before
us in light of all applicable legal principles, we affirm the Board's determination.
I.
The history of this case, which both we and our Supreme Court have
previously detailed in State v. Brady, 452 N.J. Super. 143 (App. Div. 2017), and
A-3054-23 2 In re Brady, 243 N.J. 395 (2020) respectively, is well known to the parties. We
focus on the aspects particularly relevant to this appeal. Petitioner was
appointed to the Superior Court in April 2013. She served in the Civil Division
for approximately two months until her suspension on June 12, 2013, when she
was accused of harboring her then-boyfriend, who was wanted for armed
robbery. She was indicted by a grand jury on three counts: second-degree
official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2(b), and two counts of third-degree
hindering, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(1) to (2). In March 2016, a trial court dismissed
the misconduct charge but did not dismiss the hindering charges . Both parties
appealed from those orders; we affirmed and remanded for further proceedings
in September 2017. See Brady, 452 N.J. Super. at 174. Additionally, in
February 2018, we reversed the trial court's order compelling Petitioner's
boyfriend to testify against her, and the State subsequently concluded "it lacked
sufficient evidence to prove [Petitioner]'s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"
without that testimony. On March 2, 2018, the trial court dismissed the
indictment with prejudice upon the State's motion.
On March 6, 2018, Petitioner was reinstated to the Superior Court bench.
However, on May 4, the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (ACJC) filed
a complaint against Petitioner. The ACJC held hearings over seven days in
A-3054-23 3 2019, and recommended Petitioner be removed from judicial service for
violations of Canon 1, Rule 1.1; Canon 2, Rules 2.1 and 2.3(a); and Canon 5,
Rule 5.1(a) of the Code of Jud. Conduct. The Supreme Court conducted a de
novo review and, applying the requisite clear and convincing evidence standard,
agreed with the ACJC's conclusion, but elected to impose a three-month
suspension instead of the sanction of removal. In re Brady, 243 N.J. at 423.
Petitioner had initially been suspended without pay on June 12, 2013. She
was reinstated by the Supreme Court in March 2018 after her criminal charges
were dismissed. In total, she served two months between her appointment in
April 2013 and her suspension in June 2013, and eighteen months between
March 2018 and September 2019. In September 2019, Petitioner stopped
serving and began receiving temporary disability benefits until her judicial term
expired in April 2020. She was not nominated for reappointment following the
expiration of her initial seven-year term.
On February 18, 2020, Petitioner sent a letter to the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court applying for a permanent disability pension pursuant to N.J.S.A.
43:6A-12, which requires a judge's permanent disability to be certified by the
Supreme Court and approved by the Governor. See also N.J.A.C. 17:10-5.10.
She alleged permanent disability as a result of post-traumatic stress disorder,
A-3054-23 4 bipolar II, major depression, and anxiety, caused by the unsuccessful criminal
prosecution and the stress of the removal proceedings. After referring Petitioner
to three physicians for evaluation as required by statute, the Governor approved
the report of permanent disability on October 27, 2021, and authorized Petitioner
"to pursue all necessary steps for her disability retirement." On November 18,
2021, Petitioner submitted a disability retirement application to the Division of
Pensions and Benefits (the Division). She began receiving disability retirement
benefits on December 1, 2021.
Petitioner then requested a retroactive retirement date of May 2020, which
was administratively denied by the Division. Petitioner appealed that decision
to the State House Commission, which acts as the Board of Trustees of the
Judicial Retirement System. N.J.S.A. 43:6A-29; N.J.A.C. 17:10-1.
In reviewing the request for a retroactive retirement date, the State House
Commission "determined that misconduct during [Petitioner's] tenure had not
been reviewed by the Board in light of the honorable service provisions of
N.J.S.A. 43:1-3 when the Board initially approved her retirement." Therefore,
it informed Petitioner it "would review her judicial service" pursuant to N.J.S.A.
43:1-3, in addition to considering her appeal of the denial of a retroactive
retirement date.
A-3054-23 5 On March 30, 2023, the Board conducted an honorable service review by
weighing the factors codified at N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(c) and concluded Petitioner's
pension should be forfeited as of April 1, 2023. The Board declined to reclaim
the $189,000 in pension benefits already received by Petitioner between January
2022 and April 2023. Given its decision to order the forfeiture of her benefits,
the Board concluded the retroactive retirement date issue was moot. Petitioner
appealed that decision, and the Board denied the appeal. On April 26, 2024,
having determined no material facts were in dispute, the Board memorialized its
decision in a Final Administrative Determination. This appeal followed.
