Capital Building LLC v. Fortune Ocean, LLLP

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: July 10, 2024
• Docket: 2023-1310
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed July 10, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D23-1310 Lower Tribunal No. 12-42957 ________________

Capital Building LLC, et al., Appellants,

vs.

Fortune Ocean, LLLP, et al., Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Lisa S. Walsh, Judge.

Marcus Law Center, LLC, and Nicholas M. Vicente and Alan K. Marcus, for appellants.

Coffey Burlington, P.L., and Susan E. Raffanello and Scott A. Hiaasen, for appellees.

Before EMAS, SCALES, and BOKOR, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Fernandez v. Cruz, 341 So. 3d 410, 414 (Fla. 3d DCA

2022) (“[T]he term ‘‘parties’ has been broadly interpreted to include more

than just record parties – so that, for example, a person in privity with a record

party, as well as a person who controls for his own interest a record party,

may invoke the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel.’ . . . [O]ne party

may be said to be a privy of another where the right to recover is dependent

upon the right of recovery of the plaintiff in the prior action.” (quoting West v.

Kawasaki Motors Mfg. Corp., U.S.A., 595 So. 2d 92, 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)));

Pearce v. Sandler, 219 So. 3d 961, 967 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“[T]he doctrine

of res judicata not only bars issues that were raised, but it also precludes

consideration of issues that could have been raised but were not raised in

the first case.”); Nat’l Auto Serv. Ctrs., Inc. v. F/R 550, LLC, 192 So. 3d 498,

512 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (“[S]ection 726.110(1) does not provide for separate

periods of limitations and repose. It extinguishes all causes of action as to

which suit is not commenced within four years of the transfer and provides a

carve-out for a limited class of claims brought later. Section 726.110(1) is a

statute of repose in its entirety. . . . Based on the long-standing recognition

that statutes of repose create an absolute bar to untimely actions and the

specific language of section 726.110(1), we hold that it is not subject to an

assertion of equitable estoppel.”).