3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5
6 Cari-Ann P. Burgess, Case No. 3:25-cv-00065-NJK1 7 Plaintiff(s), ORDER 8 v. [Docket Nos. 15, 21] 9 Washoe County, 10 Defendant(s). 11 Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 12 Docket No. 15. Plaintiff filed a response. Docket No. 20. Defendant filed a reply. Docket No. 13 22. Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to strike. Docket No. 21. Defendant filed 14 a response. Docket No. 24. Plaintiff filed a reply. Docket No. 26. The motions are properly 15 resolved without a hearing. See Local Rule 78-1. For the reasons discussed below, the motion to 16 dismiss is DENIED without prejudice and the motion to strike is DENIED as moot. 17 I. BACKGROUND2 18 Plaintiff brings this lawsuit arising out of being placed on leave and then being terminated 19 as registrar of voters for Washoe County. See Docket No. 10 (first amended complaint). Plaintiff 20 alleges numerous federal and state claims, including for disability discrimination and retaliation. 21 II. STANDARDS 22 In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 23 granted, courts accept all well-pled factual allegations in the operative complaint as true and 24 construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 881 F.3d 25
26 1 This case is proceeding before a magistrate judge on consent. See Docket No. 33. On November 24, 2025, the case was reassigned to the undersigned. Docket No. 37. 27 2 As the parties are familiar with the facts being alleged and the motion to dismiss is being 28 resolved on other grounds, the Court will not provide an extensive background section. 1 739, 743 (9th Cir. 2018). To avoid dismissal, the operative complaint must contain more than 2 “naked assertion[s],” “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 3 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of 4 the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 5 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Instead, the operative complaint must show that there 6 is facial plausibility to the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when 7 the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 8 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 9 III. ANALYSIS 10 Plaintiff brings federal claims for disability discrimination and retaliation. The Court 11 addresses each below. 12 A. Disability Discrimination 13 The pending motion to dismiss argues that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to adequately allege 14 a qualifying disability within the meaning of the governing statutes. The term “disability” was 15 expanded by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. See, e.g., Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. 16 Improvement & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2009). The regulations implementing 17 the ADAAA went into effect on May 24, 2011. See, e.g., Weed v. Sidewinder Drilling, Inc., 245 18 F. Supp. 3d 826, 833 (S.D. Tex. 2017). Those regulations require that the term “substantially 19 limits” be “construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted 20 by the terms of the ADA. ‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 21 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). The regulations further instruct that the “primary object of attention” in 22 disability cases “should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and 23 whether discrimination has occurred, not whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits 24 a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii). The regulations also instruct that the pre- 25 ADAAA cases applied too high a standard for assessing substantial limits. See 29 C.F.R. § 26 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) (“the term ‘substantially limits’ shall be interpreted and applied to require a degree 27 of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for ‘substantially limits’ applied prior to the 28 ADAAA”). The regulations also instruct that an “episodic” impairment can qualify as a disability 1 if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii), and 2 specifically that the six-month durational timeframe does not apply to an actual disability claim, 3 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix). The post-ADAAA regulations also remove some earlier provisions, 4 including the guidance that the “inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a 5 substantial limitation in the major lief activity of working.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) 6 (effective until May 24, 2011). 7 The motion practice challenging the sufficiency of the allegation of disability relies 8 extensively on caselaw predating the ADAAA and the corresponding 2011 regulatory changes, as 9 well as later case law that relies on the pre-ADAAA case law without explanation. See Docket 10 No. 15 at 9-10.3 Indeed, the pending motion specifically relies on the now-abrogated guidance 11 regarding specifically an “inability to perform a single, particular job.” See id. at 10. Given the 12 modified rules of construction that specifically alter the playing field on this issue, the Court 13 declines to wade into Defendant’s challenge to whether Plaintiff’s amended complaint sufficiently 14 alleges disability. Particularly as neither side meaningfully addressed this issue in relation to 15 current law, the Court will permit Defendant to file a renewed motion to dismiss on this ground. 16 Such renewed motion must specifically address the current state of the law.4 17 B. Disability Retaliation 18 The pending motion to dismiss argues that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to adequately allege 19 causation with respect to her retaliation claim. See Docket No. 15 at 17-18. This section of the 20 motion to dismiss fails to cite a single legal authority judging the sufficiency of a complaint to 21 22
23 3 Plaintiff’s responsive brief states in passing that the ADAAA provides a “broadened definition” that is met in this case, without elaborating in any fashion on what the amendments or 24 corresponding regulations actually say. See Docket No. 20 at 13. Perhaps due to the conclusory nature of Plaintiff’s assertion, Defendant in reply does not address the ADAAA or corresponding 25 regulations. See Docket No. 22 at 2-3. Hence, neither side sufficiently addresses the impact of the ADAAA and corresponding regulations on the issues raised. Even when the parties have not 26 done so, however, the Court has its own duty to correctly articulate and apply the law. Bateman v. U.S. Postal Serv., 231 F.3d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 2000).
