Candace Green , John Green v. Ron Hoover Marine, Inc. Dba Ron Hoover RV and Marine Centers

Opinion

Opinion issued August 13, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

promissory estoppel, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of express and implied warranties, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Ron Hoover.

The Greens contend they did not receive proper notice of the motion for summary judgment’s submission date and that Ron Hoover failed to meet its burden of proof to support summary judgment.

We affirm.

Background

The Greens purchased an RV from Ron Hoover. The Greens alleged that Ron Hoover made certain representations, including that the shower door and windows in the RV would be replaced and that the RV contained a brand-new refrigerator, and the Greens relied on such representations when purchasing the RV.

When the Greens took possession of the RV, they discovered the shower door remained defective, the windows had not been repaired or replaced, and the refrigerator was in fact a residential unit improperly installed in the RV. They sued Ron Hoover for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, breach of express and implied warranties, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the DTPA.

Ron Hoover moved for no-evidence and traditional summary judgment on the Greens’ claims. The trial court granted summary judgment but later granted the Greens’ agreed motion for new trial because Ron Hoover had given the Greens

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seventeen days’ notice instead of the required twenty-one under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. After the trial court amended the docket control order, Ron Hoover provided about three months’ notice of the summary judgment hearing on June 10, 2025. At the hearing, upon agreement of counsel, the trial court reset the motion for submission about a month later to give the Greens more time to respond to Ron Hoover’s motions.

A week after the submission date, the trial court granted final summary judgment in favor of Ron Hoover on the Greens’ claims. The Greens moved for a new trial alleging that their due process rights were violated because they never received notice of the submission date and the evidence did not support summary judgment. The trial court denied the Greens’ motion for new trial.

Notice

In their first issue, the Greens contend that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment because they had a faulty notice or lack of notice of the submission date. Ron Hoover responds that the Greens had actual notice of the submission date because the parties and the trial court agreed to the submission date in open court.

Due process under both the U.S. and Texas Constitutions requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Mitchell v. MAP Res., Inc., 649 S.W.3d 180, 188–89 (Tex. 2022) (analyzing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 19).

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Such notice must be “reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their objections.” Id. at 189. The reasonableness of any chosen means of giving notice, and hence its constitutionality, “may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected, or, where conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes.” Id.

Texas courts have consistently recognized that actual notice of a summary judgment hearing or submission date satisfies the notice requirement, even when formal written notice is deficient or absent. See Elgohary v. Lakes on Eldridge N. Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., No. 01‑14‑00216‑CV, 2016 WL 4374918, at *5 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 16, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); West v. Maint. Tool & Supply Co., Inc., 89 S.W.3d 96, 102–03 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, no pet.); Goode v. Avis Rent-A-Car, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).

The record shows that the parties’ counsel appeared for the hearing and, upon their agreement, the trial court re-set the submission date to July 9, 2025 at 9 a.m. to give the Greens more time to respond. The trial court explained that the agreement by counsel and setting it in open court was sufficient notice of the submission date.

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2 R.R. 7-8.1 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 11 (agreement between attorneys or parties is enforceable if “made in open court and entered of record”). Despite receiving actual notice, the Greens did not respond to the summary judgment motion or move for continuance.

We overrule the Greens’ first issue.

Summary Judgment

In their second issue, the Greens contend that Ron Hoover failed to meet its burden to disprove their claims, and thus the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support summary judgment. “We review a trial court’s order granting summary judgment de novo, taking as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.” Community Health Sys. Prof’l Servs. v. Hansen, 525 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Tex. 2017) (cleaned up). Because the trial court did not specify the grounds on which it granted summary judgment, we must affirm if any of the grounds alleged in the motions are meritorious. Id.

A no-evidence summary judgment shifts the burden to the nonmovant to produce evidence raising an issue of material fact as to the elements specified in the motion. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006). “If the

1 The Greens’ motion for new trial also mentions that counsel for the parties and the court coordinator were emailing on the submission date, which also shows the Greens had actual notice of the submission date.

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nonmovant fails to produce more than a scintilla of evidence on the essential elements of a cause of action challenged by a no-evidence motion, there is no need to analyze the movant’s traditional grounds for summary judgment.” Hansen, 525 S.W.3d at 680–81.

The Greens argue that they had no duty to respond to Ron Hoover’s summary judgment motion. This is correct as to the traditional grounds, but not as to the no- evidence grounds. See Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81, 87–88 (Tex. 2021). Ron Hoover’s no-evidence motion shifted the burden to the Greens to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to the elements specified in its motion. See State v. Three Thousand, Seven Hundred Seventy-Four Dollars & Twenty-Eight Cents U.S. Currency, 713 S.W.3d 381, 387 (Tex. 2025); Mack Trucks, Inc., 206 S.W.3d at 582.

The trial court must grant a no-evidence motion unless the nonmovant produces evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on each of the challenged claims. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(h)(3); Landers v. State Farm Lloyds, 257 S.W.3d 740, 744–46 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.). Even if a nonmovant wishes to assert that evidence in the record creates a fact issue to defeat a no-evidence motion, the nonmovant must timely file a response raising that issue in the trial court. State, 713 S.W.3d at 389–90.

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Because the Greens failed to respond to Ron Hoover’s motion, the no-

evidence grounds are dispositive of their challenge to the merits of the summary- judgment ruling. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted Ron Hoover’s no- evidence motion for summary judgment.2 Conclusion

We hold that the trial court did not err in granting Ron Hoover’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Clint Morgan

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Gunn, and Morgan.

2 Because we hold the trial court properly granted Ron Hoover’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment, we need not consider its traditional motion for summary judgment. See Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013)

(explaining if nonmovant fails to produce legally sufficient evidence to meet his burden as to no-evidence motion, there is no need to analyze whether movant satisfied its burden under the traditional motion); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

Footnotes

1. NO. 01-25-00862-CV ——————————— CANDACE GREEN AND JOHN GREEN, Appellants v. RON HOOVER MARINE, INC. and RON HOOVER COMPANIES OF HOUSTON, INC., Appellees On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2 Waller County, Texas Cause No. CV23-05-0784 MEMORANDUM OPINION This appeal arises from a dispute over the purchase of a recreational vehicle (“RV”). Candace and John Green (“the Greens”) sued Ron Hoover Marine, Inc. and Ron Hoover Companies of Houston, Inc. (“Ron Hoover”) for breach of contract,