1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 CARLA DRAPER, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00925-TL
12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION FOR 13 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 14 ZALE DELAWARE, INC.,
15 Defendant. 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Defendant Zale Delaware Inc.’s Motion for Summary 18 Judgment. Dkt. No. 31. Having reviewed Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff Carla Draper’s response 19 (Dkt. No. 34), Defendant’s reply (Dkt. No. 35), and the relevant record, the Court GRANTS 20 Defendant’s motion.1 21 // 22 // 23
24 1 Neither party requested oral argument, and the Court finds oral argument unnecessary. See LCR 7(b)(4). 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff is a woman of color in her fifties,2 who, for 12 years, worked for Signet Banter 3 by Piercing Pagoda (“Defendant”)3 at Alderwood Mall in Lynwood, Washington. See Dkt. 4 No. 18 (Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”)) at 3 ¶ 2, 9 ¶ 21, 13 ¶ 39. Plaintiff alleges two
5 causes of action against Defendant—race discrimination and age discrimination—both under the 6 Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”), Chapter 49.60 RCW. Dkt. No. 18 at 13, 7 15. The allegations stem from Plaintiff’s employment at and termination from Defendant’s store. 8 See generally Dkt. No. 18. 9 A. Plaintiff’s Employment History 10 Plaintiff began working at Defendant’s store in or around June 2012, when she was hired 11 as an Assistant Manager. Id. at 4 ¶ 2. Several months later, she was promoted to Store 12 Manager—a title she held until her termination in 2023. Id. at 4 ¶¶ 3, 6; see also Dkt. No. 28 13 (Answer to SAC) at 2 ¶ 6. As Store Manager, Plaintiff was responsible for “managing daily store 14 operations; guiding, directing, and supporting store staff[.]” Dkt. No. 18 at 4 ¶ 6; see also Dkt.
15 No. 28 at 2 ¶ 6. During the time period relevant to this case, Plaintiff “supervised an Assistant 16 Store Manager, two Key Sales Associates, and one seasonal Sales Associate[.]” Dkt. No. 31 at 6. 17 Plaintiff “reported to a District Manager, Angie Magness, and then Regional Director, Amanda 18 Horn.” Dkt. No. 31 at 6; see also Dkt. No. 28 at 6 ¶¶ 21, 24–25 (discussing Magness supervising 19 Plaintiff); id. at 9 ¶ 18 (discussing Horn supervising Plaintiff). Over the course of her 20 employment at Defendant’s store, Plaintiff was given performance bonuses and awards, and she 21 22
23 2 See infra Section I.B.2. 3 Defendant Zale Delaware, Inc., owns and operates jewelry stores under several different names, one of which is 24 Brand by Piercing Pagoda—the store where Plaintiff was employed. Dkt. No. 32 (Horn Decl.) ¶ 3. 1 received internal communications that she was a valuable member of the company.4 Dkt. No. 34- 2 1 (Carla Draper Decl.) at 4 ¶ 2. 3 B. Plaintiff’s Demographic Information 4 1. Plaintiff’s Race and Ethnicity
5 Plaintiff’s race and ethnicity has been characterized in various ways over the course of 6 her work history and this case, which the Court will outline. In Plaintiff’s SAC, she identifies as 7 “part African American part Caucasian.” Dkt. No. 18 at 4 ¶ 1. In Plaintiff’s response brief, she 8 identifies as “Non-White.” Dkt. No. 34 at 7. Plaintiff discussed her racial background in more 9 detail at her deposition. Specifically, Plaintiff stated that her father was a Black man who was in 10 the Navy with whom her mother had a one-night stand, so neither Plaintiff nor her mother knows 11 who Plaintiff’s father is. Dkt. No. 34-1 at 13–14. Plaintiff explained that growing up, her family 12 members were white, but that she was “a different color.” Id. at 14. Further, Plaintiff asserts that 13 she believes she was treated unfairly at work because of “[her] color.” Id. at 17. 14 In Plaintiff’s “Workday Profile” maintained by Defendant’s human resources department,
15 Plaintiff’s identified race/ethnicity is listed as Hispanic or Latino. Dkt. No. 32-1 (Plaintiff Banter 16 Personnel File) at 41. While working a retail job in 2006, Plaintiff identified as “Caucasian or 17 Latina.” Dkt. No. 33 (Plaintiff 2d Deposition) at 9. In a sworn interrogatory response dated 18 November 13, 2025, Plaintiff stated she identified as “Native American, Spanish, and 19 Caucasian.” Dkt. No. 33 (Plaintiff Interrog. Resps.) at 47. Plaintiff stated in her deposition, “I 20 was taught as a young child that you were born in the United States, check Caucasian.” Dkt. 21 No. 33 at 9. At Plaintiff’s current job—the one she’s worked at since being terminated by 22 Defendant—Plaintiff said she “probably” identified as “white, as [her] mom had taught [her].” 23