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3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5
6 Cari-Ann P. Burgess, Case No. 3:25-cv-00065-NJK1 7 Plaintiff(s), ORDER 8 v. [Docket Nos. 15, 21] 9 Washoe County, 10 Defendant(s). 11 Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 12 Docket No. 15. Plaintiff filed a response. Docket No. 20. Defendant filed a reply. Docket No. 13 22. Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to strike. Docket No. 21. Defendant filed 14 a response. Docket No. 24. Plaintiff filed a reply. Docket No. 26. The motions are properly 15 resolved without a hearing. See Local Rule 78-1. For the reasons discussed below, the motion to 16 dismiss is DENIED without prejudice and the motion to strike is DENIED as moot. 17 I. BACKGROUND2 18 Plaintiff brings this lawsuit arising out of being placed on leave and then being terminated 19 as registrar of voters for Washoe County. See Docket No. 10 (first amended complaint). Plaintiff 20 alleges numerous federal and state claims, including for disability discrimination and retaliation. 21 II. STANDARDS 22 In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 23 granted, courts accept all well-pled factual allegations in the operative complaint as true and 24 construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 881 F.3d 25
26 1 This case is proceeding before a magistrate judge on consent. See Docket No. 33. On November 24, 2025, the case was reassigned to the undersigned. Docket No. 37. 27 2 As the parties are familiar with the facts being alleged and the motion to dismiss is being 28 resolved on other grounds, the Court will not provide an extensive background section. 1 739, 743 (9th Cir. 2018). To avoid dismissal, the operative complaint must contain more than 2 “naked assertion[s],” “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 3 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of 4 the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 5 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Instead, the operative complaint must show that there 6 is facial plausibility to the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when 7 the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 8 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 9 III. ANALYSIS 10 Plaintiff brings federal claims for disability discrimination and retaliation. The Court 11 addresses each below. 12 A. Disability Discrimination 13 The pending motion to dismiss argues that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to adequately allege 14 a qualifying disability within the meaning of the governing statutes. The term “disability” was 15 expanded by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. See, e.g., Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. 16 Improvement & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2009). The regulations implementing 17 the ADAAA went into effect on May 24, 2011. See, e.g., Weed v. Sidewinder Drilling, Inc., 245 18 F. Supp. 3d 826, 833 (S.D. Tex. 2017). Those regulations require that the term “substantially 19 limits” be “construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted 20 by the terms of the ADA. ‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 21 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). The regulations further instruct that the “primary object of attention” in 22 disability cases “should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and 23 whether discrimination has occurred, not whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits 24 a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii). The regulations also instruct that the pre- 25 ADAAA cases applied too high a standard for assessing substantial limits. See 29 C.F.R. § 26 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) (“the term ‘substantially limits’ shall be interpreted and applied to require a degree 27 of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for ‘substantially limits’ applied prior to the 28 ADAAA”). The regulations also instruct that an “episodic” impairment can qualify as a disability 1 if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii), and 2 specifically that the six-month durational timeframe does not apply to an actual disability claim, 3 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix). The post-ADAAA regulations also remove some earlier provisions, 4 including the guidance that the “inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a 5 substantial limitation in the major lief activity of working.