Capital Transit Co. v. Garcia

194 F.2d 162, 90 U.S. App. D.C. 168, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 2740
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedJanuary 24, 1952
Docket11038_1
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 194 F.2d 162 (Capital Transit Co. v. Garcia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Capital Transit Co. v. Garcia, 194 F.2d 162, 90 U.S. App. D.C. 168, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 2740 (D.C. Cir. 1952).

Opinion

EDGERTON, Circuit Judge.

Appellee Garcia recovered judgment against appellant Transit Company for personal injuries caused by his walking against the side of a streetcar. In crossing the street on a crosswalk, he kept watching a traffic light on his right and so failed to see the streetcar approaching from his left. Obviously his negligence was a cause of his injury. The chief question is whether the District Court erred in submitting the case to the jury on the basis of the so-called last dear chance doctrine. We think the court was right.

Clearly there was never a time when the operator of the streetcar could and the appellee could not have avoided the accident by using care. In other words appellant’s operator did not have a later chance than appellee to avoid the accident. But in the *163 District of Columbia the so-called last clear chance doctrine is broader than its name. A plaintiff who appears to be oblivious to danger, although he would-be quite able to avoid it if he knew of its existence, is within this qualified exception to the rule that contributory negligence bars recovery for injuries negligently inflicted. Stewart v. Capital Transit Co., 70 App.D.C. 346, 347, 108 F.2d 1, 2; Capital Transit Co. v. Smallwood, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 230,162 F.2d 14, 16; Capital Transit Co. v. Grimes, 82 U.S. App.D.C. 393, 394, 164 F.2d 718, 719. Passengers in the streetcar inferred from appellee’s appearance and conduct as he walked through the street toward the track that he was oblivious to the car’s approach. The jury might reasonably conclude that if the operator had used due care he would have observed the same things, drawn the same inference, and sounded his gong in time to avoid the accident. There was ample testimony that no gong was sounded.

We have considered appellant’s other contentions but find no prejudicial error.

Affirmed.

CLARK, Circuit Judge, dissents.

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Related

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Jones
443 A.2d 45 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1982)
Piper v. Andrews
216 F. Supp. 758 (District of Columbia, 1963)
Louis Kuzminsky v. Leroy Woodard
307 F.2d 195 (D.C. Circuit, 1962)
Mathews v. Lindsay
173 F. Supp. 278 (District of Columbia, 1959)
Jenkins v. Young
135 A.2d 318 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1957)
Baber v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc.
215 F.2d 843 (D.C. Circuit, 1954)
Johnson v. Yellow Cab Co. of DC
93 A.2d 566 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1953)
Finney v. Capital Transit Co.
198 F.2d 81 (D.C. Circuit, 1952)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
194 F.2d 162, 90 U.S. App. D.C. 168, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 2740, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/capital-transit-co-v-garcia-cadc-1952.