Carissa Perry v. Merrick Bank Corporation

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Carissa Perry, No. CV-25-02297-PHX-DWL

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Merrick Bank Corporation,

13 Defendant. 14 15 In March 2024, Carissa Perry (“Plaintiff”) initiated an arbitration proceeding against 16 Merrick Bank Corporation (“Defendant”), asserting claims under the Fair Credit Reporting 17 Act (“FCRA”), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), and other state and 18 federal statutes. 19 In November 2024, the arbitrator issued a final award in favor of Defendant, 20 concluding that all of Plaintiff’s claims lacked merit, that Defendant was entitled to recover 21 $774.43 on a counterclaim, and that Defendant was also entitled to recover over $58,000 22 in attorneys’ fees and costs. Afterward, Defendant initiated an action in Maricopa County 23 Superior Court to confirm the arbitration award. In March 2025, that court entered 24 judgment in Defendant’s favor. Since then, Plaintiff has attempted to mount various 25 attacks on the state-court judgment, but they have all been unsuccessful. 26 Meanwhile, in July 2025, Plaintiff (who is proceeding pro se) initiated this action 27 by filing a sprawling 165-page complaint. Plaintiff again raises FCRA, FDCPA, and other 28 state and federal claims against Defendant arising from the same dispute that formed the 1 basis for the arbitration. 2 Now pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. 17.) The 3 motion is fully briefed (Docs. 20, 22) and neither side requested oral argument. For the 4 reasons that follow, the motion is granted. 5 RELEVANT BACKGROUND 6 I. The Arbitration 7 In March 2024, Plaintiff initiated an arbitration proceeding against Defendant. 8 (Doc. 17-2 at 10-17.) Among other things, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant “violated [her] 9 consumer rights which is also violation of the federal law. Company violated 10 FCRA/FDCPA & refuse to delete an inaccurate account/tradeline off [her] credit report.” 11 (Id.) In an arbitration brief filed in June 2024, Plaintiff elaborated: 12 This arbitration claim arises from a series of actions and omissions by Merrick Bank Corporation, that have significantly harmed me. I seek redress 13 for violations of various state and federal laws governing debt collection 14 practices, consumer protection and credit reporting. Merrick Bank Corporation engaged in fraudulent, abusive and harassing conduct, failed to 15 maintain accurate records, misrepresented debt information, Unfair and 16 predatory practices, and used deceptive practices. All of which have caused me substantial harm including financial loss, damage to creditworthiness, 17 emotional distress, and reputational harm as a direct result of the respondents 18 unlawful practices. I’am [sic] holding this banking Institution accountable and legally liable under the federal law, Arizona state debt collect laws and 19 statutes/codes. 20 (Id. at 28, 37.) 21 In November 2024, the arbitrator issued a final award. (Id. at 50-55.) The arbitrator 22 concluded as follows: 23 Claimant asserts that the Respondent violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 24 the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Utah state laws, and she seeks damages from these violations. Based on 25 the evidence presented, the Claimant has failed to meet her burden of proof 26 establishing violations of the federal laws and state laws that she relies on to support her claim. The record supports a finding that there was a credit card 27 agreement between Claimant and Respondent, which is the basis for 28 Respondent’s counterclaim. The record also establishes that Claimant failed to take timely substantial steps to challenge the debt that is the basis of 1 Respondent’s counterclaim. This failure to meet the requirements of the contract and applicable requirements of federal law supports a finding that 2 Respondent is awarded $774.43 and Claimant’s claim is denied. 3 (Id. at 50.) The arbitrator also noted that, during an earlier stage of the proceeding, Plaintiff 4 “expressed that she intended to make this matter difficult for Respondent. This intent 5 seemed to be the basis for Claimant’s numerous filings unsupported by cases and laws, in 6 addition to exhibits that were not relevant to her legal obligations under the contract, but 7 all were intended by Claimant to boost her claim. Claimant’s actions resulted in 8 Respondent incurring extraordinary time and expense.” (Id. at 55.) Although the arbitrator 9 concluded that Plaintiff’s “actions fall short of a frivolous claim under R-44 of the 10 Consumer Rules,” the arbitrator still ordered Plaintiff “to pay Respondent’s attorney’s fees 11 and costs. Claimant shall pay Respondent’s attorneys fee in the amount of $58,165.50 12 within 180 days of the date of this Award.” (Id.) 13 II. The State Court Action 14 On March 7, 2025, Defendant initiated an action in Maricopa County Superior Court 15 to confirm the arbitration award. (Id. at 2-5.) The action is captioned Merrick Bank v. 16 Carissa Perry and is assigned case number CV 2025-008562 (hereinafter, “the State Court 17 Action”). 