Cape Fear Lumber Co. v. Small

66 S.E. 880, 84 S.C. 434, 1910 S.C. LEXIS 173
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedJanuary 8, 1910
Docket7410
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 66 S.E. 880 (Cape Fear Lumber Co. v. Small) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cape Fear Lumber Co. v. Small, 66 S.E. 880, 84 S.C. 434, 1910 S.C. LEXIS 173 (S.C. 1910).

Opinion

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Judge Ernest Gary, in place of Mr. Justice Woods, disqualified.

The nature of this action will appear from the following statement, set out in the record

“This action was begun in 1899, to require of the defendant, Adeline Small, the specific performance of a contract, given by her to the plaintiff, for the sale of timber on a certain tract of land in Marlboro county; this contract being what is commonly known as a timber option, and to have a certain conveyance made by the defendant, Adeline Small, to the defendant, Tilghman Lumber Company, for the timber in question, declared null and void, and perpetually to enjoin the defendant, Tilghman Lumber Company, from cutting such timber. This option was executed on the 5th day of October, 1898, and it gave to the plaintiff the right or option to purchase all of the pine and poplar timber on the tract of land described therein, within four months .thereafter, which would be February 5, 1899. Thereafter, on the 16th day of February, 1899, Mrs. Small sold the same timber to her co-defendant, Tilghman Lumber Company, which claims title thereto by virtue of this deed. The case in due course was referred to John W. LeGrand, Esq., special referee, to take the testimony and report the same to the Court. The referee having complied with this order, the cause came on to be heard before Honorable Geo. W. Gage, presiding Judge, who, after hearing argument, rendered a decree, wherein he held that the option was a valid *438 and subsisting contract, and should be specifically performed ; and, in addition, that the deed under which defendant, Tilghman Lumber Company, claims is void, and should be cancelled.”

The allegations of the complaint, material to the questions under consideration, are as follows:

“That the defendant, Adeline Small, being the owner in fee of certain lands hereinafter described, in Marlboro county, in the 'State of ■S'outh Carolina, did, on the 5th day of October, A. D. 1898, for a valuable consideration then paid, execute and deliver to the plaintiff a certain writing giving an option to other rights of which the following is a copy, to wit:
“ ‘State of South Carolina, County of Marlboro.
“ ‘For and in consideration of one dollar in hand, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I hereby give to the Cape Fear Lumber Company, or assigns, the option of purchasing, within four months, all the pine and poplar timber on our lands, for the lump sum of three hundred and seventy-five dollars, the said lands containing seven hundred and fifty acres, more or less, and bounded on the north by Cashuaway Ferry and Lumberton Road and lands of J. P.. Hodges . Mrs. Adeline Small, (i,. s.)
“ ‘Witness this October 5, 1898.
“ ‘(Signed) H. N. Hodges,
S'. Mitchell.’
“That on the 14th day of January, 1899, the plaintiff did accept said option in writing, the said acceptance being within the time specified in said writing.
“That the plaintiff duly performed all the conditions of said agreement on its part, and has always been ready and willing, and still is, to fulfill the said agreement.
“That on the 14th day of January, A. D. 1899, the plaintiff forwarded the money, to its attorney in Bennettsville, with which to pay the defendant,'Adeline Small, and that soon thereafter, during the month of January, through its *439 attorney, this plaintiff tendered to the defendant the sum of three hundred and seventy-five dollars, and demanded the performance, on her part, of said agreement, by conveying to the plaintiff the timber on said land, with rights to enter, cut and take away the same, and to construct a railroad on said land, said conveyance to be made in accordance with the aforesaid agreement, but the defendant, Adeline Small, refused to perform her part of said agreement, and still refuses to do so.
“That ever since the day on which the purchase money was so tendered it has been in the hands of plaintiff’s attorney, for the purpose of completing said purchase.
“That this plaintiff is now ready to comply with said contract, and asks to be allowed to pay the purchase money into Court.”

The defendants appealed upon exceptions, which will be set out in the report of the case.

The first and second exceptions will be considered together.

1 Tender has been well defined as “an offer by a debtor, or other person, who is under an obligation to pay such debt or to perform such obligation, the actual payment or performance being prevented by the refusal of the creditor, or person entitled to performance, to accept the same.” 28 Enc. of Law, 4.

The authorities cited by the appellant’s attorneys, in their argument, sustain the general proposition that a party to whom an option is given, to purchase certain interests in land, within a prescribed time, cannot maintain an action for specific performance unless it is shown that he made payment of the purchase money, or that, upon tendering the same, that it was refused by the other party to the contract. The party giving the option may, however, waive the right to insist that the tender did not conform to the requirements of law, and all objections, except those interposed, are waived.

*440 Mr. M. C. Woods, a witness for the plaintiff, testified as follows:

“There was a letter from Mrs. Small to Cape Fear Lumber Company, dated on or about the 14th day of December, 1898. In this letter she wanted to know whether Cape Fear Lumber Company intended to buy her timber under the paper which she had given, or words to that effect. That other parties were applying to her for the purchase of that timber, and she wished to' know if they intended to comply with the option, because she did not want to lose the sale of the timber. That was in effect the contents of that letter. Another letter, that was in this package destroyed by fire, was from Cape Fear Lumber Company, or Mr. Arringdale, to Mrs. Adeline Sicnall. stating that they accepted the option and would be ready to comply therewith in a short time. Another letter in this package, from Mr. Arringdale to Mrs. Small, stated that the Cape Fear Lumber Company was now ready to comply with the option, and had: sent the matter to Mr. Bouchier to close the trade, and to call on Mr. Bouchier and perfect it. This letter was written along about the latter part of January, 1899. There was a second letter from Mrs. Small, written the latter part of January, 1899, to Cape Fear Lumber Company, or to Mr. Arringdale, in which Mrs. Small stated that she had been to Mr. Bouchier’s office, and that he had offered to close the trade with her, and had offered her the money to- close the trade, and that she would not accept it because the deed was not written in pursuance of the option, and not according to her instructions.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
66 S.E. 880, 84 S.C. 434, 1910 S.C. LEXIS 173, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cape-fear-lumber-co-v-small-sc-1910.