NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-668
CARE AND PROTECTION OF GLENDA.1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The mother appeals from a judgment issued by a Juvenile
Court judge pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 26, finding the mother
currently unfit to parent her child, Glenda, and committing the
child to the permanent custody of the Department of Children and
Families (DCF).2 The mother argues that the judge, in finding
the mother unfit to care for the child, improperly focused on
the mother's care of the child's younger brother. The mother
also claims that the judge erred in finding her unfit to parent
the child by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm.
1 A pseudonym.
2In addition to finding the mother unfit to parent the child, the judge found that the father was unfit. He did not appeal. The judge also found that DCF had not made reasonable efforts toward reunification, and ordered DCF to update the parents' action plan, convene a permanency planning conference to determine a goal for the family, provide the mother with weekly visits with the child, and confirm participation with all collaterals on a monthly basis. 1. Focus on the younger brother. The mother argued that
the trial judge's focus on the mother's care of the child's
younger brother was improper. We disagree. The mother is
correct that "[a] determination of parental unfitness must be
child-specific" and must focus on the particular child at issue.
Adoption of Ramona, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 263 (2004), citing
Custody of a Minor, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 7 (1985). It is also
true, however, that a parent's care for a child's sibling may
bear on the parent's fitness to care for the subject child. See
Adoption of Carla, 416 Mass. 510, 513 (1993) (stating that
parent's fitness to raise one child is relevant to their fitness
to raise sibling, and noting that "a parent may be fit to raise
one child and unfit to raise another," but parent may also "be
unfit to raise any child" [citation omitted]).
In this case, the trial judge found that the mother had
missed several medical appointments for the younger brother, who
had a number of specialized health needs. The younger brother
was born premature and spent three months in the neonatal
intensive care unit (NICU) before being discharged to the
mother's custody. He was diagnosed with failure to thrive and
needed a nasal gastro tube to be fed. When the tube became
dislodged, medical providers requested that he be brought to the
hospital immediately, as he needed to be fed every three hours,
but the mother did not bring him in until the next day, at which
2 point he had lost 1.5 ounces. The mother later failed to bring
the younger brother to several other medical appointments, and
he lost more than one pound while in her care. The younger
brother was ultimately removed from the mother's custody due to
medical neglect.
The mother challenges this focus on the younger brother, as
the case at hand is not about him, but about Glenda. The trial
judge did not, however, consider only the mother's medical
neglect of the younger brother; indeed, the trial judge also
focused on the mother's medical neglect of Glenda, and even of
herself, in coming to the conclusion that the mother was unfit
to parent the child.
Although the child does not have as many specialized health
needs as the younger brother, she has required specialized care.
The child was born one month premature and spent one month in
the NICU before being discharged to the mother's care.
Approximately one month after the child's birth, shortly after
the child was released from the NICU, the mother failed to bring
her in for her initial follow-up medical appointment. The
mother then failed to bring her to the following seven
rescheduled appointments. Although the mother contends that the
child had "no chronic medical issues," the trial judge came to
the reasonable conclusion that failure to bring the child to her
first follow-up appointment after being released from the NICU
3 (and seven attempts at rescheduling) constituted medical
neglect.
The trial judge also found that the mother has not managed
her own health consistently. A parent's failure to seek medical
treatment for herself can result in danger to the child. See
Petition of the Dep't of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent
to Adoption, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 965, 965 (1983). The mother has
several physical and mental health diagnoses, including
diabetes, epilepsy, asthma, posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), and bipolar disorder, and she also has a history of
substance abuse. Despite these health issues, the mother has
been inconsistent with her treatment. She attended only four
appointments with her neurologist between the summer of 2020 and
December 2021, and has since missed several more appointments.
She attended a few appointments for trauma therapy during the
summer of 2021, but stopped soon after in the fall of 2021.
Similarly, she attended one appointment with a psychiatrist, but
declined to attend the follow-up appointment. The mother later
began individual therapy, but when her regular therapist went on
leave for approximately six months, the mother did not engage in
therapy with the substitute therapist. The mother has also
misrepresented her treatment to DCF, stating that she had weekly
appointments with her substance abuse counsellor despite the
4 fact that, according to the counsellor, they did not have a
regular meeting schedule.
