McAULIFFE, Judge.
This case involves two principal questions: did the trial judge have authority to reduce the defendant’s sentence when he did; and if not, did the State have any right to appeal that action to the Court of Special Appeals? The first question is readily answered in the negative; under the facts of this case [383]*383the trial judge had no authority to modify the sentence. The second question is more difficult, and requires that we examine and trace a common law right of appeal of the State in criminal cases when the lower court acted without jurisdiction. It also requires that we consider the applicability of that doctrine to the facts of this case, and determine whether that right has been extinguished by the legislature.
I.
Laura Beth Cardinell pled guilty in the Circuit Court for Garrett County to one count of distribution of cocaine and two counts of possession of cocaine. She was sentenced to imprisonment for a total of three years. She filed a timely motion for revision of sentence pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345, and that motion was denied. Nearly seven months after sentence was imposed, the defendant filed a “supplemental” motion for revision of the sentence. This motion was granted on the day it was filed, and the trial judge ordered that execution of the unserved portion of the three-year sentence of imprisonment be suspended, and that the defendant be placed on supervised probation for three years. Two days later, the State, apparently unaware of the action taken by the court, filed an answer to the defendant’s motion, arguing that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain or act on the motion.
The State filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. That court held, among other things, that the trial judge acted without authority and therefore in excess of his jurisdiction, that the State was entitled to appeal, and that the trial court’s order modifying the sentence must be vacated. State v. Cardinell, 90 Md.App. 453, 601 A.2d 1123 (1992). We granted the defendant’s petition for certiorari to consider the two questions presented:
1. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the State had a right to appeal the lower court’s order despite the clear language of [Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,] § 12-302(c)(2)?
[384]*3842. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the trial court lacked revisory power over the sentence?
We address these questions in reverse order.
II.
The lower court was clearly without authority to modify or reduce the defendant’s sentence when it did so. The sequence of relevant events is as follows:
4 Oct 90 Sentence imposed.
27 Dec 90 Defendant’s Motion for Revision of Sentence filed.
3 Jan 91 Order filed denying defendant’s motion.
1 May 91 Defendant’s “supplemental” motion for revision of sentence filed.
1 May 91 Order filed granting defendant’s “supplemental” motion and reducing sentence.
Maryland Rule 4-345 provided,1 in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) Illegal Sentence.—The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.
(b) Modification or Reduction—Time for.—The court has revisory power and control over a sentence upon a motion filed within 90 days after its imposition ... in a circuit court, whether or not an appeal has been filed. The court may modify or reduce or strike, but may not increase [385]*385the length of, a sentence. Thereafter, the court has revisory power and control over the sentence in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity----
(c) Open Court Hearing.—The court may modify, reduce, or vacate a sentence only on the record in open court after notice to the parties and an opportunity to be heard.[2]
The defendant’s first motion for modification of sentence was timely. That motion, however, was denied. At that point, and thereafter when the 90-day period following the imposition of sentence expired, no motion was pending. The so-called “supplemental” motion for modification was filed months later, and simply had no efficacy under the Rule.
The trial judge did not enjoy a common law or inherent right to reduce or modify the legal sentence he had imposed. A limited common law revisory power has, however, been recognized. As Judge Digges pointed out for this Court in Ayre v. State, 291 Md. 155,. 433 A.2d 1150 (1981),
“[i]n Maryland all judgments are under the control of the court during the term in which they are entered, and during that time the court has inherent power to strike out or modify judgments in both civil and criminal cases.” Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 431, 109 A.2d 96, 99 (1954). In the absence of a statute or rule either modifying or rescinding this power, such authority survives.
Id. 291 Md. at 159-60, 433 A.2d 1150 (some citations omitted). See also Christian v. State, 309 Md. 114, 123, 522 A.2d 945 (1987) (acknowledging the common law doctrine that a court has plenary authority over its judgments and orders during the term in which they are entered).
Assuming, arguendo, that this revisory power extends to sentences imposed in criminal cases, and that it has not been [386]*386supplanted by Rule 4-345,3 the principle would not be applicable here because sentence was imposed in the September, 1990 term of court, which expired when the new term of court began on the second Monday in March, 1991.4 The order reducing the sentence was not entered until May, 1991.
III.