18 On March 24, 2025, the court granted the confirmation application in full. (Doc. 19 17-1 at 2-3.) The version of the judgment entered in March 2025 reads: “Judgment is 20 entered in favor of Plaintiff Merrick Bank and against [Carissa Perry] for $58,939.93. No 21 further matters remain pending and final judgment is entered against [Carissa Perry].” (Id. 22 at 2.) 23 Three days later, on March 27, 2025, Plaintiff moved to strike the judgment and 24 dismiss or stay the proceedings. (Doc. 17-3.) Defendant, in turn, moved for an extension 25 of the service deadline and/or for an order deeming Plaintiff to have been served based on 26 her actual notice of and engagement with the matter. (Doc. 17-7.) The superior court 27 granted Defendant’s motion, deeming Plaintiff to have been served (Doc. 17-8), and denied 28 Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 17-9). 1 On July 2, 2025—the same day Plaintiff initiated this action—Plaintiff filed a 2 motion to stay the proceedings in the State Court Action. See 3 https://courtminutes.clerkofcourt.maricopa.gov/viewerME.asp?fn=Civil/082025/m11466 4 688.pdf. 5 On August 26, 2025, the superior court granted the stay request, “staying [the State 6 Court Action] until February 2, 2026.” (Id.) 7 On February 24, 2026, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Vacate Judgment as Void.” See 8 https://courtminutes.clerkofcourt.maricopa.gov/viewerME.asp?fn=Civil/032026/m11689 9 002.pdf. 10 On March 4, 2026, the superior court struck that motion as improperly filed. (Id.) 11 On April 17, 2026, during a status conference, Defendant “request[ed] to amend the 12 judgment to include the specific language to make it an appealable order.” See 13 https://courtminutes.clerkofcourt.maricopa.gov/viewerME.asp?fn=Civil/042026/m11749 14 820.pdf. 15 On April 24, 2026, Defendant lodged an amended form of judgment. See 16 https://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/CivilCourtCases/caseInfo.asp?caseNumb 17 er=CV2025-008562. 18 On May 4, 2026, Plaintiff filed an objection to Defendant’s proposed amended form 19 of judgment and a “Renewed Request for Relief under Rule 60(b)(4).” See 20 https://courtminutes.clerkofcourt.maricopa.gov/viewerME.asp?fn=Civil/052026/m11793 21 986.pdf. 22 On May 27, 2026, the superior court denied Plaintiff’s objection and request. (Id.) 23 That same day, the superior court entered the amended form of judgment. See 24 https://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/CivilCourtCases/caseInfo.asp?caseNumb 25 er=CV2025-008562. The amended form of judgment—which is enclosed as Exhibit A to 26 this order—adds various references to Rule 54(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, 27 such that it now concludes: “No further matters remain pending and final judgment is 28 entered, under Rule 54(c), against [Carissa Perry] and in favor of Merrick Bank.” 1 III. This Action 2 On July 2, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this action. (Doc. 1.) The 165-page complaint 3 asserts claims against Defendant under the FCRA, the FDCPA, and other state and federal 4 statutes. (Id. at 1.) Although the complaint is not, to put it charitably, a model of clarity, 5 it describes a series of disputes that Plaintiff raised between September 2022 and 2024 6 concerning alleged inaccuracies in Defendant’s reporting of a particular tradeline. (Id. at 7 20.) 8 On February 10, 2026, Defendant filed the pending motion to dismiss. (Doc. 17.) 9 On February 24, 2026, Plaintiff filed a response. (Doc. 20.) 10 On March 5, 2026, Defendant filed a reply. (Doc. 22.) 11 DISCUSSION 12 Defendant’s primary argument is that “Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed in 13 its entirety” because all of Plaintiff’s claims “are barred by the issue and claim preclusion 14 doctrines.” (Doc. 17 at 1, 5.)1 As for claim preclusion, Defendant argues that “[t]he central 15 criterion in determining whether there is an identity of claims between the first and second 16 adjudications is ‘whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts’” 17 and contends that this standard is satisfied here in part because “each of the claims in the 18 current lawsuit that were not brought in the arbitration proceeding could have been brought 19 in the arbitration proceeding.” (Id. at 5-6.) As for issue preclusion, Defendant argues that 20 “the arbitration squarely addressed—and necessarily resolved—the same factual and legal 21 issues Plaintiff now seeks to relitigate. In particular, the Arbitrator determined [Defendant] 22 acted properly when investigating Plaintiff’s dispute and reporting information related to 23 the Account. These issues were not incidental or tangential; they were central to Plaintiff’s 24 claims and essential to the Arbitrator’s final decision. . . . Because those same 25 determinations form the factual and legal foundation of Plaintiff’s claims in this action, 26 they may not be relitigated here.” (Id. at 6-7.) 