4 Defendant does not dispute this information and does not allege that Plaintiff engaged in any violations that could 24 have resulted in her termination prior to the allegations outlined in this Order. 1 Id. at 10. In her response brief, Plaintiff described the deposition conversations about her racial 2 background as a “painful[] discuss[ion] [about] her challenging racial identity,” but that she is 3 Non-White and presents as such. Dkt. No. 34 at 7. 4 2. Plaintiff’s Age
5 At the time Plaintiff was terminated from her position at Defendant’s store, she was in 6 her fifties. In Plaintiff’s SAC, she provides that she was 51 years old at the time of her 7 termination. Dkt. No. 18 at 9. In her reply brief, however, she asserts that she was 53 years old at 8 the time of her termination. Dkt. No. 34 at 5. Regardless, in Defendant’s Answer, Defendant 9 admits to Plaintiff’s assertion that she was 51 at the time of her termination. See Dkt. No. 28 at 7 10 ¶ 21. In any event, whether Plaintiff was 51 or 53 is not of any import here, as the WLAD 11 protects individuals between 40 and 70 years of age. See Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wn.2d 12 172, 188, 23 P.3d 440 (2001), abrogated on other grounds by Mikkelsen v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 13 of Kittitas County, 189 Wn.2d 516, 404 P.3d 464 (2017). 14 C. Plaintiff’s Termination
15 On November 18, 2022, Defendant’s former assistant store manager, Lauren Lantzy, who 16 is white, made a report to the “T.I.P.S.”5 line alleging that Plaintiff had violated Defendant’s 17 store policies. Dkt. No. 32-1 (Karas Investigation Report) at 84. Specifically, Ms. Lantzy alleged 18 Plaintiff engaged in “discrimination based upon gender identity, workplace bullying, and 19 discrimination based upon race.” Id. The allegations regarding gender identity and workplace 20 bullying involved Ash Rockness, an associate at Defendant’s store supervised by Plaintiff.6 Id. 21 Ms. Lantzy’s allegations led to Defendant’s hiring of attorney Talia Karas to conduct a third- 22
23 5 The T.I.P.S. line is a hotline where employees can report employment violations. See Dkt. No. 31 at 6–7. 6 The Court focuses on the allegation regarding Mr. Rockness as that was the allegation that was ultimately 24 substantiated. Dkt. No. 32-1 at 85. 1 party investigation into Ms. Lantzy’s claims. Dkt. No. 31 at 8; see also Dkt. No. 18 at 7 ¶ 4. The 2 investigation consisted of a review of company records and interviews with Plaintiff, Ms. 3 Lantzy, and other employees of Defendant. See Dkt. No. 32-1 at 85–86. During Ms. Karas’s 4 interview of Plaintiff, Plaintiff stated that Mr. Rockness, “wanted to be he or them” but then also
5 referred to Mr. Rockness as a girl during the interview. Dkt. No. 32-1 at 86. During the 6 interview, Plaintiff “repeatedly misgendered” Mr. Rockness. Id. at 87; Dkt. No. 33 at 22–23 7 (Draper 2d Deposition). Ms. Karas did not interview Mr. Rockness, the alleged victim of some 8 of the bullying allegations. See Dkt. No. 32-1 at 85. 9 Of the five allegations that Ms. Lantzy brought, one was found to be partially 10 substantiated, one was substantiated, two were unsubstantiated, and one resulted in no finding. 11 See id. at 84–85. The substantiated allegation was that Plaintiff frequently misgendered Mr. 12 Rockness. See id. at 84. While finding that Plaintiff may not have acted with ill will toward Mr. 13 Rockness, Ms. Karas found that Plaintiff more likely than not acted recklessly and with total 14 disregard in her repeated misgendering of an employee whom she managed. See id. at 87. The
15 partially substantiated allegation was that Plaintiff had bullied both Ms. Lantzy and Mr. 16 Rockness in the workplace. See id. at 84. Both findings were violations of Defendant’s Equal 17 Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) and Anti-Bullying Policies. See Dkt. No. 32 (Horn Decl.) 18 ¶¶ 6–7. 19 Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Lantzy’s allegations were in response to what Ms. Lantzy 20 believed was Plaintiff’s role in an investigation into allegations of theft by Ms. Lantzy that 21 ultimately resulted in Ms. Lantzy leaving her job at Defendant’s store.7 See Dkt. No. 34 at 9–10. 22 7 Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Lantzy was being investigated for stealing $900 in store proceeds. Dkt. No. 34-1 at 4 ¶ 5. 23 After the allegations of theft surfaced and an investigation into Ms. Lantzy began, Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Lantzy told other employees she intended to reported Plaintiff to the T.I.P.S. line for bullying in what appeared to be retaliation. Id. ¶ 13. Defendant does not dispute the allegations that Ms. Lantzy was being investigated for losing or 24 1 Specifically, Ms. Lantzy left Defendant’s store in the middle of an investigation into allegations 2 that she had lost or stolen $900 of Defendant’s store proceeds—a claim which that Ms. Lantzy 3 connected to Plaintiff’s managerial instructions (Plaintiff denies she gave Ms. Lantzy such 4 instruction). Dkt. No. 34-1 at 4 ¶¶ 5–9. Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Karas’s failure to ask Ms.
