1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 CECILIA CAREY and KARREN Case No. 24-cv-09534-TSH MOORER, 8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ 9 v. APPLICATIONS TO PROCEED IN 10 FORMA PAUPERIS AND SCREENING MAURICIO TORRES, et al., COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1915(E) Defendants. 12
14 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Plaintiffs Cecilia Carey and Karren Moorer initiated this lawsuit by filing a complaint 17 (ECF No. 1) and applications to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 2, 3). For the reasons stated 18 below, the Court GRANTS the applications but finds the complaint deficient under 28 U.S.C. § 19 1915(e). No later than February 24, 2025, Plaintiffs must file a first amended complaint curing the 20 deficiencies identified in this screening order. If Plaintiffs fail to cure these deficiencies, the case 21 will be reassigned to a district judge with a recommendation for dismissal. 22 II. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiffs bring this case against Defendants Mauricio Torres, Jessica Marr (Ardell-Smith), 24 Community Loans & Investments, and California Superior Court of Alameda County. Compl., 25 ECF No. 1 at 4.1 In the Basis for Jurisdiction section, they checked Federal question and listed the 26 following federal statutes as being at issue: “Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 - 42 U.S.C. 27 1 § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and 18 U.S.C. § 242, 18 U.S.C. § 24.” Id. at 5. 2 Plaintiffs’ claims relate to ongoing property issues at 3414 64th Avenue Place in Oakland, 3 California.2 Id. at 6. They allege:
4 On Friday November 8, 2024, Jessica Marr of Community Realty Investments used an unlawful detainer issued by the Alameda County 5 Superior Court for 3414 64th Avenue Place Unit B to restrict tenant access to private property located in a public storage room. The 6 Oakland Police Department was onsite servicing a trespassing call and serving Lionel Tanner with a Civil Harassment Temporary 7 Restraining Order for Community Realty Investment or Jessica Marr also issued by Alameda County Superior Court. They (OPD and 8 Jessica Marr) were both notified that the private tenant property in the public tenant storage room included my legal case filings, 9 documentation and notes related to the current unlawful detainer and civil harassment complaints and that the “garage” was a storage room 10 expressly for tenant use. The Oakland Police Department gave Jessica Marr permission to seal and lock the storage room. I have not been 11 able to retrieve the documents needed for my defense.
12 Each retaliatory legal filing - Mauricio Torres, Community Loans & Investments, Jessica Marr and Alameda County Superior Courts: The 13 intentional infliction of malicious retaliatory behavior beginning with 3-Day Notice of September 6, 2023 and everyday to moving forward 14 that Defendants do not comply with federal, state and local tenant protection ordinances. Unlawful Detainer Complaint 24CV071391, 15 Unlawful Detainer Complaint 24CV088543, Petition for Civil Harassment Restraining Order 24CV091199, various noticing or lack 16 of, et al.
17 On Bench Abuse of Authority in Performance of Judicial Duties Judge Chad Stegeman abused his authority when he disregarded the 18 notice from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the status of Docket Case# 24-7530 in State case #24CV088543 ordering the case 19 be heard in Alameda County Superior Court. 20 Id. at 7. Plaintiffs allege Defendants’ actions have caused “irreparable harm . . . by the threats of 21 wrongful eviction, threat of loss of housing, damage to reputation and sense of trust and fairness 22 lost in our civil justice systems.” Id. at 8. Plaintiffs request the Court:
23 Issue an Emergency Injunction to stay all proceedings in Alameda County Superior Court related to the matters outlined herein, 24 including but not limited to unlawful detainer actions, civil harassment restraining orders, and any other related matters. 25 Initiate a thorough and independent investigation into the allegations 26 of misconduct and potential civil rights violations by Alameda 27 County Superior Court officials. 1 Further harassing or intimidating me: This includes any attempts to 2 evict me without just cause, interfering with my peaceful enjoyment of the premises, or engaging in any other retaliatory or discriminatory 3 conduct.
4 Interfering with my lawful possession of the property: This includes preventing any further attempts to lock me out, remove my 5 belongings, or otherwise disrupt my lawful occupancy.
