Campo v. United States

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
• Decided: May 21, 2026
• Docket: 24-2312
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Case: 24-2312 Document: 57 Page: 1 Filed: 05/21/2026

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________

ROBERT L. CAMPO, MICHAEL CAMPO, LEPETICH AQUACULTURE, L.L.C., M.J. LEPETICH OYSTERS, L.L.C., LOUIS CURT PANNAGL, POINT A LA HACHE OYSTER FISHERIES, INC., TONY J. TESVICH, JR., TJT, LLC, TONY TESVICH OYSTERS, INC., NIKOLA ZARAK, DIANE ZARAK, AMALIA, INC., KUZMA I. TESVICH, JR., Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee ______________________

2024-2312 ______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in Nos. 1:20-cv-00044-RTH, 1:20-cv-00047-RTH, 1:20-cv- 00055-RTH, Judge Ryan T. Holte. ______________________

Decided: May 21, 2026 ______________________

CAMILO K. SALAS, III, Salas & Co., L.C., New Orleans, LA, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by ASHLEY M. LIUZZA, MICHAEL G. STAG, Stag Liuzza, LLC, New Orleans, LA. Case: 24-2312 Document: 57 Page: 2 Filed: 05/21/2026

ROBERT PARKE STOCKMAN, Appellate Section, Environ- ment and Natural Resources Division, United States De- partment of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by AMBER BETH BLAHA; ADAM R.F. GUSTAFSON. ______________________

Before PROST, CLEVENGER, and STARK, Circuit Judges. PROST, Circuit Judge. In 2019, the Bonnet Carré Spillway (“Spillway”) was opened for a total of 123 days to prevent the Mississippi River from flooding New Orleans. This action resulted in the destruction of existing oyster stock, oyster beds, and reefs. Oyster farmers affected by the 2019 Spillway events sued the government in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, alleging that the government took their real and personal property (e.g., oyster stocks, oyster beds, and reefs) in vio- lation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed their complaint. Be- cause Appellants failed to allege a cognizable property in- terest for Fifth Amendment purposes, we affirm the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal. BACKGROUND I Water bottoms in Louisiana are largely owned by the state of Louisiana. LA. STAT. ANN. § 56:3(A) (1985). And “all oysters and other shellfish and parts thereof grown thereon, either naturally or cultivated, and all oysters in the shells after they are caught or taken therefrom, are and remain the property of the state [(Louisiana)].” Id. Loui- siana has created a statutory scheme for oyster farming, and all oyster leases issued by the state of Louisiana are governed by that scheme. Id. §§ 56:424, 56:425(A). Oyster Case: 24-2312 Document: 57 Page: 3 Filed: 05/21/2026

CAMPO v. US 3

farmers may apply to lease the state-owned water bottoms. The Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries re- views the applications and may issue leases. Id. § 41:1225(A) (authorizing the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries to “grant leases on state-owned wa- terbottoms for oyster cultivation, bedding, and harvest- ing”). Appellants allege that they own oyster leases issued by the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries. II The Spillway was constructed in 1931 in response to the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 that inundated much of the Mississippi River basin. It is located in St. Charles Parish, Louisiana—about 32.8 miles west of New Orle- ans—and serves as a flood-control structure that diverts freshwater into the Lake Pontchartrain Basin, the Missis- sippi Sound, and ultimately the Gulf of Mexico. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”) oper- ates the Spillway. The Corps does not operate the Spillway on a fixed schedule; rather, it monitors flood models and river-level forecasts to determine when the Spillway needs to be opened to divert water. Relevant to this dispute is the Corps’ decision to open the Spillway in 2019. To minimize potential flood damage to New Orleans and surrounding coastal areas, the Corps opened the Spillway for 123 days—from February 27 through April 11 and then from May 10 through July 27. During this time, nearly ten trillion gallons of freshwater from the Mississippi River entered oyster estuaries, lower- ing salinity levels of the waters and marshes where oyster farmers cultivate, grow, harvest, and process oysters. III In 2020, Appellants filed three separate complaints claiming that the 2019 opening of the Spillway, which re- duced ambient salinity levels and damaged oysters Case: 24-2312 Document: 57 Page: 4 Filed: 05/21/2026

