Caplen Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.

69 F. Supp. 850, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2933
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedJanuary 9, 1947
DocketCivil Action No. 390
StatusPublished

This text of 69 F. Supp. 850 (Caplen Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Caplen Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 69 F. Supp. 850, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2933 (S.D. Tex. 1947).

Opinion

KENNERLY, District Judge.

This is a suit by plaintiff against three groups of defendants, to recover title and possession of the C. J. O’Conner 320-acre Survey, Abstract No. 463, situated in Polk County, Texas, in this District and Division. The groups of defendants are as follows:

(a) The O’Conner Group.

(b) The Smith Group.

(c) The Carter & Davis Group. .

Plaintiff offers and stands upon what it claims to be, and which I find to be (except as herein stated), a regular chain of record title under a Patent from the State of Texas to C. J. O’Conner. The O’Conner Group and the Smith Group claim under the same chain of title, but the O’Conner Group insists that an undivided one-third interest in such Survey, owned by Mrs. Annie E. Windsor, did not pass to plaintiff, but is owned by them. And the Smith Group insists that they own the south half of such Survey under a deed from one of the persons in plaintiff’s chain of title.

The Carter & Davis Groups offer a tax collector’s deed, dated July 6, 1880, to James E. Hill and George W. Davis, by which they claim to connect with the same chain of title. They also claim title under the Texas Ten and Five Year Statutes of Limitation.

1. Taking up the title of the O’Conner Group.

The C. J. O’Conner Survey of 320 acres involved herein was patented to C. J. O’Conner April 17, 1848. O’Conner left three children. Two of the children and/or their heirs died, and the other child, his daughter, Eliza O’Conner Rudder, took title, and had at the time of her death title, to the entire survey. Mrs. Rudder left three children, and John A. Caplen without doubt acquired the title of two of them. The question is presented of whether Caplen acquired the title of the other one, i. e., Mrs. Annie E. Windsor. If he did not, then her interest (an undivided one-third) is owned by the O’Conner Group.

The facts are these:

Mrs. Windsor was on July 5, 1S02, a married woman, the wife of J. D. Windsor. He was at that time in California and she in Texas. Her interest in the 320 acres was her separate property. On that date, Mrs. Windsor, her sister and her brother executed and duly acknowledged and delivered to John A. Caplen a deed covering the 320 acres in question, but her husband J. D. Windsor did not sign nor acknowledge the Deed.1 But J. D. Windsor did on August 16, 1902, execute and duly acknowledge and deliver to John A. Caplen a deed 2 for [852]*852said property. The question for decision is whether these two deeds satisfied the Texas Statute, now Article 1299, Vernon’s Civil Statutes and Amendments 3 requiring the husband and wife to join in the conveyance of real estate which is her separate property.

The wording of the two deeds indicates that it was the intention of both the husband and wife to move under the statute and to convey the land to Caplen. I think that under the weight of authorities in Texas, Mrs. Windsor’s title passed to Caplen, givifig him record title to the entire Survey. Nolan v. Moore, 96 Tex. 341, 72 S.W. 583, 97 Am.St.Rep. 911; Halbert v. Hendrix, Tex.Civ.App., 26 S.W. 911, 912. Merriman v. Blalack, 56 Tex.Civ.App. 594, 121 S.W. 552, 554; Rogers v. Roberts, 13 Tex.Civ.App. 190, 35 S.W. 76, 77.

This disposes of the claim of the O’Conner Group.

2. Coming now to' the claim of the Smith Group. 1

On January .22, 1903, John A. Caplen executed to C. C. Smith a deed purporting to

convey to Smith “the Western or Southern one-half of the C. J. O’Conner Survey of three hundred, and twenty acres of land. Said C. C. Smith to have the choice of either the Western or Southern half of said tract of lame.’’4

The. weight of the evidence here is that C. C. Smith did not during his lifetime select either the south half or the west half of the survey, but that such selection was made by his legal representatives October 22, 1937. Under the wording of the deed from Caplen to Smith, I do not think that the right of the Smiths to make such selection became by lapse of. time stale demand as plaintiff contends. In Dull v. Blum, 68 Tex. 299, 4 S.W. 489, 490, upon which plaintiff strongly relies, one Fairchild held under a deed bearing only some slight similarity to the deed here. There was a provision that in the event Fairchild became dissatisfied with his purchase, Foster, his grantor, was to “receive back the same’.’ and return Fairchild’s- purchase money.. This seems to have influenced the conclusion reached by the Court. It closes, with the words “Under these circumstances, w.e [853]*853think it may reasonably be presumed that Fairchild had become dissatisfied and had demanded and received his money back, as the contract gave him a right to do.”

Here, the deed from Caplen to Smith has all the earmarks of a present conveyance, except that Smith had the right to say whether he would take the south half or the west half of the survey. I am convinced that as between plaintiff and the Smith Group, the Smith Group has title to the south half of the survey.

3. This brings us now to the claim of the Carter & Davis Groups.

They claim under a deed, dated July 6, 1880,5 from the Tax Collector of Polk County, Texas, where the land is situated, to James E. Hill and George W. Davis (for brevity called Hill & Davis). It recites the failure of the owners of the record title to pay the taxes on the property for the year 1879, etc. In the absence of proof of the necessary steps to empower the Tax Collector to make such sale, this [854]*854deed itself passes no title to Hill & Davis, under whom the Carter & Davis Groups claim. But under the Texas decisions, it may be used, and the Carter & Davis Groups use it, as the basis of their claim under a deed under the Texas Five Year Statute of Limitation.6 Woíford v. McKinna, 23 Tex. 36, 76 Am.Dec. 53; Davis v. Hurst, Tex. Sup., 14 S.W. 610. Davis v. Howe, Tex.Com.App., 213 S.W. 609. They also use it to show the extent of their, claim under the Texas Ten Year Statute of Limitation.7 Temple Lumber Co. v. Mackechney, Tex.Com.App., 228 S.W. 177, 178.

Both the Five and the Ten Years Statutes of Limitation require claim by a limitation claimant. The evidence shows claim by Hill & Davis and those claiming under them, including the Carter & Davis Groups, from the date of the tax deed, certainly from January 1885, down to the time of this trial. Their claim has been active and has been hostile and adverse to the claim of plaintiff and those composing the O’Conner and Smith Groups, and to all others.

Such statutes also require peaceable and adverse possession. The evidence shows peaceable and adverse possession of the survey by Hill & Davis and those claiming under them during the years beginning January 1, 1886, down to and including the year 1913.

It is shown that Irvin Dowden moved on this land in 1883 or 1884, opened a field and cultivated same, and that later a relative of Irvin Dowden built a a small house thereon. Irvin Dowden acknowledged tenancy to James E. Hill February 13, 1886, as of January 1, 1886, and remained on the land as tenant of Hill & Davis until about 1892, when he turned over possession thereof to L. H. Overstreet.

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Related

Rogers v. Roberts
35 S.W. 76 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1896)
Merriman v. Blalack
121 S.W. 552 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1909)
Nolan v. Moore
72 S.W. 583 (Texas Supreme Court, 1903)
Wofford v. McKinna
23 Tex. 36 (Texas Supreme Court, 1859)
Dull v. Blum
4 S.W. 489 (Texas Supreme Court, 1887)
Davis v. Howe
213 S.W. 609 (Texas Commission of Appeals, 1919)
Temple Lumber Co. v. Mackechney
228 S.W. 177 (Texas Commission of Appeals, 1921)

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Bluebook (online)
69 F. Supp. 850, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2933, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/caplen-oil-co-v-humble-oil-refining-co-txsd-1947.