Carey Coco v. The City of Long Beach

District Court, C.D. California·Decided May 1, 2023·No. 2:22-cv-08591·Unknown

Opinion

RODNEY S. DIGGS, Esq. (SBN 274459) RDiggs@imwlaw.com KAELIN S. DAVIS, Esq. (SBN KDavis@imwlaw.com IVIE McNEILL WYATT PURCELL & DIGGS A Professional Law Corporation 444 South Flower Street, Suite 1800 Los Angeles, California 90071 Telephone: (213) 489-0028 Facsimile: (213) 489-0552 Attorneys for Plaintiff, CAREY COCO DAWN MCINTOSH, City Attorney NICHOLAS J. MASERO, Deputy City Attorney State Bar No. 302989 411 W. Ocean Boulevard, 9th Floor Long Beach, California 90802-4664 Telephone: (562) 570-2200 Facsimile: (562) 436-1579 Attorneys for Defendant CITY OF LONG BEACH UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CAREY COCO, an individual, CASE NO.: 2:22-cv-08591-RGK- Plaintiff, (JEMx) vs. CITY OF LONG BEACH; and STIPULATED PROTECTIVE DOES 1 through 10, inclusive. ORDER Defendants. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. B. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT This case involves the wrongful detention and arrest of Plaintiff Carey Coco. Discovery in this action is likely to involve the production of sensitive, confidential documents pertaining to and contained in the private employment personnel file of City of Long Beach Department officers and of the City of Los Angeles Department officers, which include Plaintiff Carey Coco, (collectively “the parties”) production and disclosure of these confidential personnel file documents without this protective order will subject the parties to unwarranted and unnecessary embarrassment, harassment, and/or violation of the parties’ rights of privacy. Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect information the parties are entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are permitted reasonable necessary uses of such material in preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the end of the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective order for such information is justified in this matter. It is the intent of the parties that information will not be designated good faith belief that it has been maintained in a confidential, non-public manner, and there is good cause why it should not be part of the public record of this case. C. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING UNDER SEAL The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Local Civil Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. There is a strong presumption that the public has a right of access to judicial proceedings and records in civil cases. In connection with non-dispositive motions, good cause must be shown to support a filing under seal. See Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006), Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002), Makar-Welbon v. Sony Electrics, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 576, 577 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (even stipulated protective orders require good cause showing), and a specific showing of good cause or compelling reasons with proper evidentiary support and legal justification, must be made with respect to Protected Material that a party seeks to file under seal. The parties’ mere designation of Disclosure or Discovery Material as CONFIDENTIAL does not—without the submission of competent evidence by declaration, establishing that the material sought to be filed under seal qualifies as confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable—constitute good cause. Further, if a party request sealing related to a dispositive motion or trial, then compelling reasons, not only good cause, for the sealing must be shown, and the relief sought shall be narrowly tailored to serve the specific interest to be protected. See Pintos v. Pacific Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 677-79 (9th Cir. 2010). For each item or type of information, document, or thing sought to be filed or introduced under seal in connection with a dispositive motion or trial, the party and legal justification, for the requested sealing order. Again, competent evidence supporting the application to file documents under seal must be provided by declaration. Any document that is not confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable in its entirety will not be filed under seal if the confidential portions can be redacted. If documents can be redacted, then a redacted version for public viewing, omitting only the confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable portions of the document, shall be filed. Any application that seeks to file documents under seal in their entirety should include an explanation of why redaction is not feasible. 2. DEFINITIONS 2.1 Action: This pending federal lawsuit. 2.2 Challenging Party: A Party or Non-Party that challenges the designation of information or items under this Order. 2.3 “CONFIDENTIAL” Information or Items: Information (regardless of how it is generated, stored or maintained) or tangible things that qualify for protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), and as specified above in the Good Cause Statement. 2.4 Counsel: Outside Counsel of Record and House Counsel (as well as their support staff). 2.5 Designating Party: A Party or Non-Party that designates information or items that it produces in disclosures or in responses to discovery as “CONFIDENTIAL.” 2.6 Disclosure or Discovery Material: All items or information, regardless of the medium or manner in which it is generated, stored, or maintained (including, among other things, testimony, transcripts, and tangible things), that are produced or generated in disclosures or responses to discovery in this matter. 2.7 Expert: A person with specialized knowledge or experience in a matter pertinent to the litigation who has been retained by a Party or its counsel to serve as an expert witness or as a consultant in this Action. 2.8 House Counsel: Attorneys who are employees of a party to this Action. House Counsel does not include Outside Counsel of Record or any other outside counsel. 2.9 Non-Party: Any natural person, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity not named as a Party to this action. 2.10 Outside Counsel of Record: Attorneys who are not employees of a party to this Action but are retained to represent or advise a party to this Action and have appeared in this Action on behalf of that party or are affiliated with a law firm which has appeared on behalf of that party, and includes support staff. 2.11 Party: Any party to this Action, including all of its officers, directors, employees, consultants, retained experts, and Outside Counsel of Record (and their support staffs). 2.12 Producing Party: A Party or Non-Party that produces Disclosure or Discovery Material in this Action. 2.13 Professional Vendors: Persons or entities that provide litigation support services (e.g., pho

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