The incident that precipitated the child's removal
demonstrates how the mother's failure to care for her own health
could impact the child. The mother had a medical marijuana
card, as she used marijuana to treat her epilepsy. On the day
of the child's removal, the mother purchased marijuana from an
acquaintance rather than using her medical marijuana card at a
dispensary. After using this marijuana, the mother lost
consciousness and had to be taken to the hospital, where she
tested positive for cocaine. The mother stated that she
believed the marijuana was laced with cocaine. The child was in
the home sleeping when this occurred. Although the child was
asleep and the mother's brother was also in the home, he was
asleep and not acting as a sober caretaker for the child. Based
on this incident, the trial judge could reasonably conclude that
the mother's failure to properly treat her epilepsy could place
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-668
CARE AND PROTECTION OF GLENDA.1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The mother appeals from a judgment issued by a Juvenile
Court judge pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 26, finding the mother
currently unfit to parent her child, Glenda, and committing the
child to the permanent custody of the Department of Children and
Families (DCF).2 The mother argues that the judge, in finding
the mother unfit to care for the child, improperly focused on
the mother's care of the child's younger brother. The mother
also claims that the judge erred in finding her unfit to parent
the child by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm.
1 A pseudonym.
2In addition to finding the mother unfit to parent the child, the judge found that the father was unfit. He did not appeal. The judge also found that DCF had not made reasonable efforts toward reunification, and ordered DCF to update the parents' action plan, convene a permanency planning conference to determine a goal for the family, provide the mother with weekly visits with the child, and confirm participation with all collaterals on a monthly basis. 1. Focus on the younger brother. The mother argued that
the trial judge's focus on the mother's care of the child's
younger brother was improper. We disagree. The mother is
correct that "[a] determination of parental unfitness must be
child-specific" and must focus on the particular child at issue.
Adoption of Ramona, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 263 (2004), citing
Custody of a Minor, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 7 (1985). It is also
true, however, that a parent's care for a child's sibling may
bear on the parent's fitness to care for the subject child. See
Adoption of Carla, 416 Mass. 510, 513 (1993) (stating that
parent's fitness to raise one child is relevant to their fitness
to raise sibling, and noting that "a parent may be fit to raise
one child and unfit to raise another," but parent may also "be
unfit to raise any child" [citation omitted]).
In this case, the trial judge found that the mother had
missed several medical appointments for the younger brother, who
had a number of specialized health needs. The younger brother
was born premature and spent three months in the neonatal
intensive care unit (NICU) before being discharged to the
mother's custody. He was diagnosed with failure to thrive and
needed a nasal gastro tube to be fed. When the tube became
dislodged, medical providers requested that he be brought to the
hospital immediately, as he needed to be fed every three hours,
but the mother did not bring him in until the next day, at which
2 point he had lost 1.5 ounces. The mother later failed to bring
the younger brother to several other medical appointments, and
he lost more than one pound while in her care. The younger
brother was ultimately removed from the mother's custody due to
medical neglect.
The mother challenges this focus on the younger brother, as
the case at hand is not about him, but about Glenda. The trial
judge did not, however, consider only the mother's medical
neglect of the younger brother; indeed, the trial judge also
focused on the mother's medical neglect of Glenda, and even of
herself, in coming to the conclusion that the mother was unfit
to parent the child.
Although the child does not have as many specialized health
needs as the younger brother, she has required specialized care.
The child was born one month premature and spent one month in
the NICU before being discharged to the mother's care.
Approximately one month after the child's birth, shortly after
the child was released from the NICU, the mother failed to bring
her in for her initial follow-up medical appointment. The
mother then failed to bring her to the following seven
rescheduled appointments. Although the mother contends that the
child had "no chronic medical issues," the trial judge came to
the reasonable conclusion that failure to bring the child to her
first follow-up appointment after being released from the NICU
3 (and seven attempts at rescheduling) constituted medical
neglect.
The trial judge also found that the mother has not managed
her own health consistently. A parent's failure to seek medical
treatment for herself can result in danger to the child. See
Petition of the Dep't of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent
to Adoption, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 965, 965 (1983). The mother has
several physical and mental health diagnoses, including
diabetes, epilepsy, asthma, posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), and bipolar disorder, and she also has a history of
substance abuse. Despite these health issues, the mother has
been inconsistent with her treatment. She attended only four
appointments with her neurologist between the summer of 2020 and
December 2021, and has since missed several more appointments.