II.
Our review of an administrative agency's determination is limited. In re
Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482 (2007); McKnight v. Bd. of Rev., Dep't of Lab., 476
N.J. Super. 154, 162 (App. Div. 2023). We will sustain a board's decision
"unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,
or that it lacks fair support in the record." Ibid. (quoting In re Herrmann, 192
N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007)). Our review is guided by three inquiries: (1) whether
the agency's decision conforms with relevant law; (2) whether the decision is
supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record; and (3) whether, in
applying the law to the facts, the administrative agency "clearly erred in
A-3054-23 6 reaching" its conclusion. Allstars Auto Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle
Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) (quoting In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194
(2011)). We are not bound by an agency's statutory interpretation or other legal
determinations, Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14,
27 (2011) (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).
A. The Jurisdiction of the Board of the Judicial Retirement System to Conduct Honorable Service Reviews of Superior Court Judges.
The Judicial Retirement System Act (JRSA), N.J.S.A. 43:6A-12, outlines
the procedure a judge of the Superior Court must follow to retire with a disability
pension:
Whenever the Supreme Court shall certify to the Governor, any member who shall have served as a judge of the several courts, may be retired for disability if the member has become physically or otherwise incapacitated for full and efficient service to the State in his judicial capacity. The Governor shall thereupon refer the disability claim to three physicians of skill and repute in their profession and residents of this State who shall examine the member and report to the Governor as to his physical or other disability and whether in all reasonable probability, if they find the disability existent, it will continue permanently and does and will continue to prevent the member from giving full and efficient service in the performance of his judicial duties. If the report confirms the existence of the disability, and if the Governor approves the report, the member shall be retired not less than 1 month next following the date of filing of an application with the retirement system, and he shall receive a
A-3054-23 7 retirement allowance which shall consist of an annuity which is the actuarial equivalent of his accumulated deductions together with regular interest, and a pension which, when added to the member's annuity, will provide a retirement allowance during the remainder of his life in an amount equal to three-fourths of his final salary.
[N.J.S.A. 43:6A-12.]
Petitioner, for the first time on appeal, argues judges whom the Governor
has approved for disability retirement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:6A-12 are exempt
from honorable service review pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:1-3. Because her
disability had already been confirmed by the Governor, she argues the decision
was "final" and the Board has no role in the assessment of whether she had
served honorably.
Generally, we "will decline to consider questions or issues not properly
presented to the trial court." Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234
(1973). However, because Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Board,
we elect to relax that general rule. See Hamilton, Johnston, & Co. v. Johnston,
256 N.J. Super. 657, 662 (App. Div. 1992) ("The question of jurisdiction is
usually recognized as an exception to the general rule that an appellate court
will decline to consider issues not properly presented to the trial court when
there was an opportunity to do so.").
A-3054-23 8 The New Jersey Constitution provides: "Provisions for the pensioning of
the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Judges of the Superior Court shall be
made by law." N.J. Const., Art. VI, § 6, ¶ 3. In accordance with this mandate,
JRSA was enacted in 1973. L. 1973, c. 140 (codified at N.J.S.A. 43:6A-1 to -
47).
The review process for a judge's initial disability determination is distinct
from the process for honorable service review outlined in N.J.S.A. 43:1-3, which
states, "[t]he receipt of a public pension or retirement benefit is hereby expressly
conditioned upon the rendering of honorable service by a public officer or
employee." N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(a). To that end, N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(d) empowers the
respective pension boards to determine whether a member's service was
dishonorable, subjecting the member to full or partial forfeiture of their pension.
Petitioner argues the Governor's approval of her disability application
exempts her from the process of honorable service review. This argument fails
because of the plain language of N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(b), which provides:
The board of trustees of any State or locally-administered pension fund or retirement system created under the laws of this State is authorized to order the forfeiture of all or part of the earned service credit or pension or retirement benefit of any member of the fund or system for misconduct occurring during the member's public service which renders the member's service or part thereof dishonorable ....
A-3054-23 9 [N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(b) (emphasis added).]
"The Legislature's intent is the paramount goal when interpreting a statute
and, generally, the best indicator of that intent is the statutory language."
