Caprice Ali v. Department of the Air Force

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedFebruary 10, 2025
DocketDC-0752-23-0321-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Caprice Ali v. Department of the Air Force (Caprice Ali v. Department of the Air Force) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Caprice Ali v. Department of the Air Force, (Miss. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

CAPRICE ALI, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DC-0752-23-0321-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DATE: February 10, 2025 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Jay Kyler , Esquire, Williamsburg, Virginia, for the appellant.

Chief Labor Law , Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman* Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member

*The Board members voted on this decision before January 20, 2025.

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her involuntary resignation appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). On petition for review, the appellant alleges that she raised a nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction and that the administrative judge erred by weighing the evidence and resolving the parties’ conflicting assertions to find otherwise. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. Specifically, she contends that the administrative judge accepted the agency’s assertions as true even though “[she] alleged, with supporting evidence, that she was transferred into a position for which she was not qualified and could not become qualified, thus, the [a]gency would have to terminate her.” Id. at 6. We find the appellant’s arguments unavailing. A resignation is presumed to be voluntary, and thus outside the Board’s jurisdiction, unless the employee presents sufficient evidence to establish that the action was obtained through duress or coercion or shows that a reasonable person would have been misled by the agency. Searcy v. Department of Commerce, 114 M.S.P.R. 281, ¶ 12 (2010). An appellant claiming that her resignation is involuntary is entitled to a hearing on jurisdiction only if she makes nonfrivolous allegations casting doubt on the presumption of voluntariness. Id., ¶ 10. The appellant ultimately bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction over her appeal 3

by a preponderance of the evidence. Vitale v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 107 M.S.P.R. 501, ¶ 17 (2007); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). To meet the nonfrivolous standard, an appellant need only plead allegations of fact that, if proven, could show jurisdiction. Pariseau v. Department of the Air Force, 113 M.S.P.R. 370, ¶ 14 (2010). Mere pro forma allegations are insufficient to meet the standard. Id. The Board has found that, in determining whether an appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction, an administrative judge may consider an agency’s documentary submissions; however, to the extent the agency’s evidence constitutes mere factual contradiction of the appellant’s otherwise adequate prima facie showing of jurisdiction, the administrative judge may not weigh evidence and resolve conflicting assertions of the parties and the agency’s evidence may not be dispositive. Ferdon v. U.S. Postal Service, 60 M.S.P.R. 325, 329 (1994). Here, the administrative judge analyzed the appellant’s allegations and considered the totality of the circumstances in finding that the appellant did not make a nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction. 2 Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 15, Initial Decision (ID) at 4-7. We agree with the administrative judge. Other than her bare assertions that the agency subjected her to discrimination based on race and reassigned her to a position to which she was unqualified, the appellant did not allege facts or offer evidence that would show that her work conditions were so intolerable that she had no choice but to resign. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-9. Even if we accept as true the appellant’s allegations that the agency improperly reassigned her to a lateral position that she did not qualify for, her unsupported and vague arguments do not constitute nonfrivolous allegations of

2 In the initial decision, the administrative judge discussed the agency’s evidence and argument concerning the appellant’s lateral transfer to the Program Analyst position. ID at 4-5. Although the Board may not deny jurisdiction by crediting the agency’s interpretation of the evidence, Ferdon, 60 M.S.P.R. 325, 329, we find that the administrative judge did not rely on the agency’s interpretation of the evidence, or otherwise weigh evidence, in finding that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that she involuntarily resigned. 4

Board jurisdiction. See Briscoe v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 55 F.3d 1571, 1573-74 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding that bald allegations standing alone do not meet the nonfrivolous allegation standard); see also Coleman v. Department of the Army, 106 M.S.P.R. 436, ¶ 9 (2007) (stating that pro forma allegations are insufficient to satisfy the nonfrivolous standard). For the reasons stated in the initial decision, we agree that the appellant failed to raise a nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction over this appeal, and we find that the appellant’s mere disagreement on review with the administrative judge’s findings does not provide a basis for disturbing the initial decision. See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997); Broughton v. Department of Health & Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987).

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

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Anne L. Briscoe v. Department of Veterans Affairs
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Caprice Ali v. Department of the Air Force, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/caprice-ali-v-department-of-the-air-force-mspb-2025.