5 Lantzy about the circumstances behind her leaving Defendant’s store, as well as a failure to 6 mention such circumstances in her investigation, “support an inference of discriminatory motive 7 and pretext” in Plaintiff’s termination. Dkt. No. 34 at 10–11. 8 In addition to the bullying violations, Defendant also asserts that it terminated Plaintiff 9 for violating Defendant’s “LP Policies”—also referred to by Defendant as “timecard fraud.” Dkt. 10 No. 32 (Horn Decl.) ¶¶ 10–13. Defendant asserts that in March 2023, Plaintiff twice edited 11 previously recorded time submissions, and also recorded hours during a week in which she did 12 not actually work. See Dkt. No. 31 at 9. Plaintiff does not provide a factual rebuttal to the 13 timecard assertions and instead: (1) highlights what she believes will be an unavailable key 14 witness at trial; and (2) argues that the allegations of timecard fraud are “unsupported by any
15 admissible evidence and cannot be credited where the underlying data, methodology, and witness 16 are all absent from the record.” Dkt. No. 34 at 14. 17 After her termination, on March 17, 2025, Plaintiff sued Defendant in Snohomish County 18 Superior Court. Dkt. No. 1-2 (State Court Complaint) at 27. On May 15, 2025, Defendant 19 removed the matter to this Court. Dkt. No. 1 (Notice of Removal). On March 26, 2026, 20 Defendant moved for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 31. 21 22
23 stealing the money, nor does Defendant dispute that the alleged conduct was the reason Ms. Lantzy left Defendant’s store. Instead, Defendant calls the allegations “irrelevant” because [Plaintiff] admitted to the conduct” and that the 24 “misconduct was substantiated” by the investigation. Dkt. No. 31 at 9 fn 1. 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “mandate[] the entry of summary judgment, after 3 adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing 4 sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
5 party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 6 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The inquiry at the summary judgment stage is “whether the 7 evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so 8 one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 9 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986). 10 The party moving for summary judgment must carry its burden of production by “either 11 produc[ing] evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or 12 show[ing] that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to 13 carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz 14 Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). This showing must be made through evidence in
15 the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (explaining the ways in which a “party asserting that a fact 16 cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion”). Unless the burden of production 17 is met, “the nonmoving party has no obligation to produce anything” to support its claims or 18 defenses. Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103–04. 19 Courts do not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence at this stage. See 20 Munden v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 8 F.4th 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 2021). They resolve factual 21 issues in favor of a non-moving party, but “only in the sense that, where the facts specifically 22 averred by that party contradict facts specifically averred by the movant, the motion must be 23 denied.” Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). Conclusory, non-specific
24 affidavits are insufficient, and “missing facts” are not to be presumed. Id. at 889. Further, 1 uncorroborated and self-serving testimony does not create a genuine issue of fact. See Villiarimo 2 v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002). 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 The WLAD prohibits an employer from discharging any person from employment
5 because of, inter alia, age, race, or color. RCW 49.60.180(2). In assessing claims brought under 6 the WLAD, courts use the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 7 Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Bittner v. Symetra Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 32 Wn. App. 2d 647, 658, 8 558 P.3d 177 (2024). First, the plaintiff claiming discrimination holds the burden of establishing 9 a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Next, if the plaintiff 10 establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, then the burden shifts to the employer to 11 articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory, reason for the plaintiff’s termination. Id. Lastly, if the 12 employer identifies a non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s termination, the burden shifts 13 back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated reason for termination is merely pretext 14 for discrimination. Id. at 804. “If there is sufficient evidence of pretext, the case must go to the
15 jury.” Salas v. Indep. Elec. Contractors Inc., No. C11-1748, 2013 WL 1898249, at *6 (W.D. 16 Wash. May 7, 2013). 17 A. Race Discrimination 18 To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff must show: “(1) the 19 plaintiff belongs to a protected class, (2) [s]he was performing according to h[er] employer’s 20 legitimate expectations, (3) [s]he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) similarly 21 situated employees were treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse 22 employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest 23 Prods., 847 F.3d 678, 691 (9th Cir. 2017).
