[Cite as Capital One, N.A. v. Campbell, 2026-Ohio-1.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
CAPITAL ONE, N.A. : : C.A. No. 30577 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 24CVF02172 v. : : (Civil Appeal from Municipal Court) DAVE R. CAMPBELL SR. : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & Appellant : OPINION :
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Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on January 2, 2026, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE
TUCKER, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30577
DAVE R. CAMPBELL, SR., Appellant, Pro Se JACKSON T. MOYER and THOMAS R. MYERS, Attorneys for Appellee
HANSEMAN, J.
{¶ 1} This case is before us on the pro se appeal of Defendant-Appellant, Dave
Campbell, Sr., from a summary judgment order entered on behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee,
Capital One, N.A. (“Capital”). Campbell failed to provide any assignments of error, in
violation of App.R. 16(A). However, from reading Campbell’s brief, we construe his claims
to be that the trial court erred in these ways: (1) by denying all of his motions; (2) by failing
to state reasons for denying evidence that he tried to enter; and (3) by denying him due
process of law. Campbell also argues that Capital failed to provide discovery as required by
Civ.R. 26. Finally, Campbell appears to contend the court erred in granting summary
judgment to Capital.
{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we find no error or plain error occurred in the trial
court. We also find that Campbell’s defenses and counterclaim against Capital were purely
frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 3} On September 20, 2024, Capital filed a complaint against Campbell in Vandalia
Municipal Court, alleging that Campbell owed $7,671.42 due to non-payment on a credit
card account Capital had issued. Attached to the complaint was Campbell’s statement for a
billing cycle from December 21, 2023, through January 20, 2024. The prior balance was
$7,483.33, no payments had been made, and the current balance of $7,671.42 (which
included interest of $188.09), was then due. After service of the complaint was returned
2 unclaimed, Capital requested ordinary mail service, which was sent on November 22, 2024,
to Campbell at the address listed on the complaint.
{¶ 4} On November 26, 2024, Campbell, representing himself pro se, filed a
document with the court that was titled “Motion to Enter Evidence into Case” (“Motion to
Enter Evidence”). While this document was not labeled as an answer or counterclaim,
Campbell alleged Capital was in breach of contract for failing to credit his account with
$28,455.42 of what he called “bills of exchange” that he sent to Capital. To support this
proposition, Campbell cited various sections of the Ohio Uniform Commercial Code as well
as “the bill of exchange act of 1882.” Motion to Enter Evidence, p. 2. Campbell also alleged
in this “motion” that he was an agent and “attorney in fact” for himself. Id. at p. 3.
{¶ 5} On the same day, Campbell filed a “Notice to Claim Equity with Clean Hands
and to Seek Equitable Relief” (“Notice”), to which he attached various documents like a
“Credentials Card from the Ohio Assembly Land and Soil Jurisdiction” and a document in
which he claimed to be a grantor of a “Cestui Que Vie TRUST.” In the Notice, Campbell
denied being a “sovereign citizen” and listed several violations Capital had allegedly
committed, like violating his rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, securities fraud, restraint of trade,
and so forth.
{¶ 6} On December 2, 2024, Campbell filed several more motions, including a motion
for discovery, a motion to seek treble damages, a “motion” for counterclaim (in which alleged
various wrongful acts on Capital’s part, such as refusing to credit his accounts after he
provided bills of exchange, negligence causing him damages like major depressive disorder,
theft, and securities and exchanges fraud), a motion to enter “adverse action letters” into the
case (which were allegedly used to deny him credit), and a motion to “amend” evidence.
3 {¶ 7} On December 13, 2024, Capital filed a notice stating that it had served a
combined request for admissions, interrogatories, and request for production of documents
on Campbell. Subsequently, on December 17, 2024, Campbell filed a motion for summary
judgment on Capital’s claim and on his counterclaim. This, again, was based on Campbell’s
alleged payment of his account with bills of exchange. However, Campbell failed to attach
an affidavit or any authenticated documents to the motion. On December 20, 2024, Capital
filed a reply to the counterclaim and asserted various affirmative defenses.
