OPALA, J.
¶ 1 Two issues are presented on certiorari: (1) Did COCA err when it reversed the nisi prius judge’s new-trial order? and (2) Did COCA identify and apply on appeal the correct standard of review? Because both questions are answered in the negative, we reverse the nisi prius new-trial grant by applying an analysis that differs from that used by COCA.
I.
ANATOMY OF THE LITIGATION
¶2 This action arose from an automobile accident in which a pickup truck driven by Terry Capshaw (Capshaw, plaintiff or appel-lee) was struck from the rear by a semi tractor driven by Sam Coronado, an employee of Koch Trucking, Inc. (together with Stan Koch & Sons Trucking Inc., and Gulf Insurance Co., collectively to be known as Coronado, defendant or appellant). The basic facts are uncontested. Immediately preceding the accident Capshaw was stopped at an intersection awaiting a green traffic signal. Coronado came to a stop behind him. Capshaw proceeded through the intersection and then stopped to make a left turn. Coronado’s truck rear-ended plaintiffs pickup.
¶3 A trial by jury dealt with contested issues of liability and with whether Capshaw sustained any injury from this collision.2 Coronado also urged Capshaw’s contributory negligence. At the close of the evidence, after instructions were read, the verdict form was handed to the jury. Although the parties tendered for the court’s use in the case Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction (OUJI) verdict forms,3 none objected to the nonstandard form selected by the judge.4 By a unanimous verdict, the jury found none of the parties to have been negligent and awarded no recovery.5 The trial judge — in [598] conversation with both parties’ counsel and outside the jury’s hearing — then expressed sua sponte his concern that he submitted to the jury a flawed verdict form6 Although the form permitted a no-negligenee finding, the judge did not think the jury was free to find, under the submitted theories of the case, none of the parties negligent but rather was required to find the sum of the parties’ negligence to be no less than one hundred percent.7 Both parties’ counsel seemed deferential to the judge’s concern. Capshaw’s lawyer suggested a mistrial. Coronado’s counsel urged that the jury be re-instructed and afforded the opportunity to deliberate further. The judge accepted neither suggestion. He directed the verdict be read and accepted. The jury was discharged. Upon the judge’s request for post-verdict motions, [599] Capshaw moved for a mistrial, a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. When the new-trial motion was sustained, Coronado appealed.
¶4 On appeal Coronado urged the trial judge abused his discretion because: (1) the record is silent concerning the basis for a new-trial grant; (2) if the basis is an alleged error in the blank verdict form, Capshaw, by his failure timely to preserve this perceived defect, waived the error he now alleges in his motion for new trial;8 (3) the trial judge could have used less drastic means to correct the verdict; and (4) there was competent evidence to support the jury’s verdict.9 According to Capshaw, the trial court did not err. This is so because the verdict form— which permitted the jury to find that none of the litigants was negligent even though the defense of unavoidable accident was not urged — is fraught with fundamental (manifest) error. According to plaintiff, this error misled the jury and detrimentally affected its assessment of damages.
¶ 5 COCA did not address itself to whether the verdict form was tainted by fundamental error. Its opinion is bottomed on the rationale that a jury may find liability and yet limit or assess no damages.10 It concluded that although insofar as it dealt with the litigants’ negligence the jury verdict could have been corrected, its decision not to award damages adequately serves as a resolution of the dispute and as grounds to deny the new-trial motion.11 Any defect in the form was not fatal, and a new trial should not have been granted. COCA reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the cause with instructions to reinstate the jury’s verdict that allowed no recovery. Capshaw sought certiorari relief.
II.
COCA ERRED IN ITS SELECTION AND APPLICATION OF THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 6 We first turn to Capshaw’s argument that COCA’s pronouncement fails to apply the correct standard of appellate review. COCA’s opinion reveals that the issue before it was reviewed as one of law12 and the standard to be used as that of abused discretion.13 It then references the terms of [600]*60020 O.S.2001 § 3001.1,14 whose review standard deals with appellate reversal of a jury verdict by granting a new trial. This confusion is magnified by some of COCA’s language that appears later in the opinion and, according to Capshaw, incorrectly places the burden of proof on him as the appellee,15
¶7 A motion for new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.16 When a trial court grants a new trial and its decision is appealed, we will indulge every presumption in favor of that decision’s correctness.17 In reviewing a trial court’s grant of new trial, the standard of review an appellate court must apply is whether the trial court abused its discretion.18 Because a trial court’s discretion is broad its ruling will not be disturbed by the reviewing tribunal in the absence of a clear showing of a manifest error or abuse of discretion with respect to a pure, simple and unmixed material question of law.19
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OPALA, J.