27 1 Defendant also argues that the complaint is deficient under Rule 8 (Doc. 17 at 7), 28 but the Court need not resolve that argument in light of its determination that the complaint is subject to dismissal under the issue preclusion doctrine. 1 “In determining the preclusive effect of a state-court judgment, [courts] must refer 2 to the preclusion law of the State in which judgment was rendered.” Diruzza v. Cnty. of 3 Tehama, 323 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). In light of this principle, it is 4 unclear whether the doctrine of claim preclusion would support dismissal of the complaint 5 in its entirety at this stage of the case. “Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars 6 litigation in a subsequent action of any claims that were raised or could have been raised 7 in the prior action.” W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 1997). 8 Under Arizona law, claim preclusion requires “(1) an identity of claims in the suit in which 9 a judgment was entered and the current litigation, (2) a final judgment on the merits in the 10 previous litigation, and (3) identity or privity between parties in the two suits.” Lawrence 11 T. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 438 P.3d 259, 262 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019) (cleaned up). 12 As for the identity-of-claims element, Defendant cites a case analyzing the res 13 judicata effect of an earlier federal judgment in support of the notion that “[t]he central 14 criterion in determining whether there is an identity of claims between the first and second 15 adjudications is ‘whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.’” 16 (Doc. 17 at 5, citing Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 2000)). But 17 as noted, the Court must apply Arizona’s identity-of-claims test here, and “Arizona courts 18 apply the ‘same evidence’ test” to evaluate the first element of the claim preclusion test. 19 Lawrence T., 438 P.3d at 264. See also Huffman v. Magic Ranch Ests. Homeowners Ass’n, 20 2023 WL 3000820, *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2023) (unpub.) (acknowledging that the Arizona 21 Supreme Court continues to use the same-evidence test rather than the transactional 22 approach). Under this approach, “[f]or an action to be barred, it must be based on the same 23 cause of action asserted in the prior proceeding. Arizona has applied a rather restrictive 24 test to resolve this question: If no additional evidence is needed to prevail in the second 25 action than that needed in the first, then the second action is barred.” Phoenix Newspapers, 26 Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., State of Ariz., 934 P.2d 801, 804 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (citations 27 omitted). “Two causes of action which arise out of the same transaction or occurrence are 28 not the same for purposes of res judicata if proof of different or additional facts will be 1 required to establish them.” E.C. Garcia and Co., Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 875 P.2d 2 169, 179 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). “The ‘same evidence’ test is quite liberal, and permits a 3 plaintiff to avoid preclusion ‘merely by posturing the same claim as a new legal theory,’ 4 even if both theories rely on the same underlying occurrence.” Power Rd.-Williams Field 5 LLC v. Gilbert, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1309 (D. Ariz. 2014) (citation omitted). Defendant 6 has not attempted—likely due to its mistaken belief that the transactional approach applies 7 here—to show that each of the claims asserted in Plaintiff’s 165-page complaint is barred 8 under the same-evidence test. 9 With that said, Defendant’s arguments regarding issue preclusion do not require the 10 same mode of analysis. In Arizona, “[c]ollateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, binds a party 11 to a decision on an issue litigated in a previous lawsuit if the following factors are satisfied: 12 (1) the issue was actually litigated in the previous proceeding, (2) the parties had a full and 13 fair opportunity and motive to litigate the issue, (3) a valid and final decision on the merits 14 was entered, (4) resolution of the issue was essential to the decision, and (5) there is 15 common identity of the parties.” Campbell v. SZL Properties, Ltd., 62 P.3d 966, 968 (Ariz. 16 Ct. App. 2003). 