Cannon v. Cannon

316 N.E.2d 762, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 874, 1974 Mass. App. LEXIS 817
CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court
DecidedSeptember 24, 1974
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 316 N.E.2d 762 (Cannon v. Cannon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cannon v. Cannon, 316 N.E.2d 762, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 874, 1974 Mass. App. LEXIS 817 (Mass. Ct. App. 1974).

Opinion

The respondent, formerly the husband of the petitioner, has appealed from an order or decree of a Probate Court which “ denied” his plea to the jurisdiction of the court with respect to a petition described in the petitioner’s brief as one “seeking to modify a divorce decree from the State of Nevada dated September 11, 1962.” No question is presented as to the appeal’s being properly here. 1. Whatever the parties may have intended by the proviso to the fourteenth paragraph of their separation agreement dated August 2, 1962 (see Surabian v. Surabian, 362 Mass. 342, 345 [1972]), the Nevada decree (entered following proceedings at which both parties filed appearances and were represented by counsel) explicitly provided that “the aforesaid agreement shall survive this decree and all of the terms thereof shall remain in full force and effect.” See Ballin v. Ballin, 78 Nev. 224, 229-231, 232 (1962); Rush v. Rush, 82 Nev. 59, 60 (1966). Contrast Day v. Day, 80 Nev. 386, 389-390 (1964). Accordingly, for that reason alone, the Probate Court was without jurisdiction to modify the terms of either the original 1962 agreement or the 1965 amendment thereof, which, for all that appears, arose solely through the voluntary act of the parties. Schillander v. Schillander, 307 Mass. 96, 98-99 (1940). Compare Whitney v. Whitney, 316 Mass. 367, 370-371 (1944); Freeman v. Sieve, 323 Mass. 652, 657 (1949); Jones v. Jones, 86 Nev. 879, 883-884 (1970). 2. As the Nevada decree cannot, under authorities cited, be construed as ordering the respondent to comply with the terms of the 1962 agreement, the petition cannot be maintained under G. L. c. 208, § 35 (as amended by St. 1950, c. 57) as one to enforce that decree. Contrast De Gategno v. De Gategno, 336 Mass. 426 (1957); Holsinger v. Holsinger, 357 Mass. 1 (1970). 3. The provisions of G. L. c. 208, § 37, apply, by their terms, only to Massachusetts decrees. See Gosselin v. Gosselin, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 146, 147-149 (1973). 4. As the parties appear to be no longer married, we do not reach any question of jurisdiction under the second sentence of the second paragraph of G. L. c. 215, § 6, as originally inserted by St. 1933, c. 237, § 1, and as now appearing in St. 1973, c. 1114, § 63. Whitney v. Whitney, 316 Mass. 367, 372 (1944). Seltmann v. Seltmann, 322 Mass. 650, 652-654 (1948). The order or decree overruling the plea [875]*875to the jurisdiction is reversed; a new order or decree is to be entered sustaining the plea; the petition is to be dismissed.

The case was submitted on briefs. C. Michael Sheridan for the respondent. Robert Athos for the petitioner.

So ordered.

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Related

Bohner v. Bohner
468 N.E.2d 653 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1984)
Gunter v. Gunter
325 N.E.2d 297 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1975)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
316 N.E.2d 762, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 874, 1974 Mass. App. LEXIS 817, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cannon-v-cannon-massappct-1974.