6 Violating my constitutional rights: This includes current surviellance [sic] activities and ensuring that all future proceedings are conducted 7 fairly and impartially, with due process and equal protection of the law. 8 Id. at 9. Plaintiffs also seek $80,000 in actual damages and $80,000 in punitive damages. Id. 9 In addition to their complaint, Plaintiffs filed a “Request for Emegency [sic] Injunction and 10 Investigation into California Superior Court Alameda County.” Id. at 11-25. They request the 11 Court prevent the Alameda County Superior Court from hearing certain matters currently 12 scheduled in related proceedings pending there, arguing they violate their Fourteenth Amendment 13 Due Process and Equal Protection rights. Id. at 11-12. 14 III. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION 15 A district court may authorize the start of a civil action in forma pauperis if the court is 16 satisfied the would-be plaintiff cannot pay the filling fees required to pursue the lawsuit. See 17 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Plaintiffs submitted the required documentation demonstrating an 18 inability to pay the costs of this action, and it is evident from the application that the listed assets 19 and income are insufficient to enable payment of the fees. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the 20 applications to proceed in forma pauperis. 21 IV. SUA SPONTE SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 22 A. Legal Standard 23 A court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service of process if it “(i) is 24 frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks 25 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(i)- 26 (iii). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which 27 relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2 2012) (citation omitted). As such, the complaint must allege facts that plausibly establish each 3 defendant’s liability. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 CECILIA CAREY and KARREN Case No. 24-cv-09534-TSH MOORER, 8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ 9 v. APPLICATIONS TO PROCEED IN 10 FORMA PAUPERIS AND SCREENING MAURICIO TORRES, et al., COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1915(E) Defendants. 12
14 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Plaintiffs Cecilia Carey and Karren Moorer initiated this lawsuit by filing a complaint 17 (ECF No. 1) and applications to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 2, 3). For the reasons stated 18 below, the Court GRANTS the applications but finds the complaint deficient under 28 U.S.C. § 19 1915(e). No later than February 24, 2025, Plaintiffs must file a first amended complaint curing the 20 deficiencies identified in this screening order. If Plaintiffs fail to cure these deficiencies, the case 21 will be reassigned to a district judge with a recommendation for dismissal. 22 II. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiffs bring this case against Defendants Mauricio Torres, Jessica Marr (Ardell-Smith), 24 Community Loans & Investments, and California Superior Court of Alameda County. Compl., 25 ECF No. 1 at 4.1 In the Basis for Jurisdiction section, they checked Federal question and listed the 26 following federal statutes as being at issue: “Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 - 42 U.S.C. 27 1 § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and 18 U.S.C. § 242, 18 U.S.C. § 24.” Id. at 5. 2 Plaintiffs’ claims relate to ongoing property issues at 3414 64th Avenue Place in Oakland, 3 California.2 Id. at 6. They allege:
4 On Friday November 8, 2024, Jessica Marr of Community Realty Investments used an unlawful detainer issued by the Alameda County 5 Superior Court for 3414 64th Avenue Place Unit B to restrict tenant access to private property located in a public storage room. The 6 Oakland Police Department was onsite servicing a trespassing call and serving Lionel Tanner with a Civil Harassment Temporary 7 Restraining Order for Community Realty Investment or Jessica Marr also issued by Alameda County Superior Court. They (OPD and 8 Jessica Marr) were both notified that the private tenant property in the public tenant storage room included my legal case filings, 9 documentation and notes related to the current unlawful detainer and civil harassment complaints and that the “garage” was a storage room 10 expressly for tenant use. The Oakland Police Department gave Jessica Marr permission to seal and lock the storage room. I have not been 11 able to retrieve the documents needed for my defense.
12 Each retaliatory legal filing - Mauricio Torres, Community Loans & Investments, Jessica Marr and Alameda County Superior Courts: The 13 intentional infliction of malicious retaliatory behavior beginning with 3-Day Notice of September 6, 2023 and everyday to moving forward 14 that Defendants do not comply with federal, state and local tenant protection ordinances. Unlawful Detainer Complaint 24CV071391, 15 Unlawful Detainer Complaint 24CV088543, Petition for Civil Harassment Restraining Order 24CV091199, various noticing or lack 16 of, et al.