She attended a few appointments for trauma therapy during the
summer of 2021, but stopped soon after in the fall of 2021.
Similarly, she attended one appointment with a psychiatrist, but
declined to attend the follow-up appointment. The mother later
began individual therapy, but when her regular therapist went on
leave for approximately six months, the mother did not engage in
therapy with the substitute therapist. The mother has also
misrepresented her treatment to DCF, stating that she had weekly
appointments with her substance abuse counsellor despite the
4 fact that, according to the counsellor, they did not have a
regular meeting schedule.
The incident that precipitated the child's removal
demonstrates how the mother's failure to care for her own health
could impact the child. The mother had a medical marijuana
card, as she used marijuana to treat her epilepsy. On the day
of the child's removal, the mother purchased marijuana from an
acquaintance rather than using her medical marijuana card at a
dispensary. After using this marijuana, the mother lost
consciousness and had to be taken to the hospital, where she
tested positive for cocaine. The mother stated that she
believed the marijuana was laced with cocaine. The child was in
the home sleeping when this occurred. Although the child was
asleep and the mother's brother was also in the home, he was
asleep and not acting as a sober caretaker for the child. Based
on this incident, the trial judge could reasonably conclude that
the mother's failure to properly treat her epilepsy could place
the child at risk if returned to the mother's custody.
Taken together with the mother's failure to maintain her
own health properly and her medical neglect of the child, the
mother's medical neglect of the younger brother was not an
improper consideration for the trial judge, as it offered
evidence of a pattern of behavior and therefore had prognostic
value. Adoption of Abigail, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 191, 196 (1986).
5 2. Sufficiency of the evidence. The mother also argues
that the evidence was insufficient to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that she was unfit to parent the child. We
disagree, as there was significant evidence supporting the trial
judge's decision, including the mother's medical neglect of the
child, the mother's unsafe use of marijuana, the environment of
domestic violence, and the mother's inconsistent visitation with
the child.
For a judge to commit a child to DCF's custody, DCF must
prove, "by clear and convincing evidence, that a parent is
currently unfit to further the best interests of a child." Care
& Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. 567, 570 (2005). A finding that
a parent is unfit requires "more than ineptitude, handicap,
character flaw, conviction of a crime, unusual life style, or
inability to do as good a job as the child's foster parent."
Adoption of Katharine, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 25, 28 (1997). The
judge must instead find "'grievous shortcomings or handicaps'
that put the child's welfare 'much at hazard.'" Id., quoting
Petition of New England Home for Little Wanderers to Dispense
with Consent to Adoption, 367 Mass. 631, 646 (1975).
a. Marijuana use. In addition to the medical neglect of
the child, described above, the trial judge relied on the
mother's unsafe use of marijuana in finding her currently unfit
to parent the child. Substance abuse is a relevant
6 consideration in a determination of unfitness if the substance
abuse interferes with a parent's ability to provide minimally
acceptable care of the child. See Adoption of Katharine, 42
Mass. App. Ct. at 31.
The mother has consistently used marijuana since the age of
eighteen, and she uses it to treat her epilepsy. Against
medical advice, the mother used marijuana while pregnant with
the child. The trial judge found that the mother's marijuana
use during her pregnancy "contribut[ed] to [the child] being
born premature," a finding the mother does not contest as
clearly erroneous, though she does note there is evidence that
might support an opposite conclusion. She did disclose her
marijuana use to her medical providers, causing the child to be
labeled a substance-exposed newborn (despite the fact that both
the mother and child tested negative for all substances). The
mother claimed she was not told by medical providers to stop
using marijuana while pregnant, but the trial judge did not
credit that statement. At trial, the mother testified that she
continued to use marijuana one to two times per week.
As noted above, the child was removed following the
mother's collapse after she used marijuana that she purchased
from an acquaintance rather than a dispensary, and which she
later claimed to have come to believe was laced with cocaine
after a urine screen came back positive for cocaine. At the
7 time of the incident, emergency workers noticed marijuana
wrappers and a "heavy odor of marijuana" in the mother's
apartment.
