Cari Marie Flewelling v. Douglas Robert Flewelling

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: September 10, 2024
• Docket: 39855-2
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED SEPTEMBER 10, 2024 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE

CARI MARIE FLEWELLING, ) ) No. 39855-2-III Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) DOUGLAS ROBERT FLEWELLING, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Respondent. )

STAAB, A.C.J. — Cari Flewelling was granted a domestic violence protection

order (DVPO) against her former spouse Douglas Flewelling.1 When the trial court

granted Cari the DVPO, it denied her request for attorney fees and again denied the

request on a motion for reconsideration. Cari appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in

denying her requests for attorney fees.

We decline to review the matter because the record on appeal is insufficient to

determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.

1 The parties will be referred to by their first names to avoid confusion due to their shared last names. No disrespect is intended. No. 39855-2-III Flewelling v. Flewelling

BACKGROUND

Cari Flewelling and Douglas Flewelling are former spouses who share children in

common. Cari was granted a DVPO against Douglas on April 17, 2023. Cari requested

that Douglas be ordered to pay attorney fees associated with filing the petition for the

DVPO and a subsequent revision. Presumably, the court denied Cari’s request. In the

DVPO, the section ordering the restrained person to “Pay Fees and Costs” was struck by

the trial judge. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 5. Cari then filed a motion for reconsideration on

the request for attorney fees and that request was denied by the trial court. The trial court

made only one finding in its written order denying reconsideration that stated, “upon its

discretion, the court will not change its prior ruling.” CP at 19.2

Cari appealed the denial of her request for attorney fees. During the pendency of

her appeal, she notified the court that she would not be filing a statement of

arrangements. Thus, the record on appeal does not include transcripts from the hearings

where Cari’s requests for attorney fees were denied.

ANALYSIS

Cari’s assignments of error claims that the trial court abused its discretion by

denying her attorney fees after granting her a DVPO. Because the record on appeal is

insufficient, we decline to consider the issue.

2 An attorney represented Cari in filing the petition, revision, and motion for reconsideration. On appeal, Cari represents herself pro se.

2 No. 39855-2-III Flewelling v. Flewelling

This court applies a two-part review to a trial court’s decision to award or deny

attorney fees. Gander v. Yeager, 167 Wn. App. 638, 647, 282 P.3d 1100 (2012). First,

the court “review[s] de novo whether there is a legal basis for awarding attorney fees by

statute, under contract, or in equity.” Id. Second, the court reviews “a discretionary

decision to award or deny attorney fees . . . for an abuse of discretion.” Id.

Here, there is a statutory legal basis for awarding attorney fees. When a court

issues a protection order, they have broad discretion to grant relief, including in the form

of attorney fees. RCW 7.105.310. Cari was granted a DVPO, so the trial court had the

legal authority under RCW 7.105.310 to order Douglas to pay her attorney fees. In other

words, the trial court could award attorney fees, but was not required.

Because the trial court’s decision to deny Cari’s attorney fees was discretionary,

we next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion. Gander, 167 Wn. App. at

647. A court abuses its discretion by making a decision that is “‘manifestly unreasonable

or is based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.’” Wood v. Milionis Constr., Inc.,

198 Wn.2d 105, 119, 492 P.3d 813 (2021) (quoting Bird v. Best Plumbing Grp., LLC,

175 Wn.2d 756, 774-75, 287 P.3d 551 (2012)). A decision is manifestly unreasonable or

based on untenable grounds if it is “unsupported by the record or result[s] from applying

the wrong legal standard.” Gilmore v. Jefferson County Pub. Transp. Benefit Area, 190

Wn.2d 483, 494, 415 P.3d 212 (2018). The reviewing court “must be convinced that ‘no

reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court,’” which means there is

3 No. 39855-2-III Flewelling v. Flewelling

no “‘abuse of discretion simply because [the reviewing court] would have decided the

case differently.’” Wood, 198 Wn.2d at 119 (quoting Gilmore, 190 Wn.2d at 494).

To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, an appellate court looks

to the record to determine the trial court’s reasoning. On appeal, the appellant bears the

“burden of providing an adequate record” so the reviewing court is “apprised of all

necessary evidence to decide the issues presented.” State v. Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d 607,

619, 290 P.3d 942 (2012); Tacoma S. Hosp., LLC v. Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co., 19 Wn. App. 2d

210, 220, 494 P.3d 450 (2021). The “record on review” may include clerk’s papers, a

report of proceedings, and exhibits. RAP 9.1(a).

If the appellant fails to meet their burden of perfecting the record, the reviewing

court may decline to address the merits of an issue. Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d at 619. We

attempt to avoid such harsh results by overlooking technical violations and considering

issues when the nature of the challenge is clear. See RAP 1.2(a); Green River Cmty.

Coll., Dist. No. 10 v. Higher Educ. Pers. Bd., 107 Wn.2d 427, 431, 730 P.2d 653 (1986);

Stiles v. Kearney, 168 Wn. App. 250, 260, 277 P.3d 9 (2012). But in considering whether

a trial court abused its discretion, we must have the complete record of the court’s

reasoning.

4 No. 39855-2-III Flewelling v. Flewelling

In State v. Wade, 138 Wn.2d 460, 463, 979 P.2d 850 (1999), our Supreme Court

held that Division Two of the Court of Appeals could not properly determine whether the

trial court abused its discretion without the record of the evidentiary hearing. Wade, 138

Wn.2d at 466. The Supreme Court noted that:

In response to Wade’s renewed motion, the trial court mainly explained that it adhered to its prior ruling. And although the prior acts were cited as evidence in the State’s closing argument and the court’s final decision, those allusions are no substitute for the trial court’s reasoning in admitting the evidence. Finally, the Court of Appeals . . . having acknowledged that “the record [was] silent as to how the trial court related Wade’s prior acts to intent,” the court went on to infer the trial court’s analysis “from the silent record.”

Wade, 138 Wn.2d at 464-65 (quoting State v. Wade, 92 Wn. App. 885, 893, 966 P.2d 384

(1998)).

Here, the record before us is inadequate for review. We do not know whether the

trial court made findings concerning attorney fees or what arguments were raised by the

parties concerning the fees. Like the record provided in Wade, the only information in

the record here, as to why the trial court denied Cari’s attorney fees, was the judge’s note

that “upon its discretion, the court will not change its prior ruling.” CP at 19. As the

appellant, Cari has the burden to provide the record, and she failed to provide a report of

proceedings with the trial court’s reasoning. Thus, we decline to review the issues she

raises on appeal.

5 No. 39855-2-III Flewelling v. Flewelling

Affirmed.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

_________________________________ Staab, A.C.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________________ Pennell, J.

_________________________________ Cooney, J.