Having determined that the trial judge lacked the power to reduce this defendant’s sentence when he did, we turn to the question of whether this Court is authorized to entertain the appeal noted by the State. Article IV, § 14 of the Constitution of Maryland provides in part that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals shall be co-extensive with the limits of the State and such as now is or may hereafter be prescribed by law.” A part of the law of which that constitutional provision speaks is the common law as it existed in England and in this colony on the 4th day of July, 1776, and is not inconsistent with the constitution of the State or its new political institutions. See Declaration of Rights of Maryland, Article 5; State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317, 358 (1821).
A majority of the Court of Special Appeals’ panel considering this case held that the appeal was permitted by statute, and in the alternative was permitted under the common law principle that an appellate court may entertain an appeal to review a contention that an inferior court acted in excess of its jurisdiction. State v. Cardinell, supra, 90 Md.App. at 460, 601 A.2d 1123. We do not agree that the statute is broad enough to authorize the State’s appeal, but we do agree that the appeal will lie pursuant to common law principles that have not been abolished by the legislature.
[387]*387The statutory authority suggested by the State is § 12-302(c)(2) of the Courts and Proceedings Article, Md. Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.). That section provides .in pertinent part as follows:
(c) In a criminal case, the State may appeal as provided in this subsection.
*
(2) The State may appeal from a final judgment if the State alleges that the trial judge failed to impose the sentence specifically mandated by the Code.
A majority of the Court of Special Appeals’ panel reasoned that rules promulgated by this Court have the force of law,5 that the trial judge acted outside the authority granted him by Maryland Rule 4-345(b), and that the modified sentence was therefore not authorized “by the Code.” State v. Cardinell, supra, 90 Md.App. at 458-60, 601 A.2d 1123. This broad interpretation of the statute was adopted in the belief that “[t]he legislature must have intended that the State have a right to appeal under circumstances such as these where a trial court imposed a sentence that was contrary to law.” Id. at 459, 601 A.2d 1123. Although we agree that the legislature did not intend by the enactment of this section of the statute to deprive the State of the important and long-standing common law right to appeal when a court has exceeded its power, we do not agree that the statute was intended to, or does, codify that right. Ordinarily, when the legislature speaks of the Code, it means the statutory law of the State. The more general term “law” encompasses much more, including the common law of the State and the rules of this Court that have the force of law. We think the legislature used the word “Code” in its ordinary signification in § 12-302(c)(2), and consequently that section does not authorize the State’s appeal in this case.
The State does, however, enjoy a common law right to appeal under these circumstances. In State v. Buchanan, [388]*388supra, 5 H. & J. at 329-30, our predecessors noted that even in the absence of a statute,
the King might have a writ of error in a criminal case; since it would be absurd to say that a man who had obtained a judgment of acquittal for a defect in the indictment, or on a special verdict, could never again be indicted for the same offense, until that judgment was reversed by writ of error, if a writ of error would not lie.
Pointing out that Attorney General Luther Martin had prosecuted writs of error on behalf of the State in various criminal cases tried in the Court of Oyer and Terminer, & c. for Baltimore County, the Court said:
And there is no sufficient reason why the State should not be entitled to a writ of error in a criminal case. It is perhaps a right that should be seldom exercised, and never for the purpose of oppression, or without necessity; which can rarely, and it is supposed would never happen, and would not be tolerated by public feeling. But as the State has no interest in the punishment of an offender, except for the purpose of general justice connected with the public welfare, no such abuse is to be apprehended; and as the power of revision is calculated to produce a uniformity of decision, it is right and proper that the writ should lie for the State, in the same proportion as it is essential to the due administration of justice, that the criminal law of the land should be certain and known____
Id. at 330. In Rayner v. State, 52 Md. 368 (1879), Judge Alvey said for the Court:
It is only where the Circuit Court has proceeded without right or jurisdiction to hear and decide the case that an appeal or writ of error may be taken to this court to reverse the judgment thus unwarrantably rendered.
Id. at 374. Judge Alvey further stated:
If the judgment of the court below had been rendered without power or jurisdiction to hear and decide the case; for instance, if the appeal had not been authorized by law, or if judgment had been rendered against the party in his [389]*389absence and without legal notice, or opportunity of defending himself or asserting his rights, or the court had, in the rendition of its judgment, transcended the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it; in all such cases the party prejudiced by the judgment would have had the right of appeal. In other words, there would have been a want of jurisdiction in the Circuit Court to render the judgment, and for that reason the right of review would exist.
Id. at 376.
By Chapter 506 of the Laws of 1892, the legislature provided that the parties to criminal proceedings were entitled to bills of exceptions in the same manner as in civil proceedings, and that appeals in criminal cases could be taken in the same manner as in civil cases. Judge Markell, writing for the Court in State v. Adams, 196 Md. 341, 347, 76 A.2d 575 (1950), noted that under the Act, an appeal “presents for review not only questions presented by bills of exceptions but also questions appearing on the face of the record, formerly reviewable only on writ of error.”
