Canal Co. v. Hill

82 U.S. 94, 21 L. Ed. 64, 15 Wall. 94, 1872 U.S. LEXIS 1236
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedDecember 16, 1872
StatusPublished
Cited by86 cases

This text of 82 U.S. 94 (Canal Co. v. Hill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Canal Co. v. Hill, 82 U.S. 94, 21 L. Ed. 64, 15 Wall. 94, 1872 U.S. LEXIS 1236 (1872).

Opinion

Mr. Justice BRADLEY

delivered the opinion of the court.

The large investment of capital made by the appellee in sole reliance on the water-power which the lease secures, with the full knowledge which the appellants had of this reliance and intended investment, renders it necessary that we should look carefulty to the substance of the original *100 agreement, of January, 1864, as contradistinguished from its mere form, in order that we may give it a fair and just construction, and ascertain the substantial intent of the parties, which is the fundamental rule in the construction of all agreements. It is not to be presumed that they intended to provide for a certain aperture in the canal without respect to the amount of water it would discharge and the purpose which that water was to accomplish. What the appellee sought was waterpower to drive the machinery of an expensive mill. The appellants knew this to be his object, and the thing leased or granted was intended to be, and in fact was, water, as the means of creating such power. It was not only water, but a certain quantity of water, namely (in the words of the lease), “ so much water as will pass through an aperture of two hundred square inches,” under certain conditions specified. The parties clearly had in view a fixed quantity of water to be reeeived.in a given time. In ascertaining their mutual rights under the lease, it is important to know how much this quantity was. When we know that, we know the substance of the agreement.

Now, in speaking of a certain .quantity of water,-we always have reference to its cubical contents, its bulk or weight. We mean so many gallons, or hogsheads, or cubic feet of water. We have no reference to surface or sectional measurement. A square foot, or a square inch of water, expresses no quantity at all. But- when we speak of the quantity which will pass through a square foot, or square inch of aperture, in a certain time, then our words have meaning. The size and position of the aperture so carefully prescribed in the lease were intended merely as a means of measurement of the real thing granted, namely, that certain quantity of water per second, or per hour, which the parties had in mind, and about which they were dealing. If we can ascertain this, we can easily adjust the mutual rights of the parties. Can it be ascertained from the terms of the lease, aided by the light derived from the evidence in the cause? We think it can. And in making this inquiry we have a right to examine into the state of things existing at the time *101 and the circumstances in which the lease was made. This kind of evidence is especially pertinent when the inquiry is as to the subject-matter of the agreement.

The amount of water which will be discharged through an aperture of a given size will depend upon the form of the aperture, the head under which the water is drawn, and the freedom from obstruction with which it is permitted to flow away.

In this case the lessee is not restricted as to the form of the aperture, except, perhaps, that it shall be rectangular. So that it contains only the content of two hundred square inches he is at liberty to construct it of such relative dimensions as he sees fit. Of course it is his interest to give it the greatest length and the least height consistent with a free flow. Such a form gives the greatest head of water abov.e the aperture and increases the discharge. The right of superintending and directing the construction of the works, reserved to the lessors, cannot be construed to restrict this discretion of the lessee. That right has more particular reft erence to the manner of the construction, and the solidity and safety of the work, in reference to the structure and uses of the canal. It cannot be allowed to annul the substantial rights of the lessee without becoming repugnant to the grant.

In the next place, as to the head of water under which the leased water is to be drawn, the only restriction imposed upon the lessee in this regard is that the lower edge of the aperture shall not be nearer to the caual bottom than two feet. Of course he is entitled to draw under the entire head of water above this two feet. What that head shall be will depend upon the usual depth or height of water in the canal. It is to be presumed that the parties contracted in reference to that. The lessors do not guarantee any particular head ; but any alteration of their canal which would materially and permanently reduce it would abstract from the lessee a portion of the water, which he must be presumed to have stipulated for. The contract was made in reference to the state of things existing at the time it was made.

*102 In the third place, as to the freedom from obstruction with which the water shall be permitted to flow oil' and be discharged: the lease imposes no restrictions upon the lessee on this point, except that he shall not affix to the aperture any attachments or contrivances for increasing the flow beyond what it would otherwise be. This restriction relates to the well-known law of practical hydraulics that an adjutage or nozzle attached to the outside of an aperture prevents the vein of water from contracting and increases the aggregate discharge. With this exception, however, the lessee is entitled to draw off from the canal as much water as the two-hundred-inch aperture will discharge when it flows free from any obstruction except that which maj' arise from the ordinary use of the water in milling operations. This is a very important and essential right of the lessee, and one of which the lessors cannot deprive him under any pretence of regulating and directing the mode of constructing his fore-bay and its appendages. If the water is discharged under a four-feet head (which is about what the evidence shows to be the fact), the practical rules of hydraulics determine exactly how much water will issue in each second of time from a rectangular aperture of two hundred square inches, provided it meets with no obstruction outside, as where it falls out freely into open space. Mr. Hutton, the commissioner, to whom, as an expert, certain important questions in the cause were referred by the court below, says that the other mills discharge about six and two-thirds cubic feet per second for every one hundred inches of aperture. This is probably a little less than the discharge would be in the open air, because there is undoubtedly some obstruction to the flow arising from the passage of the water through the flumes.

This rate of flow would give to the appellee, through his aperture of two hundred square inches, a discharge of thirteen and one-third cubic feet per second. Something like this amount of actual water must be considered as within the intent of the parties to give and receive.

But the fact became developed that, by the faulty con *103 struction of the appellee’s forebay or flume, arising from its small capacity, its great length, and its want of pitch or slope, he does not get but about one-half of the amount of water which is due to the aperture in the canal, and which he ought to receive. This fact is established beyond a question by the evidence.

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Bluebook (online)
82 U.S. 94, 21 L. Ed. 64, 15 Wall. 94, 1872 U.S. LEXIS 1236, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/canal-co-v-hill-scotus-1872.