17 The first, second, fourth, and fifth elements are all satisfied here. The disputed 18 issues in the arbitration—in which there was a common identity of parties—included (1) 19 whether Plaintiff was the person who incurred the disputed charges on her credit card 20 account with Defendant; (2) whether Defendant acted properly when investigating 21 Plaintiff’s dispute; (3) whether Defendant acted properly when reporting information to 22 credit reporting agencies (“CRAs”) related to the dispute; and (4) whether Defendant 23 engaged in improper debt-collection activities. (See generally Doc. 17-2.) The arbitrator 24 resolved each of those issues, which were essential to the decision, in Defendant’s favor 25 after a full and fair proceeding in which Plaintiff had the opportunity and motive to litigate 26 the issues. More specifically, as for the first issue, the arbitrator concluded: “The lack of 27 information supporting evidence of the alleged fraud, including when, where, or how, fails 28 to support a finding that the debt associated with [Plaintiff’s] contract occurred as the result 1 of theft or loss. The record supports a finding that [Plaintiff’s] accumulation of debt on the 2 credit card account was due to purchases under the contract provisions along with interest 3 charges and late fees assessed when she failed to pay the amount due under the terms of 4 the contract.” (Id. at 52.) As for the second and third issues, the arbitrator concluded: 5 “[Plaintiff] provides incomplete or no information in support of her claim of an inadequate 6 investigation conducted by [Defendant] when [Plaintiff] disputed the contract. [Plaintiff’s] 7 delay in raising a dispute under the contract, along with the lack of information describing 8 what she disputes, fails to support [Plaintiff’s] assertion of an inadequate investigation by 9 [Defendant]. [Defendant] acting as furnisher met its obligation under the FCRA, and the 10 record clearly supports a finding that [Defendant] conducted a reasonable investigation in 11 responding to each of the consumer reporting agencies when contacted about [Plaintiff’s] 12 status as a debtor with an account with [Defendant].” (Id. at 53.) And as for the fourth 13 issue, the arbitrator concluded: “[Plaintiff] asserts that the collections steps undertaken by 14 [Defendant] to seek payment of the past due debt amounted to violations of the FDCPA 15 due to the number of contacts and the methods used to contact her. [Plaintiff’s] assertions 16 are without merit because the FDCPA provisions that limit how a FDCPA creditor may 17 contact a debtor regarding the debt do not apply to [Defendant].” (Id. at 54.) 18 Turning to the third element, “Arizona procedural rules define when a judgment is 19 final. Under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c), a ‘judgment as to all claims and parties 20 is not final unless the judgment recites that no further matters remain pending and that the 21 judgment is entered under Rule 54(c).’ Arizona courts take a strict approach to Rule 54(c)’s 22 requirements.” Martinez v. City of Phoenix, 2026 WL 1470010, *1 (9th Cir. 2026). Here, 23 although the original version of the judgment entered in March 2025 was insufficient 24 because it lacked an express reference to Rule 54(c), the amended judgment entered in May 25 2026 remedies this omission—as noted, it now provides that “[n]o further matters remain 26 pending and final judgment is entered, under Rule 54(c), against [Carissa Perry] and in 27 favor of Merrick Bank.” This is sufficient to achieve finality. 28 Notwithstanding all of this, Plaintiff first argues that “preclusion cannot be resolved 1 at the pleading stage” because it is an affirmative defense. (Doc. 20 at 4.) This is incorrect. 2 Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The defendants raised res 3 judicata in their motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), rather than in a responsive 4 pleading. Ordinarily affirmative defenses may not be raised by motion to dismiss, but this 5 is not true when, as here, the defense raises no disputed issues of fact. In the circumstances 6 of this case it is appropriate to affirm the district court’s order of dismissal of Count One 7 as res judicata . . . .”). 8 Plaintiff next argues that “issue preclusion is not established” because “Defendant 9 identifies no specific statutory element adjudicated and necessarily decided that bars claims 10 here.” (Doc. 20 at 5-6.) This argument lacks merit. The complaint asserts 11 federal 11 claims: (1) a claim under the FCRA for “failure to conduct reasonable reinvestigation after 12 notice from CRA” (Doc. 1 at 69-73); (2) a claim under the FDCPA premised on 13 Defendant’s “materially false” submissions to credit reporting agencies regarding the 14 disputed tradeline and other “derogatory reporting” (id. at 73-77); (3) a claim under the 15 FCRA for failing to conduct a reasonable investigation, failing to report accurate results, 16 and failing to delete inaccurate information (id. at 77-81); (4) a claim under the FCRA for 17 “willful and negligent failure to block fraudulent tradeline after receipt of identity theft 18 report” (id. at 82-85); (5) a claim under the FDCPA premised on Defendant’s attempts to 19 “collect on a defaulted, disputed, and identity-theft-afflicted tradeline” (id. at 85-89); (6) a 20 claim under the FCRA for “failure to maintain reasonable procedures to assure maximum 21 possible accuracy” (id. at 89-91); (7) a claim under the FCRA for “willful and negligent 22 noncompliance” (id. at 91-95); (8) a claim under the FDCPA for “using false, deceptive, 23 or misleading representations in connection with the collection of a debt that was disputed, 24 