17 On Bench Abuse of Authority in Performance of Judicial Duties Judge Chad Stegeman abused his authority when he disregarded the 18 notice from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the status of Docket Case# 24-7530 in State case #24CV088543 ordering the case 19 be heard in Alameda County Superior Court. 20 Id. at 7. Plaintiffs allege Defendants’ actions have caused “irreparable harm . . . by the threats of 21 wrongful eviction, threat of loss of housing, damage to reputation and sense of trust and fairness 22 lost in our civil justice systems.” Id. at 8. Plaintiffs request the Court:
23 Issue an Emergency Injunction to stay all proceedings in Alameda County Superior Court related to the matters outlined herein, 24 including but not limited to unlawful detainer actions, civil harassment restraining orders, and any other related matters. 25 Initiate a thorough and independent investigation into the allegations 26 of misconduct and potential civil rights violations by Alameda 27 County Superior Court officials. 1 Further harassing or intimidating me: This includes any attempts to 2 evict me without just cause, interfering with my peaceful enjoyment of the premises, or engaging in any other retaliatory or discriminatory 3 conduct.
4 Interfering with my lawful possession of the property: This includes preventing any further attempts to lock me out, remove my 5 belongings, or otherwise disrupt my lawful occupancy.
6 Violating my constitutional rights: This includes current surviellance [sic] activities and ensuring that all future proceedings are conducted 7 fairly and impartially, with due process and equal protection of the law. 8 Id. at 9. Plaintiffs also seek $80,000 in actual damages and $80,000 in punitive damages. Id. 9 In addition to their complaint, Plaintiffs filed a “Request for Emegency [sic] Injunction and 10 Investigation into California Superior Court Alameda County.” Id. at 11-25. They request the 11 Court prevent the Alameda County Superior Court from hearing certain matters currently 12 scheduled in related proceedings pending there, arguing they violate their Fourteenth Amendment 13 Due Process and Equal Protection rights. Id. at 11-12. 14 III. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION 15 A district court may authorize the start of a civil action in forma pauperis if the court is 16 satisfied the would-be plaintiff cannot pay the filling fees required to pursue the lawsuit. See 17 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Plaintiffs submitted the required documentation demonstrating an 18 inability to pay the costs of this action, and it is evident from the application that the listed assets 19 and income are insufficient to enable payment of the fees. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the 20 applications to proceed in forma pauperis. 21 IV. SUA SPONTE SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 22 A. Legal Standard 23 A court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service of process if it “(i) is 24 frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks 25 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(i)- 26 (iii). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which 27 relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2 2012) (citation omitted). As such, the complaint must allege facts that plausibly establish each 3 defendant’s liability. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). “A claim has 4 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 5 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 6 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In making this determination, the Court must “take as true all 7 allegations of material fact stated in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to 8 the plaintiff.” Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112 (citation omitted). The Court must also “construe a pro 9 se plaintiff’s pleadings liberally and afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Id. (cleaned 10 up). However, the Court “may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 11 pled.” Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992). 12 B. Application 13 Rule 8 14 As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs’ complaint does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil 15 Procedure 8, which requires the complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 16 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The failure to comply with 17 Rule 8 is a basis for dismissal that is not dependent on whether the complaint is without merit. 18 McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996). 19 To comply with Rule 8, Carey and Moorer must each plead their claims separately, 20 identifying the transaction or occurrence giving rise to the claim. See Bautista v. Los Angeles 21 Cnty., 216 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Moreover, each plaintiff’s claim being founded upon a 22 separate transaction or occurrence, it is properly stated in a separate count because a separation 23 facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth.”) (cleaned up). Here, while Plaintiffs 24 Carey and Moorer are both named in the complaint’s caption, the body of the complaint lists 25 Carey as the only plaintiff. ECF No. 1 at 3. Further, Plaintiffs do not use their names for any of 26 the allegations in the complaint, instead using only singular pronouns. See, e.g., id. at 7 (“I have 27 not been able to retrieve the documents needed for my defense.”); id. at 8 (“I could not continue 1 me.”). Plaintiffs also do not state their claims in separate counts for each Plaintiff, making it 2 difficult for a putative defendant to know whom they’re responding to, let alone how to respond. 