allegedly within their leases, resulted in a taking under the Fifth Amendment. These complaints were consolidated. The government moved to dismiss in part Appellants’ complaint, arguing that Appellants lack a compensable property right in the oysters. The Court of Federal Claims denied the government’s motion. Campo v. United States, 157 Fed. Cl. 584 (2021). In a lengthy final footnote, the court faulted both parties for failing to include a year for their statutory citations, noting it was unclear whether the parties were referring to the correct version. Id. at 618 n.27. Thus, “[g]iven the potential importance of these stat- utes to this case,” the parties were directed to include a dis- cussion of the applicability of the statutes (and the relevant versions) in their joint status report. Id. The court also allowed limited discovery on this issue. After limited dis- covery was completed, the government moved to dismiss Appellants’ complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, arguing that the relevant Louisiana statutes preclude Appellants from suing the United States for claims allegedly arising out of the 2019 Spillway events. The Court of Federal Claims granted the government’s mo- tion and dismissed the complaint. Campo v. United States, 169 Fed. Cl. 502 (2024). It explained that the relevant Lou- isiana law governing the Appellants’ oyster leases barred them from the instant suit. Id. at 520, 530. Appellants then filed a motion for reconsideration, ar- guing that the Court of Federal Claims “committed factual or legal error by applying its ruling to leases that [Appel- lants] obtained prior to the 2016 amendments” to the rele- vant Louisiana statutes. Campo v. United States, 172 Fed. Cl. 472, 474 (2024) (cleaned up). According to Appellants, if the court had applied the 2006 version of the relevant law, it would have reached a different result. The court denied the motion, concluding that the relevant portions of the statute as amended in 2006 were “substantively the same as the 2016 version.” Id. at 476; see also id. at 477. Case: 24-2312 Document: 57 Page: 5 Filed: 05/21/2026

CAMPO v. US 5

Appellants timely appealed. We have jurisdiction un- der 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). DISCUSSION I We review the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal for failure to state a claim and issues of statutory interpreta- tion de novo. Lesko v. United States, 161 F.4th 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (en banc). In deciding the motion-to-dis- miss issue, we must accept all well-pleaded factual allega- tions as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. United States, 671 F.3d 1284, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2012). We review the Court of Federal Claims’ denial of reconsideration for abuse of dis- cretion. Ind. Mun. Power Agency v. United States, 59 F.4th 1382, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2023). II The main issue on appeal is whether there was a per- manent taking of Appellants’ property interests in viola- tion of the Fifth Amendment. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004). To re- solve this issue, we must determine whether the operation of the Spillway in 2019 was for “coastal protection, conser- vation, or restoration” as defined under the 2006 version of the Louisiana Revised Statutes § 56:423. 1 Because we con- clude that it was, we also conclude that Appellants have failed to allege a cognizable property interest for purposes

1 Appellants conceded at oral argument that if the relevant 2016 Louisiana statutes applied, then they would not have a takings claim. Oral Arg. at 3:03–18, No. 24- 2312, https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/24- 2312_04132026.mp3. Thus, our analysis will focus only on the leases that were executed or renewed after the 2006 amendments and not subject to the 2016 amendments. Case: 24-2312 Document: 57 Page: 6 Filed: 05/21/2026

of the Fifth Amendment and thus affirm the Court of Fed- eral Claims’ dismissal of Appellants’ complaint. III The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause provides: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, with- out just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Con- stitution does not create property interests compensable under the Fifth Amendment. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). “‘[E]xisting rules and understandings’ and ‘background principles’ derived from an independent source, such as state, federal, or common law, define the dimensions of the requisite property rights for purposes of establishing a cognizable taking.” Mari- trans Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992)). “[B]ackground principles of law may inhere in a plaintiff’s title to his property and thereby limit his ability to recover for a taking.” A & D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). We thus start our analysis with the relevant 2006 Lou- isiana statutes and how those statutes define the scope of Appellants’ alleged property rights associated with their oyster leases at issue in this appeal, which were all signed after the 2006 amendments went into effect. Louisiana has enacted a statutory scheme that regu- lates the state’s oyster industry. This statutory scheme limits the property rights of oyster lessees and prevents them from raising certain claims against the United States. The 2006 version of § 56:423 stated that property rights enjoyed by oyster lessees are “subordinate to the rights or responsibilities of the state, any political subdivi- sion of the state, the United States, or any agency or agent thereof, to take any action in furtherance of coastal protec- tion, conservation, or restoration.” LA. STAT. ANN. § 56:423(A) (2006) (emphasis added). That same section Case: 24-2312 Document: 57 Page: 7 Filed: 05/21/2026

