Camran v. San Diego Youth Services

District Court, S.D. California·Decided July 24, 2025·No. 3:23-cv-00491·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SARA CAMRAN, an individual, Case No.: 23-cv-00491-GPC-VET

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 14 SAN DIEGO YOUTH SERVICES,

15 Defendant. [ECF No. 37] 16 17 Before the Court is Plaintiff Sara Camran’s motion for reconsideration of the 18 Court’s previous order denying Plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment. ECF No. 37. 19 Defendant timely filed an opposition, ECF No. 39, and Plaintiff timely filed a reply, ECF 20 No. 41. The Court finds the matter suitable for decision on the papers. For the reasons 21 below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. 22 BACKGROUND 23 I. Case Background and Settlement 24 On March 17, 2023 Plaintiff Sara Camran filed a complaint against Defendant San 25 Diego Youth Services alleging that she “experience[d] different forms of harassment and 26 discrimination” in the workplace and that Defendant breached her privacy. ECF No. 1 at 27 1 2.1 On May 8, 2023, the Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint for failure to state a 2 claim and granted Plaintiff leave to amend. ECF No. 7 at 3-7. Plaintiff subsequently 3 filed an amended complaint. ECF No. 8 (“FAC”). In the FAC, Plaintiff more 4 specifically alleged that Defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her religion 5 and that Defendant breached her privacy by accessing her personal e-mail account 6 without authorization. FAC at 3-4. Defendant filed an answer to the FAC. ECF No. 11. 7 On September 20, 2023, Magistrate Judge Gallo held an Early Neutral Evaluation 8 Conference (“ENE”), but the case did not settle. ECF No. 15. The case ultimately settled 9 on December 6, 2023, ECF No. 27-1 at 8 ¶¶ 23-24, and the Court granted the parties’ 10 joint stipulation for dismissal with prejudice on December 18, 2023, ECF Nos. 19, 20. 11 II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment 12 On September 23, 2024—nine months after the Court dismissed the case—Plaintiff 13 moved the Court for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), 14 alleging that Judge Gallo coerced her into settling the case at the ENE, and that she was 15 vulnerable to his impressions because she was not represented by counsel. ECF No. 25. 16 Plaintiff further argued that Defendant engaged in fraud by lying about a date on which a 17 key event occurred and mischaracterizing the relevant events in an email Defendant 18 provided in discovery. Id. 19 The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment. ECF No. 29. The 20 Court reasoned that Judge Gallo properly oversaw the ENE and that the parties did not 21 reach a settlement until several weeks after the ENE, and therefore there was no evidence 22 that the settlement was a result of any coercion. Id. at 3-6. As for the alleged fraud, the 23 Court reasoned that Plaintiff’s allegations were merely indicative of a factual dispute as 24 opposed to fraud. Id. at 6-7. 25