3 See Bautista, 216 F.3d at 840. Thus, Plaintiffs must amend the complaint to allege separately for 4 each of them: (1) the specific laws or rights that you think the defendant(s) violated; (2) for each 5 law or right, state the specific factual allegations that connect each defendant with the alleged 6 wrongdoing, including dates, the names of people involved, and what those people did to you; and 7 (3) how you were harmed. 8 Immunity 9 Plaintiffs name Alameda County Superior Court as a defendant. Compl. at 4. However, it 10 is well-established that under the Eleventh Amendment, “agencies of the state are immune from 11 private damage actions or suits for injunctive relief brought in federal court.” Mitchell v. Los 12 Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988). The Superior Court is an arm of the 13 state and is therefore protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Munoz v. Superior Court 14 of Los Angeles Cnty., 91 F.4th 977, 980 (2024). As such, any claims brought against the Alameda 15 County Superior Court must be dismissed. 16 Although not named as a defendant, Plaintiffs also appear to bring claims against Judge 17 Chad Stegeman, alleging he “abused his authority when he disregarded the notice from the Ninth 18 Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the status of Docket Case# 24-7530 in State case 19 #24CV088543 ordering the case be heard in Alameda County Superior Court.” ECF No. 1 at 7. 20 However, Judge Stegeman “also has Eleventh Amendment immunity as a state judge.” Munoz, 91 21 F.4th at 980. While there are certain exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity, such as that a 22 plaintiff may seek prospective injunctive relief to remedy violations of federal law under the Ex 23 Parte Young doctrine, see Douglas v. Cal. Dep't of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 817 (9th Cir. 2001), 24 these are not applicable to judges as they “do not enforce state laws as executive officials might; 25 instead, they work to resolve disputes between parties.” Munoz, 91 F.4th at 980. Thus, “any 26 errors made by state-court judges can be remedied through some form of appeal.” Id. (citation and 27 internal quotations omitted). Thus, to the extent Plaintiffs seek to bring claims against any judges 1 Fourteenth Amendment 2 Plaintiffs allege claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal 3 Protection Clauses. To the extent Plaintiffs bring these claims against the Alameda County 4 Superior Court in its judges, as discussed above, these claims must be dismissed. As to the 5 remaining defendants, there is a threshold problem with Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims; namely, 6 they assert these claims against private actors— i.e., persons who are not government or state 7 actors. “Individuals bringing actions against private parties for infringement of their constitutional 8 rights . . . must show that the private parties’ infringement somehow constitutes state action.” 9 George v. Pac.-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citations 10 omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The presumption is that a private actor’s conduct is not state 11 action. Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuym, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2011). 12 State action exists “only if there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged 13 action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Brentwood 14 Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (quotations omitted). 15 Courts may find state action when the challenged activity “results from the State’s exercise of 16 coercive power, when the State provides significant encouragement, either overt or covert, or 17 when a private actor operates as a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.” 18 Id. (cleaned up). Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not indicate that Defendants’ alleged conduct 19 resulted from the State’s exercise of coercive power or that the State encouraged them in their 20 alleged conduct to the point that Defendants’ conduct could be attributed to the State. See Blum v. 21 Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). The Court finds Defendants’ alleged conduct therefore does 22 not constitute “state action” for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 23 Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 24 their Fourteenth Amendment claims must be dismissed. 25 Unlawful Detainer 26 Throughout their complaint, Plaintiffs reference unlawful detainer cases decided against 27 them in state court. As Plaintiffs do not state separate causes of action, it is unclear if they seek to 1 claims must be dismissed. 2 As courts of limited jurisdiction, “federal courts have an independent obligation to ensure 3 that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 4 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011); Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting 5 that district courts are “obligated to consider sua sponte whether [they] have subject matter 6 jurisdiction”). To the extent Plaintiffs seek to challenge any unlawful detainer decision, the Court 7 lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars federal district 8 courts from hearing appeals or de facto appeals from state-court judgments. See Cooper v. Ramos, 9 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); 10 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923). Any request to set aside a state court 11 judgment is an attempt to appeal that judgment. See Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 12 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (an action is a de facto appeal when the claimed legal injuries “arise from the 13 state court’s purportedly erroneous judgment.”). That Plaintiffs may seek to bring additional 14 claims for relief based on federal constitutional theories makes no difference. See Feldman, 460 15 U.S. at 486; Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (District courts lack 16 jurisdiction over claims “‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s decision such that the 17 adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling.”) