Carbajal-Aguilar v. Loya Insurance Company

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *

7 MONICA CARBAJAL-AGUILAR, et al., Case No. 2:24-cv-02115-RFB-NJK

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER

9 v.

10 LOYA INSURANCE COMPANY dba FRED 11 LOYA INSURANCE, et al.,

12 Defendants.

14 Before the Court for consideration is Plaintiffs Monica Carbajal-Aguilar and Oscar 15 Paramo’s (ECF No. 5) Motion to Remand. For the following reasons, the Court grants the Motion 16 and remands this case. 17 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 On October 10, 2024, Plaintiffs, who are Nevada citizens, filed their Complaint in Eighth 20 Judicial District Court of Clark County, Nevada. ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiffs allege they were injured 21 in a car accident caused by non-party Jesus Gonzalez, who was insured by Defendant. Id. In July 22 2022, Plaintiffs sued Gonzalez for their injuries sustained in the accident. See ECF No. 1. That 23 suit resulted in a total judgment amount of $75,547 to Plaintiff Carbajal-Aguilar and $51,110 to 24 Plaintiff Paramo, including attorney’s fees and interest. Id. In September 2024, Plaintiffs obtained 25 a judicial assignment of Gonzalez’s rights against Defendant, and subsequently brought the present 26 action asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair 27 dealing, and violations of the Nevada Unfair Claims Practices Act (N.R.S. 686A). Id. On October 28 1 16, 2024, Defendant was served. ECF No. 1-3. On November 12, 2024, Defendant filed its 2 Answer. ECF No. 1-4. On November 13, 2024, at 8:23 a.m., Plaintiffs filed a First Amended 3 Complaint which removed the prayer for punitive damages and purported to limit Plaintiffs 4 damages to “total combined damages not to exceed $74,999.99.” ECF No. 1-5. 5 On November 13, 2024 at 1:46 p.m., Defendant filed its Notice of Removal pursuant to 28 6 U.S.C. § 1441(b) and § 1446, which stated that Defendant is a citizen of Texas and thus diverse 7 from the Nevada Plaintiffs; and the amount in controversy is in excess of $75,000 from the face 8 of the Complaint, because Plaintiffs seek payment by Defendant of their combined $126,000 9 judgment, as well as post-judgment interest, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. ECF No. 1. 10 However, on August 13, 2024, Defendant paid $25,000 to each Plaintiff toward their judgment, 11 leaving a balance of $50,547.99 for Plaintiff Carbajal-Aguilar, and $26,110.21 for Plaintiff 12 Paramo. See ECF Nos. 5-1; 5-2. 13 On November 19, 2024, Defendant proposed to stipulate to remand this action if Plaintiffs 14 would agree they would not seek more than $75,000 in damages, however, Plaintiffs’ counsel 15 refused to drop the claim for attorney’s fees and costs. ECF No. 7-1. Plaintiffs offered to settle for 16 $75,000. Id. The negotiations continued without resolution until the filing of the Motion to 17 Remand. Id. On November 25, 2024, Defendant filed its Statement Regarding Removal, which 18 reiterated the jurisdictional facts in the Petition for Removal. ECF No. 4. 19 On December 13, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Remand. ECF No. 5. On December 20 26, 2024, Defendant filed its Opposition. ECF No. 6. On January 10, 2025, the parties filed a 21 Stipulation to Remand, wherein Plaintiffs agreed—in exchange for Defendant’s agreement to have 22 the matter remanded back to state court—they would not seek, and could not recover, more than 23 $75,000 in total damages in this action, including attorney’s fees but excluding interest and costs. 24 ECF No. 8. On February 4, 2025, the parties filed a second Stipulation to Remand. ECF No. 15. 25 On April 14, 2025, the Court denied the Stipulations to Remand without prejudice, with leave to 26 refile a stipulation that the amount in controversy did not meet the jurisdictional threshold at the 27 time of removal. ECF No. 16. No such stipulation was filed. 28 The Court’s Order on the Motion to Remand follows. 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Removal of a state action may be based on either diversity jurisdiction or federal question 3 jurisdiction. City of Chicago v. Int'l College of Surgeons, 552 U.S. 156, 163 (1997); Caterpillar 4 Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Jordan v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, 781 F.3d 1178, 5 1181 (9th Cir. 2015). Diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a) grants original jurisdiction to a district 6 court when there is both complete diversity of citizenship and an amount-in-controversy exceeding 7 $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 8 “The burden of establishing removal jurisdiction . . . lies with the defendant seeking 9 removal.” Washington v. Chimei Innolux Corp., 659 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2011); Geographic 10 Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2010) 11 (“[T]he proponent of federal jurisdiction—typically the defendant in the substantive dispute—has 12 the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that removal is proper.”). Courts “strictly 13 construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and any doubts as to removability 14 should be resolved in favor of remanding the case. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 15 1992) (citations omitted). Thus, “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to 16 the right of removal in the first instance.” Id. “The ‘strong presumption’ against removal 17 jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” 18 Id.; see also Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006). 