24 1 1. Plaintiff Belongs to a Protected Class 2 Plaintiff has established that she belongs to a protected class. In support of this argument, 3 Plaintiff makes several assertions in her response brief that are supported by excerpts from her 4 deposition. Plaintiff asserts that she testified “that she was Non-White, and presented as Non-
5 White. [Plaintiff] testified that her mother told her she is the child of a Black sailor, that she has 6 always presented as Non-White, and that Defendant had consistently perceived her as 7 Non-White.” Dkt. No. 34 at 7. In Plaintiff’s deposition, she asserted, in reference to growing up 8 in a white family, “people see me, and I’m a different color.” Dkt. No. 34-1 at 14. When asked 9 about whether there were any reasons Plaintiff believed she was treated unfairly or prejudicially, 10 she asserted that it was because of the color of her skin (in addition to her age). See id. at 17. 11 Defendant also provides evidence that supports her assertion that she is a member of a 12 protected class. Defendant asserts that at a prior job, Plaintiff identified as Caucasian or Latina, 13 and that at Defendant’s store, her Workday Profile showed that she identified as Hispanic or 14 Latina. Dkt. No. 31 at 13. And although Defendant asserts that Plaintiff said she “probably”
15 identified as white at a job she worked after Defendant’s store (Dkt. No. 31 at 6 (citing Dkt. 16 No. 33 at 12)), that ignores the additional context that Plaintiff gave. Dkt. No. 33 at 12. Namely, 17 Plaintiff explained that her mother, who is white, taught her that she should identify as white 18 because if “you were born in the United States, check Caucasian.” Dkt. No. 33 at 9. Her mother 19 taught her this despite Plaintiff’s father being Black and despite Plaintiff’s being “a different 20 color” than the rest of her family. Dkt. No. 34-1 at 13–14. 21 Defendant argues that “[b]ecause Draper cannot show, and expressly denies, being a 22 member of the protected class identified in the SAC, her claim for race discrimination must be 23 dismissed.” Dkt. No. 31 at 13–14. Defendant argues that in the SAC, Plaintiff asserts she is part
24 African American and part Caucasian, but that in her deposition and sworn interrogatories, she 1 identifies differently. See id. at 13. But this completely ignores the full context of Plaintiff’s 2 mixed-race background, and the fact that Plaintiff has consistently identified as a woman of 3 color. Plaintiff’s racial background, paired with how she was taught to identify, clearly 4 complicates how she has historically expressed her racial identity. See Dkt. No. 34 at 7
5 (“Plaintiff painfully discussed her challenging racial identity”). While Plaintiff’s representations 6 at her deposition, in responses to interrogatories, and on applications to other employers might 7 affect her credibility at trial, the Court does not make credibility determinations on a motion for 8 summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 9 The facts of the matter are that Plaintiff asserted in her Complaint that she is part African 10 American; she testified at her deposition that she has a Black father; she identifies as a woman of 11 color; and she presents as a woman of color. The WLAD explicitly prohibits discrimination 12 based on color. See RCW 49.60.180(2) (“It is an unfair practice for any employer: [t]o discharge 13 or bar any person from employment because of . . . color[.]”). Therefore, irrespective of how she 14 chooses to identify her race or ethnicity, Plaintiff is a member of a protected class because of the
15 color of her skin. 16 2. Adverse Employment Action 17 Plaintiff’s establishment of the second and third elements of a prima facie case are 18 undisputed. Plaintiff asserts she performed to Defendant’s legitimate expectations, and, although 19 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s firing was legitimate, Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff 20 cannot establish this element of the prima facie case. See Dkt. No. 34-1 at 4 (highlighting that 21 Defendant demonstrated Plaintiff’s value to Defendant through “performance bonuses, awards, 22 and internal communications that [she] was a valuable member of the Zale family”). Further, the 23 adverse employment action here was Plaintiff’s termination. Therefore, Plaintiff has met both the
24 second and third prongs of her prima facie case. 1 3. Circumstances Giving Inference of Discrimination 2 Plaintiff offers several examples as to how the circumstances surrounding her termination 3 give rise to an inference of discrimination. 4 Plaintiff testified at her deposition that Ms. Horn, who terminated Plaintiff, “didn’t like”
