Carbon Autonomous Robotic Systems Inc. v. Laudando & Assoc.

District Court, E.D. California·Decided May 7, 2025·No. 2:24-cv-03012·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CARBON AUTONOMOUS ROBOTIC No. 2:24-cv-03012-DAD-JDP SYSTEMS INC., 12 Plaintiff, 13 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S AND v. DEFENDANT’S REQUESTS TO SEAL 14 WITHOUT PREJUDICE LAUDANDO & ASSOCIATES LLC, 15 (Doc. Nos. 50, 59, 62) Defendant. 16

17 LAUDANDO & ASSOCIATES LLC, 18 Counter Claimant, 19 v. 20 CARBON AUTONOMOUS ROBOTIC 21 SYSTEMS INC., 22 Counter Defendant. 23 24 This matter is before the court on the requests to seal documents filed by plaintiff and 25 defendant. (Doc. Nos. 50, 59, 62.) In its requests to seal documents, plaintiff seeks to seal: “1. 26 Portions of Carbon’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Carbon’s Motion for 27 Preliminary Injunction; 2. Portions of the Declaration of Paul Mikesell; 3. Exhibit M1 to the 28 Declaration of Paul Mikesell; 4. Exhibit M4 to the Declaration of Paul Mikesell; and 5. Portions 1 of the Declaration of Jim Bergman” as well as “1. Portions of Carbon’s Reply in Support of its 2 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; 2. Portions of Exhibit 14 to the Supplemental Declaration of 3 Ralph W. Powers III; and 3. Portions of the Reply Declaration of Paul R. Weckler, Ph.D.” (Doc. 4 Nos. 50 at 2; 62 at 2.) Plaintiff represents in each of its requests that during its meet-and-confer 5 efforts, defendant counsel indicated that it does not oppose either of its requests to seal. (Doc. 6 Nos. 50 at 2–3; 62 at 2–3.) In its request, defendant seeks to seal: “1. L&A’s Memorandum of 7 Points and Authorities in Support of L&A’s Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction; and 8 2. Declaration of Christopher Laudando in Support of L&A’s Opposition to Motion for 9 Preliminary Injunction.” (Doc. No. 59 at 2.) Defendant represents in its request that during its 10 meet-and-confer efforts, plaintiff counsel indicated that it did not oppose this request to seal. (Id.) 11 The court observes that both parties have filed the redacted versions of the documents 12 they seek to seal on the court’s public docket, prior to leave to do so being granted by the court. 13 (See Doc. Nos. 49-1; 49-2; 49-5; 58; 58-1; 61; 61-1; 61-2.) In any event, for the reasons 14 explained below, all of the parties’ pending requests to seal will be denied without prejudice as 15 not adequately supported. 16 LEGAL STANDARD 17 All documents filed with the court are presumptively public. San Jose Mercury News, 18 Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999) (“It is well-established that the fruits 19 of pretrial discovery are, in the absence of a court order to the contrary, presumptively public.”). 20 “Historically, courts have recognized a ‘general right to inspect and copy public records and 21 documents, including judicial records and documents.’” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 22 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 23 597 & n.7 (1978)).1 24 Two standards generally govern requests to seal documents. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors 25 Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 2010). 26 1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(d), a court “may order that a filing be made 27 under seal without redaction.” However, even if a court permits such a filing, it may “later unseal the filing or order the person who made the filing to file a redacted version for the public record.” 28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(d). 1 [J]udicial records attached to dispositive motions [are treated] differently from records attached to non-dispositive motions. Those 2 who seek to maintain the secrecy of documents attached to dispositive motions must meet the high threshold of showing that 3 “compelling reasons” support secrecy. A “good cause” showing under Rule 26(c) will suffice to keep sealed records attached to non- 4 dispositive motions. 5 Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 6 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2003)). The reason for these two different standards is that “[n]ondispositive 7 motions are often unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action, and, as 8 a result, the public’s interest in accessing dispositive materials does not apply with equal force to 9 non-dispositive materials.” Pintos, 605 F.3d at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). 10 Under the “compelling reasons” standard applicable to dispositive motions, such as a 11 motion to dismiss: 12 [T]he court must conscientiously balance the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records 13 secret. After considering these interests, if the court decides to seal certain judicial records, it must base its decision on a compelling 14 reason and articulate the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture. 15 16 Id. at 1178–79 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The party seeking to seal a 17 judicial record bears the burden of meeting the “compelling reasons” standard. Id. at 1178. 18 While the terms “dispositive” and “non-dispositive” motions are often used in this 19 context, the Ninth Circuit has clarified that the “compelling reasons” standard applies whenever 20 the motion at issue “is more than tangentially related to the merits of a case.” Ctr. for Auto Safety 21 v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2016). 22 “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to . . . justify sealing court records exist when 23 such ‘court files might . . . become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to 24 gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade 25 secrets.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). “The mere fact that the 26 production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to 27 further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id. Finally, “[t]he 28 ///// 1 ‘compelling reasons’ standard is invoked even if the dispositive motion, or its attachments, were 2 previously filed under seal or protective order.” Id. at 1178–79. 3 DISCUSSION 4 The requests to seal at issue were filed in relation to a motion for preliminary injunction. 5 In some instances, the proposed filing of documents under seal in connection with motions for 6 preliminary injunctions, motions for sanctions, or motions in limine—though such motions are 7 not dispositive—may be governed by the “compelling reasons” test, which is predicated on the 8 right of access and the need to “provide the public with a more complete understanding of the 9 judicial system and a better perception of its fairness.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1101–02. 10 The Ninth Circuit has held that when a motion for preliminary injunction is “more than 11 tangentially related to the merits” that the “compelling reasons” test applies. Id. Plaintiff’s 12 motion for preliminary injunction involves a determination of whether plaintiff is likely to 13 succeed on the merits of its claim that defendant is infringing at least one of its patents. (Doc. 14 No. 49-1 at 16.) Moreover, the relief sought by plaintiff in moving for a preliminary injunction is 15 that the court order defendant to not launch its allegedly infringing product until this action is 16 resolved. (Id.

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Carbon Autonomous Robotic Systems Inc. v. Laudando & Assoc., (E.D. Cal. 2025).

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