In State v. Fisher, 204 Md. 307, 104 A.2d 403 (1954), the State challenged the authority of the trial judge to suspend a sentence. This Court said:
The [Sjtate does not challenge the form of the suspension order; it contends that the Statute creating the misdemean- or stripped the court of all power to suspend the sentence, except on the conditions specified in the Statute itself. Since it appears on the face of the record that the statutory conditions were not met, the question of the legality of the suspension is jurisdictional.... While the State’s right to appeal “as on” writ of error in Maryland has been chiefly recognized in cases where the indictment was quashed, we think the principle has a somewhat wider application, and appeal lies in the circumstances of the instant case.
Id. at 312, 104 A.2d 403.
Effective 1 January 1957, Maryland Rule 810 provided that the sole method of securing review by this Court was by appeal, except where certiorari may be permitted by law, and [390]*390that writs of error were abolished. A committee note to the Rule stated that writs of error had been abolished because they had fallen into disuse, and cited 2 John Prentiss Poe, Pleading and Practice § 821, at 782 (5th ed. Tiffany 1925) for the proposition that “there is no distinction in principle between writs of error and appeals.” In Liquor Board v. Handelman, 212 Md. 152, 161, 129 A.2d 78 (1957), this Court said with respect to Rule 810 that “the views which led to its adoption make it clear that it effected no change in substance in the law as it previously existed with regard to the absence of any real difference between review on appeal and review as on writ of error.”
In State v. Jacob, 234 Md. 452, 199 A.2d 803 (1964), the State’s appeal challenged the authority of a trial magistrate to grant probation without verdict. The State had initially challenged the action by petition for writ of certiorari filed with a circuit court, and its appeal was from a denial of relief by that court. This Court held that the trial magistrate had no authority, and thus no jurisdiction, to grant probation without verdict. The Court further held that the jurisdiction of the trial magistrate was properly tested in the circuit court by certiorari, and that because the circuit court acted in its capacity as a common law court of original jurisdiction in ruling on that petition, the appeal from that court would lie. Significantly, the Court contrasted the lack of authority of the trial magistrate, which it characterized as jurisdictional, with a mere irregularity in the proceedings.
No question is presented with regard to- the jurisdiction of the trial magistrate to try the case; his power to dispose of it by probation without verdict is in issue, and this, we think, presents a question which is essentially one of jurisdiction, rather than of mere irregularity in the proceedings.
Id. at 458, 199 A.2d 803 (footnote omitted).
More recently, in State ex rel. Sonner v. Shearin, 272 Md. 502, 325 A.2d 573 (1974), the questions before the Court involved the power of a circuit court judge to suspend a sentence which the legislature had mandated should not be [391]*391suspended, and the right of the State to appeal. This Court, recognizing that “the authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative,” Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42, 37 S.Ct. 72, 61 L.Ed. 129 (1916), held that the trial judge had exceeded his authority. Concerning the right of the State to appeal, this Court said:
[T]he holding in Fisher, considered in light of the language used in Liquor Board v. Handelman, supra, and the subsequent holding in Jacob, is authority for an appeal from the imposition of an illegal sentence, since the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction is involved in the sense of whether it exceeded the powers vested in it by prescribing a penalty contrary to law. A lower court which thus exceeds its power must be bridled by a court of last resort. Were it otherwise, mandates of the General Assembly could be defied with impunity and the only protection of the public would be the torturous process of judicial removal which would not have the effect of correcting the specific error.
Sonner, supra, 272 Md. at 526, 325 A.2d 573. It is clear, therefore, that at least up to the time of Sonner, the common law right of the State to appeal from an action of the lower court that was outside that court’s jurisdiction remained intact.