5 Plaintiff and treated Plaintiff unfairly or prejudicially because of the color of Plaintiff’s skin. 6 Dkt. No. 34 at 8 (citing Dkt. No. 34-1 at 17). Plaintiff testified that the reason she believed this is 7 “[m]y own feelings” and “[j]ust the way she treated me.” Id. (citing Dkt. No. 34-1 at 17). 8 Plaintiff further testified that “I knew Amanda Horn hated me. Anytime she’d come she'd look at 9 me up and down. I met with her probably twice at my store.” Id. (citing Dkt. No. 34-1 at 17). A 10 more specific example Plaintiff gives is a phone call between her and Horn. Plaintiff testified as 11 follows: 12 And then I had remembered with Amanda, one time she called me and she asked me -- not nicely either. She asked me, how do you 13 know Shannon? Just like that. And I said, Shannon who? She goes, I’m on your Facebook and you know Shannon. And she said her 14 last name, and I don’t remember the last name. And I said, Oh, she’s a police officer at LAPD. I said, I have a cousin that works in 15 the offices where -- that she has direct contact with. She goes, So you know somebody that I know? I’m like, I don’t, I don’t know. 16 And I said, How do you know Shannon? She works with my husband. They’re police officers. And I’m like, Okay. Oh, that’s 17 all I wanted to know, and she hung up. So yeah, it was just -- that was another encounter with her. 18 Dkt. No. 34-1 at 22; see also Dkt. No. 34 at 9. Plaintiff argues “A reasonable jury could perceive 19 Horn’s conduct as racialized status-sorting behavior, assessing Ms. Draper’s credibility and 20 standing through the lens of perceived race.” Dkt. No. 34 at 9. In reply, Defendant argues that 21 “[b]ecause there is no evidence in the record that Horn perceived Draper as belonging to any 22 particular protected class, and because there is no evidence to support Draper’s speculation that 23 24 1 Horn had engaged in ‘status-sorting behavior,’ there is no dispute of material fact for a jury to 2 resolve.” Dkt. No. 35 at 3. 3 The cases cited by Plaintiff and the factual record show that the evidence Plaintiff 4 provides is not sufficient to make a prima facie showing that circumstances surrounding her
5 termination give rise to an inference of discrimination. Plaintiff asserts that whether Defendant 6 acted with racial animus is a jury question and cites to several cases. Dkt. No. 34 at 11. But these 7 cases are not analogous to Plaintiff’s circumstances. For example, in the section of McGinest v. 8 GTE Service Corp. cited by Plaintiff, the court found that the plaintiff, who was Black, was 9 subjected to a hostile work environment because, among other things, a management-level 10 employee called the plaintiff the N-word and racist graffiti regularly appeared in the work 11 bathroom. 360 F.3d 1103, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2004). In another case Plaintiff cites, this time about 12 gender-based discrimination, Dominguez-Curry v Nevada Department of Transportation, the 13 court found that genuine factual disputes existed because the plaintiff testified, among other 14 things, that “Stacey made numerous demeaning comments about women in the workplace,
15 including stating that ‘women should only be in subservient positions’; [and] that women ‘have 16 no business in construction[.]’” 424 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005). The Court need not go on 17 and distinguish every case Plaintiff provides. There is stark contrast between the conduct that led 18 to findings of discrimination in those cases compared to the conduct outlined in Plaintiff’s case. 19 Other than Plaintiff’s “own feelings,” Plaintiff points only to two meetings where Ms. Horn 20 looked Plaintiff up and down, and one phone call about someone they knew in common. These 21 actions—the first a pair of glances that Plaintiff herself does not characterize as hostile, the 22 second a “not nice[]” conversation that Plaintiff suggests a jury might consider “racialized status- 23 sorting behavior”—are too ambiguous to be considered probative evidence of race
24 discrimination. 1 As a further example of discrimination, Plaintiff offers that when Ms. Lantzy was 2 interviewed by the external investigator, Ms. Karas, “Lantzy racialized Plaintiff, describing her 3 as Hispanic and therefore Non-White,[8] and the investigator Karas adopted that framing without 4 scrutiny.” Dkt. No. 34 at 10. Plaintiff goes on to argue that “[a] jury could readily find that this
5 racialized narrative shaped the investigation, influenced credibility assessments, and contributed 6 to Defendant’s decision to terminate Plaintiff.” Id. But Plaintiff’s assertions about the third-party 7 investigation do not support circumstantial evidence of race-based discrimination. Plaintiff 8 claims that “the investigator accepted [Lantzy’s] statements wholesale and used them to justify 9 terminating Ms. Draper” (Dkt. No. 34 at 10), but this argument completely ignores the fact that 10 the investigator found two of Ms. Lantzy’s allegations unsubstantiated, and did not make a 11 finding as to a third (see Dkt. No. 32-1 at 84–85). This means that Ms. Karas made a 12 “substantiated” finding on fewer than half of the allegations that Ms. Lantzy had lodged against 13 Plaintiff. See Dkt. No. 32-1 at 84–85. And one of the allegations that Ms. Karas found 14 unsubstantiated was that Plaintiff had given preferential treatment to Hispanic team members.
