Caravan Gifts, Inc. v. Ho Sang Whang

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Caravan Gifts, Inc. v. Ho Sang Whang

181 A.D.2d 618, 581 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1992 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4137

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 26, 1992

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 181 A.D.2d 618 (Caravan Gifts, Inc. v. Ho Sang Whang) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Caravan Gifts, Inc. v. Ho Sang Whang, 181 A.D.2d 618, 581 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1992 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4137 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1992).

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Opinion

— Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Francis N. Pécora, J.), entered on February 25, 1991, which, insofar as appealed from, denied plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on its first cause of action, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The pertinent portions of the parties’ security agreement on which the first cause of action is based are susceptible to differing interpretations supportive of either of the positions urged by the parties, and thus parol evidence may be considered to determine the parties’ intent (67 Wall St. Co. v Franklin Natl. Bank, 37 NY2d 245, 248). Summary judgment is inappropriate where, as here, the intent of the parties [619]*619cannot be determined from the face of the agreement (see, e.g., IBM Credit Fin. Corp. v Mazda Motor Mfg. [USA] Corp., 152 AD2d 451). Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Milonas, Rosenberger, Ross and Kassal, JJ.

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— Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Francis N. Pécora, J.), entered on February 25, 1991, which, insofar as appealed from, denied plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on its first cause of action, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The pertinent portions of the parties’ security agreement on which the first cause of action is based are susceptible to differing interpretations supportive of either of the positions urged by the parties, and thus parol evidence may be considered to determine the parties’ intent (67 Wall St. Co. v Franklin Natl. Bank, 37 NY2d 245, 248). Summary judgment is inappropriate where, as here, the intent of the parties [619]*619cannot be determined from the face of the agreement (see, e.g., IBM Credit Fin. Corp. v Mazda Motor Mfg. [USA] Corp., 152 AD2d 451). Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Milonas, Rosenberger, Ross and Kassal, JJ.

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181 A.D.2d 618, 581 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1992 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4137, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/caravan-gifts-inc-v-ho-sang-whang-nyappdiv-1992.

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