Campos v. City of Chicago

2025 IL App (1st) 241371-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: February 28, 2025
• Docket: 1-24-1371
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 241371-U

SIXTH DIVISION February 28, 2025

No. 1-24-1371

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT

) CLIVIA CAMPOS, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) v. ) ) Appeal from the CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation ) Circuit Court of by and through its authorized agents and ) Cook County employees, ) ) No. 2021 L 9797 Defendants, ) ) The Honorable and ) Thomas V. Lyons, ) Judge Presiding. FULLERTON KIMBALL MEDICAL AND ) SURGICAL CENTER and FULLERTON KIMBALL ) MEDICAL GROUP, ) ) Defendants-Appellants. )

PRESIDING JUSTICE TAILOR delivered the judgment of the court. Justices C.A. Walker and Gamrath concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Defendants failed to provide a sufficient factual record on appeal, so we presume that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it denied defendants’ motion to vacate. No. 1-24-1371

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 On April 12, 2021, Clivia Campos was driving on West Addison Street in Chicago when

her vehicle was struck by a vehicle operated by Jacqueline Penaranda. Minutes later, Campos’s

vehicle was struck a second time by a City of Chicago garbage truck. Campos sustained injuries

as a result, and filed suit against Penaranda and the City of Chicago, alleging negligence by both

parties. The case went to trial, and on September 8, 2023, Campos was awarded $9,734,740 in

damages by a jury. This award included $257,390 for Campos’s medical bills.

¶4 On March 27, 2024, Campos filed a motion to adjudicate liens and for a hearing on the liens

asserted under the Health Care Services Lien Act (Act) (770 ILCS 23/10) (West 2022)) by various

medical providers. One of the liens was asserted by Fullerton Kimball Medical and Surgical Center in

the amount of $588,312 and a second lien was asserted by Fullerton Kimball Medical Group in the

amount of $1,006. Campos acknowledged that the Act allows healthcare professionals and

healthcare providers to place a lien for the value of their reasonable charges against the proceeds

of a personal injury verdict, judgment, award, or settlement, but asserted her belief some of the

liens were unreasonable. She therefore requested an evidentiary hearing for the lienholders to

establish the reasonable value of their services, and argued that because a jury found the total value

of the “reasonable expense of necessary medical care, treatment and services rendered” was

$257,390, the total amount of money available to lienholders should not exceed that amount.

¶5 The court set the matter for a hearing on April 5, 2024, at which time an attorney appeared

in court on behalf of Fullerton Kimble Medical and Surgical Center and Fullerton Kimble Medical

Group (collectively FKM). The hearing was continued by agreement of the parties until April 10,

2024. When counsel for FKM failed to appear on April 10, a hearing was held in his absence. After

the hearing, the court ruled that “Fullerton Kimble Medical & Surgical Center is entitled to a per

surgery value similar to the per surgery amount attributable to Belmont Harlem Surgery Center.”

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Accordingly, it found that “the reasonable value of the medical services provided by Fullerton

Kimble Medical & Surgical Center” was $15,000 and that the reasonable value of medical services

provided by Fullerton Kimble Medical Group was $201.

¶6 On May 2, 2024, FKM filed a motion to vacate and for leave to file a response. FKM asked

the court to set aside the April 10, 2024, judgment under section 2-1301 of the code, arguing that

they “have a meritorious defense” and asking to “allow proofs as to the proper lien adjudication.”

FKM also argued that “the adjudication formula in the Court’s order was a deviation from the Lien

Act.”

¶7 After a hearing on June 6, 2024, the court denied FKM’s motion to vacate. It noted in its

written order that the motion had been “fully briefed” and that its “[r]easoning is set forth in the

record.” A transcript of this hearing is not included in the record on appeal.

¶8 II. ANALYSIS

¶9 FKM argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied their motion to vacate

the April 10, 2024, order. We review a trial court’s denial of a section 2-1301 motion to vacate for

an abuse of discretion. Standard Bank & Trust Co. v. Madonia, 2011 IL App (1st) 103516, ¶ 8. A

trial court abuses its discretion if it “acts arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious

judgment or if its decision exceeds the bounds of reason and ignores principles of law such that

substantial prejudice has resulted.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hansen, 2016 IL App (1st) 143720,

¶ 14 (quoting Marren Builders, Inc., v. Lampert, 307 Ill. App. 3d 937, 941 (1999)).

¶ 10 Here, FKM asks us to find that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied their

motion to vacate, yet they fail to provide us with a transcript of the June 6, 2024, hearing where

the court set forth its reasoning. FKM does not provide us with a bystander’s report, an agreed

statement of facts, or anything else to support their claim either. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(a), (c), (d)

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(eff. July 1, 2017) (requiring an appellant to prepare and file a transcript or a bystander’s report of

the proceedings in the trial court or an agreed statement of facts).

¶ 11 “The moving party has the burden of establishing sufficient grounds for vacating the

judgment” (Larson v. Pedersen, 349 Ill. App. 3d 203, 207 (2004)), and “[a]ny doubts which may

arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant.” Foutch v.

O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392 (1984). Here, FKM had the burden to present this court with a

sufficiently complete record on appeal. Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426, 432 (2001). Because

they failed to do so here, we “presume[] that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity

with law and had a sufficient factual basis.” Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392 (affirming the trial court’s

decision to deny defendants’ motion to vacate judgment, reasoning that “[a]s there is no transcript

of the hearing on the motion to vacate here, there is no basis for holding that the trial court abused

discretion in denying the motion”); Webster, 195 Ill. 2d at 433-34 (finding that because the

appellant failed to supply the court with a transcript of the hearing, a report of the proceedings, a

bystander’s report, or an agreed statements of facts, it “d[id] not know what evidence or arguments

were presented at that hearing *** [or] the basis for the trial court’s decision” and therefore it

“presume[d] that the trial court heard adequate evidence to support its decision and that its order

*** was in conformity with the law”); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2016 IL App (1st) 143720, ¶ 15

(affirming the trial court’s decision to deny appellant’s motion to vacate where appellant “provided

neither a report of proceedings of the hearing on his motion to vacate nor a sufficient substitute,

such as a bystander’s report or an agreed statement of facts *** [so] we do not know whether

the trial court heard evidence on the motion, what the parties argued, or—most importantly—the

basis for the court's decision[,]” reasoning that “[w]ithout this information, we must presume that

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the trial court did not act arbitrarily but within the bounds of reason, keeping in mind relevant legal

principles”).

¶ 12 Without a transcript of the June 6, 2024, hearing where the trial court set forth its reasoning

for denying FKM’s motion to vacate or a sufficient substitute, “there is no basis for holding that

the trial court abused discretion in denying the motion.” Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392. See also Webster,

195 Ill. 2d at 432 (“Where the issue on appeal relates to the conduct of a hearing or proceeding,

this issue is not subject to review absent a report or record of the proceeding.”); Hye Ra Han v.

Halloway, 408 Ill. App. 3d 387, 390 (2011) (same).

¶ 13 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 14 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

¶ 15 Affirmed.