15 See id. at 84. Moreover, Plaintiff admits that she did not know whether Ms. Karas knew of the 16 underlying circumstances of Ms. Lantzy’s firing (Dkt. No. 34 at 10), and that Plaintiff did not 17 have an opportunity to tell Ms. Karas about evidence of Ms. Lantzy’s motive and plan to falsely 18 report Plaintiff to the T.I.P.S. line (Dkt. No. 34-1 at 4–5). Essentially, Plaintiff makes no 19 showing that Ms. Karas actually possessed the knowledge that Plaintiff asserts made this a race- 20 based, discriminatory investigation. Further, Plaintiff does not engage at all with Ms. Karas’s 21 finding that Plaintiff repeatedly misgendered Mr. Rockness during her interview, even while 22 admittedly knowing Mr. Rockness identified as a male, and consequently leading Ms. Karas to 23
8 There is evidence that although Plaintiff identified herself as Non-white, she also identified as Hispanic. See supra 24 Section I.B. 1 find it more likely than not that Plaintiff had recklessly and with total disregard to Ms. Rockness’ 2 gender identity, repeatedly misgendered her employee.9 See generally Dkt. No. 34. 3 Ultimately, Plaintiff’s case relies on her subjective belief, without actual or direct or 4 circumstantial evidence, that she was terminated because of the color of her skin. And, “[a]
5 plaintiff’s subjective belief that [s]he was subject to racial discrimination, without more, is 6 insufficient to avoid summary judgment.” Atkins v. Integrated Mgmt. Sys., No. C06-1144, 2007 7 WL 4560895, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 20, 2007) (citing Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 8 393 (9th Cir.1983) (finding that a plaintiff’s mere assertions that the employer “had 9 discriminatory motivation and intent in failing to promote him were inadequate, without 10 substantial factual evidence, to raise an issue precluding summary judgment”)). 11 * * * 12 Because Plaintiff has failed to show that the circumstantial evidence provided is evidence 13 of race discrimination, Plaintiff has not made a prima facie case of race discrimination. 14 Plaintiff’s failure to establish each element of a prima facie case means that Defendant is entitled
15 to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Tighe v. King County, No. C17-1875, 2019 WL 16 13240853, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2019). Consequently, the Court need not address the 17 remaining parts of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.10 The Court finds that 18 Defendant has shown that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact related to Plaintiff’s 19
20 9 Plaintiff provides declarations from her husband and daughter that primarily address Ms. Lantzy’s behavior and the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s termination. Neither address Plaintiff’s behavior while responding to 21 questions about Mr. Rockness as described by Ms. Karas. See Dkt. No. 34-1 at 7–8 (Lauryn Draper Decl.), 9–11 (Adam Draper Decl.). A “district court can disregard a self-serving declaration that states only conclusions” uncorroborated by other admissible factual evidence. Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 784 F.3d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 22 2015). Although the Court has considered these declarations, it does not find them particularly illuminating with respect to the issues at hand. 23 10 However, even if Plaintiff had established a prima facie case of race discrimination, the Court would still find that Defendant has provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s termination, and that Plaintiff has 24 failed to show that this reason is a pretext for discrimination. See infra Sections III.B.2, 3. 1 race discrimination claim, and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The 2 Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s race discrimination 3 claim. 4 B. Age Discrimination
5 To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination in employment, a plaintiff must 6 show: “(1) [s]he was within the statutorily protected age group of employees 40 years of age or 7 older, (2) [s]he was discharged or suffered an adverse employment action, (3) [s]he was doing 8 satisfactory work, and (4) [s]he was either replaced by a substantially younger employee with 9 equal or inferior qualifications or discharged under circumstances otherwise giving rise to an 10 inference of age discrimination.” Taylor v. Lowe’s Corp., No. C18-5622, 2020 WL 1445755, at 11 *10 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 25, 2020). 12 1. Plaintiff Makes a Prima Facie Showing of Age Discrimination 13 Plaintiff shows, and Defendant does not dispute, that she can make a prima facie showing 14 of age discrimination. First, Plaintiff belongs to a protected class, because she is more than 40
