Caprio v. Bell Atl Sickness

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: July 8, 2004
• Docket: 03-2253
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinions of the United 2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

7-8-2004

Caprio v. Bell Atl Sickness Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 03-2253

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Recommended Citation "Caprio v. Bell Atl Sickness" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 442. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/442

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2004 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu. PRECEDENTIAL Attorney for Appellant

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Steven D. Spencer FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Kay Kyungsun Yu Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1701 Market Street No. 03-2253 Philadelphia, Pa. 19103

Attorneys for Appellees FRANK J. CAPRIO, Verizon Communications Inc. and Bell Atlantic Sickness Appellant and Accident Disability v. Benefit Plan

BELL ATLANTIC SICKNESS Douglas E. Ress AND ACCIDENT PLAN; CORE, INC.; Kaufman, Coren, Ress & Weidman VERIZON, INC. 1525 Locust Street 17th Floor Philadelphia, Pa. 19102 On Appeal from the United States District Court James T. Finnigan for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Rich May (D.C. Civ. No. 00-cv-06155) 176 Federal Street Honorable R. Barclay Surrick, Boston, MA 02110 District Judge Attorneys for Appellee CORE, Inc.

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) June 28, 2004 OPINION OF THE COURT

BEFORE: AMBRO, BECKER, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. (Filed: July 8, 2004) I. INTRODUCTION William T. Wilson This matter comes on before this MacElree Harvey Ltd court on an appeal brought by Frank J. 17 West Miner Street Caprio from orders entered in the district P.O. Box 660 court on April 1, 2003, granting a motion West Chester, PA 19381 for summary judgment made by defendants Bell Atlantic Sickness and includes administrative appeal Accident Plan (“Plan”), Verizon, Inc. procedures. Inasmuch as Caprio was (“Verizon”) and CORE, Inc. (“CORE”) awarded benefits based on sickness but (“appellees”), denying Caprio’s motion denied more generous accident benefits, for summary judgment, and entering he seeks in this action to recover accident judgment in favor of the appellees. We benefits. will vacate the orders and will remand the case to the district court for further After certain proceedings in the proceedings. district court that we need not describe, appellees moved for summary judgment, The background of the case is as but the court denied their motion without follows. Caprio, who claimed to be prejudice in a memorandum opinion on disabled and who had been employed by May 31, 2002. The court, largely Bell Atlantic Company of Pennsylvania concerning its opinion with determining and later by its successor, Verizon, its standard of review under Firestone brought this action against appellees Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., 101, 109 S.Ct. 948 (1989), concluded seeking benefits under a Sickness and that it would examine the denial of Accident Disability Benefit Plan that benefits under an arbitrary and capricious Bell Atlantic and Verizon provided.1 standard of review. The district court Caprio made CORE a defendant because then considered our opinion in Pinto v. it had administrative and fiduciary Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., responsibilities under the Plan and made 214 F.3d 377, 387 (3d Cir. 2000), determinations regarding claimants’ quoting it for the point that “heightened eligibility for payments, including scrutiny is required when an insurance determinations with respect to Caprio. company is both plan administrator and The Plan makes a distinction between funder.” The district court later in its disabilities attributable to sickness and opinion cited Goldstein v. Johnson & those attributable to accidents and Johnson, 251 F.3d 433, 442 (3d Cir. 2001), concluding from that case that Pinto “does not appear to be limited to 1 plans involving insurance companies.” Even though Caprio sued Verizon, Inc. appellees indicate that there is no The district court noted that such entity and that Verizon appellees had submitted an affidavit Pennsylvania, Inc., a subsidiary of stating that CORE’s compensation was Verizon Communications Inc., was “not tied in any way to the results of the Caprio’s employer. Appellees indicate disability cases that it manages for Bell that Caprio also misnamed the defendant Atlantic.” This representation led the Plan. These mistakes may be rectified on court to observe that, according to the remand by appropriate amendments.

2 affidavit, “CORE has no conflict of disability benefits. The interest in administering claims under the District Court’s decision Plan.” Nevertheless, inasmuch as the that CORE did not abuse court believed that Caprio was entitled to its discretion in denying answers to interrogatories he had served Caprio’s appeals before it definitively settled on its concerning the standard of review, it denied appellees’ classification of his [short motion without prejudice and ordered term disability] benefits them to answer Caprio’s interrogatories was also correct. “for the limited purpose of determining the appropriate standard of review in this Id. at 11. case.” Not inappropriately, the court did not indicate what its result would be on In fact, notwithstanding the the merits depending on the standard of foregoing statement, the court did not review it selected. indicate, following the appellees’ renewal of their motion for summary The appellees apparently judgment, exactly what standard of answered the interrogatories as in their review it was using, though it had brief they indicate, in a representation considered this point preliminarily in its that Caprio does not contradict, that after May 31, 2002 opinion. Moreover, it “some discovery had been completed,” never said at any time that CORE “did appellees br. at 3, appellees renewed not abuse its discretion in denying their motion for summary judgment and Caprio’s appeals . . . .” Indeed, as Caprio moved for summary judgment. appellees acknowledge, the court did not Appellees then indicate that the district render any opinion when it granted court, “without opinion, allowed the summary judgment. Rather, it simply motion of the defendants-appellees and entered orders granting appellees’ denied Caprio’s motion.” Id. at 4. The motion, denying Caprio’s motion, and appellees in their brief go on to explain: granting a judgment in favor of the appellees, following which Caprio The District Court appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 correctly held that CORE’s U.S.C. § 1291. decision must be reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard because the [Plan] confers II. DISCUSSION upon CORE the discretionary authority to Inasmuch as the district court did resolve all questions not indicate why it was granting the relating to eligibility for appellees’ motion for summary