Garden State Check Cashing Serv., Inc. v. Dep't of Banking & Ins., 237 N.J.
482, 489 (2019) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). "If a
statute's plain language is clear, we apply that plain meaning and end our
inquiry." Ibid.; see also Sanchez v. Fitness Factory Edgewater, LLC, 242 N.J.
252, 260 (2020) ("[W]e need delve no deeper than the act's literal terms.”
(quoting State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 180 (2010))).
Pursuant to JRSA, the "general responsibility for the proper operation of
the retirement system is . . . vested in the State House Commission." N.J.S.A.
43:6A-29(a). The law further provides "[t]he State House Commission shall be
and is hereby constituted the trustee of all the various funds established by this
act." N.J.S.A. 43:6A-30(a); see also N.J.A.C. 17:10-1.1. The State House
Commission is plainly a "board of board of trustees any State or locally-
administered pension fund or retirement system created under the laws of this
State." N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(b). As such, it is vested with the sole authority to review
a member's retirement or disability application for honorable service, rendering
Petitioner's jurisdictional argument futile. See O'Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484,
A-3054-23 10 488 (2002) ("A court may neither rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the
Legislature nor presume that the Legislature intended something other than that
expressed by way of the plain language.").
Moreover, N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(a) states "the receipt of a public pension or
retirement benefit is hereby expressly conditioned upon the rendering of
honorable service by a public officer or employee." Judges are "public
officer[s]" or "employee[s]." Nothing in N.J.S.A. 43:1-3, enacted in 1995, L.
1995, c. 408, excludes Superior Court judges or the judicial pension system.
The judicial disability retirement provision at issue in this case, N.J.S.A. 43:6A -
12, was enacted over twenty years before N.J.S.A. 43:1-3; if the Legislature had
intended to exclude judges, it could have done so easily. See Correa v. Grossi,
458 N.J. Super. 571, 580 (App. Div. 2019) ("The Legislature is presumed to be
familiar with its existing enactments and is presumed to intend that its newer
enactments be harmonized with the existing ones, in light of the Legislature's
purpose.").
Petitioner next argues any honorable service review, if the statute is
applicable to judges, must be performed by the Governor and the Supreme Court
when the initial disability decision is made, not by the Board after the fact. This
argument is belied by both the plain language of N.J.S.A. 43:6A-12, which
A-3054-23 11 makes no mention of honorable service review, and the plain language of
N.J.S.A. 43:1-3, which does not exclude judicial pensions from honorable
service review or set forth a timeframe for that review. Petitioner relies on the
use of the mandatory "shall" in the disability provision: "[I]f the Governor
approves the report, the member shall be retired . . . ." N.J.S.A. 43:6A-12. This
contention lacks merit because it ignores the clear language of N.J.S.A. 43:1-3,
which mandates all public employees are subject to honorable service review
and does not specifically exclude judges.
Honorable service review is a distinct process from the initial disability
application. To accept Petitioner's reading of N.J.S.A. 43:6A-12 would ignore
the "overriding principle of statutory construction[,which] compels that every
effort be made to harmonize legislative schemes enacted by the Legislature."
Richter v. Oakland Bd. of Educ., 246 N.J. 507, 538 (2021). In sum, N.J.S.A.
43:1-3 and N.J.S.A. 43:6A-12 involve distinct processes. N.J.S.A. 43:6A-12
sets forth a process to determine whether a judge is initially entitled to receive
a disability pension. N.J.S.A. 43:1-3 provides the mechanism for an honorable
service review by the pension administration to determine whether any public
employee, including judges of the Superior Court, should forfeit their pension
because of misconduct.
A-3054-23 12 B. Whether the Application of N.J.S.A. 43:1-3 Requires a Threshold Determination that the Disqualifying Conduct was Related to the Judge's Employment.
Petitioner next contends the Board erred as a matter of law in ordering
pension forfeiture based on conduct unrelated to her judicial duties. According
to Petitioner, N.J.S.A. 43:1-3 can never apply to misconduct unrelated to official
duties. However, the statute makes clear that whether the conduct was related
to the public employee's official employment duties is only one of the eleven
factors to be considered, not a threshold determination as to whether an
honorable service review may be conducted. See N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(c).
N.J.S.A. 43:1-3 codified our Supreme Court's decision in Uricoli v. Board
of Trustees, Police & Firemen's Retirement System, 91 N.J. 62 (1982). See L.