¶ 1 Two issues are presented on certiorari: (1) Did COCA err when it reversed the nisi prius judge’s new-trial order? and (2) Did COCA identify and apply on appeal the correct standard of review? Because both questions are answered in the negative, we reverse the nisi prius new-trial grant by applying an analysis that differs from that used by COCA.
I.
ANATOMY OF THE LITIGATION
¶2 This action arose from an automobile accident in which a pickup truck driven by Terry Capshaw (Capshaw, plaintiff or appel-lee) was struck from the rear by a semi tractor driven by Sam Coronado, an employee of Koch Trucking, Inc. (together with Stan Koch & Sons Trucking Inc., and Gulf Insurance Co., collectively to be known as Coronado, defendant or appellant). The basic facts are uncontested. Immediately preceding the accident Capshaw was stopped at an intersection awaiting a green traffic signal. Coronado came to a stop behind him. Capshaw proceeded through the intersection and then stopped to make a left turn. Coronado’s truck rear-ended plaintiffs pickup.
¶3 A trial by jury dealt with contested issues of liability and with whether Capshaw sustained any injury from this collision.2 Coronado also urged Capshaw’s contributory negligence. At the close of the evidence, after instructions were read, the verdict form was handed to the jury. Although the parties tendered for the court’s use in the case Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction (OUJI) verdict forms,3 none objected to the nonstandard form selected by the judge.4 By a unanimous verdict, the jury found none of the parties to have been negligent and awarded no recovery.5 The trial judge — in [598] conversation with both parties’ counsel and outside the jury’s hearing — then expressed sua sponte his concern that he submitted to the jury a flawed verdict form6 Although the form permitted a no-negligenee finding, the judge did not think the jury was free to find, under the submitted theories of the case, none of the parties negligent but rather was required to find the sum of the parties’ negligence to be no less than one hundred percent.7 Both parties’ counsel seemed deferential to the judge’s concern. Capshaw’s lawyer suggested a mistrial. Coronado’s counsel urged that the jury be re-instructed and afforded the opportunity to deliberate further. The judge accepted neither suggestion. He directed the verdict be read and accepted. The jury was discharged. Upon the judge’s request for post-verdict motions, [599] Capshaw moved for a mistrial, a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. When the new-trial motion was sustained, Coronado appealed.
¶4 On appeal Coronado urged the trial judge abused his discretion because: (1) the record is silent concerning the basis for a new-trial grant; (2) if the basis is an alleged error in the blank verdict form, Capshaw, by his failure timely to preserve this perceived defect, waived the error he now alleges in his motion for new trial;8 (3) the trial judge could have used less drastic means to correct the verdict; and (4) there was competent evidence to support the jury’s verdict.9 According to Capshaw, the trial court did not err. This is so because the verdict form— which permitted the jury to find that none of the litigants was negligent even though the defense of unavoidable accident was not urged — is fraught with fundamental (manifest) error. According to plaintiff, this error misled the jury and detrimentally affected its assessment of damages.
¶ 5 COCA did not address itself to whether the verdict form was tainted by fundamental error. Its opinion is bottomed on the rationale that a jury may find liability and yet limit or assess no damages.10 It concluded that although insofar as it dealt with the litigants’ negligence the jury verdict could have been corrected, its decision not to award damages adequately serves as a resolution of the dispute and as grounds to deny the new-trial motion.11 Any defect in the form was not fatal, and a new trial should not have been granted. COCA reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the cause with instructions to reinstate the jury’s verdict that allowed no recovery. Capshaw sought certiorari relief.
II.