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 18 483, 485). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to final state court orders and judgments as well 19 as interlocutory orders and non-final judgments issued by a state court. Doe & Assoc. Law Offices 20 v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001). 21 Accordingly, the Court is unable to review these state court decisions, and any such claims 22 must be dismissed. 23 Criminal Statutes 24 Finally, Plaintiffs allege the Court has jurisdiction over their claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 25 §§ 23, 242 and 1341. However, these are criminal statutes, and it is well-established that “a 26 private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of 27 another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1 Redmond v. United States, 2022 WL 1304472, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2022) (A “private 2 individuals lack standing to assert claims for relief based on criminal statutes.”) (collecting cases). 3 Thus, “[i]ndividuals cannot file criminal charges in the United States District Court. Rather, 4 criminal proceedings in federal court are initiated by the government, usually through the United 5 States Attorney’s Office.” Candy-Anh-Thu:Tran v. Daniel, 2017 WL 6513414, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 6 Dec. 20, 2017) (citing Harbor v. Kim, 2017 WL 443164, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017) (“The 7 decision to institute criminal proceedings lies within the discretion of the proper state or federal 8 prosecuting authority”); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (observing that 9 the executive branch has “exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to 10 prosecute a case”). As such, Plaintiffs lack standing to bring the claims alleged in their complaint. 11 See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (no private cause of action under 18 12 U.S.C. § 242); Ross v. Orange Cnty. Bar Ass’n, 369 F. App’x 868, 869 (9th Cir. 2010) 13 (“[Plaintiff] ha[s] no separate private right of action for mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341.”). If 14 Plaintiffs believe the defendants engaged in criminal conduct, they must contact federal law 15 enforcement or the United States Attorney’s Office and present the facts supporting that belief to 16 them. 17 V. CONCLUSION 18 For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS the applications to proceed in forma pauperis 19 but finds the complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). However, given 20 Plaintiffs’ pro se status, and because it is not clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not 21 be cured by amendment, the Court shall grant Plaintiffs the opportunity to file an amended 22 complaint. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint by February 23 24, 2025. 24 A. Requirements for Amended Complaint 25 Because an amended complaint replaces the previous complaint, it may not incorporate 26 claims or allegations in the original complaint by reference. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 27 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Instead, any amendment must include all of the facts and claims to be 1 include the following sections:
2 Caption Page On the first page, list the names of the defendant(s), the case number 3 used in this order (24-cv-09534-TSH), the title (“FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT”), and write “Demand for Jury Trial” if you want your 4 case to be heard by a jury.
5 Form of Pleadings The factual allegations and claims must be written in numbered 6 paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. 7 Subject Matter Jurisdiction 8 The first numbered paragraph in your complaint (labeled “Jurisdiction”) should explain why this Court has the power to decide 9 this kind of case. A federal court can hear a case based on a federal question jurisdiction (a violation of federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 10 1331) or diversity jurisdiction (when all plaintiffs and all defendants are citizens of different states disputing more than $75,000) under 28 11 U.S.C. § 1332.
12 Parties In separate paragraphs for each party, identify the plaintiff(s) and 13 defendant(s) in the case.
14 Statement of Facts Explain the important facts in numbered paragraphs, describing how 15 the defendant(s) violated the law and how you have been injured.
16 Claims Include a separate heading for each legal claim (Claim 1, Claim 2, 17 etc.), identifying the specific law that you think the defendant(s) violated and explaining in numbered paragraphs what each defendant 18 did to violate each law. Each plaintiff’s claims must be listed separately. 19 20 B. Resources 21 Plaintiffs may wish to seek assistance from the Legal Help Center, a free service offered by 22 the Justice & Diversity Center of the Bar Association of San Francisco. You may request an 23 appointment by emailing fedpro@sfbar.org or calling 415-782-8982. At the Legal Help Center, 24 you will be able to speak with an attorney who may be able to provide basic legal help but not 25 representation. More information is available at https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-litigants/. 26 Plaintiffs may also wish to obtain a copy of this District’s Handbook for Litigants Without 27 a Lawyer, which provides instructions on how to proceed at every stage of your case. The 1 https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-litigants/. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 4 || Dated: January 23, 2025 5 TAA. | THOMAS S. HIXSON 6 United States Magistrate Judge 7 8 9 10 11 a 12
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