The trial judge in the case before us had no inherent or common law authority, nor any authority by virtue of statute or rule, to reduce this defendant’s sentence at the time he did so. The absence of authority or power in this case means that the trial judge acted without jurisdiction, as that term has been used in cases dealing with the State’s right to appeal. See, e.g., Rayner, supra, 52 Md. at 376 (absence of power equated to absence of jurisdiction); Fisher, supra, 204 Md. at 312, 104 A.2d 403 (where legislature stripped trial judge of power to suspend sentence, legality of the suspension is jurisdictional); Jacob, supra, 234 Md. at 458, 199 A.2d 803 (power of magistrate to grant probation without verdict presents a question of jurisdiction rather than mere irregularity of proceedings); Sonner, supra, 272 Md. at 526, 325 A.2d 573 (stating that the “issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction is [392]*392involved in the sense of whether it exceeded the powers vested in it”). In Czaplinski v. Warden, 196 Md. 654, 658, 75 A.2d 766 (1950), the Court stated:
Where the sentence has been decreased after the term, the reported cases we have been able to find which discuss the point hold that this is also beyond the power of the court, generally upon the ground that when a sentence has been passed, and has become enrolled, the jurisdiction of the court is concluded and the court has no further authority.
(Emphasis in original).
Federal cases are in accord. Rule 4-345 is “virtually identical” to former Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b).6 Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 29, 39, 333 A.2d 37 (1975). Our review of the cases considering that federal rule7 and similar state rules modeled after the federal rule8 indicates that the [393]*393time limits encompassed therein are jurisdictional, and require dismissal if not observed. In 8A Moore’s Federal Practice § 35.06[1] (2d Ed., 1992 Rev.), the author states:
The Rule 35 requirement that motions to reduce sentence be filed within 120 days of the triggering events is a rigid limit on the jurisdiction of the district court to decide the motion.
Similarly, in 3 Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 587, at 410 (2d ed. 1982) the author concludes:
The time limits of Rule 35(b) are jurisdictional; if the motion is untimely under the rule and the sentence is a lawful one, the court is powerless to act.
(Footnote omitted).
We have examined and traced the limited but important common law right of appeal that has existed from the earliest days of this State through the time of Sonner, and we have determined that it is sufficiently broad to embrace the appeal taken in this case. We note that, although the right of appeal was originally to this Court, exclusive initial appellate jurisdiction in this type of case has been transferred to the Court of Special Appeals. See Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 12-308 (providing that “the Court of Special Appeals has exclusive initial appellate jurisdiction over any renewable judgment, decree, order or other action of a circuit court ...” except for the limited jurisdiction reserved to this Court pursuant to § 12-307). We now turn then to the question of whether the legislature has, by any statute enacted since Sonner, abolished that right.
The statute that applied in Sonner was Md.Code (1957,1968 RepLVol.), Art. 5, § 14. That section provided:
The State may appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from a final order or judgment granting a motion to dismiss, or quashing or dismissing any indictment, information, presentment or inquisition in a criminal action, but the State shall have no right of appeal in any criminal action where the defendant has been tried and acquitted.
[394]*394That statute, first enacted in this form by Chapter 399 of the Acts of 1957, defined certain instances when the State could appeal and expressly stated when the State could not appeal. This Court considered that statute in Sonner and said that “Art. 5, § 14 specified some instances in which there was a right of appeal by the State. It did not purport to limit the right of appeal.” 272 Md. at 525, 325 A.2d 573.
As a part of the Code revision process, the laws governing appeals were recodified in the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, effective January 1,1974. See Chapter 2, § 1, Acts of the First Extraordinary Session of 1973. Section 12-301 of the Courts Article granted general rights of appeal. Section 12-302(c) contained the following exception applicable to the State’s right of appeal in a criminal case:
In a criminal case, the [S]tate may appeal only from a final judgment granting a motion to dismiss or quashing or dismissing any indictment, information, presentment, or inquisition in a criminal case.
Md.Code (1974), Cts. & Jud.Proc. Art., § 12-302(c). There is no indication that the legislature intended to change the meaning of the law by this change in language. We have said repeatedly that
[rjecodification of statutes is presumed to be for the purpose of clarity rather than change of meaning. Thus, even a change in the phraseology of a statute by a codification will not ordinarily modify the law unless the change is so material that the intention of the General Assembly to modify the law appears unmistakably from the language of the Code.
In re Special Investigation No. 236, 295 Md. 573, 576-77, 458 A.2d 75 (1983). See also Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. Trustees, 322 Md. 442, 449, 588 A.2d 340 (1991); State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315 Md. 254, 265-66, 554 A.2d 366, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816, 110 S.Ct. 66, 107 L.Ed.2d 33 (1989); Nationwide v. USF & G, 314 Md. 131, 147, 550 A.2d 69 (1988); Rohrbaugh v. Estate of Stern, 305 Md. 443, 449-50, 505 A.2d 113 (1986); Consumer Protection v. Consumer Pub., 304 Md. [395]*395731, 768, 501 A.2d 48 (1985); Duffy v. Conaway, 295 Md. 242, 257-58, 455 A.2d 955 (1983). Moreover, the Revisor’s Note to § 12-302(c) makes it clear that there was no intention to alter the substantive rights that existed under Art. 5, § 14. The Revisor’s Note to § 12-302 explained briefly how the new statute differed from its predecessor:
REVISOR’S NOTE: Subsection (c) is essentially the language of Art. 5, § 14. The language proscribing an appeal by the State after an acquittal is omitted since the State may only appeal in the limited situations set forth in the section in any event.