COCA ERRED IN ITS SELECTION AND APPLICATION OF THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 6 We first turn to Capshaw’s argument that COCA’s pronouncement fails to apply the correct standard of appellate review. COCA’s opinion reveals that the issue before it was reviewed as one of law12 and the standard to be used as that of abused discretion.13 It then references the terms of [600]*60020 O.S.2001 § 3001.1,14 whose review standard deals with appellate reversal of a jury verdict by granting a new trial. This confusion is magnified by some of COCA’s language that appears later in the opinion and, according to Capshaw, incorrectly places the burden of proof on him as the appellee,15
¶7 A motion for new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.16 When a trial court grants a new trial and its decision is appealed, we will indulge every presumption in favor of that decision’s correctness.17 In reviewing a trial court’s grant of new trial, the standard of review an appellate court must apply is whether the trial court abused its discretion.18 Because a trial court’s discretion is broad its ruling will not be disturbed by the reviewing tribunal in the absence of a clear showing of a manifest error or abuse of discretion with respect to a pure, simple and unmixed material question of law.19
118 An appellate court’s standard of review is not mere ritualistic legal liturgy. It defines the permissible sweep of critical testing to be undertaken by a reviewing court. Its recitation must be correct and serve more significantly than as an empty gesture.20 Although initially identifying and appearing to apply the correct standard of review — abuse of discretion — COCA also injects a different standard, that embodied in the terms of § 3001.1.21 The cited provision is inapplicable to today’s procedural scenario. That section targets only appellate dispositions that reverse judgments on jury verdict by granting a new trial. Today’s cause does not deal with that type of disposition. Even if we were to conclude that the § 3001.1 criteria were not employed by COCA — and hence their insertion merely superfluous— COCA’s reference to those statutory terms appears misleading.
¶ 9 Moreover, the burden to establish a trial court’s abused discretion when granting a new trial rests upon the appellant, not on the appellee. COCA’s choice of words— “Capshaw has not show(n) otherwise”— seemingly infers that appellee has not met [601] his burden to show the trial court’s decision is error free. It was Coronado’s, not Cap-shaw’s, burden on appeal to show that the trial judge abused his discretion in deciding a critical question of law. In view of its reference to conflicting tests and of COCA’s oblique language for defining an appellant’s burden on review, we cannot say that COCA’s pronouncement was guided by the correctly applicable standard of review.
III.
THE NEW-TRIAL MOTION
A.
ARGUMENTS ON CERTIORARI
¶ 10 Having settled the proper review standard to be used, we now turn to whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted plaintiffs new-trial motion. COCA’s opinion rests on the teaching that a jury may legitimately find negligence without assessing damages.22 Capshaw agrees that this is indeed a correct statement of Oklahoma jurisprudence, but that a jury determination carries legitimacy only if the triers were properly instructed. He asserts use either of a flawed verdict form or of confusing instructions that mislead the jury and result in a verdict that is different from that which it otherwise would have rendered may not be allowed to stand.23 Here, the form permitted no-negligence findings for any party which, he contends, is a fundamentally flawed statement of Oklahoma law.24 This confused and misled the jury. According to plaintiff, the critical rule of law which might have been used here — that the apportioned, aggregate negligence by all parties must total one hundred percent — was omitted from the non-standard verdict form.25 The trial judge, urges Capshaw, recognized an error because no proper evaluation of the evidence can justify a finding of no negligence by the defendant.26 According to plaintiff, this error led the jury to make findings about damages that would have been different but for this defect.27 The trial judge did not hence err in exercising his discretion by a new-trial grant.
¶ 11 Coronado responds (1) plaintiffs contention the verdict form confused the jury and tainted the trial’s outcome is merely speculative and hence cannot stand as the basis for a new trial and (2) even if the verdict form were incorrect there is here [602] competent proof to support the jury’s verdict.28
B.
CAPSHAW FAILED TIMELY TO EXCEPT TO THE BLANK VERDICT FORM
¶ 12 Capshaw’s contention is, in essence, twofold: (1) the blank verdict form was fraught with a fatal facial defect and (2) this defect operated to taint the jury’s decision against awarding damages. Coronado’s COCA briefs (although not his certiorari materials) urge that Capshaw failed timely to except to the verdict form and hence waived the error he later alleged in his new-trial motion.29 Concern over whether an efficacious exception to the form was indeed made by Capshaw may explain his characterization of the form as tainted by “fundamental error.” 30 The record is clear that neither party excepted to the blank verdict form before its submission to the jury.31 The trial judge’s sua sponte challenge to the form in his post-trial colloquy with counsel was the basis of Capshaw’s new-trial motion.32 Although COCA’s opinion did not address whether Capshaw made a timely challenge to the blank form and hence preserved the asserted defect as a basis for his new-trial motion, we must examine Coronado’s argument in light of the scenario revealed by the record.33
¶ 13 An allegation of error in a motion for new trial must be based on an error preserved in the course of trial proceedings.34 If the motion is rested on an [603] error that does not stand preserved for review, it is of no avail as a party’s support for its new-trial quest.35 Oklahoma’s extant jurisprudence reveals that an exception to an alleged defect in a blank verdict form must be lodged before the form is given to the jury and that failure to do so constitutes waiver of the error.36 Here, both parties submitted proposed verdict forms for the court’s use and both were aware of the blank form submitted by the court. Neither party excepted.37 The nisi prius judge’s post-verdict sua sponte notice of an alleged defect, upon which plaintiffs new-trial motion came to be based, was too late. An exception to a blank verdict form may not be interposed for the first time in a motion for new trial. To preserve that error for review here, Capshaw must have excepted to the blank verdict form at the pre-submission stage of the case, i.e., simultaneously with exceptions to jury instructions.
c.