15 years old. See Taylor, 2020 WL 1445755, at *10. Second, during her 12 years of employment, 16 Plaintiff performed to Defendant’s legitimate expectations, as evidenced by her sworn 17 declaration outlining her “performance bonuses, awards, and internal communications that 18 [Plaintiff] was a valuable member of the Zale family.” Dkt. No. 34-1 at 4 ¶ 2. Third, Plaintiff 19 suffered an adverse employment action when Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment. 20 Finally, Plaintiff alleges, and Defendant does not dispute, that Plaintiff was replaced by a 21 substantially younger employee with less experience—Assistant Store Manager Lord Franklin 22 Lelis. Dkt No. 34 at 12; Dkt. No. 31 at 9–10. 23 //
24 // 1 2. Defendant Provides a Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory, Reason for Plaintiff’s Termination 2 Defendant asserts Plaintiff was terminated because she violated company policy. 3 Defendant argues that Plaintiff was terminated because she “violated the EEO and Anti-Bullying 4 Policies” by, on several occasions, misgendering an employee Plaintiff managed. Dkt. No. 31 at 5 16. Moreover, Defendant argues that Plaintiff also violated policy by committing “timecard 6 fraud,” in that Plaintiff logged hours during a week in which she did not actually work. Id. In 7 support, Defendant provides the Court with: the company EEO Policy (Dkt. No. 32-1 at 61); the 8 Anti-Bullying Policy (id. at 68); the report of the Karas investigation finding the allegations of 9 bullying substantiated (id. at 84); copies of Plaintiff’s timecard recording (id. at 129–30); and 10 emails confirming Plaintiff did not work during the timeframe in which she logged hours (id. at 11 132–33). Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the Court reviews whether 12 Defendant has provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory, reason for Plaintiff’s termination. Here, 13 Defendant has done so by providing evidence that Plaintiff allegedly violated the company’s 14 Anti-Bullying policy.11 15 3. Plaintiff Fails to Show That Defendant’s Reason for Termination is a Pretext 16 for Discrimination 17 Plaintiff holds the burden of showing that Defendant’s reason for termination is a pretext 18 for discrimination. Plaintiff can show pretext in two ways: “directly by persuading the court that 19 a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the 20 employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. 21 Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); see also Johnson v. Albertsons LLC, No. C18-1678, 2020 22 WL 4689264, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2020). Because Plaintiff does not offer any direct 23
24 11 The Court does not reach the timecard records issue for the reasons stated in footnote 13. 1 evidence of age discrimination, she must instead provide “specific” and “substantial” 2 circumstantial evidence that Defendant’s explanation for her termination is pretextual. See Earl 3 v. Nielsen Media Rsch., Inc., 658 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2011). 4 In her response, Plaintiff argues that the reasons for her termination were pretext for age
5 and race discrimination.12 As to the bullying-related rationale, Plaintiff points to several pieces 6 of evidence that she asserts indicate that Defendant’s proffered explanation is not believable. 7 Plaintiff asserts that the independent investigator, Ms. Karas, never asked Ms. Lantzy about her 8 resignation and suspected theft of $900. Dkt. No. 34 at 9–10. Plaintiff points out that, instead, 9 Ms. Karas noted that Ms. Lantzy “left in May of 2022 bc moving out to Tennessee.” Id. at 10 10 (quoting Dkt. No. 32-1 at 95). Plaintiff uses these facts to assert that “[s]elective enforcement of 11 policies against a protected-class employee while ignoring similar or worse misconduct by others 12 is pretext.” No. 34 at 10. But this is not an apples-to-apples comparison. Ms. Lantzy resigned 13 during the middle of an investigation into the missing store funds and was technically terminated 14 because it was against store policy to resign during an investigation. See Dkt. No. 34-1 at 4 ¶ 9;
15 see also Dkt. No. 18 at 6 ¶ 24. On the other hand, Plaintiff was terminated after the investigation 16 found that she violated company policies. Dkt. No. 32 ¶ 13. This is far from “selective 17 enforcement” of company policy: Defendant investigated Ms. Lantzy as it did Plaintiff, but the 18 investigation was never completed because Ms. Lantzy left before it ended. 19 Plaintiff also argues that “[a] reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant terminated 20 Ms. Draper based on the uncorroborated representations of a compromised witness who had 21 every incentive to deflect blame and who portrayed Ms. Draper as having disrupted her transfer 22