3 judgment, it did not act in conformity that court for further proceedings. In with our direction in Vadino v. A. Valey those proceedings the court may revisit Engineers, 903 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. its substantive decision granting 1990), to district courts in this circuit to appellees summary judgment if it “accompany grants of summary concludes that it would be appropriate to judgment . . . with an explanation do so. sufficient to permit the parties and this court to understand the legal premise for We regret that the consequence of the court’s order.” See also Forbes v. our disposition is to put the parties to Township of Lower Merion, 313 F.3d additional expense which they fairly may 144, 148-49 (3d Cir. 2002). Even though attribute to the district court’s failure to our standard of review is plenary with conform to our directions in Vadino. respect to the order of the district court, Accordingly, in order that the procedural see Kemmerer v. ICI Americas Inc., 70 oversight here not be replicated, we point F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 1995), and thus out that in future cases in which district we could determine this matter on the courts overlook the procedure we set merits without remanding, see Vadino, forth in Vadino the parties should not 903 F.2d at 259-60, we are satisfied that hesitate to bring that case to the court’s the uncertainties surrounding the court’s attention. order in this complex matter, both as to the standard of review it exercised and We make this suggestion even the basis for its assessment of Caprio’s though we can understand why parties claim on the merits, require that, in the might be wary of advising a district court first instance, the district court explain of its oversight, and we do not require the reasons for its decision. See Gillis v. that they do so. Yet we note that our Hoechst Celanese Corp., 4 F.3d 1137, suggestion is consistent with 1149 (3d Cir. 1993). requirements in other situations that parties bring procedural requirements to The fact is that we are not certain a court’s attention if it should overlook whether the district court granted them. Thus, Federal Rule of Civil summary judgment for appellees through Procedure 24(c) provides that when the the application of Firestone with or constitutionality of any act of Congress without our refinement of that case in or statute of a State affecting the public Pinto. Moreover, whatever standard the interest is drawn in question in an action court followed, we do not know the in which the United States or the State or reasoning that led it to grant the any agency, officer, or employee thereof appellees’ motion for summary is not a party, the court shall notify the judgment. Thus, we will vacate the Attorney General of the United States or orders of the district court entered on the State’s attorney general, depending April 1, 2003, and remand the case to upon the statute implicated, as provided

4 by 28 U.S.C. § 2403, so that he or she determined, however, not to retain may intervene on the question of jurisdiction because we have authorized constitutionality. It further provides that the court to revisit its decision on the the party challenging the constitutionality merits and thus it is conceivable that the of the legislation “should call the court’s outcome on remand could be attention of the court to its consequential different from that which it reached duty.” Similarly, under some case law previously. Moreover, it is possible that when a party following trial moves for the disappointed party, after considering judgment as a matter of law and, in the the court’s explanation for its alternative, moves for a new trial, it determination, may not wish to pursue should notify the court of the need for it the matter further.2 to make a contingent ruling on the motion for a new trial if it grants the judgment as a matter of law but does not rule on the motion for a new trial. See III. CONCLUSION Lowenstein v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Pennsauken, 536 F.2d 9, 12 n.8 (3d Cir. For the foregoing reasons we will 1976); Arenson v. Southern Univ. Law vacate the orders of the district court Ctr., 43 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1995). entered on April 1, 2003, and will Indeed, if the party does not notify the remand the matter to that court for court of this procedural requirement it further proceedings. The parties will may lose the possibility of obtaining a bear their own costs on this appeal. new trial if the judgment as a matter of law in its favor is reversed. See Lowenstein, 536 F.2d at 12 n.8.

In closing we point out that we have not overlooked our authority to retain jurisdiction as we did in Forbes after we remanded that case to the district court to specify the material facts in issue which precluded the court from granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 2 Of course, if the court does not grant action on the basis of qualified immunity. a summary judgment on the remand it is Forbes, 313 F.3d at 151. If we retained unlikely that the order denying summary jurisdiction, we then could determine the judgment will be appealable, at least matter without a new appeal being filed before a final judgment is entered. See following the remand, perhaps after In re Complaint of PMD Enters., Inc., additional briefing. We have 301 F.3d 147, 149 (3d Cir. 2002).