Carl H. Loewenson, Jr., Receiver-Appellee v. London Market Companies, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London

351 F.3d 58, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24480, 2003 WL 22872321
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedDecember 5, 2003
Docket02-6322
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 351 F.3d 58 (Carl H. Loewenson, Jr., Receiver-Appellee v. London Market Companies, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carl H. Loewenson, Jr., Receiver-Appellee v. London Market Companies, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 351 F.3d 58, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24480, 2003 WL 22872321 (2d Cir. 2003).

Opinion

JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Most people would think that insurance underwriters are very good at numbers. This appeal demonstrates that sometimes they are not. The appeal presents the issue of whether a flawed calculation constitutes the sort of mutual mistake that justifies reformation of a contract, in this case, a settlement agreement. London Market Companies and Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, third-party-defendants-appellants (“Underwriters”), appeal from the January 6, 2003, judgment of the District Court for the Southern District of New York (Robert W. Sweet, District Judge) in favor of receiver-appellee Carl H. Loewenson, Jr., as receiver for Credit Bancorp, Ltd. and its affiliated companies (“Receiver”). The judgment denies the Underwriters’ motion under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to reform the provision of a settlement agreement (“Settlement”) calling for the return of an unearned premium, grants the Receiver’s motion to enforce the agreement, and orders the Underwriters to pay the Receiver the balance due under the Settlement.

We conclude that, although the calculation of the amount of the unearned premium is flawed, the parties agreed not only to the amount to be returned but also to the flawed methodology by which the amount was determined, and that such circumstances do not constitute the sort of mutual mistake that warrants reformation under applicable New York law. We therefore affirm.

*60 Facts

Only a few facts are pertinent to the pending appeal. 1 The Underwriters issued an all risk policy to Credit Bancorp, Ltd. (“CBL”) providing coverage for losses up to $450 million for the period from August 1, 1998, to April 1, 2001. The premium, due in yearly installments, was at the rate of $450,000 per year. Thus, the payments were to have been $450,000 for the first and second years and $313,150 for the partial third year. 2 After the first year’s premium was paid, the policy limit was amended on April 29, 1999, to reduce the coverage to $300 million, and the premium was reduced to a rate of $225,000 per year. Reflecting that amendment, the Underwriters returned $62,260 to CBL, representing the portion of the first year for which a premium at the original $450,000 rate was unearned. That reduced the first year’s premium to $387,740. The reduced installment for the second year became $225,000 and for the partial third year, $156,575. CBL paid the second year’s premium of $225,000.

The Receiver for CBL was appointed on January 21, 2000, an event that terminated the policy 173 days into the second year of coverage. The policy stipulated that the Underwriters shall refund the unearned premium, “computed pro rata,” if the policy is terminated by reason of a receivership. The Receiver sought return of the unearned premium, and the Underwriters agreed to its return.

By letter dated November 20, 2001, counsel for the Underwriters wrote to counsel for the Receiver, proposing an amount of unearned premium to be refunded and explaining precisely their method of calculation. The amount was $205,237.26. The calculation involved four steps. First, the Underwriters determined that no coverage was provided for 435 days of the total policy period (two and two-thirds years or 974 days). Second, they divided 435 by 974 and got 44.66 percent. Third, they applied 44.66 percent to the total amount of premiums that were paid, $612,740 ($387,740 for the first year plus $225,000 for the second year), yielding $273,649.68. Fourth, they subtracted 25 percent, representing the brokerage fee, yielding $205,237.26 as the net amount of premium to be refunded.

The Receiver agreed with the Underwriters’ refund figure, and it was ultimately incorporated into the Settlement, which settled various disputes between the parties in litigation pending before the District Court, including the Receiver’s claims for unearned premiums for other insurance policies, several of which had been subscribed to by the Underwriters. After providing that the Underwriters would pay the Receiver just over $58 million in settlement of various claims, an amount referred to in the Settlement as “the Settlement Amount,” the Settlement further provided:

3. In addition to the Settlement Amount ... [Underwriters] subscribing to [the all risk policy] shall pay the *61 Receiver two hundred five thousand two hundred thirty-seven dollars and twenty-six cents (US$205,237.26) as a return of unearned premiums.

The District Court approved the Settlement by order entered March 18, 2002.

On September 27, 2002, the Receiver filed a motion to enforce the Settlement and for judgment against the Underwriters in the amount of $205,237.26. On October 4, the Underwriters filed a cross-motion for an order amending the Settlement and denying the Receiver’s motion to enforce the Settlement. Counsel for the Underwriters averred in support of the cross-motion that one of the Underwriters had determined that the $205,237.26 figure was incorrect and that the correct amount of premium to be returned was $88,767.12. Counsel’s explanation made clear that the new figure was obtained by taking the same four steps in the original calculation, but taking them only with respect to the second year’. Thus, the first step was to determine that no coverage was provided for 192 days of the second year. Second, 192 was divided by 365, which equaled 52.60274 percent. Third, 52.60274 percent was applied to the premium paid for the second year, $225,000, yielding $118,356.16. Fourth, 25 percent was subtracted, representing the brokerage fee, yielding $88,767.12.

In an opinion dated November 20, 2002, Judge Sweet denied the Underwriters’ cross-motion to amend the Settlement and granted the Receiver’s motion to enforce the Settlement. Judgment was entered January 6, 2003, for the difference between the $205,237.26 due as a return of unearned premium and the $88,767.12, which the Underwriters acknowledged was due and had paid, plus interest.

Discussion

The parties are in agreement on several aspects of the law concerning the pending appeal: New York law applies to the Settlement; in New York a settlement agreement is construed according to general principles of contract law; an unambiguous agreement must be construed according to its terms without resort to extrinsic evidence; and reformation of a contract is available for mutual mistake provided the party claiming reformation can “show in no uncertain terms, not only that mistake ... exists, but exactly what was really agreed upon between the parties,” George Backer Management Corp. v. Acme Quilting Co., 46 N.Y.2d 211, 219, 413 N.Y.S.2d 135, 139, 385 N.E.2d 1062 (1978).

The Underwriters initially contend that the Settlement is ambiguous because paragraph 3 specifies the amount of $205,237.26 and refers to it “as a return of unearned premium.” Like Judge Sweet, we see no ambiguity arising from this wording. The parties unambiguously agreed that, “in addition to the Settlement Amount,” the Underwriters would return the unearned premium resulting from the termination of the policy.

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Bluebook (online)
351 F.3d 58, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24480, 2003 WL 22872321, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carl-h-loewenson-jr-receiver-appellee-v-london-market-companies-ca2-2003.