Capri Optics Profit Sharing v. Digital Equipment Corp.

760 F. Supp. 227, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4267, 1991 WL 46572
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedMarch 22, 1991
DocketCiv. A. 88-1295-Y
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 760 F. Supp. 227 (Capri Optics Profit Sharing v. Digital Equipment Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Capri Optics Profit Sharing v. Digital Equipment Corp., 760 F. Supp. 227, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4267, 1991 WL 46572 (D. Mass. 1991).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YOUNG, District Judge.

Capri Optics Profit Sharing [“Capri”] brought this class action under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) 1 and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. *228 § 240.10b-5, 2 alleging fraud on the market and misrepresentation. 3 Capri asserts that nine misleading statements, made by Digital representatives to various newspapers and through press releases, were designed to inflate the market price for Digital securities and concealed adverse facts concerning Digital’s markets, business, management, financial condition and future prospects. The disputed statements allegedly influenced the investment decisions of the class to its detriment.

Digital Equipment Corporation [“Digital”] moves for summary judgment, making an evidentiary showing that the disputed public statements were accurately based upon growth revenues and certified orders, and that disclosure of additional facts was unwarranted absent a duty to disclose pursuant to Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 12-13 (1st Cir.1990). Capri counters that Backman does not apply where the plaintiff, unlike Backman, alleges misrepresentation rather than mere nondisclosure. 4

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Upon a thorough review of the factual record developed with respect to this motion for summary judgment, the following facts are not genuinely disputed:

Between January 13, 1988 and March 18, 1988, members of the class purchased stock in Digital. During the months before the class period, Digital representatives made several public statements about the overall health and status of Digital in the wake of “Black Monday.” 5 On October 14, 1987, Digital released its earnings for the first quarter of fiscal year 1988 [“1Q88”]. Digital Exhibit 1. The report showed a 24% gain in total operating revenues from 1Q87 and a 48% increase in net income for the same period. That day, Kenneth Olsen [“Olsen”], President of Digital, was quoted as saying “Overseas business remained firm, while orders from customers in the United States accelerated somewhat.” Olsen based these remarks on growth revenues and certified order reports for 1Q88. Olsen aff. at ¶ 3, 4, 6.

Meanwhile, several internal meetings were held at Digital during which the Executive Committee discussed the state of the company and the economy in the wake of the stock market crash. At one such meeting, held on October 26, 1987, Olsen remarked upon possible adverse effects upon the company in the wake of the market falloff. Olsen encouraged the increased sale of products and services. Digital Interoffice Memo, Capri Exhibit 3. At another meeting, on October 30th, 1987, Digital *229 executives discussed the market crash and its effect on the United States economy. Digital Interoffice Memo, Capri Exh. 4. Roughly three weeks later, at the November 5, 1987 Board of Directors meeting, the Executive Committee, in order to cope with the potential adverse financial impact of Black Monday, announced management strategies such as cost reduction programs, review of capital spending, and the like. Minutes at p. 5, Capri Exh. 5. A follow-up memorandum, dated November 6, 1987, allegedly from John J. Shields [“Shields”], Vice President at Digital, 6 remarked upon the uncertainties of domestic and international worldwide economic markets and expressed confidence in Digital’s current business and future. Memorandum, Capri Exh. 6.

Meanwhile, Digital continued to examine the overall health of the economy and of Digital itself. An internal Operations Review, held on November 19, 1987, revealed that: “SSMI exceeded plan in Ql; the present forecast falls short of the plan in Q2; but makes the plan for the entire year.” Digital Interoffice Memo at p. 4, Capri Exh. 8. The Review Chairman, Dick Fishburn, also explained why “CERTS are meeting plan, but revenue is falling short of plan.” Id. The November 20, 1987 in-house meeting recognized a significant shortfall in the 2Q87 forecast and total-year forecast for the products businesses. Id. at p. 5. By December 14, 1987, Digital knew its costs were rising faster than revenue for the first time since 1985. Financial Forecast Reports, Capri Exh. 10, 11.

At a December 23,1987 in-house meeting at Digital, the internal Operations Review revealed, “Although the year-to-date numbers look reasonable at this point, Q2 performance has weakened compared to Ql ... there is a general concern that expectations are too high for the second half of FY 88.” Digital Interoffice Memo at p. 2, Capri Ex. 13. Indeed, Charles E. Shue, Digital’s Vice President of United States Sales, while testifying that in January 1988 he had not yet determined the impact of the crash on Digital’s performance, admitted to taking some “precautionary steps on the expense side,” believing that Digital would experience some effect from the market crash. Shue deposition at 60-61.

The next allegedly misleading statement occurred on January 13, 1988, when Mark Steinkrauss, Digital’s Director of Investor Relations, was quoted in the Wall Street Journal as saying, that “the company ... hasn’t given out any negative guidance to analysts.” Digital stock prices had fallen by $7,875 on January 12, 1988 and two financial analysts had reduced Digital’s investment rating. Digital Exh. 13. Stein-krauss’ statement was based upon his own conversations with the two analysts. 7

On January 13, 1988, Digital issued a lengthy press release, revealing its 2Q88 figures, showing a 22% growth in revenues over 2Q87. Based on the figures and upon comparisons to IBM’s revenue growth, 8 Olsen stated, “We are gratified that revenues continue to grow at a rate which indicates market share gains. Business overall is firm and our international business remains quite strong. Some of the industry sectors that performed particularly well in the quarter include ... financial servic-es_” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 14, 1988 at p. 14, Digital Exh. 14. See also Olsen aff. 11 9, 10, 11. Olsen avers that his statements were made in good faith and were accurately based upon growth revenues and certified orders. Olsen aff. 1117. Compare Hahn v. Sargent, 388 F.Supp. 445, 454 (D.Mass.), aff'd 523 F.2d 461 (1st Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 1495, 47 L.Ed.2d 754 (1976) (affidavits denying existence of a conspiracy among defendants sufficient to defeat such a claim *230 in absence of direct evidence of conspiratorial intent).

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760 F. Supp. 227, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4267, 1991 WL 46572, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/capri-optics-profit-sharing-v-digital-equipment-corp-mad-1991.