unverified, and—based on documentary evidence—fraudulent in origin” (id. at 95-99); (9) 25 a claim under the FCRA for improperly “obtain[ing] and disseminat[ing] [Plaintiff’s] 26 consumer information” after Plaintiff established she was a victim of identity theft (Doc. 1 27 at 99, Doc. 1-1 at 1-3); (10) a claim for “violation of procedural due process” under the 28 Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (Doc. 1-1 at 44-48); and (11) a claim for violation of 1 the Federal Trade Commission Credit Practices Rule that is premised on Defendant 2 “continuing to furnish derogatory information to consumer reporting agencies after being 3 placed on notice . . . that the account was: a) factually inaccurate, b) disputed, c) and no 4 longer enforceable” and “fail[ing] to implement reasonable procedures to ensure the 5 accuracy and legal compliance of information it furnished to CRAs” (id. at 55-57). Each 6 of those federal claims—with the possible exception of the “procedural due process” 7 claim—would necessarily require Plaintiff to establish at least one of the four issues, 8 discussed above, that was resolved in Defendant’s favor during the arbitration. Plaintiff 9 makes no effort to show otherwise. And the “procedural due process” claim is 10 independently subject to dismissal because it is invalid on its face. See, e.g., Sanai v. 11 Cobrae, 2022 WL 17542106, *3 n.2 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (“It is axiomatic that . . . only state 12 action is subject to scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. Here, the complaint neither 13 alleges state action nor invokes a statutory vehicle through which to bring a constitutional 14 due process claim.”) (cleaned up). See also Sparling v. Hoffman Const. Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 15 635, 637-38 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that a “trial court may act on its own initiative to note 16 the inadequacy of a complaint and dismiss it for failure to state a claim” where “the 17 plaintiffs cannot possibly win relief”) (cleaned up).2 18 Plaintiff’s next argument is that “Defendant’s reliance on extrinsic materials is 19 improper” because the materials on which Defendant relies to establish issue preclusion 20 “were not referenced in the Complaint and are not central to the federal statutory claims 21 asserted here.” (Doc. 20 at 6.) This argument is unavailing. The materials on which the 22 Court has relied when evaluating issue preclusion are from the State Court Action and from 23 the parties’ underlying arbitration proceeding, which the State Court Action affirmed. 24 Plaintiff does not dispute the authenticity of any of those materials. All of those materials 25 are thus properly subject to judicial notice. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Robinson 26

27 2 As for the remaining state-law claims in the complaint (Doc. 1-1 at 3-44, 48-54, 57- 61), it is unnecessary to decide whether they are barred by issue preclusion because the 28 Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them in light of the dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s federal claims. 1 Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Generally, 2 we will not consider facts outside the record developed before the district court. However, 3 we may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal 4 judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue. The 5 proceedings before the California Superior Court are directly related to this appeal and may 6 in fact be dispositive. Accordingly, we take notice of that court’s final judgment, and 7 related filings. . . . The state court judgment confirmed the AAA award in all respects. 8 Thus, the findings and conclusions of the arbitrator have the same force and effect as a 9 decision reached by the court itself at the close of a fully litigated civil action.”) (cleaned 10 up); EXA-USA, Corp. v. Farnese Terra, Inc., 2023 WL 2772515, *3 (N.D. Cal. 2023) 11 (“Courts have also taken judicial notice of arbitration awards.”). And because those 12 materials are subject to judicial notice, they may be considered here without converting 13 Defendant’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. United States v. 14 Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). 15 Plaintiff’s next argument is that no “final and valid judgment entitled to preclusive 16 effect” exists because, at the time she filed her response to the motion to dismiss, she had 17 also filed a pending Rule 60(b)(4) motion in the State Court Action. (Doc. 20 at 5.) As an 18 initial matter, this argument ignores that “[a] judgment otherwise final for purposes of the 19 law of res judicata is not deprived of such finality by the fact that time still permits 20 commencement of proceedings in the trial court to set aside the judgment and grant a new 21 trial or the like; nor does the fact that a party has made such a motion render the judgment 22 nonfinal.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13, cmt. f (1982) (cited with approval in 23 Tumacacori Mission Land Dev., Ltd. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 297 P.3d 923, 925 n.5 (Ariz. 24 Ct. App. 2013)). At any rate, as discussed in the Relevant Background section, the superior 25 court in the State Court Action has since denied Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion and 26 entered an amended judgment that contains the necessary finality language under Arizona 27 Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c).3