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) 6 (effective until May 24, 2011). 7 The motion practice challenging the sufficiency of the allegation of disability relies 8 extensively on caselaw predating the ADAAA and the corresponding 2011 regulatory changes, as 9 well as later case law that relies on the pre-ADAAA case law without explanation. See Docket 10 No. 15 at 9-10.3 Indeed, the pending motion specifically relies on the now-abrogated guidance 11 regarding specifically an “inability to perform a single, particular job.” See id. at 10. Given the 12 modified rules of construction that specifically alter the playing field on this issue, the Court 13 declines to wade into Defendant’s challenge to whether Plaintiff’s amended complaint sufficiently 14 alleges disability. Particularly as neither side meaningfully addressed this issue in relation to 15 current law, the Court will permit Defendant to file a renewed motion to dismiss on this ground. 16 Such renewed motion must specifically address the current state of the law.4 17 B. Disability Retaliation 18 The pending motion to dismiss argues that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to adequately allege 19 causation with respect to her retaliation claim. See Docket No. 15 at 17-18. This section of the 20 motion to dismiss fails to cite a single legal authority judging the sufficiency of a complaint to 21 22
23 3 Plaintiff’s responsive brief states in passing that the ADAAA provides a “broadened definition” that is met in this case, without elaborating in any fashion on what the amendments or 24 corresponding regulations actually say. See Docket No. 20 at 13. Perhaps due to the conclusory nature of Plaintiff’s assertion, Defendant in reply does not address the ADAAA or corresponding 25 regulations. See Docket No. 22 at 2-3. Hence, neither side sufficiently addresses the impact of the ADAAA and corresponding regulations on the issues raised. Even when the parties have not 26 done so, however, the Court has its own duty to correctly articulate and apply the law. Bateman v. U.S. Postal Serv., 231 F.3d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 2000). 27 4 If Defendant continues to rely on older legal authority, any renewed motion must explain 28 how it remains good law in light of the ADAAA and corresponding regulatory changes. 1] allege causation. See id. (citing cases in the summary judgment context only). Of course, “[t]he 2|| standard for summary judgment is different than that for a motion to dismiss.” Harden v. Soboro, 3] 2016 WL 259689, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 21, 2016); see also, e.g., Rahimian vy. Adriano, 2022 WL 4! 798371, at *5 (D. Nev. Mar. 16, 2022) (in deciding motion to dismiss, finding case law addressing 5} summary judgment to be uninstructive given different standards). Without having been provided 6] legal authority regarding what is required to plead causation sufficiently, the Court declines to wade into this issue at this time. As discussed above, however, the Court will allow Defendant to 8] file a renewed motion to dismiss.° CONCLUSION 10 For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED without 11} prejudice and Plaintiffs motion to strike is DENIED as moot. Any renewed motion to dismiss 12} must be filed by February 6, 2026. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 Dated: January 21, 2026 Li he oe 1 5 □ mm \ A □□□ Nancy J. Koppe, 16 United States-“Magistrate Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22) —____ > The motion to dismiss also relies extensively elsewhere on case law arising in the 23] summary judgment, trial, or post-trial context. For example, the challenge to causation for disability discrimination relies solely on case law in the summary judgment and jury instruction 24! context. See Docket No. 15 at 15. That section of the motion does not provide legal authority as 95 to what is required to plead causation. 6 The motion to dismiss covers ground not addressed herein. For example, the motion 26] challenges the various state law claims identified in the amended complaint. See Docket No. 18- 24. In light of the deficiencies as to briefing the federal claims, the Court declines to otherwise 27| address the merits of the pending motion to dismiss. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Nothing herein precludes Defendant 28] from renewing its other arguments in any renewed motion practice.