{¶ 8} On January 7, 2025, Campbell filed more documents, including a motion to
compel Capital to disclose discovery and a motion to strike Capital’s “dismissal for
defendant’s counterclaim.” The latter motion was based on the Cestui Que Vie Act of 1666,
the Bill of Exchange Act, and other grounds. Capital responded to the motion to compel on
January 15, 2025, stressing that the court had extended its time to reply to discovery and
that it intended to comply with the deadline, which had not yet passed. Capital also filed a
motion to strike Campbell’s summary judgment motion because it had not been timely
served and the parties were still engaging in discovery. The magistrate then set a pretrial
conference for February 24, 2025. Before the conference was held, Campbell filed a second
summary judgment motion. In response, Capital filed another motion to strike, noting
Campbell failed to attach any evidence that conformed with Civ.R. 56.
{¶ 9} After holding the pretrial conference, the magistrate granted the parties leave to
file dispositive motions by April 11, 2025, ordered Campbell to make initial discovery
disclosures to Capital under Civ.R. 26(B)(3) by March 10, 2025, and set trial for July 14,
2025. The magistrate then filed an order denying both of Campbell’s summary judgment
motions because they were not supported by any evidentiary materials of the kind required
by Civ.R. 56(C). In addition, the magistrate overruled the remaining motions that Campbell
4 had filed. Magistrate’s Order (Feb. 25, 2025), p. 1-2. On March 6, 2025, Campbell asked the
magistrate to reconsider its order.
{¶ 10} In early March 2025, Campbell also filed several more documents, including
an unsworn “letter of declaration and affirmation,” a motion to compel further discovery
responses, a motion “to enter the card member agreement into evidence” as Exhibit G-1,
and a notarized “letter of declaration and affirmation.” After Capital filed a response, the
magistrate denied all of Campbell’s motions, including his request for reconsideration.
Magistrate’s Order (Apr. 1, 2025). Capital then filed its summary judgment motion on April 8,
2025. The same day, the magistrate filed an order giving Campbell 28 days to respond to
the summary judgment motion.
{¶ 11} On April 11, 2025, Campbell filed a “corrected” motion to enter a state of facts,
which again was not accompanied by any affidavits or evidence. Campbell then, on May 14,
2025, filed a motion to appeal the magistrate’s decision. However, the magistrate had not
yet made a summary judgment decision, other than to allow Campbell the 28-day response
time. Further, to the extent the motion referenced discovery orders, the time had already
expired for seeking to set the magistrate’s April 1, 2025 order aside. See Civ.R. 53(D)(2)(b).
{¶ 12} In any event, Campbell never responded to the summary judgment motion,
and on July 11, 2025, the trial court entered summary judgment on Capital’s behalf and
dismissed Campbell’s counterclaim with prejudice. See Judgment Entry as to Defendant,
Dave R. Campbell, Sr. (July 11, 2025) (“Judgment Entry”). Campbell timely appealed from
the judgment.
II. Discussion
{¶ 13} As a preliminary point, we again note that Campbell’s brief failed to conform to
App.R. 16(A). In pertinent part, the rule mandates: “(3) A statement of the assignments of
5 error presented for review, with reference to the place in the record where each error is
reflected”; “(4) A statement of the issues presented for review, with references to the
assignments of error to which each issue relates”; “(6) A statement of facts relevant to the
assignments of error presented for review, with appropriate references to the record in
accordance with division (D) of this rule”; and “(7) An argument containing the contentions
of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the
reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of
the record on which appellant relies.”
{¶ 14} “Where an appellant fails to comply with these requirements, App.R. 12(A)(2)
allows us to disregard a party's assignments of error.” State v. Huelsman, 2023-Ohio-649,
¶ 7 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Mize, 2022-Ohio-3163, ¶ 77 (2d Dist.). We may also choose to
consider error in the interests of justice. E.g., Ransom v. Aldi, Inc., 2017-Ohio-6993, ¶ 23
(2d Dist.).