THE VERDICT FORM IN CONTEST CONTAINS NO MANIFEST ERROR
¶ 14 Because Capshaw urges the blank verdict form is fundamentally (manifestly) flawed — a claim that may be presented absent a preserved trial-court exception— we proceed to review the verdict form in contest. We find it not fatally defective on its face. It is neither inconsistent nor incapable of translation into a final jury resolution fit as a legal judgment. Capshaw’s assertion — the aggregate of the parties’ negligence must total one hundred percent is mistakenly absent from the form — is incorrect. The form provides that negligence, if any, which is to be apportioned among the parties must total either zero or one hundred percent. This is no misstatement of law. [604] The mere happening of an accident is not indicative of negligence. The jury is the trier of fact. In any negligence case the jury is free to find that none of the parties was negligent. Its freedom to make this choice does not depend on the plead defense of unavoidable accident. Finding no negligence on the part of any party is the jury’s prerogative, not an aberration. The jury here was at liberty to assess negligence among the parties in any percentage (equaling zero or one hundred percent) expressive of its findings. The form simply combines the rules of law that pertain to negligence into a single statement. It provides the jury the full panoply of available legal options pressed for by the litigants: negligence, no negligence or contributory negligence. Apportioning one hundred percent negligence among the parties is an option embodied within the form’s parameters. The jury did not in this case choose to make this finding.
¶ 15 Neither party argued that the form restricts the jury’s choices. If the form might be perceived as tainted it is only because it might lead one to conclude that when the parties’ apportioned negligence does not equal one hundred percent, the verdict should be zero. The form gives the jury a choice between zero and one hundred percent. This is not a fatally defective choice. We would be straining to conclude that it operates to strip the jury of any of its authority to assess negligence in any proportion to its findings. Here, the jury disagreed with the notion of foisting negligence on the defendant and of the defendant foisting contributory negligence on the plaintiff. The record reveals the jury could have inferred that both vehicles were proceeding properly and in the exercise of due care, and that the collision between them occurred without negligence on the part of either driver.38 It could also have determined that plaintiffs alleged injuries, if any, were pre-existing and neither the result of this accident nor aggravated by its occurrence.39 As a matter of law one is free to deduce that since both parties are declared free of negligence neither can foist liability upon the other. In short, the plaintiff was declared not to be entitled to recover.40 The order granting a new trial is hence erroneous as a matter of law.
IY.
SUMMARY
¶ 16 To preserve for review an alleged defect in a blank verdict form, an exception to the form must be lodged in the pre-submission stage of case, i.e., in conjunction with exceptions to jury instructions. The nisi prius judge’s sua sponte notice of an alleged defect, upon which plaintiffs new-trial motion was based, came too late. The error was not preserved for review by a timely exception from Capshaw. Neither is the blank verdict form tainted by manifest error. Although a non-standard verdict form was used, it permitted a jury to find negligence, no negligence or contributory negligence in any proportion that totaled either zero or one hundred percent. The jury, as the trier of fact, is free to decide that neither party was negligent and hence none is entitled to damages. The record reveals competent evidence to support this finding. The trial court erred when it granted plaintiffs quest for a new trial. We hence reverse the trial court’s new-trial grant, reinstate the jury verdict, and order judgment to be entered on the verdict.
¶ 17 On certiorari previously granted upon Capshaw’s petition, the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion is vacated; the trial court’s new-trial grant is reversed and the judgment on the reinstated jury verdict is ordered to be entered.
¶ 18 WINCHESTER, V.J., LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, EDMONDSON and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
¶ 19 KAUGER, J., concurs in result.
[605] ¶ 20 WATT, C.J., dissents.
¶ 21 COLBERT, J., disqualified.
WE, THE JURY, being duly empaneled and sworn, find as follows:
1. Plaintiff's negligence (0-100%) .0 %
2. Defendant's negligence (0-100%) .0 %
Total = 0% or 100 %
(If the percentage of Plaintiff's negligence is equal to or less than the Defendant's negligence, then answer No. 3 below.)
