Carissa Michelle Johns v. Charles Edward Johns

CourtCourt of Appeals of Virginia
DecidedMay 20, 2014
Docket1628133
StatusUnpublished

This text of Carissa Michelle Johns v. Charles Edward Johns (Carissa Michelle Johns v. Charles Edward Johns) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carissa Michelle Johns v. Charles Edward Johns, (Va. Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Frank, Huff and Senior Judge Haley UNPUBLISHED

CARISSA MICHELLE JOHNS MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 1628-13-3 PER CURIAM MAY 20, 2014 CHARLES EDWARD JOHNS

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY Thomas J. Wilson, IV, Judge

(Daniel J. Travostino, on briefs), for appellant.

(Shelly R. James, on brief), for appellee.

Carissa Michelle Johns (wife) appeals an order denying her request for continued spousal

support. Wife argues that the trial court erred by (1) denying her motion to continue spousal support

and ignoring or giving improper weight to evidence regarding the parties’ incomes, wife’s need for

support, and the ability of Charles Edward Johns (husband) to pay support1; and (2) ordering wife to

produce in pre-trial discovery a compact disc (CD) of all contents of her Facebook account, absent a

showing of relevance. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this

appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See

Rule 5A:27.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 1 Husband asserts on brief that wife failed to raise or prove a change in circumstances pursuant to Code § 20-109 to warrant modification of the final support order, but we do not reach that issue because it was not raised or argued below, nor was it preserved or raised as an assignment of error. Rules 5A:18, 5A:20. BACKGROUND

“When reviewing a trial court’s decision on appeal, we view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prevailing party, granting it the benefit of any reasonable inferences.”

Congdon v. Congdon, 40 Va. App. 255, 258, 578 S.E.2d 833, 834 (2003) (citations omitted).

The parties married on November 30, 1991. Four children were born during the

marriage. On July 15, 2009, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce, which incorporated

the trial court’s letter opinion. As part of its equitable distribution award, the trial court ordered

husband to pay wife $51,332.35 for her share of the marital property. Husband was supposed to

make that payment “within one hundred twenty (120) days” of the final decree. The trial court

also found that wife had no income and, by agreement, had been a stay-at-home mother during

the marriage. Meanwhile, husband owned and operated Harrisonburg Auto Exchange and

earned $139,000 per year. After considering the factors in Code § 20-107.1(E), the trial court

awarded wife $1,700 per month in spousal support for forty-eight months and a reservation of

support for an additional forty-two months. Neither party appealed the final decree of divorce.

In 2011, wife filed a motion for a rule to show cause because husband still owed her

$27,732.35, plus interest, for the equitable distribution award. The trial court found husband in

contempt and ordered him to pay $1,500 per month on his obligation with a final lump sum

payment due by March 1, 2012, provide wife with the use of a car until the discharge of the debt,

maintain and insure the car during that time period, pay her attorney’s fees, and pay a $1,000 fine

to wife. In March 2012, husband satisfied his debt.

On April 1, 2013, wife filed a motion to seek additional support. She stated that the

initial forty-eight-month spousal support period would end in July 2013, and she sought spousal

support for the additional forty-two months. Husband objected. On July 18, 2013, the trial court

-2- heard evidence and argument, including information regarding wife’s employment history, her

expenses, and husband’s income and expenses.

On July 22, 2013, the trial court issued its letter opinion. After reviewing the statutory

factors in detail, the trial court concluded that wife’s motion for additional spousal support would

be denied. The trial court also declined to award attorney’s fees to either party. This appeal

followed.

ANALYSIS

Spousal support

Wife argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to seek additional spousal

support. Wife asserts that she has a high school education and was a stay-at-home mother by

agreement of the parties during their marriage. She notes that since the divorce, she has been

employed doing clerical work and is earning $10 per hour at her current job where she works

thirty to forty hours per week. She argues that her standard of living has decreased since the

divorce and that she needs spousal support. She maintains that husband has the ability to pay

support.

A trial court has broad discretion in awarding spousal support, and its ruling will not be

overturned unless there is an abuse of discretion. Brooks v. Brooks, 27 Va. App. 314, 317, 498

S.E.2d 461, 463 (1998) (citations omitted). “We will not disturb the trial court’s decision where

it is based on an ore tenus hearing, unless it is ‘plainly wrong or without evidence in the record

to support it.’” Furr v. Furr, 13 Va. App. 479, 481, 413 S.E.2d 72, 73 (1992) (quoting

Schoenwetter v. Schoenwetter, 8 Va. App. 601, 605, 383 S.E.2d 28, 30 (1989)).

Wife contends the trial court abused its discretion by ignoring or giving “improper

weight” to evidence regarding the parties’ income and expenses.

-3- In awarding spousal support, a trial court must consider the factors in Code § 20-107.1(E);

however, “[t]his does not mean that the trial court is required to quantify or elaborate exactly

what weight or consideration it has given to each of the statutory factors. It does mean, however,

that the court’s findings must have some foundation based on the evidence presented.” Woolley

v. Woolley, 3 Va. App. 337, 345, 349 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1986).

The trial court considered each of the statutory factors in its letter opinion. It found that

husband had averaged $9,345 per month in 2012, which was less than what he was earning at the

time of the divorce. The trial court held that there was “no showing of any inaccuracy” in

husband’s tax returns and that he was living “more frugally than prior to the divorce.”

The trial court found that wife had no income at the time of the divorce and was earning

$1,567.63 per month at the time of the hearing. It noted that wife previously had jobs earning

more than she was currently earning. The trial court found that wife had “not taken any

opportunity to enhance her earning capacity since the original award four years ago.” She did

not work for the first two years after the divorce. She did not go to school or take any classes.

Wife argues that because husband did not timely pay her for the equitable distribution award, she

could not afford to pay for schooling or classes. The trial court took this fact into consideration,

but also noted that wife received attorney’s fees, a civil fine, and use of a car as a result of

husband’s late payment.

The trial court held that husband “has an ability to pay something, should it be awarded,”

but it also concluded that some of wife’s expenses were “exaggerated.” Wife disagrees and

argues that the trial court placed too much weight on some of her expenses. The trial court stated

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Related

Powell v. McCormack
395 U.S. 486 (Supreme Court, 1969)
United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty
445 U.S. 388 (Supreme Court, 1980)
Congdon v. Congdon
578 S.E.2d 833 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2003)
Brooks v. Brooks
498 S.E.2d 461 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1998)
O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin
479 S.E.2d 98 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1996)
Hallmark Personnel Agency, Inc. v. Jones
154 S.E.2d 5 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1967)
Woolley v. Woolley
349 S.E.2d 422 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1986)
Furr v. Furr
413 S.E.2d 72 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1992)
Schoenwetter v. Schoenwetter
383 S.E.2d 28 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1989)
Hamer v. Commonwealth
59 S.E. 400 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1907)
Hankins v. Town of Virginia Beach
29 S.E.2d 831 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1944)

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