Camuro v. Commissioner of Social Security

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AMANDA C., Case No.: 20-CV-00969-DEB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 14 KILILO KIJAKAZI, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. [DKT. NO. 32] 16 17 18 19 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Motion for Attorney Fees (“Motion”) 20 pursuant to Social Security Act § 206(b)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Dkt. No. 32. For the 21 reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Motion. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff Amanda C. filed this action seeking review of the Acting Commissioner of 24 Social Security’s (“Commissioner”) denial of her application for social security disability 25 and supplemental security income benefits. Dkt. No. 1. The parties filed a Joint Motion to 26 Remand, which the Court granted. Dkt. Nos. 25, 26. The Clerk of the Court entered 27 judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 27. Pursuant to the parties’ Joint Motion, the Court 28 1 awarded Plaintiff $6,619.32 in fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 2 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Dkt. Nos. 30, 31. 3 On remand, the Commissioner found Plaintiff disabled and awarded $117,560.12 in 4 past due benefits. Dkt. No. 32-3 at 4.1 The Commissioner withheld $29,390.03 from the 5 past due benefits in the event Plaintiff’s counsel requested payment of fees. Id. at 3. 6 Through this Motion, Plaintiff’s counsel, the Olinsky Law Group, seeks $23,390.03 7 in attorney fees (25% of the past due award, less the $6,000 hearing level representative 8 fee awarded by the Commissioner) and requests the Court direct it to reimburse Plaintiff 9 for the $6,619.32 in EAJA fees awarded by the Court. Dkt. No. 32-1. The Commissioner 10 takes no position on the reasonableness of counsel’s request. Dkt. No. 34. 11 II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), “a court entering judgment in favor of [a social security] 13 claimant who was represented by an attorney ‘may determine and allow as part of its 14 judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total 15 of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.’” 16 Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 17 § 406(b)(1)(A)). “Within the 25 percent boundary, . . . the attorney for the successful 18 claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.” Gisbrecht 19 v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). 20 When determining a reasonable fee, district courts “must respect ‘the primacy of 21 lawful attorney-client fee agreements,’ . . . ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, 22 then testing it for reasonableness.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 23 U.S. at 793, 808). Courts must consider “whether the amount need be reduced, not whether 24 the loadstar amount should be enhanced.” Id. at 1149. While there is not a definitive list of 25

26 27 1 When referencing page numbers of documents filed with the Court, the Court’s citation refers to the page numbers assigned by the Court’s CM-ECF system. 28 1 factors, courts should consider “the character of the representation and the results the 2 representative achieved.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. “The court may properly reduce the 3 fee for substandard performance, delay, or benefits that are not in proportion to the time 4 spent on the case.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. “[A]n EAJA award offsets an award under 5 Section 406(b).” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. 6 III. DISCUSSION 7 Prior to filing this case, Plaintiff entered into a contingency fee agreement (“Fee 8 Agreement”) with the Olinsky Law Group. Dkt. No. 32-2. Plaintiff agreed to pay counsel 9 a contingency fee of up to 25% of past-due benefits awarded by the Commissioner. Id. 10 Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks an award of $23,390.03. Dkt. No. 32-1 at 3. This 11 represents a de facto hourly rate of $569.10 based on 41.1 hours of work. Dkt. Nos. 32-1 12 at 3, 32-4, 32-5, 32-6.2 If the Motion is granted, Plaintiff’s counsel requests the Court direct 13 the $6,619.32 EAJA award be refunded to Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 32-1 at 3. 14 The Court finds the fee request is reasonable. From 2020 until 2021, Plaintiff’s 15 attorneys and their paralegals expended 41.1 hours for successful representation. Dkt. 16 Nos. 32-4, 32-5, 32-6. “Neither the character of the representation nor the results the 17 representative achieved suggest the unreasonableness of the fee sought.” Chapa v. Astrue, 18 814 F. Supp. 2d 957, 962 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (citations and quotations omitted); see also 19 Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151 (finding the fee reasonable because counsels’ performance 20 was “excellent . . . [with] no evidence of fraud or overreaching in the making of the 25% 21 contingent-fee agreement[]”). Similarly, no reduction in the fee award is appropriate 22 because there is no evidence of substandard performance or delay. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 23 1151 (“[N]o reduction in fees for dilatory conduct was warranted, as the attorneys in these 24 cases caused no excessive delay which resulted in an undue accumulation of past-due 25 benefits.”). 26 27 2 The de facto hourly rate is calculated by dividing the $23,390.03 fee requested by 41.1 28 l IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion and awards the Olinsky Law 3 Group $23,390.03 in attorney fees. Counsel must reimburse Plaintiff $6,619.32 for EAJA 4 || fees awarded by this Court. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: March 9, 2023 — PTT g Honorable Daniel E. Butcher United States Magistrate Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28