Capitol Records, Inc. v. Record Club of America (In re Record Club of America)

30 B.R. 413, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18182
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 29, 1983
DocketCiv. A. No. 82-0990
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 30 B.R. 413 (Capitol Records, Inc. v. Record Club of America (In re Record Club of America)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Record Club of America (In re Record Club of America), 30 B.R. 413, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18182 (M.D. Pa. 1983).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

RAMBO, District Judge.

The appellant, Capitol Records, Inc., and the appellee, Record Club of America, Inc. [hereinafter RCOA] entered into a non-exclusive licensing agreement on November 14, 1972. The agreement was terminated either on or about December 23, 1974 when RCOA filed for reorganization under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,1 or on or about December 26, 1974 when Capitol notified RCOA of its unwillingness to continue.

Capitol has filed a claim against RCOA for money due it under the agreement. The Bankruptcy Referee allowed the claim of Capitol in the amount of $180,123.42. In re Record Club of America, Inc., BK 74-553 (Bkry.M.D.Pa. May 25, 1982). Capitol has appealed the bankruptcy referee’s order. The allegation is that $625,000.00 of “a nonreturnable” advance which RCOA was to pay to Capitol under the agreement and which was not allowed by the referee, should have been allowed.

The bankruptcy referee made six (6) findings of fact which are as follows: •

1.On November 14, 1972, RCOA and Capitol entered into a licensing agreement in settlement of anti-trust litigation RCOA had brought against Capitol.
2. Under the agreement RCOA obtained a non-exclusive right, for a minimum of five years (and, at RCOA’s option, for ten years), to manufacture recordings from copies of record masters owned by Capitol.
3. The contract obligations pertinent to this proceeding are set forth in section 9 of the agreement:
9. COMPANY1 hereby agrees to pay CAPITOL the following sums:
a. as a non-returnable advance for the first 5 years of the term: $1,250,-000 payable
(1) $375,000 on signing this Agreement;
and
(2) the balance in 14 installments of $625,000 each on the first days of January, April, July and October of 1974, 1975, and 1976 and January and April of 1977.
9(b) Last paragraph:
The sums paid shall be non-returnable advances only against the total fees payable to CAPITOL under Paragraph 6.a. above. The sums payable in the 1st five year period (60 months from January 1, 1973) are advances only against total fees payable under Paragraph 6.a. for RECORDS sold or distributed.
4. The agreement provided for its termination in the event that RCOA went into bankruptcy.
5. On December 23, 1974, RCOA filed a petition for an arrangement under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. Three days later Capitol terminated the agreement.
6. Section 21 of the agreement provides the following as to termination:
The termination of this agreement shall cause all of COMPANY’S rights and obligation to cease except ... (ii) obligation for non-returnable advances after a termination pursuant to Para[415]*415graphs 17 a. or 17 b. above, or Section 22 below (which obligation shall limited to the remaining balance of the aggregate advance for which COMPANY is obligated for the particular period in which the termination occurs)....
1 Refers to RCOA

Id. at 1-2.

This court after a review of the recorckon appeal has determined that these findings of fact are correct.

The bankruptcy referee in the decision appealed from has decided only one issue. He decided what amount of Capitol’s claim No. 96 would be allowed.

The bankruptcy referee has not decided:

1. Whether Capitol’s claim No. 96 was properly filed;
2. Whether the contract is void or voidable;
3. Whether the terms of the contract were violated by either party; and
4. Whether there are defenses to payment under the contract.

See Verbatim report of hearing held on December 18, 1980 before Judge Thomas Wood pp. 35-36 (hearing on various defenses and counter-claims of RCOA was deferred). This court therefore has before it only the question of the amount of Capitol’s claim No. 96 that should be allowed.2

The dispute between the parties relates to the referee’s legal determination that the term “particular period” used in paragraph 21 of the agreement refers to an “installment period.” Id. at 3. The referee apparently used the terms “installment period” to refer to the three month time span between the dates on which the installment payments of the non-returnable advance were to be made. See Licensing Agreement ¶ 9.a.2. Thus the termination of the agreement prior to January 1, 1975 resulted in RCOA not being obligated to make the ten (10) installments due in January 1975 and every three months thereafter for the remainder of the first five years of the agreement. These ten (10) installments total $625,000.00 which is the amount in controversy.

Neither the terms “particular period” or “installment period” are specifically defined in the agreement. Paragraph 21 uses “particular period” in the following context:

21. The termination of this Agreement shall cause all of COMPANY’S rights, interests and obligations to cease except (i) obligations theretofore accrued, (ii) obligations for non-returnable advances after a termination pursuant to Paragraphs 17.a. or 17.b. above, or Section 22. below (which obligation shall be limited to the remaining balance of the aggregate advance for which COMPANY is obligated for the particular period in which the termination occurs), (iii) obligations relating to liquidation provisions of Paragraph 21.b. below and (iv) as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Agreement and shall relieve CAPITOL from performing its obligations under this Agreement except as otherwise provided. Licensing Agreement ¶ 21 (emphasis added).

The time frame encompassed by the phrase “particular period” as used in paragraph 21 is not clear from the immediate context. Since the meaning of “particular period” is unclear from the immediate context, it is necessary to look at the entire agreement to determine if the meaning can be clarified.3

The basic objective in interpreting a contract is to determine the intentions of the parties from the language used. In re Robertson Class Plaintiffs, 479 F.Supp. 657, 668 (S.D.N.Y.1979) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 625 F.2d 407 (2d Cir.1980).

Paragraph 9 of the agreement can provide some assistance in how the term “period” was understood by the parties. The concluding section of paragraph 9 says:

The sums paid shall be non-returnable advances only against the total fees pay[416]*416able to CAPITOL under Paragraph 6.a. above. The sums payable in the 1st five year period (60 months from January 1, 1973) are advances only against total fees payable under Paragraph 6.a. for RECORDS sold or distributed in that 1st five year period and similarly the sums payable in the second five year period (60 months from January 1, 1978) are advances only against total fees payable under Paragraph 6.a.

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Related

In Re Record Club of America
38 B.R. 691 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 1983)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
30 B.R. 413, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18182, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/capitol-records-inc-v-record-club-of-america-in-re-record-club-of-pamd-1983.