Canizio v. New York

327 U.S. 82, 66 S. Ct. 452, 90 L. Ed. 545, 1946 U.S. LEXIS 2804

Opinions

Mk. Justice Black

delivered thé opinion of the Court.

On June 1, 1931 in the County Court of Kings County, New York, the petitioner pleaded guilty to the crime of robbery in the first degree. On June 19, 1931 that court' sentenced him to serve a term of from 15 to 30 years in state prison. After the petitioner had served almost 14 years of this sentence he instituted this proceeding by a motion, coram nobis, in the Kings County court, praying that the June 19, 1931 sentence be vacated and set aside. His motion, verified by oath, alleged that at the time of his arraignment, guilty plea, and sentence, petitioner was 19 years old and unfamiliar with legal proceeding^ that he was not represented'by counsel; and that the court neither asked him whether he desired counsel to be assigned, nor advised him of his right to counsel. Petitioner’s motion charged that the acceptance of his guilty plea and the sentehteing under these circumstances violated Article 1, § 6 of the New York State Constitution and § 308 of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, and deprived him of his liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States'Constitution.

The District Attorney filed an affidavit opposing the motion. This affidavit, based on information obtained from court records, admitted that these failed to show that petitioner had been represented by counsel when he was arraigned and when he pleaded guilty on June 1,1931. To overcome this apparent defect of the record the affidavit urged the presumption of regularity of judicial proceedings to support the conclusion, in the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, that the judge must have performed his duty under New York’s laws to advise petitioner of his right to counsel. The District Attorney contended that petitioner’s motion though verified was not sufficient to overcome this presumption, especially since petitioner’s conviction occurred 14 years ago. Moreover, the affidavit denied that petitioner was not represented by counsel at the time of sentencing, and alleged that on June 17,1931, two days before the sentence was imposed, there was filed a notice of appearance of counsel on behalf of the petitioner. Thus, according to the affidavit petitioner was represented by counsel from June 17th to June J9th, 1931. Petitioner filed no denial to this affidavit.

The court denied petitioner’s motion on the basis of the aforementioned papers including the record of the original proceeding, and without permitting petitioner to introduce any evidence. Under New York practice petitioner’s motion was the proper procedure to raise the federal question. Lyons v. Goldstein, 290 N. Y. 19, 47 N. E. 2d 425. Since the court’s denial of the motion cannot be appealed to any higher New York court, People v. Gersewitz, 294 N. Y. 163, 61N. E. 2d 427, we have jurisdiction to consider the case. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 461. We granted certiorari because the case presents an important question involving the right to counsel under the Constitution of the United States..

Before we consider this question we shall assume that petitioner was without counsel when arraigned and when he pleaded guilty and that although he was unfamiliar with his legal rights the court failed to inform him of his right to counsel. Consequently, had there been nothing to contradict petitioner’s, general allegation that he was not represented by counsel in the interim between his plea of guilty and the time he was sentenced, his charges would have been such as to have required the court to hold a hearing on his motion. Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786. But the District Attorney’s affidavit and the record and stenographic transcripts of the original proceedings in which petitioner was sentenced show that petitioner was actively represented by counsel in long hearings during the day of sentence. In our opinion, these new facts, undénied, so far refuted petitioner’s entire constitutional claim as to justify the court’s holding that a hearing on petitioner’s motion was unnecessary.

These papers before the trial court showed that petitioner along with two others were originally charged under three counts. Petitioner pleaded guilty on one charge on condition that he would not be prosecuted on the other two. Thereafter, as we have indicated, an attorney appeared on his behalf in an effort to secure a low sentence. The attorney could have moved to withdraw the plea of guilty and the County Court of Kings County would have had the power to set aside the plea and let the petitioner stand trial. New York Code of Criminal Procedure, § 337 People v. Gowasky, 244 N. Y. 451, 155 N. E. 737. Petitioner’s counsel probably thought it undesirable to do so, because this move might have jeopardized his chances for securing a low sentence. The plea was to robbery in the first degree, unarmed. The record clearly shows that petitioner was heavily armed. Had he been convicted of first degree robbery while armed he would in all likelihood have gotten a higher sentence. Cf. People ex rel. O’Berst v. Murphy, 256 App. Div. 58, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 965; People ex rel. Pilo v. Martin, 262 App. Div. 1056, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 290. At any rate, whatever the reason, petitioner’s counsel did not move to withdraw the guilty plea.¹ All of this demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court below that even though petitioner may not have had counsel at the beginning, he had counsel in ample time to take advantage of every defense which would have been available to him originally. We think the record shows that petitioner actually had the benefit of counsel. When that counsel took over petitioner’s defense he could have raised the question of a defect in the earlier part of the proceedings.² Failing to do so when the statute afforded him the opportunity, we cannot say that the court denied petitioner the right to have a trial with the benefit of counsel.

Petitioner’s motion was, therefore, properly denied.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

1

The assumption cannot be made that had petitioner’s counsel done so it would not have been granted. If the motion had in fact been denied, petitioner’s counsel could have appealed and thus have brought up the denial of the motion. Code of Crim. Proc. § 517; People v. Joyce, 41 Hun 641. If the case had then eventually reached us our previous decisions would have compelled us to hold the denial of the motion improper. See e. g. Rice v. Olson, supra. But the question is not before us in this proceeding.

2

It is suggested that the New York ease of People v. Steinmetz, 240 N. Y. 411, 148 N. E. 597, which allows a withdrawn guilty plea under some circumstances to be admitted at trial as evidence in the nature of a confession, might have compelled counsel to refrain from making a motion to withdraw the plea because in view of the Steinmetz rule little would thereby be accomplished in a practical way. In the Steinmetz case defendant had been represented by counsel at the time of the guilty plea. The opinion, read as a whole, seems'to indicate that a guilty plea would be inadmissible as evidence at a trial, where it was later withdrawn because defendant, ignorant of his right to counsel, had at the time of pleading guilty not been informed of his right. We have held that in a federal court a withdrawn guilty plea is not admissible in evidence. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U. S. 220, 223, 225. See also People v. Ariano, 264 App. Div. 426, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 818. If a guilty plea without counsel should be held admissible in New York, the proper case in which to raise the issue of the propriety of its admission is on appeal to this Court on conviction after trial. Otherwise, if such an admission is proper at all it would also be proper if a trial is had after we reversed this case. Consequently nothing would be gained by a reversal on that ground.