26 1 Page numbers reflect CM/ECF pagination. 27 1 III. The Instant Motion 2 On May 6, 2025, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the Court’s order denying 3 her motion for relief from judgment.2 ECF No. 37. 4 In her motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff attempts to highlight new facts or 5 circumstances regarding the alleged coercion and fraud. Id. Regarding Judge Gallo’s 6 alleged coercion, Plaintiff again claims that “Judge Gallo was hostile towards her” and 7 “encouraged her to settle,” and that an eyewitness who was present at the ENE could 8 testify as to these circumstances. Id. at 3. Plaintiff also explains that the only reason she 9 did not settle immediately following the ENE was because she was in the process of 10 moving. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff further states that, in the time since the parties reached the 11 settlement, some of the potential witnesses are no longer employed at San Diego Youth 12 Services, and therefore might be more willing to testify truthfully in Plaintiff’s favor. Id. 13 at 4. 14 Regarding Defendant’s alleged fraud, Plaintiff recalls that an incident between her 15 and a client, which played a key role in her termination, took place on March 5, 2021. 16 ECF No. 37 at 4-5. However, during the instant litigation, Defendant’s counsel emailed 17 Plaintiff a copy of a February 12, 2021 email, which instead indicates that the incident 18 took place on February 12, 2021. Id.; see id. at 12-16 (copies of the emails); see also 19 ECF No. 39-1, Declaration of Amy Wintersheimer (“Wintersheimer Decl.”) ¶ 18 (stating 20 that Ms. Wintersheimer sent Plaintiff a copy of the February 12, 2021 email on 21 22 23 2 Leading up to the instant motion, Plaintiff filed several documents asking the Court to reconsider its 24 order and reopen the case. See ECF Nos. 30-35. First, after the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment, Plaintiff filed an untimely reply brief in support of the already-denied motion for 25 relief from judgment. ECF No. 30. The Court then struck several subsequent documents from the record because of Plaintiff’s noncompliance with the Local Rules and Chambers Rules. ECF Nos. 31- 26 34. Ultimately, the Court directed the Plaintiff to file the instant motion for reconsideration. ECF No. 36. 27 1 September 11, 2023). Plaintiff suggests that Defendant fraudulently changed the date on 2 the email. ECF No. 37 at 4-5. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant mischaracterized the 3 facts of the incident in the February 12, 2021 email. Id. Plaintiff claims that video 4 footage of the events3 and testimony from individuals she lists in an exhibit to her 5 motion, see id. at 6-7, would support her version of events. Id. at 5. 6 DISCUSSION 7 A court has discretion to reconsider and vacate a prior order, Barber v. Hawaii, 42 8 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th Cir. 1994), but motions for reconsideration are generally 9 disfavored, Nw. Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26 (9th 10 Cir. 1988). Recapitulations of rejected arguments are not adequate bases for 11 reconsideration. Slama v. City of Madera, 2012 WL 1292501, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 12 2012). Further, under Local Rule 7.1(i), Plaintiff’s application for reconsideration must 13 include “(1) when and to what judge the application was made, (2) what ruling or 14 decision or order was made thereon, and (3) what new or different facts and 15 circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not shown, upon such 16 prior application.” 17 At issue is whether Plaintiff has met her burden to present new or different facts or 18 circumstances which did not exist when she filed her motion for relief from judgment on 19 September 23, 2024. Plaintiff purportedly presents new facts regarding both the 20 settlement coercion and Defendant’s alleged fraud. ECF No. 37 at 3-6. The Court will 21 first consider the new settlement facts and then consider the new fraud facts. 22 Plaintiff again claims that “Judge Gallo was hostile towards her” and “encouraged 23 her to settle.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff suggests that an eyewitness who was present at the ENE 24

25 26 3 Plaintiff does not offer video evidence in her motion, but instead suggests that Defendant would provide it during discovery. ECF No. 37 at 5. 27 1 could testify as to these circumstances. Id. However, these are not “new” facts, as 2 Plaintiff previously discussed Judge Gallo’s handling of the ENE and mentioned her 3 eyewitness in the original motion for relief from judgment. See ECF No. 25 at 2. 4 Plaintiff further states that the only reason she did not settle immediately following the 5 ENE was because she was in the process of moving. Id. at 3-4. But this is not new 6 information that did not exist at the time of the motion for relief from judgment, as 7 Plaintiff would have had personal knowledge of these facts at the time.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Camran v. San Diego Youth Services, (S.D. Cal. 2025).

Camran v. San Diego Youth Services (Camran v. San Diego Youth Services) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

School District No. 1j, Multnomah County, Oregon v. Acands, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation E.J. Bartells Company, a Washington Corporation A.P. Green Refractories Company, School District No. 1j, Multnomah County, Oregon v. Acands, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation, and Fibreboard Corp., a Delaware Corporation as Successor in Interest to the Paraffine Companies, Inc., Pabco Products, Inc., Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation, Plant Rubber & Asbestos Works and Plant Rubber & Asbestos Co., School District No. 1j, Multnomah County, Oregon v. Acands, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation Armstrong Cork Company, Inc., a Delaware Corporation Atlas Asbestos Company, Inc., a Canadian Corporation, and Keene Corporation, a New York Corporation Individually and as Successor in Interest to the Baldwin Ehret Hill Company, School District No. 1j, Multnomah County, Oregon v. Acands, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation Armstrong Cork Company, Inc., a Delaware Corporation Atlas Asbestos Company, Inc., a Canadian Corporation, and Us Gypsum Company, a Delaware Corporation, School District No. 1j, Multnomah County, Oregon v. Acands, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation Armstrong Cork Company, Inc., a Delaware Corporation Atlas Asbestos Company, Inc., a Canadian Corporation, and Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation, School District No. 1j, Multnomah County, Oregon v. Acands, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation Armstrong Cork Company, Inc., a Delaware Corporation Atlas Asbestos Company, Inc., a Canadian Corporation, and Flintkote Company, a Delaware Corporation, School District No. 1j, Multnomah County, Oregon v. Acands, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation Atlas Asbestos Company, Inc., a Canadian Corporation, and Armstrong Cork Company, Inc., a Delaware Corporation
5 F.3d 1255 (Ninth Circuit, 1993)
PDK Labs Inc. v. Reno
134 F. Supp. 2d 24 (District of Columbia, 2001)