28 3 The Court further notes that the amended judgment would remain final, for issue preclusion purposes, even if Plaintiff subsequently filed a notice of appeal in the State 1 Finally, Plaintiff argues in conclusory fashion in the final sentence of her response 2 brief that “if the Court identifies any pleading deficiency, Plaintiff requests leave to amend 3 under Rule 15(a).” (Doc. 20 at 8.) The rule in the Ninth Circuit is that “[a] district court 4 should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear 5 that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 6 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). “[B]efore dismissing a pro se complaint 7 the district court must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his complaint 8 in order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively.” Ferdik v. 9 Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (May 22, 1992). This is one 10 of those rare instances in which leave to amend should be denied in spite of Plaintiff’s 11 status as a pro se litigant. It is absolutely clear to the Court that the deficiencies in the 12 complaint could not be cured by amendment. During the arbitration proceeding, Plaintiff 13 “expressed that she intended to make this matter difficult for” Defendant and “[t]his intent 14 seemed to be the basis for [Plaintiff’s] numerous filings unsupported by cases and laws, in 15 addition to exhibits that were not relevant to her legal obligations . . . .” (Doc. 17-2 at 55.) 16 This action has represented more of the same—Plaintiff filed a sprawling complaint against 17 Defendant on the heels of her loss in the arbitration and has never made any serious effort 18 to explain how the claims in her 165-page complaint differ from the claims she 19 unsuccessfully pursued in the arbitration. Nor is this the only recent lawsuit in which 20 Plaintiff has engaged in similar tactics. Perry v. Exeter Finance LLC, 2026 WL 538300, 21 *1, *5 n.5, *8 (D. Ariz. 2026) (granting defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, in 22 response to Plaintiff’s “90-page complaint [that] assert[ed] 18 causes of action under 23 federal and state law,” and noting that Plaintiff’s filings included at least one “hallucinated 24 citation” as well as “fake quotations” misattributed to real cases). 25 … 26 … 27 …

28 Court Action. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13, cmt. f (1982) (“The better view is that a judgment otherwise final remains so despite the taking of an appeal . . . .”). 1 Accordingly, 2 IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 17) is granted. The || Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this action. 4 Dated this 9th day of June, 2026. 5 6 } “2 _C— 7 Dominic W. I anza United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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14 EXHIBIT A

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT □ FILED 2 C. Lockhart, Deputy 3 4 5 6 7 ARIZONA SUPERIOR COURT 8 MARICOPA COUNTY MERRICK BANK, . CASE NO.: CV2025-008562 10 Plaintiff, AMENDED FORM OF JUDGMENT VS. (Assigned to the Honorable Christopher 121 CARISSA PERRY, Whitten) 13 Defendant. 14 15 16 This matter came before the Court on March 7, 2025, on Plaintiff Merrick Bank’s 17|| (‘Plaintiff’) Application to Confirm Arbitration Award. 18 WHEREAS, on March 24, 2025, the Court issued an order confirming the 19|| arbitration award, and 20 WHEREAS, on that same date, the Court entered Judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Carissa Perry (“Defendant”) in the amount of $58,939.93, and 22 WHEREAS, no further matters are pending before the co, piven to □□□□ S4 23 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 24|| DECREED: 25 1. The November 22, 2024 Final Award in favor of Plaintiff against Defendant in the 26 total amount of Fifty Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty Nine Dollars and Ninety 27 Three Cents ($58,939.93) is CONFIRMED; 28

l 2. The Judgment previously entered in favor of Plaintiff Merrick Bank and against 2 Defendant for $58,939.93 is hereby confirmed; and 3 3. Post-judgment interest on this amount shall accrue at the legal rate from and after 4 March 24, 2025 until the Judgment is paid in full; and 5 4. No further matters remain pending and final judgment is entered, under Rule 54(c), 6 against Defendant and in favor of Merrick Bank. 7 wd g Dated thiso® day of Mas , 2026. 9 ; 2 10 Ju stopher Whitten Maricopa County Superior Court 12 13 14 □ 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

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