23 12 Although the Court finds that Plaintiff could not make a prima facie showing of race discrimination, Plaintiff’s rationale for her pretext arguments applies to both her race and age claim. Therefore, the Court will consider all 24 pretext arguments Plaintiff raises. 1 to a Tennessee Zale location.” Dkt. No. 34 at 10–11. Although one would expect a thorough 2 investigation to have at least acknowledged the theft allegations against Ms. Lantzy, Plaintiff 3 fails to draw a logical connection between the investigation and Defendant’s firing her because 4 of her age. More importantly, Plaintiff admitted in her deposition that she does not believe that
5 the investigator’s findings were at all impacted by her age.13 Dkt. No. 33 at 19. Finally, Plaintiff 6 argues that her being replaced by a significantly younger, less experienced employee whom 7 Plaintiff managed, raises serious questions of pretext and infers age discrimination. However, 8 Plaintiff acknowledged during her deposition that her age and race were not at all referenced in 9 the investigation report. Id. at 20. And nowhere in any of Plaintiff’s arguments does she 10 reference—directly or indirectly—any evidence that age was considered, let alone mentioned, in 11 her firing. While Plaintiff asserts that she makes a prima facie case for age discrimination, she 12 utterly fails to engage with the remainder of the required analysis. See Dkt. No. 34 at 11–13. 13 Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the reasons she provides do 14 not give rise to an inference of age discrimination. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails
15 to show Defendant’s reasons for termination are a pretext to age discrimination.14 16 * * * 17 The Court finds that Defendant has shown there is no genuine dispute as to any material 18 fact related to Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim, because it provides legitimate, non- 19
13 Plaintiff also admitted that she did not believe that the investigator’s findings were at all impacted by her race. 20 Dkt. No. 33 at 20. 14 The Court need not analyze whether Defendant’s timecard termination reason was pretextual, because it finds that 21 the anti-bullying policy termination reason was not pretextual. In any event, Plaintiff solely relies on arguments that the timecards reasoning is not reliable because witness Alec Jones, who emailed with Ms. Horn about the timecard 22 fraud, will not testify. Dkt. No. 34 at 14–16. Plaintiff makes this assumption because Mr. Jones no longer works for Defendant. Id. at 14. This, however, ignores the fact that being employed by Defendant is not a prerequisite for 23 testifying on Defendant’s behalf at trial. Plaintiff offers no evidence that this witness is otherwise unavailable. In any event, while Plaintiff does not dispute she was not working the week discussed in the emails, she does raise factual disputes centering on the uncertainty as to whether she was nevertheless at the store, because Mr. Jones stated the 24 alarm report “does not show who deactivated the alarm.” See Dkt. No. 34 at 14 (quoting Dkt. No. 32-1 at 132–33). 1 || discriminatory reasons for terminating Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has failed to show that these 2 || reasons are a pretext for discrimination. Summary judgment is proper where a plaintiff fails to 3 || “present evidence that the defendant’s reasons for its employment action were . . . mere 4 || pretext[.]” Tighe, 2019 WL 13240853, at *8 (citing Domingo v. Boeing Emps.’ Credit Union, 5 || 124 Wn. App. 71, 77-78, 98 P.3d 1222 (2004) abrogated on other grounds by Mikkelsen v. Pub. 6 || Util. Dist. No. 1 of Kittitas Cnty., 189 Wn.2d. 516, 528 (2017)). Therefore, the Court GRANTS 7 || Defendant’s request for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's age-discrimination claim. 8 IV. CONCLUSION 9 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED: 10 (1) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 31) is GRANTED. 11 (2) This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Judgment will be entered separately in 12 accordance with this order. 13 14 Dated this 2nd day of July, 2026. 15 fo j 16 Tana Lin 7 United States District Judge
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ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT — 19