{¶ 15} While Campbell is representing himself pro se, his status is irrelevant.
“Litigants who choose to proceed pro se are presumed to know the law and correct
procedure, and are held to the same standards as other litigants.” Yocum v. Means, 2002-
Ohio-3803, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.), citing Kilroy v. B.H. Lakeshore Co., 111 Ohio App.3d 357, 363
(8th Dist. 1996). A pro se litigant “‘cannot expect or demand special treatment from the
judge, who is to sit as impartial arbiter.’” Id., quoting Kilroy at 363. Nonetheless, in the
interests of justice, we consider Campbell’s arguments to the extent they can be deciphered.
We begin with Campbell’s three initial assertions, which concern the court’s denial of
Campbell’s motions, failure to state reasons for denying evidence Campbell tried to enter,
and denial of due process of law. These assertions are properly classified as procedural
matters.
6 A. Procedural Issues
{¶ 16} Concerning the first three points, we find no error on the trial court’s part. None
of Campbell’s “motions” had merit. Most involved Campbell’s assertion of convoluted and
plainly frivolous arguments. Specifically, when Campbell received billing statements from
Capital, he returned the payment stub to Capital with various notations that he inserted, like
“accepted for deposit”; “payable to bearer” above his name and address on the payment
stub; and a notation that he was paying the entire amount due on the line for “amount
enclosed,” when actually he sent no payment. See, e.g., Ex. 3(C) attached to Motion to Enter
Evidence. In essence, Campbell claimed Capital’s stub was actually tendering him payment
for charges he had incurred using the credit card Capital issued. As noted, this claim was
based on the Bills of Exchange Act and the Cestui Que Vie Act of 1666.
{¶ 17} Very little authority exists in Ohio regarding the Bills of Exchange Act.
However, in 1915, the Supreme Court of Ohio remarked that “[i]In 1902 the Legislature of
Ohio passed the Negotiable Instruments Act. It follows generally the English bills of
exchange act, and is substantially like the act adopted by practically all the states of the
Union.” Elyria Sav. & Banking Co. v. Walker Bin Co., 92 Ohio St. 406, 408 (1915). Thus,
Campell’s “theory” is based on English legislation that has no effect here. Courts in other
jurisdictions have found citation to the Bills and Exchange Act of 1882 “legally frivolous on
its face.” Davis v. ACEF Martin Folsom LLC, 2023 WL 8477987, *2 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 7, 2023).
See also Griffin v. Gen. Elec. Credit Union, 2023 WL 5955735, *3-4 (S.D.Ohio Sept. 13,
2023) (dismissing alleged federal claim under the Bills and Exchange Act of England).
{¶ 18} Although Campbell claims he is not a sovereign citizen, the Cestui Que Vie
Act is associated with sovereign-citizen arguments. See Donald Sullivan, LLC v. Mackey,
2025-Ohio-1903, ¶ 2, 8 (11th Dist.), and In re S.H.O., 2019-Ohio-645, ¶ 5-6, 16 (2d Dist.)
7 (rejecting “sovereign nation” and “sovereign citizen” arguments as meritless). As noted,
among the documents attached to Campbell’s Notice was a “Certificate of Assumed Name,
Notice of Transfer of Reserved Name,” in which Campbell refers to himself as grantor of a
“Cestui Que Vie Trust.” Notice, Certificate of Assumed Name, p. 1.
