Capitol Region Conf. v. Dept. of Ins., No. Cv 96 055 93 46 (Oct. 11, 1996)

1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 7973
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedOctober 11, 1996
DocketNo. CV 96 055 93 46
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 7973 (Capitol Region Conf. v. Dept. of Ins., No. Cv 96 055 93 46 (Oct. 11, 1996)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Capitol Region Conf. v. Dept. of Ins., No. Cv 96 055 93 46 (Oct. 11, 1996), 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 7973 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS The plaintiffs in this case are Capitol Region Conference of Churches, Donald Rettmann, Anthony Zimmitti, United Auto Workers Union Region 9A, Citizens for Economic Opportunity of West Hartford, Shannon Wegele, Benjamin Wenograd, Rosie Stanko, Robert Cerritelli, Connecticut Citizens Action Group of West Hartford, and AFL-CIO of Rocky Hill.

The plaintiffs appeal the decision of the defendant insurance department approving the acquisition of the defendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Company and the defendant Standard Fire Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as Aetna subsidiaries) by the defendant Travelers Insurance Group, Inc. The Aetna subsidiaries were at that time wholly owned subsidiaries of Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Company (Aetna parents). The insurance department acted pursuant to General Statutes § 38a-132. The plaintiffs appeal pursuant to § 38a-139. The plaintiffs assert different grounds for appeal, based on their various connections to the defendant insurance companies. Presently before the court are the defendants' CT Page 7974 motions to dismiss on the basis that none of the plaintiffs have standing to appeal. The court finds the issues in favor of the defendants.

On December 18, 1995, the Travelers filed an application with the department pursuant to General Statutes § 38a-130 requesting approval of its proposed acquisition of the Aetna subsidiaries. Specifically, the Travelers proposed to purchase for cash all of the issued and outstanding shares of stock of those companies from the Aetna parent company.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 38a-132, the insurance commissioner commenced a public hearing on March 6, 1996. The commissioner denied several motions filed on behalf of individuals and organizations, including these plaintiffs, to intervene as parties and also denied a motion that he recuse himself from participation in the public hearing. On March 13, 1996, the commissioner reconsidered his ruling on the motion to recuse and did recuse himself from continuing to sit on the proceeding. Thereafter, the deputy insurance commissioner conducted the hearing.

Following the hearing, in a memorandum of decision issued April 1, 1996, the deputy commissioner found that the proposed acquisition satisfied the requirements of General Statutes § 38a-132 and approved the acquisition, subject to a variety of conditions not relevant to the issues presently before the court. Simultaneously with the decision on the merger, the deputy insurance commissioner also confirmed the earlier ruling of the insurance commissioner denying each of the plaintiffs' applications to intervene in the proceedings, concluding that there was no evidence in the record that supported a finding that a "legal right, duty or privilege will be affected."

On April 2, 1996, pursuant to the deputy commissioner's decision, the Travelers acquired all the issued and outstanding common stock of the Aetna subsidiaries for approximately $4 billion in cash. The merger combines the property and casualty operations of the Travelers and the Aetna subsidiaries under a new holding company based in Hartford called Travelers/Aetna CT Page 7975 Property Casualty Corp.

The plaintiffs filed this appeal in this court on April 2, 1996. In their appeal, the plaintiffs raise a variety of procedural and substantive issues. In particular, the plaintiffs claim that the final decision was tainted by the participation of Insurance Commissioner George M. Reider, Jr., prior to his recusal; that the deputy commissioner should have begun new proceedings rather than continuing the original hearing; that the deputy commissioner should have granted the plaintiffs requests to intervene; and that the deputy commissioner's finding that the statutory requirements of General Statutes § 38a-132 were satisfied is contrary to the evidence.

The general issue raised by the defendants in their motions to dismiss the appeal is whether the various plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged and proved that they or any of them are legally aggrieved by the insurance department's decision approving the acquisition. General Statutes § 38a-139, the statute that authorizes appeals of the insurance department's decisions on mergers and acquisitions, provides in part, "Any person aggrieved (may appeal)." Pleading and proof of aggrievement are necessary, therefore, in order for a party to have standing to bring an appeal to the court. Unless a party can establish aggrievement, the court has no jurisdiction over the appeal and must dismiss it. The court's decision on this issue requires a review of the law of aggrievement in such appeals and an examination of the different claims of the various plaintiffs in this case.

Aggrievement

"The fundamental test for determining aggrievement encompasses a well settled two fold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that the specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision." (Citations and CT Page 7976 internal quotation marks omitted). Light Rigging Co. v.Dept. of Public Utility Control, 219 Conn. 168, 173,592 A.2d 1386 (1991).

Although "Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected," Id., a party's speculation that a loss will occur or "mere generalizations and fears are not sufficient to establish aggrievement." Nader v.Altermatt, 166 Conn. 43, 59 (1974).

Applying these general principles to the present case, in order for this court to have jurisdiction, at least one of the plaintiffs must show (1) that he or she has a specific personal interest in the subject matter of the insurance department's decision, an interest which is protected by law, and (2) that the decision approving the acquisition has or will possibly have an actual adverse effect on that personal, legally protected interest.

Plaintiff Employees

Plaintiffs Rettmann and Zimmitti, current and former employees of the parent Aetna or the Aetna subsidiaries, contend that they are aggrieved by the insurance department's decision because they claim they will lose their jobs if the merger is approved. Zimmitti concedes that he is not currently employed by Aetna, but claims that his pending petition for reinstatement will be in jeopardy if the acquisition is permitted.

In support of his claim of aggrievement, Rettmann has presented an affidavit to the court in which he states that several corporate executives have told him and others that hundreds of employees will be "outsourced" — laid off — as a result of the merger and that his job is one of those targeted. Zimmitti has also presented an affidavit, stating that he prevailed in a law suit in federal court in which Aetna was found to have illegally discriminated against him. He states that there is now pending in that court his petition to be reinstated as an employee.

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Related

Nader v. Altermatt
347 A.2d 89 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1974)
Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc.
479 A.2d 781 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1984)
Light Rigging Co. v. Department of Public Utility Control
592 A.2d 386 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 7973, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/capitol-region-conf-v-dept-of-ins-no-cv-96-055-93-46-oct-11-1996-connsuperct-1996.