After the child's removal, DCF created a medical marijuana
safety plan with the mother that included "1) no smoking in the
apartment with the child[] present, 2) having a sober adult
present in the apartment when Mother was under the influence, 3)
following Mother's medical providers' advice on intake amount,
4) only buying from medical marijuana dispensaries, 5) and
storing the medical marijuana safely in a lockbox provided by
[DCF]." Despite this safety plan, after each of four overnight
visits with the mother, the child would return to her foster
family with an odor of marijuana, which led the trial judge to
conclude that the mother "continued to use substances in the
presence of [the child]," a finding that is not, as the mother
claims, clear error given the evidence that there was an odor of
marijuana on the child after overnight visits, in the apartment,
and in mother’s car, even if the odor in the apartment was not
of concern to the social worker. And at the time of trial, the
mother continued to smoke marijuana despite being pregnant.
According to G. L. c. 94G, § 7 (d), "[a]bsent clear,
convincing and articulable evidence that the person's actions
related to marijuana have created an unreasonable danger to the
safety of a minor child," legal possession and consumption of
8 marijuana shall not "form the sole or primary basis for
substantiation, service plans, removal or termination or for
denial of custody, visitation or any other parental right or
responsibility." In this case, the mother's unsafe marijuana
use did create an unreasonable danger to the safety of the
child. On the day of the child's removal, the mother used
marijuana from an unregulated source and had to be brought to
the hospital, leaving the child in her apartment while no sober
caretaker was present and awake. Additionally, after a
marijuana safety plan was put in place, the judge found that the
mother was not following it, as she was using marijuana in the
presence of the child. Even if the mother's marijuana use did
not create an unreasonable danger to the safety of the child, it
was not the sole basis for the judge's finding of unfitness, as
the judge also relied on the mother's pattern of medical
neglect, including of the child, the environment of domestic
violence, and her inconsistent visitation with the child.
b. Domestic violence. In his determination that the
mother was unfit to parent the child, the judge considered the
fact that the majority of the mother's relationships have
involved domestic violence. "[A] judge must consider issues of
domestic violence and its effect upon the child[] as well as a
parent's fitness." Adoption of Gillian, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 398,
404 n.6 (2005).
9 The mother's relationship with the father involved verbal
and emotional abuse. The mother never sought a restraining
order against the father. After the mother's relationship with
the father ended, she entered a relationship with the younger
brother's father, and this relationship also involved domestic
violence. The details of the domestic violence are known to the
parties and need not be recounted here. What is relevant is
that, despite numerous instances of domestic violence with the
younger brother's father, several of which involved physical
abuse, the mother continued her relationship with him for over a
year after the first incident and even lived with him. The
mother also declined to pursue a restraining order against him,
and failed to report certain incidents to DCF. The younger
brother's father was eventually arrested due to an incident of
domestic violence with the mother, and then was released from
incarceration several months later. The mother testified that
she has not had contact with him following his release, but the
trial judge did not credit that testimony. Although there was
no evidence that the child ever witnessed any domestic violence,
the trial judge did not err in considering the effect that
domestic violence could have if the child were returned to the
mother's custody, as "[i]n determining parental fitness a judge
may use past conduct to predict future ability and performance."
Custody of Michel, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 269-270 (1990).
10 c. Inconsistent visitation. Finally, the judge considered
the mother's inconsistency in visiting the child in his
determination that the mother was unfit to parent the child.
This was an appropriate consideration for the trial judge in
determining the mother's unfitness, as "the refusal of the
parents to maintain service plans, visitation schedules, and
counseling programs designed to strengthen the family unit are
relevant to the determination of unfitness." Petitions of the
Dep't of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 399
Mass. 279, 289 (1987).
After the child was removed from the mother's custody, the
mother was initially consistent with her visitation. However,
by November 2021, the mother's visitation became much more
inconsistent. Because the mother cancelled numerous visits, she
did not attend any visits with the child in November or
December, and attended only one visit in January and one in
February. Then in March, she once again had no visits.
Although the mother attended several visits in April, she still
cancelled three visits, and in May, she had only one visit,
because she cancelled four. The mother's visits with the child
were suspended for several months following the younger
brother's removal, but were reinstated in July 2022. Even after
that months-long break in visitation, the mother continued to
cancel several visits over the following months.
11 3. Conclusion. Based on all of the above considerations,
there was sufficient evidence for the trial judge to find by
clear and convincing evidence that the mother was, at the time
of trial, currently unfit to parent the child.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Rubin, Massing & Desmond, JJ.3),
Assistant Clerk
Entered: April 4, 2024.
3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.