{¶ 19} “A ‘cestui que vie’ is ‘[t]he person whose life measures the duration of a trust,
gift, estate, or insurance contract.’” Wood v. United States, 161 Fed.Cl. 30, 34, fn. 2
(Fed.Ct.Cl. 2022), quoting Black's Law Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019). In sovereign citizen
practice, the Cestui Que Vie Act of 1666 is used “to assert that because [the plaintiff] has
been presumed dead, the United States became the custodian of his estate and now owes
him the ‘interest of the Estate.’” Id. at 34. Presumably, Campbell is asserting that Capital is
somehow the custodian of his estate and owes him money, rather than the reverse, which
is that he contracted for a credit card, incurred charges, and failed to pay. This argument is
frivolous. See Wood at 35 (commenting that “the legal fiction presented by plaintiff in the
complaint is not based in law but in the fantasies of the sovereign citizen movement.”).
{¶ 20} As to the trial court’s denial of Campbell’s motion to compel discovery, the first
motion was premature, as noted. Further, the attachments to Campbell’s later motion to
compel reveal that Capital objected to various requests as nonsensical and irrelevant. We
agree. For example, request seven asked Capital: “Whose job is it to pay interest?” Motion
to Compel Further Discovery (Mar. 6, 2025), p. 3. This was not an appropriate discovery
request; it was not a question but instead asked for a legal conclusion. Specifically, whether
interest should be paid would have been governed by the credit card agreement, which
Campell could read. The same observations apply to the remaining discovery questions.
Consequently, the trial court did not commit any error in denying the motion to compel.
8 {¶ 21} Finally, there was no due process violation. In fact, Campbell received all
process due. Rather than being deprived, Campbell burdened the court with voluminous and
frivolous pleadings to try and avert a simple contract judgment based on his failure to pay a
creditor for items he had charged.
{¶ 22} Having found no error concerning the above matters, we consider the order
granting summary judgment and the dismissal of Campbell’s counterclaim.
B. Summary Judgment
1. Legal Standards
{¶ 23} We begin with legal standards that apply to summary judgment. For summary
judgment to be granted under Civ.R. 56(C), “it must be demonstrated that there is no issue
as to any material fact, that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and
that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to
the nonmoving party.” Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 80 Ohio St.3d 607, 617 (1998), citing
Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1997). The party seeking summary
judgment has the burden of showing that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Id., citing
Mitseff v. Wheeler, 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 115 (1988). “[I]f the moving party has satisfied its
initial burden, the nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and, if the nonmovant
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the
nonmoving party.” Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). While Civ.R. 56(C)
requires that evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
“an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party's pleadings
. . . .” Civ.R. 56(E).
9 {¶ 24} De novo review applies to summary judgment decisions. Ward v. Bond, 2015-
Ohio-4297, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.), citing Schroeder v. Henness, 2013-Ohio-2767, ¶ 42 (2d Dist.). In
this type of review, we use the same standards as the trial court and examine the evidence
to decide if genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment. Id., citing Brewer
v. Cleveland City Schools Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio App.3d 378, 383 (8th Dist. 1997). (Other
citation omitted.)
2. Principles that Govern Actions on Accounts
{¶ 25} “An action on an account is founded upon contract, and exists to avoid the
multiplicity of suits that would be necessary if each transaction between the parties would
be construed as constituting a separate cause of action.” Rumpke v. Acme Sheet & Roofing,
Inc., 1999 WL 1034455, *4 (2d Dist. Nov. 12, 1999), citing Am. Sec. Serv. v. Baumann,
32 Ohio App.2d 237, 242 (10th Dist. 1972). “The cause of action exists only as to the balance
that may [be] due one of the parties as a result of the parties’ transactions, and not as to
each item of the account.” Id. “A breach of contract claim requires proof of the existence of
a contract, performance by the plaintiff, breach by the defendant, and resulting damage to
the plaintiff.” Discover Bank v. Pierce, 2014-Ohio-625, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing Sullivan v. Curry,
2010-Ohio-5041, ¶ 43 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 26} “Ohio recognizes that the issuance and use of a credit card can create a legally
binding agreement.” Unifund CCR Partners Assignee of Palisades Collection, LLC v. Childs,
2010-Ohio-746, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), citing Bank One, Columbus, N.A. v. Palmer, 63 Ohio App.3d
491 (10th Dist. 1989). In addition, we have held that “[a] creditor does not need to produce
a signed credit card application to prove the existence of a binding contract because the
credit card agreement created one.” Capital One, N.A. v. Howard, 2024-Ohio-275, ¶ 12
(2d Dist.), citing Discover Bank v. Poling, 2005-Ohio-1543, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.).
