Caressa Desiray Dawson v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 20, 2025
• Docket: 06-25-00047-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-25-00047-CR

CARESSA DESIRAY DAWSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 336th District Court Fannin County, Texas Trial Court No. CR-19-27104

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens MEMORANDUM OPINION

Caressa Desiray Dawson pled guilty to evading arrest with a motor vehicle, a third-

degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04(b)(2)(A) (Supp.). In accordance with a plea

agreement with the State, the trial court placed Dawson on deferred adjudication community

supervision for six years. Because she failed to report to her community supervision officer and

failed to complete community service as required, the State moved to adjudicate Dawson’s guilt.

After Dawson pled true to the State’s allegations, the trial court adjudicated her guilt and

sentenced her to two years’ imprisonment. Dawson appeals.

Dawson’s attorney has filed a brief stating that he reviewed the record and found no

genuinely arguable issues that could be raised on appeal. The brief sets out the procedural

history of the case and summarizes the evidence elicited during the course of the trial court

proceedings. Since counsel has provided a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating

why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced, that evaluation meets the requirements of

Anders v. California. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743–44 (1967); In re Schulman, 252

S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503,

509–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 812–13 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel

Op.] 1978). Counsel also filed a motion with this Court seeking to withdraw as counsel in this

appeal.

On April 30, 2025, counsel mailed to Dawson copies of the brief, the motion to

withdraw, and a motion for pro se access to the appellate record lacking only Dawson’s

signature. Dawson was informed of her rights to review the record and file a pro se response.

2 On May 5, we informed Dawson that her pro se motion for access to the appellate record was

due on or before May 20. By letter dated May 28, this Court informed Dawson that the case

would be set for submission on June 18. We received neither a pro se response from Dawson

nor a motion requesting an extension of time in which to file such a response.

We have reviewed the entire appellate record and have independently determined that no

reversible error exists. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

However, non-reversible error is found in the trial court’s judgment.

The bill of costs and judgment include $25.00 in time payment fees. The Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals has concluded that a time payment fee like the one imposed here “must indeed

be struck for being prematurely assessed because a defendant’s appeal suspends the duty to pay

court costs and therefore suspends the running of the clock for the purposes of the time payment

fee.” Dulin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 129, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). “As a consequence, even

now, assessment of the time payment fee in this case would be premature because appellate

proceedings are still pending.” Id. Pursuant to Dulin, we strike the time payment fee “in [its]

entirety, without prejudice to [it] being assessed later if, more than 30 days after the issuance of

the appellate mandate, the defendant has failed to completely pay . . . court costs” owed. Id. at

133.

Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s judgment and bill of costs by deleting the $25.00

time payment fee “without prejudice to [it] being assessed later if, more than 30 days” elapses

3 without payment of court costs after they become due. Id.; Mitchell v. State, 653 S.W.3d 295,

298 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2022, no pet.). As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.1

Scott E. Stevens Chief Justice

Date Submitted: June 18, 2025 Date Decided: June 20, 2025

Do Not Publish

1 Since we agree that this case presents no reversible error, we also, in accordance with Anders, grant counsel’s request to withdraw from further representation of appellant in this case. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant desire to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, appellant must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review (1) must be filed within thirty days from either the date of this opinion or the date on which the last timely motion for rehearing was overruled by this Court, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2, (2) must be filed with the clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.3, and (3) should comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4. 4