1995, c. 408; Assemb. State Gov. Comm. Statement to A. No. 676 (April 20,
1994) (stating the bill codifies the "essence" of Uricoli). Uricoli involved a
police chief who applied for accidental disability benefits. 91 N.J. at 65. After
twenty-three years of service, he was convicted of "malfeasance in office" for a
"ticket-fixing incident" in which he "illegally disposed of a careless driving
ticket . . . issued to the son of a 'near and dear friend.'" Ibid.
In Uricoli, our Supreme Court cautioned "honorable service is an implicit
requirement of every public pension statute, whether or not this conditional term
A-3054-23 13 appears in the particular statute" and honorable service is required "without
regard to whether the retirement is based on disability, age, or length of service."
Id. at 66. The Court then decided how a public employee's misconduct should
affect their pension rights. Id. at 77-78. The Court rejected a rule that any
misconduct should "automatically" result in "absolute forfeiture" of a public
employee's pension. Id. at 77. Instead, the court emphasized "flexibility and
the application of equitable considerations" and devised an eleven-factor
balancing test, which included the following:
(1) the employee's length of service; (2) the basis for retirement, i.e., age, service, disability, etc.; (3) the extent to which the employee's pension has vested; (4) the duties of the particular employment; (5) the employee's public employment history and record; (6) the employee's other public employment and service; (7) the nature of the misconduct or crime, including the gravity or substantiality of the offense, whether it was a single or multiple offense and whether it was continuing or isolated; (8) the relationship between the misconduct and the employee's public duties; (9) the quality of moral turpitude or the degree of guilt and culpability, including the employee's motives and reasons, personal gain, and the like; (10) the availability and adequacy of other penal sanctions; and (11) other personal circumstances relating to the employee bearing upon the justness of forfeiture.
[Id. at 77-78.]
In applying these factors to Uricoli's case, the Court held total forfeiture
was not warranted. Id. at 78. The Court noted the wrongfulness of Uricoli's
ticket-fixing and its "direct and actual" relationship to his job duties. Id. at 79.
A-3054-23 14 But the Court also weighed Uricoli's "[twenty] full years of honorable service"
and the fact the conduct was not "pervasive or chronic," and noted there was no
"personal gain" or "indication of venality." Ibid. Finally, the Court concluded
"adequate penal sanctions" had already been applied, including Uricoli's
termination, conviction, and sentence. Ibid.
In Corvelli v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System,
the Court subsequently clarified that misconduct resulting in forfeiture need not
be criminal. 130 N.J. 539, 552 (1992). The Court stated:
Although Uricoli had been convicted of a crime, nowhere does our opinion in his case state that only criminal acts may constitute dishonorable service deserving of forfeiture. The term 'honorable service' as used in Uricoli and other opinions is sufficiently generic to encompass a broad range of misconduct bearing on the forfeiture decision, including but not limited to criminal conviction.
Uricoli's balancing test was later enacted, L. 1995, c. 408, and codified at
N.J.S.A. 43:1-3, which authorizes the respective boards of the State's pension
systems to weigh the eleven factors and, if necessary, order total or partial
forfeiture of an employee's pension or retirement benefit. N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(b) to
(c).
Petitioner's reliance upon Masse v. Board of Trustees, Public Employment
Retirement System, 87 N.J. 252 (1981), in arguing that conduct unrelated to her
A-3054-23 15 official judicial duties cannot form the basis for forfeiture pursuant to N.J.S.A.
43:1-3 is without merit. Not only was Masse a pre-Uricoli case, but N.J.S.A.
43:1-3 is clear that whether the misconduct was unrelated to employment is to
be considered as only one of the factors. See N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(c)(8) (including
as a factor "the relationship between the misconduct and . . . public duties.").
Uricoli synthesized decades of precedent, including Masse, and concluded "in
all cases, even where there is a relationship between the particular misconduct
at issue and the performance of employment duties, a balancing approach is
required in order to determine whether forfeiture is justified under all of the
circumstances." 91 N.J. at 67-73, 77 (emphasis added).
After Uricoli, we reiterated that whether the misconduct was unrelated to
official employment duties is simply one factor to be considered in the totality
of the circumstances, not a threshold inquiry before the balancing test is applied.