19 The removability of a civil action filed in state court is “generally determined as of the time 20 of the petition for removal.” Local Union 598, Plumbers & Pipefitters Industry Journeymen & 21 Apprentices Training Fund v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 846 F.2d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, 22 “jurisdiction must be analyzed on the basis of the pleadings filed at the time of removal.” Sparta 23 Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998). 24 “For removal purposes, the amount of damages sought in the complaint controls.” Hall v. 25 North American Van Lines, Inc., 476 F.3d 683, 689 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, where the state 26 complaint alleges an amount in controversy in excess of the statutory limit, “such requirement is 27 presumptively satisfied unless it appears to a ‘legal certainty’ that the plaintiff cannot actually 28 recover that amount.” Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2007). 1 Whereas if a plaintiff “has pled damages less than the jurisdictional amount,” the “party seeking 2 removal must prove with ‘legal certainty’ that the amount in controversy is satisfied, 3 notwithstanding the prayer for relief in the complaint.” Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 4 F.3d 994, 996 (9th Cir. 2007) overruling on other grounds recognized by Rodriguez v. AT & T 5 Mobility Servs. LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 998 (9th Cir. 2013). 6 7 III. DISCUSSION 8 The parties do not dispute that there is diversity of citizenship—the sole dispute is whether 9 the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 at the time of removal. Singer v. State Farm Mut. 10 Auto Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373 (9th Cir. 1997) (“‘Events occurring subsequent to the institution of 11 suit [or removal] which reduce the amount recoverable below the statutory limit do not oust 12 jurisdiction.’”) (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-90 13 (1938)). Although Plaintiffs amended their complaint several hours before Defendant filed its 14 Notice of Removal and purported to limit their claimed damages in their prayer for relief to 15 $74,999.99, in determining removability based on the amount in controversy, Defendant can offer, 16 and the Court can consider, evidence outside the First Amended Complaint to prove the 17 jurisdictional threshold was met at the time of removal. See e.g., id. at 376-77. 18 Defendant relies on the following facts to establish the jurisdictional minimum was met at 19 the time of removal. First, if Plaintiffs succeed on their bad faith failure to settle claims as set forth 20 in their First Amended Complaint, they would recover the amount of the excess judgment, which 21 Plaintiffs concede is a combined amount of $76,768. That alone, Defendant argues, is sufficient to 22 show the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 at the time of removal. Defendant also points 23 to the fact that Plaintiffs demanded $75,000 to settle the case and would not agree to stipulate to 24 limit their recovery to below $75,000. Finally, Defendant points to the fact that Plaintiffs’ claim 25 for attorney’s fees, which are recoverable by statute, also establishes the jurisdictional minimum. 26 Defendant has failed to establish the jurisdictional threshold was met at the time of removal 27 to a “legal certainty,” despite the $74,999.99 limitation in the prayer for relief. See Lowdermilk, 28 479 F.3d at 996. That is because although Plaintiffs together would recover over $75,000 on their 1 failure to settle claims, based on the combined excess judgment amount of $76,768, separately, 2| their claims are for significantly less than the jurisdictional threshold: $50,547.99 for Plaintiff 3| Carbajal-Aguilar, and $26,110.21 for Plaintiff Paramo. “‘[W]hen two or more plaintiffs, having 4| separate and distinct demands, unite for convenience and economy in a single suit, it is essential 5 | that the demand of each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount.’” Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 6| F.3d 927, 943 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40 (1911)). Likewise, Plaintiffs combined settlement demand for $75,000 fails to establish that each 8 | Plaintiff □□□ a claim with an amount-in-controversy exceeding $75,000. And Defendant has failed to establish that each Plaintiffs attorney’s fees would bring the amount-in-controversy in their 10 | individual claims over the threshold. 11 Therefore, Defendant has failed to meet its burden to establish removal jurisdiction. The 12 | Court finds it lacks jurisdiction over this action because the amount in controversy requirement 13 | was not met at the time of removal, and remand is proper. 14 15 IV. CONCLUSION 16 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the (ECF No. 5) Motion for Remand is 17 | GRANTED. This case is REMANDED to the Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County, 18 | Nevada. 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pending Motions (ECF Nos 19, 21) are DENIED 20 | without prejudice as moot. 21 The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. 22 DATED: September 26, 2025. 23 24 Fe 25 RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 26 27 28

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