Carey v. Smith

11 Ga. 539
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedJuly 15, 1852
DocketNo. 65
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 11 Ga. 539 (Carey v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carey v. Smith, 11 Ga. 539 (Ga. 1852).

Opinion

By the Court.

Warner, J.

delivering the opinion.

[545]*545This bill is filed by the complainant, for the purpose of enjoining a suit instituted against him by Edward Carey, assignee of the Bank of Columbus, on the Common Law side of the Court, as one of the stockholders of the Planters’ and Mechanics’ Bank of Columbus, for the ultimate redemption of the bills issued by that bank, according to the provisions of the 11th section of the charter thereof.

The complainant alleges in his bill, that there are various equitable circumstances which ought to exonerate him from the payment of the bills sued on, as a stockholder, and especially, that there was a fraudulent combination between a portion of the directors of the Planters’ and Mechanics’ Bank and the Bank of Columbus, for the benefit of said directors; and that the bills in question were not received by the Bank of Columbus (the assignee of which is now seeking to enforce the payment thereof) on the credit of the Planters’ and Mechanics’ Bank, but on the credit of a personal guarantee made by a portion of the directors of the Planters’ and Mechanics’ Bank, for their own personal benefit and private speculation ; all of which was well known to the Bank of Columbus, when the bills now sued on were received by the last mentioned bank. The prayer of the bill is, that the assignee of the Bank of Columbus may be perpetually enjoined from prosecuting his said suit on the bills of the Planters’ and Mechanics’ Bank against the complainant, as a stockholder in the last named bank, and for other relief, &c. To so much of the complainant’s bill as sought a discovery from the defendant in relation to the banking house and lot of the Planters’ and Mechanics’ Bank, and the alleged contract or agreement in regard to the same, the defendant answered. To the other portions of the bill, the defendant demurred. After the demurrer was filed by the defendant, the complainant obtained leave of the Court to amend his bill, by striking out material parts thereof and to make new and distinct allegations in relation to the same subject matter; which was allowed bj the Court.

[1.] The defendant objected to the amendment of the complainant’s bill, by striking out material allegations, admissions, [546]*546and averments contained therein ; insisting that he was entitled to demur to the bill as it originally stood, with the additional matter introduced by way of amendment.

The first question to be considered and decided, is, whether a complainant in an injunction bill, which has been sworn to by him, can amend it by striking out material averments and allegations contained therein ? Such a practice cannot, in our judgment, be sustained, either upon principle or by authority. In Verplanck vs. The Mercantile Insurance Company, (1 Edwards’ Ch. Rep. 46,) this identical question appears to have been well considered, on an application to amend an injunction bill.

[2.] In that case it was held, that material and substantive matter, and statements, allegations and charges, which have been sworn to, cannot be stricken out; they are to be corrected' by the addition of explanatory or supplemental statements; and this regulation was held to be as applicable to ordinary sworn bills, as to those where injunctions are outstanding. It was also held in that case, that amendments to a bill can only be granted when the bill is defective in parties, or in prayer for relief, or in the omission or mistake of a fact or circumstance connected with the substance, but not forming the substance itself, nor repugnant thereto ; and that a party under the privilege of amending, is not to introduce matter which would constitute a new hill.

[3.] In Rodgers vs. Rodgers, (1 Page’s Ch. R. 424,) it was held that an injunction bill will not be amended, unless the proposed amendments are distinctly stated to the Court, and verified by the oath of the complainant, nor unless a sufficient excuse is rendered for not incorporating them in the original bill, and that the application to amend must be made as soon as the necessity of the amendment is discovered. One cogent reason for not allowing a party complainant in a sworn injunction bill to ■strike out material allegations and averments therein, by way of amendment, is, that if he should 'swear falsely for the purpose of obtaining the injunction, he might by that means, destroy and obliterate all trace of the evidence of his offence. The Court below erred, in our judgment, in allowing the complainant to [547]*547strike out of his bill the averments and allegations marked and designated in the record before us.

The defendant was entitled to demur to the complainant’s bill as it stood, before the order to strike out was made; that is to say, he wras entitled to demur to the complainant’s bill, as amended by the insertion of the new matter, without any portion thereof being stricken out. The bill as it was originally sworn to by the complainant and filed in office, together with the additional matter introduced by way of amendment, constituted the complainant’s bill, at the time the demurrer was heard and determined in the Court below.

[4.] An amended bill is considered as an original bill. 2 Maddock’s Ch. Prac. 369. At the May Term, 1852, the defendant filed additional grounds of demurrer to the complainant’s bill, as amended, the second ground of which is in the following words— “And for further cause of demurrer to said bill as amended, this defendant sheweth that the complainant shews by his said amended bill, he has been guilty of a violation of the charter of the Planters’ and Mechanics’ Bank, and of committing a gross fraud in the organization of the same, and therefore is not entitled to come into a Court of Equity, and ask relief from the consequences thereof.”

[5.J It is undoubtedly a principle of Equity jurisprudence, that he who seeks equity, must come into Court with clean hands. The general rule is, that where parties are concerned in illegal agreements or other illegal transactions,' whether they are mala prohihita, or mala in se, Courts of Equity, following the rule of Law, as to participators in a common crime, will not interpose to grant any relief; acting upon the well known maxim, In pari delicto potior est conditio defendenlis et possidentis. In all such cases the rule is, to leave the parties where it finds them, giving no relief and no countenance to claims of that character. 1 Story’s Equity, 295, sec. 298. Thompsons. Thompson, 7 Vesey, 470. This doctrine has been fully recognized and adopted by this Court, in Howell, adm. vs. Fountain et al., 3 Kelly’s Rep. 176. The question raised by the defendant’s second ground of demurrer to the complainant’s bill as amended, necessarily leads us [548]*548to inquire whether the complainant by his own allegations in his bill, clearly shows that he actively

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Bluebook (online)
11 Ga. 539, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carey-v-smith-ga-1852.