Carafa, L. v. Carafa, F.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania·Decided May 12, 2023·No. 1622 EDA 2022·Unpublished

Opinion

J-A07008-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

LOUISE A. CARAFA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : FRANK N. CARAFA : : Appellant : No. 1622 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered June 20, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at No(s): CV-2009-015174

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED MAY 12, 2023

Appellant, Frank N. Carafa (“Husband”), appeals from the August 3,

2022 order1 entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas that

denied his April 8, 2021 Petition for Special Relief and granted attorney’s fees

to Appellee, Louise A. Carafa (“Wife”). Upon review, we affirm.2

Husband and Wife have been involved in highly contentious and litigious

divorce proceedings since 2009 when the parties separated after thirty-five

years of marriage, and Wife filed a divorce complaint. The trial court entered

an equitable distribution order on November 16, 2016, and a final divorce

decree on June 27, 2017. On April 10, 2019, Wife filed a Petition to Distribute

____________________________________________

1The order is dated August 2, 2022, but the court did not docket the order until August 3, 2022.

2 Wife’s March 8, 2023 Motion for Leave of Court to File Sur Reply Brief is granted and we accept the Sur Reply Brief filed on March 8, 2023. J-A07008-23

the Marital Estate and, on June 26, 2019, the court entered an Agreed Order

for Distribution.

On July 9, 2019, Husband filed a Petition for Special Relief to Vacate or

Set Aside Final Equitable Distribution Order. On February 24, 2021, after a

hearing on the petition, the trial court denied the petition and found that

Husband “has failed to present a scintilla of evidence to substantiate his

continued allegations of fraud in connection with the Equitable Distribution

Hearing held in September 2016 and the Final Equitable Distribution Order,

dated November 16, 2016 in this matter, despite this Court having given him

ample opportunity to do so.” Trial Ct. Op., dated 8/1/22, at 1-2 (citing N.T.

6/8/20 at 67, 70, 107).

On April 8, 2021, Husband filed the instant Petition for Special Relief

once again challenging the equitable distribution order and asserting fraud.

Wife filed an Answer and Counterclaim, requesting attorney’s fees. After a

hearing, the trial court denied Husband’s petition and ordered Husband to pay

Wife’s attorney’s fees.

Husband timely appealed. Both Husband and the trial court complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.3 ____________________________________________

3 In addressing Husband’s issues, the trial court opined:

All claims in this case have been fully and fairly litigated and [Husband] is collaterally estopped from raising any alleged claim for interest income. The [c]ourt concludes that [Husband] is essentially asking this [c]ourt to reconsider [the 2016 equitable (Footnote Continued Next Page)

-2- J-A07008-23

In his Statement of Questions, Husband raises the following issues for

our review:

1. May the court deny relief to a party where the court based its denial in part on irrelevant, unwarranted, and speculative findings without factual basis?

2. May a party be assessed counsel fees, sanctions, and costs where there was no proof offered in support of excessive, punitive, unwarranted award, and not subject to a hearing before this court as required by the applicable Rules?

3. May the court base its conclusions on speculative or false assumptions and argument not supported by facts or testimony before the court in this proceeding.

4. May the court peremptorily find and conclude any further attempt by the Defendant to relitigate . . . etc. is without merit and . . . serves to harass the Plaintiff[,] denying a party Constitutional rights and create[ing] a barrier to the party’s access to this court. ____________________________________________

distribution order], which is both improper and impermissible. . . The [c]ourt concludes, and the Divorce Code makes clear, that beyond thirty (30) days, a decree cannot be vacated absent fraud which is collateral to the proceedings. The [c]ourt concludes [that the court previously found that Husband] has failed to present a scintilla of evidence to substantiate his continued allegations of fraud in connection with the Equitable Distribution Hearing held in September 2016 . . . despite this [c]ourt having given him ample opportunity to do so. [Husband] herein continues to litigate and re-litigate, attempting to open up his divorce case years after a Final Divorce Decree has been entered, now acknowledging that he is appealing solely to the equitable powers of the [c]ourt, while [Wife] is being forced to continue to expend attorney’s fees. This conduct on the part of [Husband] in continuing to litigate and re- litigate this case is without merit and simply serves as an effort to harass [Wife]. [Husband]’s conduct is clearly obdurate and vexatious and [Wife] is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.

Trial Ct. Op., filed 8/2/22 at 7, 16.

-3- J-A07008-23

Husband’s Br. at 7 (some capitalization omitted).

This Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant or deny special relief

in divorce actions for an abuse of discretion. Conway v. Conway, 209 A.3d

367, 371 (Pa. Super. 2019). “An abuse of discretion exists when the trial court

has rendered a decision or a judgment which is manifestly unreasonable,

arbitrary, or capricious, has failed to apply the law, or was motivated by

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Id. (citation omitted).

In his Argument section, Husband essentially abandons the issues as

stated in his Statement of Questions. Specifically, Husband fails to identify

which trial court findings and conclusions are speculative, fails to provide any

argument regarding the award of attorney’s fees, and fails to develop an

argument regarding a violation of his constitutional rights.

Instead, Husband avers that the equitable distribution order provided

for an equal division of assets and argues that he paid state and federal

income taxes on assets that were subsequently assigned to Wife. Husband’s

Br. at 15. Husband contends that Wife owes him 50% of the $163,000 that

he unfairly paid in taxes. Id.

It is axiomatic that issues not presented in an appellant’s Statement of

Questions Involved or “fairly suggested thereby” will not be considered.

Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a); Commonwealth v. Felder, 247 A.3d 14, 20 (Pa. Super.

2021). Further, an appellant is required to develop an argument regarding

issues raised with reference to the record, citation and discussion of pertinent

authorities. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (listing argument requirements for appellate

-4- J-A07008-23

briefs). “The Rules of Appellate Procedure . . . state unequivocally that each

question an appellant raises is to be supported by discussion and analysis of

pertinent authority.” Commonwealth v. Martz, 232 A.3d 801, 811 (Pa.

Super. 2020) (citation omitted).

Here, assuming that Husband’s argument is fairly suggested by the

questions presented, he fails to develop it in a meaningful and coherent way.

Although Husband cites boilerplate law, he fails to apply the law to the facts

of this case in a meaningful and coherent manner as required by our Rules of

Appellate Procedure and case law. It is not the role of this Court to develop

an appellant's argument where the brief provides mere cursory legal

discussion.

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