[598]*5983. Plaintiff has sustained damages as a direct result of this collision without regard to the percentage of contributoiy negligence of either party, in the total sum of.... $ 0 (Note — This amount will be reduced by the Judge by the percentage found in Finding No. 1 above) (If the percentage of Plaintiff's negligence is more than the Defendant's negligence, then answer No. 4 below.)
4. Defendant is entitled to judgment..
The record reflects prior to returning a verdict the jury presented a question for the trial judge. The members had reached a decision but were uncertain how to reflect it on the verdict sheet. The judge prepared instruction number 17 and asked the lawyers if they had any objection to its being sent to the jury. There was no objection by counsel. Instruction 17 does not appear in the record.
* ⅜ * "XHE COURT: I think we may have messed up on our verdict form because I don't think they can do zero, zero since there wasn’t any defense of unavoidable accident.
MR. JONES: They have to find negligence.
THE COURT: I think they do.
MR. FARNAN: Okay.
MR. LANGER: Move for a mistrial.
THE COURT: The way they instructed—
MR. JONES: No. Not a mistrial.
MR. FARNAN: Move for a mistrial.
MR. JONES: Judge, that's not a mistrial. We can send them back to re-deliberate. There's no mistrial because they incorrectly filled out the verdict form. I think you just re-instruct them that they need to read it again and do it again. There is nothing detrimental to the trial of this case.
THE COURT: I think I would need to instruct them that they must find a total of one hundred percent liability.
MR. JONES: Yes.
THE COURT: In this case.
MR. JONES: Yes.
MR. FARNAN: But you already have.
THE COURT: But I think the confusing thing was the verdict form had zero or one hundred percent which is what I normally use when you have an unavoidable accident. And I didn't take that out of my original, I didn’t take it out of the verdict form.
MR. JONES: I think you should instruct that they have to find, have a finding of negligence before they can find damages. But it isn't detrimental to the trial and the deliberation process at all, Judge.
MR. FARNAN: The only problem with it of course is that if they find the defendants' negligence zero this is one of those ones like you said would indicate that maybe we should have a new trial.
THE COURT: Well, we're not there yet though.
MR. JONES: No.
MR. FARNAN: But their finding of zero percent negligence on the defendant and zero percent on the, it's like act of God or something here. So I'm renewing my request for a mistrial.
MR. JONES: Well, Judge, still isn't detrimental to the trial of the case, I don't know if I need to restate this or not, Judge, it’s just that they can be instructed to resume their deliberations and to find negligence one way or the other. It doesn't affect their damage finding at all. And our defense was a complete defense, they don't have to find damages, Judge. And it seems to me as simple as just telling them they have to find negligence one way or the other.
THE COURT: Would you be satisfied with that instruction?
MR. LANGER: No.
THE COURT: Why not?
MR. LANGER: Well, this seems to be too confused to straighten out.
MR. JONES: It doesn’t seem to be too confused, I've seen many times and ya'U have seen before that juries have to be instructed to recommence deliberations if they filled it out, it doesn't make the trial process detrimental at all, Judge. They just got confused on the percentages of negligence. I mean they can find a hundred percent negligence on my client—
THE COURT: Would you get the jury instructions. Court is going to order the verdict form read. And you can make your motion after-wards.” * * *
After the verdict form was read the following occurred in open court.
THE COURT: * * * "Motion?
MR. FARNAN: Oh, a mistrial, a new trial, judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
THE COURT: Sustained. Motion for new trial granted.” * ⅜ *
Coronado urged an additional issue on appeal — that Capshaw failed to preserve his right to move for a new trial because his oral motion did not comply with the terms of 12 O.S.2001 § 654(A). The cited provisions require a new-trial motion to be in writing. COCA addressed this issue and held (1) Capshaw’s oral motion for a new trial does not meet the § 654 statutoiy requirement and (2) this procedural scenario does not fall within the “made during a hearing or trial" exception of 12 O.S.2001 § 2007(B)(1). Because Coronado failed to object when the oral motion was interposed, COCA ruled the error could not be raised for the first time on appeal. The issue was not re-urged on certiorari: we hence express no opinion on the correctness of COCA’s resolution.
A court abuses its discretion when it uses that standard to an end or purpose that is justified neither by reason nor by evidence. Abuse of discretion lies in a manifestly unreasonable act, supported by untenable grounds or reasons. Patel v. OMH Medical Center, Inc., 1999 OK 33, ¶ 20, 987 P.2d 1185, 1194.