CAMPO v. US 7

defined “coastal protection, conservation, or restoration” to mean “any project, plan, act, or activity for the protection, conservation, restoration, enhancement, creation, preser- vation, nourishment, maintenance, or management of the coast, coastal resources, coastal wetlands, and barrier shorelines or islands.” Id. The 2006 version of the statute also limited the types of actions an oyster lessee could raise: [N]o lessee shall have any right to maintain any ac- tion against the state, any political subdivision of the state, the United States, or any agency, agent, contractor, or employee thereof for any claim aris- ing from any project, plan, act, or activity in rela- tion to coastal protection, conservation, or restoration, except as provided in R.S. 56:427.1. 2 Id. § 56:423(B)(1); see also id. § 56:427.1(A) (“[T]he United States . . . shall be held free and harmless from any claims arising under any oyster lease . . . for any purpose from di- versions of fresh water or sediment . . . or any other actions taken for the purpose of coastal protection, conservation, or restoration.”). The Spillway is a “project, plan, act, or activity for the protection, . . . maintenance, or management of the coast.” Id. § 56:423(A). The Spillway was opened in 2019 because “river levels were predicted to rise to minor flood stage in New Orleans.” J.A. 81; see also J.A. 59. Because the 2019 Spillway events were for “coastal protection, conservation, or restoration,” Appellants’ leases prevent them from “maintain[ing] any action” against the United States for “any project, plan, act, or activity in relation to coastal pro- tection, conservation, or restoration.” LA. STAT. ANN. § 56:423(B)(1) (2006). Moreover, Appellants concede that

2 The exception noted here (R.S. 56:427.1) is not rel- evant to the parties’ dispute. Case: 24-2312 Document: 57 Page: 8 Filed: 05/21/2026

the Spillway is a “fresh water diversion structure,” J.A. 72, and under § 56:427.1, “the United States . . . shall be held free and harmless from any claims arising under any oyster lease . . . from diversions of fresh water or sediment . . . or any other actions taken for the purpose of coastal protec- tion.” LA. STAT. ANN. § 56:427.1(A) (2006) (emphasis added). Thus, Appellants have failed to state a claim under the 2006 amendments, which subordinate Appellants’ oys- ter leases to the Corps’ operation of the Spillway and place limits on claims against the United States. Appellants argue that the Spillway’s operations do not fall within the definition of “coastal protection, conserva- tion, or restoration.” Appellants’ Br. 49. We disagree. Ap- pellants rely on the following language from their complaint to support their argument: “[The Spillway] is not a coastal restoration project or a freshwater diversion used for coastal restoration or for creation or restoration of wet- lands or habitats in the Lake Pontchartrain Basin.” J.A. 80. That is a legal conclusion, and we are not required to accept legal conclusions when reviewing a motion to dis- miss. See Am. Bankers Ass’n v. United States, 932 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In any event, avoiding coastal flooding is a means to protect the coast. Appellants also rely on several cases that apparently hold that Louisiana oyster lessees have “compensable prop- erty rights in the oysters” for leases executed before 2016. See Appellants’ Br. 35–36. But those cases issued before the Louisiana state legislature made the 2006 amend- ments. Those cases did not have the opportunity to evalu- ate the 2006 amendments, such as the changes to § 56:423. For the foregoing reasons, because Appellants failed to demonstrate the existence of a cognizable property interest for Fifth Amendment purposes, our “task is at an end.” Am. Pelagic Fishing, 379 F.3d at 1372. There can be no takings claim when the Appellants never had a cognizable property interest. Case: 24-2312 Document: 57 Page: 9 Filed: 05/21/2026

CAMPO v. US 9

CONCLUSION We have considered Appellants’ remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. AFFIRMED