Cannon v. San Francisco Police Department

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: January 24, 2023
• Docket: 3:22-cv-06778
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 LADY BENJAMIN CANNON, Case No. 22-cv-06778-SI

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 9 v. WITH LEAVE TO AMEND AND DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT 10 SAN FRANCISCO POLICE WATTERS’S MOTIONS DEPARTMENT, et al., 11 Re: Dkt. Nos. 6, 12, 13, 18, 19, 21, 32, 33, Defendants. 12 34, 35

13 14 BACKGROUND 15 On November 2, 2022, plaintiff filed a complaint against 23 named defendants and 60 16 unnamed “Doe” defendants concerning what plaintiff alleges was an unlawful eviction, among other 17 acts. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff moved to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. No. 3. On November 7, 18 Magistrate Judge Hixson granted plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis but found that the 19 complaint was deficient pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Dkt. No. 7. The case was reassigned to 20 the undersigned. Dkt. No. 30. 21 Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on December 4, 2022. Dkt. No. 20. 22 The Court now screens the FAC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 23 24 DISCUSSION 25 Where a plaintiff is found to be indigent under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and is granted leave 26 to proceed in forma pauperis, courts must engage in screening and dismiss any claims which: (1) 27 are frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seek 1 Marks v. Solcum, 98 F.3d 494, 495 (9th Cir. 1996). 2 Plaintiff brings the FAC against 23 named defendants and 60 unknown “Doe” defendants. 3 Dkt. No. 20 at 2–6. However, plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed her claims against Carlos Jato, 4 Daniel Berko, and the Law Offices of Carlos Jato. Dkt. No. 25. The Court reviews plaintiff’s claims 5 against the other parties. 6 7 I. Rule 8 8 As a preliminary matter, the Court reminds plaintiff that Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules 9 of Civil procedure requires that the complaint set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim 10 showing [plaintiff] is entitled to relief” and Rule 8(d)(1) requires that each allegation be “simple, 11 concise, and direct.” Judge Hixson’s order cautioned plaintiff that she must amend the complaint 12 “so that each cause of action includes (1) all necessary elements to establish the claim and (2) 13 specific factual allegations that connect each defendant with the alleged wrongdoing.” Dkt. No. 7 14 at 3. Plaintiff has failed to do so. Blanket allegations that all defendants assisted the others to 15 perform all alleged violations are not sufficiently specific to place the defendants on notice of the 16 allegations against them. 17 If plaintiff amends her complaint a second time, she must follow the requirements of Rule 18 8, or the complaint will again be dismissed. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 19 1996) (affirming dismissal of a “prolix, confusing complaint” because it “impose[d] unfair burdens 20 on litigants and judges”). 21 22 II. Plaintiff’s Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 23 24 A. Claims Against Private Actors Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 25 Plaintiff’s first, second, third, fourth, and fifth claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 26 § 1983. Dkt. No. 20 at 29–44. Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any 27 rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Wilder 1 under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal 2 law, and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West 3 v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 4 Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are brought against all the defendants. Dkt. No. 20 at 29–44. 5 However, plaintiff alleges that all defendants are private parties aside from the municipal entities 6 and defendants Maron,1 Sanford, and Baumgartner. Dkt. No. 20 at 2–6. As explained by Judge 7 Hixson’s order, “purely private conduct, no matter how wrongful” does not create liability under 8 section 1983. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999); Ouzts v. Maryland 9 Nat. Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1974). Judge Hixson explained that in order to bring 10 claims under § 1983, plaintiff would need to “include allegations establishing that [each defendant 11 was] acting under the color of state law.” Dkt. No. 7. 12 Plaintiff has attempted to remedy this deficiency by listing cases in which private parties 13 were found to be acting under color of law and making the conclusory allegation that all defendants 14 in this case “were acting under the color of state law” by “acting to directly support, assist, and 15 advance the goals of the state actors.” Dkt. No. 20 at 16–24; 32. While it is true that private actors 16 can act under color of state law in certain circumstances, plaintiff has not made any factual 17 allegations that support her claim the private defendants acted under color of law. See Simmons v. 18 Sacramento Cty. Superior Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding conclusory allegations 19 lawyer was conspiring with state official were insufficient). 20 Because plaintiff has not adequately alleged that the defendants acted under color of state 21 law, plaintiff’s first, second, third, fourth, and fifth claims are dismissed as to defendants Jadallah; 22 Provencio; Watters; Wiseblood; McClain; Thompson; Bledsoe, Diestel, Treppa & Crane LLP; 23 Riley; Hain; Ryan Murphy; Kavin Williams; Eviction Defense Collaborative; Friendly Movers; and 24 Does 1–60. 25 26 27 1 B. Claims Against Local Government Entities Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 2 Of the remaining defendants, three of them – the City and County of San Francisco, the San 3 Francisco Police Department, and the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department – are local government 4 entities. See Dkt. No. 20 at 2. While local government entities can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 5 a local government is only liable where injury is caused by the government’s “policy or custom.” 6 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 659 (1978). To establish Monell 7 liability, a plaintiff must show “action pursuant to official municipal policy,” including “the 8 decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so 9 persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 10 51, 60–61 (2011). Local government entities “are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their 11 employees’ actions” but can in certain circumstances be liable for failure to train. Connick, 563 12 U.S. at 61. 13 Plaintiff does not make any allegations that the alleged violations of her rights were 14 committed according to policy with respect to her first, second, fourth, or fifth claims. See Dkt. No. 15 20 at 29–44. Thus, plaintiff’s claims against local government entities with respect to her first, 16 second, fourth, and fifth claims are dismissed. 17 Plaintiff’s third claim is for failure to train, which can be a basis for Monell liability. 