See T.J.M. v. Bd. of Trs., 218 N.J. Super. 274, 279 (App. Div. 1987) ("Uricoli
explicitly states its test applies to "all cases" involving forfeiture of pension
benefits." (quoting Uricoli, 91 N.J. at 77)). If an employee's misconduct is
unrelated to one's job duties, that factor is considered favorably in the balancing
process. See ibid. But it does not, as Petitioner argues, foreclose application of
N.J.S.A. 43:1-3 altogether.
A-3054-23 16 C. Whether the Board Acted Arbitrarily and Capriciously in Applying the N.J.S.A. 43:1-3 Factors.
Finally, Petitioner argues the Board arbitrarily and capriciously weighed
the honorable service factors outlined in N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(c)(1) to (11) to
mandate the forfeiture of her pension. After reviewing each factor individually,
and the Board's weighing of the factors as a whole, we conclude the Board's
decision to forfeit Petitioner's pension prospectively was not arbitrary or
capricious. Contrary to Petitioner's claim, the Board properly applied the
eleven-factor analysis according to the statute and relied on substantial evidence
in reaching its forfeiture decision.
1. Factor One – the member's length of service
The Board found Petitioner earned two years and four months of JRS
service credit based on her employment history and pension contributions, and
she had barely begun her judicial service when she engaged in the misconduct
at issue. Based on these circumstances, it concluded factor one weighed heavily
against Petitioner. Without legal support, Petitioner argues the Board should
have considered her "length of service" to be her seven-year judicial term,
instead of her "length of pension service." "Service" is clearly defined in JRSA
as "service rendered for which credit is allowed on the basis of contributions
made by the State." N.J.S.A. 43:6A-3(r). Petitioner worked and made pension
A-3054-23 17 contributions for only two years and four months of her judicial appointment.
The Board correctly concluded she has a total JRS service credit of two years
and four months.
We reject Petitioner's argument that she was deprived of the ability to
make pension contributions over a fifty-four-month period during the pendency
of her criminal proceeding. Petitioner could not sit as a judge while she was
under criminal indictment.
2. Factor Two – the basis for retirement
The Board reasonably found factor two weighed against Petitioner
because her disability retirement was based on a disability she asserts was
caused, in part, by the very events at issue. Although Petitioner argues her
disability was caused by Woodbridge law enforcement, who wrongly believed
Petitioner engaged in official misconduct, the Board correctly relied on the
Supreme Court's finding that Petitioner had committed violations of the Code of
Jud. Conduct and had demonstrated a lack of candor to the tribunal. As part of
the analysis, the Board applied the Supreme Court's rationale in Patterson v.
Board of Trustees, State Police Retirement System, in which the Court found a
state trooper ineligible for accidental disability retirement benefits based on a
traumatic event that was caused, in part, by his own misconduct. 194 N.J. 29,
A-3054-23 18 51-52 (2008). In ruling that the trooper could not "rely on the incident as the
predicate for an enhanced public pension," the Court observed "[t]o rule
otherwise would reward dereliction of duty." Ibid. The Board here found
Petitioner's claim for lifetime benefits on this basis would "reward dereliction
of duty," and the Legislature never intended to provide such a windfall. We
perceive no error in the Board's reasoning.
3. Factor Three – the extent to which the member's pension has vested
Likewise, the Board correctly concluded factor three weighed heavily
against Petitioner because she had not vested for any pension benefit other than
disability retirement, such as service retirement under N.J.S.A. 43:6A-8; early
retirement under N.J.S.A. 43:6A-10; or deferred retirement under N.J.S.A.
43:6A-11.
4-6. Factors Four through Six - the duties of the particular member; the member's public employment history and record covered under the retirement system; and any other public employment or service
The Board found Petitioner's duties and employment history weighed
against her, given the significance of her position as a judge and the paucity of
creditable service before the incident at issue in June 2013—a mere two months.
We agree.
A-3054-23 19 7. Factor Seven - the nature of the misconduct or crime, including the gravity or substantiality of the offense, whether it was a single or multiple offense and whether it was continuing or isolated
The Board concluded the nature and gravity of the offense weighed
against Petitioner because her violations of the Code of Jud. Conduct were
substantial and continued over a two-day period. Petitioner argues her
misconduct occurred during an emotional time, and she did not have an
obligation to advise law enforcement of the location of a known fugitive.
