Carl L. Calhoun, Jr. v. Co Ward

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedMarch 6, 2026
Docket2:25-cv-01866
StatusUnknown

This text of Carl L. Calhoun, Jr. v. Co Ward (Carl L. Calhoun, Jr. v. Co Ward) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carl L. Calhoun, Jr. v. Co Ward, (E.D. Wis. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ CARL L. CALHOUN, JR.,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 25-cv-1866-pp

CO WARD,

Defendant. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2), SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ADD DEFENDANT (DKT. NO. 9) ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Carl L. Calhoun, Jr., who is incarcerated at the Milwaukee Secure Detention Facility and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendant violated his constitutional rights. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On December 2, 2025, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $52.87. Dkt. No. 5. The court received that fee on February 3, 2026. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay remainder of the filing fee

over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720

(citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff alleges that on April 15, 2025, the defendant was mad at the plaintiff’s cellmate who did not lock in on time. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. The plaintiff states that once his cellmate entered the room, the defendant slammed the door with all his might against the plaintiff’s finger, which injured his finger. Id. The defendant then allegedly started cussing at the plaintiff’s cellmate. Id.

Later, the plaintiff allegedly asked the defendant why he slammed the door on the plaintiff’s finger, and the defendant said he was “tired of working all these mutha fu**in hours”, didn’t apologize and waved the plaintiff off. Id. The plaintiff states that because of the defendant’s actions, he lost the ability to hold or grab items tightly. Id. at 4. For relief, he seeks $100,000 in damages. Id. C. Analysis

The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” on prisoners. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). In cases involving the use of excessive force, the question is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Id. at 7. The plaintiff may proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim against the defendant in his individual capacity for injuring the plaintiff by slamming the door on his hand.

The plaintiff also has filed a motion to add a defendant, in which he says that he wants to add the Milwaukee Secure Detention Facility as a defendant. Dkt. No. 9. But a state prison is not a “person” that may be sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Myers v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 655 F. App’x 500, 503 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989)). The court will deny the plaintiff’s motion to add the institution as a defendant. III. Conclusion The court GRANTS the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee.

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Related

Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Hudson v. McMillian
503 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Jason Myers v. Indiana Department of Correcti
655 F. App'x 500 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
Carl L. Calhoun, Jr. v. Co Ward, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carl-l-calhoun-jr-v-co-ward-wied-2026.