10 {¶ 27} “An account must show the name of the party charged. It begins with a balance
preferably at zero, or with a sum recited that can qualify as an account stated, but at least
the balance should be a provable sum. Following the balance, the item or items, dated and
identifiable by number or otherwise, representing charges, or debits, and credits, should
appear. Summarization is necessary showing a running or developing balance or an
arrangement which permits the calculation of the balance claimed to be due.” Brown v.
Columbus Stamping & Mfg. Co., 9 Ohio App.2d 123, 126 (10th Dist. 1967), modified as
noted in Johncol, Inc. v. Cardinal Concession Services, L.L.C., 2017-Ohio-9031, ¶ 18
(10th Dist.).
{¶ 28} In Johncol, the court remarked, “Since Brown, we have clarified the
requirements to adequately plead and prove an account. In Hudson & Keyse, L.L.C. v.
Carson, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-936, 2008-Ohio-2570, 2008 WL 2221968, we stated, ‘[i]t is not
necessary that every transaction between the parties be included.’” Id., quoting Hudson at
¶ 13. Our own district has similarly held that “‘to constitute an account, it is not necessary
that every transaction that has transpired between the parties be included during the entire
existence of their business relationship, although such also would represent an account.’”
(Emphasis in original.) Rumpke, 1999 WL 1034455, at *6, quoting Wolf Automotive v. Rally
Auto Parts, Inc., 95 Ohio App.3d 130, 134 (10th Dist.1994).
{¶ 29} Having reviewed all the evidence Capital submitted to support its motion for
summary judgment, we find that Capital satisfied the necessary requirements for proving
the account and was entitled to summary judgment. Given this, Campell then had the burden
to affirmatively demonstrate genuine issues of material fact. He failed to do so because he
did not respond to the summary judgment motion and did not submit any proper evidentiary
materials.
11 {¶ 30} “Any error committed by the trial court in granting summary judgment is waived
if the non-moving party fails to file a brief or evidence in opposition or fails to challenge the
movant's evidence.” USA Freight, L.L.C. v. CBS Outdoor Group, Inc., 2015-Ohio-1474, ¶ 21
(2d Dist.), citing Rodger v. McDonald's Restaurants of Ohio, Inc., 8 Ohio App.3d 256, 258,
fn. 7 (8th Dist.1982). In that situation, we review for plain error only. Id. at ¶ 22. “The plain-
error doctrine ‘is not favored and may be applied only in the extremely rare case involving
exceptional circumstances where error, to which no objection was made at the trial court,
seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process,
thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.’” Citibank v.
Wood, 2008-Ohio-2877, ¶ 50 (2d Dist.), quoting Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116,
122-123 (1997).
{¶ 31} Here, there was no error or plain error. The trial court granted summary
judgment to Capital and dismissed the counterclaim for the reasons Capital had stated in its
motion. Judgment Entry, p. 1. In the motion, Capital presented properly authenticated copies
of the Customer Agreement that applied to Campbell. It also submitted account statements
from December 17, 2017 (showing a zero balance), through January 20, 2024, which
showed an ending balance of $7,671.42 (the amount alleged in the complaint). Campbell
never denied making the charges; his only claim was that he had paid more than $28,000
to Capital when he actually paid nothing. Campbell never presented any proof as required
by Civ.R. 56 and advanced only frivolous theories. Accordingly, no error or plain error
occurred.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 32} For the reasons stated, Campbell’s assignments of error are overruled, and
the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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TUCKER, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.