Chapter 2, § 1, Acts of the First Extraordinary Session of 1973.
Thus, like its predecessor, § 12-302 should not be read as an absolute limitation on the State’s right of appeal. Even the inclusion of the word “only” in the new statute cannot now mandate a reading of the statute as limiting, for that word was deleted by amendment in 1976. See Chapter 49 of the Laws of 1976. When the statute was amended again in 1982, the proposed bill once again included the word “only,” but that word was deleted prior to enactment. See Chapter 493 of the Laws of 1982. Keeping in mind that we are bound to determine and enforce the intent of the legislature, Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398, 405, 535 A.2d 471 (1988), we think these facts indicate that the legislature enacted § 12-302 to codify the State’s right of appeal in certain circumstances, but not to strip the State of rights already established by common law.
The 1976 amendment is also significant in that it articulated another instance in which the State may bring an appeal. The 1976 version read:
(c) In a criminal case, the State may appeal:
(1) From a final judgment granting a motion to dismiss or quashing or dismissing any indictment, information, presentment, or inquisition; and
(2) From a final judgment if the State alleges that the trial judge failed to impose the sentence specifically mandated by the Code.
[396]*396McLCode (1974,1976 Cum.Supp.), Cts. & JucLProc. Art., § 12-302. This change is consistent with the approach taken by the legislature whenever it has dealt with the State’s right of appeal: spelling out specific instances when the State may appeal without abolishing the common law right to appeal when the lower court has acted outside its jurisdiction. Those provisions of the statute have remained essentially the same since 1976.9 We see nothing to indicate a legislative intent, in either 1976 or 1982, to strip the State of the right to appeal recognized in Fisher. In fact, the language of the statute and its subsequent amendments indicate that it should not be construed as a limit on the State’s right. Section 12-302(c), like its predecessor, Art. 5, § 14, lists instances where the State may appeal and may not appeal. What we said in Sonner about Art. 5, § 14 applies equally to § 12-302: “It did not purport to limit the right of appeal.” 272 Md. at 525, 325 A.2d 573. That is not to say that § 12-302 should be used as a basis for finding new rights of appeal; we merely hold that § 12-302 did not operate to eliminate the State’s long-standing and firmly established right of appeal from a final judgment involving action outside the jurisdiction of the lower court.
[397]*397In so holding, we acknowledge recent decisions in which this Court has entertained questions concerning the State’s right of appeal.10 See Shilling v. State, 320 Md. 288, 577 A.2d 83 (1990); Telak v. State, 315 Md. 568, 556 A.2d 225 (1989); State v. Hannah, 307 Md. 390, 514 A.2d 16 (1986). Those cases contain dicta that the statute “ ‘placed in serious question, if it did not completely eliminate, the State’s right to appeal an illegal sentence as recognized in the earlier cases and reiterated in Sonner.’ ” Telak, supra, 315 Md. at 573, 556 A.2d 225 (quoting Hannah, supra, 307 Md. at 399, 514 A.2d 16). See also Shilling, supra, 320 Md. at 294, 577 A.2d 83. We now make clear that the State’s limited common law right of appeal which we have described herein was not abolished by the enactment of § 12-302 or subsequent amendments thereto.
This Court has on many occasions, both civil11 and criminal, recognized that there must be some effective means of curtailing a trial judge who has gone completely beyond the bounds of judicial authority. Judicial review applies, not just to correct legal errors, but to prevent the usurpation of power. The fact that post-Sonner legislation codified certain of the State’s rights to appeal does not mean that it was intended to, [398]*398or did, abolish the right of appeal to challenge a judgment that was beyond the jurisdiction of an inferior court.
IV.
Conclusion
The trial judge had no authority or power to reduce a criminal sentence pursuant to a motion filed seven months after the imposition of sentence. This defect is not simply procedural, it is jurisdictional. The State has a continuing common law right to appeal an action that was outside the jurisdiction of the lower court, and this case was therefore properly before the Court of Special Appeals.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY and BELL, JJ, dissent.