18 However, “[a] municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a 19 claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. To state a claim for failure to train, a 20 plaintiff must allege facts showing that the “municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant 21 respect must amount to ‘deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained 22 employees] came into contact.’ ” Id. (quoting Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). Here, 23 plaintiff does not allege any facts to support her failure to train claim, instead making conclusory 24 recitations of the elements of a Monell claim. See Dkt. No. 20 at 38–39. Because plaintiff’s 25 allegations are “conclusory and unsupported by any facts,” her claim is dismissed. Mitchell v. Cty. 26 of Contra Costa, 600 F.Supp.3d 1018, 1032 (2022). 27 1 C. Claims Against Government Officials Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 2 Plaintiff names three alleged government officials in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Dkt. No. 3 20 at 2–3, 29–44. Plaintiff does not specify whether she brings suit against the officials in their 4 individual or official capacities. To the extent plaintiff is attempting to bring suit against the officials 5 in their official capacity, her suit is actually against the agencies they represent. Brandon v. Holt, 6 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166–67. Those claims fail for the 7 reasons described above. To the extent plaintiff is attempting to bring suit against the officials in 8 their personal capacities, the Court analyzes her claims below. 9 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a plaintiff to make “a short and 10 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” In his Order, Judge 11 Hixson instructed plaintiff to amend her complaint such that each cause of action would include 12 “specific factual allegations that connect each defendant with the alleged wrongdoing.” Dkt. No. 7 13 at 3. The complaint must give each “defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon 14 which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (simplified). Plaintiff brings no specific 15 allegations against Captain Maron to support her first, second, or fifth claim. She brings no specific 16 allegations against Captain Sanford to support her first, second, or fifth claim. She brings no specific 17 allegations against Ms. Baumgartner to support her second or fifth claim. Those claims are 18 dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 19 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (noting a plaintiff must provide “[f]actual allegations must be enough 20 to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in 21 the complaint are true”). 22 The only allegation plaintiff brings against defendant Baumgartner for her first claim is that 23 Baumgartner was in a supervisory position within the Sheriff’s department and was “notified . . . 24 that any eviction had to be called off . . . .” Dkt. No. 20 at 31. Plaintiff appears to be attempting to 25 bring a claim against Baumgartner for supervisory liability. To state a claim for supervisory liability 26 under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that either (1) the supervisor was personally involved in the 27 constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is “a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's 1 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989)). Plaintiff has alleged neither. 2 Because plaintiff fails to allege either a that Baumgartner was personally involved in the deprivation 3 or sufficient causal connection between Baumgartner’s conduct and the constitutional violation, this 4 claim is dismissed. See id. 5 For her fifth claim, plaintiff makes only conclusory allegations that each officer failed to 6 train police officers or sheriff’s deputies. See Dkt. No. 20 at 38–39. These allegations are not 7 sufficient to support plaintiff’s failure to train claim. See Ray v. Saunders, No. C 12-1280 YGR PR, 8 2012 WL 5341384, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2012) (noting plaintiff must “allege a ‘specific policy’ 9 or ‘a specific event’ instigated by [the supervisors] that led to the constitutional violations”). This 10 claim is dismissed. 11 Finally, plaintiff brings an excessive force claim against all three officials under the Fourth 12 Amendment, alleging that defendant Baumgartner “sanctioned use of lethal force against” plaintiff 13 and that defendants Maron and Sanford “threatened to arrest her and employ . . . various agents upon 14 Plaintiff if she attempted to intervene” or enter the residence. Dkt. No. 20 at 41. But plaintiff does 15 not allege any actual use of force against her. Id. Her excessive force claim therefore fails. See 16 Battle v. Baalaer, 536 Fed.Appx. 725, 726 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming summary judgment where 17 plaintiff “failed to raise genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants used any physical 18 force against him”). 19 20 III. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims 21 In addition to her federal claims, plaintiff brings state law claims for conversion, intentional 22 infliction of emotional distress, violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and defamation. Dkt. No. 23 20 at 45–54. Because plaintiff’s federal claims are without merit, the Court declines to exercise 24 supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 25 715, 726 (1966) (“Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should 26 be dismissed as well.”). 27 1 IV. Defendant Watters’s Motions 2 Defendant Watters has made ten motions, several of which are duplicative. Dkt. No. 6, 12, 3 13, 18, 19, 21, 32, 33, 34, 35. Because the Court is dismissing plaintiffs claims, defendant’s 4 || motions are denied as moot. 5 6 CONCLUSION 7 For the reasons discussed above, plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. 8 || Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint on or before March 7, 2023. Failure to do so 9 || will result in the dismissal of the complaint WITH PREJUDICE. 10 Plaintiff may wish to seek assistance from the Legal Help Center, a free service offered by 11 the Justice & Diversity Center of the Bar Association of San Francisco. You may request an 12 appointment by emailing fedpro @ sfbar.org or calling 415-782-8982. At the Legal Help Center, you 5 13 will be able to speak with an attorney who may be able to provide basic legal help but not 14 || representation. More information is available at http://cand.uscourts.gov/helpcentersf. 3 15 Plaintiff may also wish to obtain a copy of this District’s Handbook for Litigants Without a 16 || Lawyer, which provides instructions on how to proceed at every stage of your case. The handbook 3 17 is available in person at the Clerk’s Office and online at: http://cand.uscourts.gov/prosehandbook. 18 Because the complaint is dismissed, defendant Watters’s motions are DENIED as moot. 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 Dated: January 24, 2023 22 sy / bin | Ly Dw 73 SUSAN ILLSTON United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28