However, seven years later, the Supreme Court, in finding she had violated
canons of judicial conduct, specifically found she lacked candor to the tribuna l,
In re Brady, 243 N.J. at 420, and demonstrated little remorse even then, id. at
422.
8. Factor Eight – the relationship between the misconduct and the member’s public duties
The Board also weighed this factor heavily against Petitioner. It found
Petitioner was culpable of an egregious violation of judicial standards by
elevating her personal relationship over her public duties. While she concedes
she had an obligation to conform to the judicial canons, Petitioner continues to
claim she had no obligation to advise law enforcement of the location of a
criminal fugitive, demonstrating a patent lack of understanding of the role of a
judicial officer. To be sure, not every violation of a judicial canon will subject
A-3054-23 20 a judge to pension forfeiture or even dishonorable service review. However, a
judge's long-standing documented lack of insight as to their role as a judicial
officer in upholding the law may, in appropriate cases and following a robust
fact-sensitive inquiry, subject that judge to pension forfeiture.
9. Factor Nine - the quality of moral turpitude or the degree of guilt or culpability, including the member's motives and reasons, personal gain and similar considerations
The Board noted the Supreme Court's finding that Petitioner acted not at
the direction of the police, "but in the hope that she could assist [her boyfriend]
and preserve their relationship while maintaining her judicial career." Id. at 417.
The Board found the gain Petitioner sought was personal, though not monetary.
Petitioner argues her infraction did not amount to "moral turpitude," especially
given her emotional state at the time, but the Board reasonably rejected that
claim, noting, as did the Supreme Court, id. at 422, a seeming lack of remorse
on Petitioner's part about her actions in June 2013, even years later.
10. Factor Ten - the availability and adequacy of other penal sanctions
The Board considered Petitioner's argument that she had suffered enough
due to the three-month, after-the-fact suspension imposed by the Supreme Court
and the fifty-seven-month suspension during the pendency of her criminal case.
The Board did not impose total forfeiture. It ordered the forfeiture of Petitioner's
A-3054-23 21 prospective pension benefits beginning on April 1, 2023, but allowed her to keep
$189,000 in pension benefits received between January 2022 and April 2023
(amounting to three and one-half times the value of Petitioner's total pension
contributions to JRS).
11. Factor Eleven - other personal circumstances relating to the member which bear upon the justness of forfeiture
The Board took specific note of the amount already expended by the
pension system as compared to Petitioner's total pension contributions, reviewed
mitigating factors considered by the Supreme Court and argued by Petitioner to
the ACJC (including two adverse credibility findings by the Supreme Court),
the lack of insight and remorse the Supreme Court and Board perceived on
Petitioner's part, the stress this process caused Petitioner and her family, and the
hardship on Petitioner if the Board sought to recover monies already paid to her.
We see no reason to disturb these findings.
We conclude the Board reasonably weighed the N.J.S.A. 43:1-3 factors.
The Board weighed "heavily" the fact Petitioner had only two years and four
months of creditable service:
This is not, like Uricoli, a case in which an expectation of pension benefits built over a long career of honorable service is forfeited over a single infraction, or one in which an early infraction is followed by a long period of honorable service. To the contrary, [Petitioner] had barely begun her service when she egregiously
A-3054-23 22 violated the standards to which the public has a right to expect judges to adhere by failing to cooperate with police in their attempt to apprehend a fugitive accused of a violent crime.
The Board concluded "Petitioner’s receipt, after dishonoring the bench
just over two months into her relatively brief judicial service, of a lifetime
pension amounting to three-fourths of her judicial salary would be an
unwarranted windfall."
Moreover, as the Board noted, Petitioner was paid a monthly disability
pension from January 2022 to April 2023, the point at which the Board forfeited
her pension. The Board did not order total forfeiture, and the payments
Petitioner received totaled $189,000, which more than compensated her for her
pension contributions.
Therefore, considering all the circumstances, the Board did not act
arbitrarily and capriciously in weighing the factors. It was reasonable to
conclude the very short length of service, coupled with the serious breach of
public trust committed by Petitioner, outweighed her entitlement to a lifetime
pension. Our role is not to substitute our judgment for that of the Board but only
to conclude whether its decision follows the law, is supported by substantial
evidence, and is reasonable. In re Carter, 191 N.J. at 483.
Affirmed.
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