J-A08011-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JOSEPH CAMPISI, JR., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant
v.
CARMELLA V. CAMPISI,
Appellee
CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA, L.L.C.,
Appellee No. 1326 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment Entered September 18, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Civil Division at No(s): 11 QT 000347
BEFORE: SHOGAN, WECHT, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED MAY 28, 2015
Appellant, Joseph Campisi, Jr., appeals from the judgment entered in
the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County. We affirm.
On October 13, 1981, Appellant, his father, Joseph Campisi, Sr., and
Appellee, Carmella V. Campisi (“Carmella”), the wife of Joseph Campisi, Sr.
and mother of Appellant, purchased seventy-plus acres in Albany Township,
Bradford County. Deed, 10/13/81, at 1-4. The deed provided that title to
the property was held as a one-half interest in favor of Appellant and a one- ____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A08011-15
half interest in favor of Joseph Campisi, Sr. and his wife, Carmella. Id.;
N.T., 12/10/13 A.M. Session, at 49; N.T., 12/10/13 P.M. Session, at 35-37.
Appellant maintains that after the death of his father in May 2005,
Carmella expressed her desire to sell the property. N.T., 12/10/13 P.M.
Session, at 50. Appellant wanted to keep the property because he and his
family used it, and he convinced Carmella not to sell it. Id. at 50. Both
parties, he asserts, agreed to investigate the possibility of gas leases for the
property. N.T., 12/10/13 P.M. Session, at 49-51.
Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. (“Chesapeake”) conducted testing on
the property. As a result of the test, Chesapeake issued a check to the
parties in the approximate amount of $7,300.00. N.T., 12/10/13 P.M.
Session, at 51. The parties agreed that the funds received from the gas
testing were used to make repairs to the property. Id. at 51-52.
On June 15, 2007, a “paid-up oil and gas lease” with Chesapeake was
executed. Paid-Up Oil & Gas Lease, 6/15/07, at 1-4. It was a five-year
lease and provided for Appellant and Carmella to receive royalties. Id.1
Appellant avers that after receiving a few royalty payments, the
checks ceased, and as a result, Appellant contacted Chesapeake. N.T.,
____________________________________________
1 The original lease referred to “Joseph Campisi and Carmella V. Campisi, husband and wife” as the Lessors. Paid-Up Oil and Gas Lease, 6/15/07, at 2. A lease modification was subsequently executed, which clarified that Appellant and Carmella were not husband and wife, and that Carmella was a widow. Lease Modification, 9/4/09, at 2.
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12/10/13 PM session, at 81-82. Chesapeake advised Appellant that they
could not provide any information to Appellant and that Appellant should
contact an attorney. Id. Appellant contacted an attorney and conducted a
title search and learned of a deed dated March 12, 1992, which purported to
convey the property to Appellant’s parents. Deed, 3/12/92, at 1-3; N.T.,
12/10/13 P.M. Session, at 83-87. Appellant asserts that he had no
knowledge of this deed prior to the title search and contends that the deed
was forged. N.T., 12/10/13 P.M. Session, at 83-87.
Carmella, on the other hand, asserts that after a falling out between
Appellant, Carmella and Joseph Campisi, Sr., Appellant executed a deed
dated March 12, 1992, thereby selling his one-half interest in the property to
Carmella and his father. N.T., 12/10/13 A.M. Session, at 59. An
independent witness, the lawyer handling the deed transaction, Attorney
D’Ambrosio, testified at trial that although he did not remember this specific
transaction, it was his consistent practice to require all sellers to sign a deed
in his presence. N.T., 12/10/13 P.M. Session, at 8-21.
Carmella also maintains that, after the death of Joseph Campisi, Sr. in
2005, she acquiesced to Appellant’s urging to have the property tested for
gas deposits and authorized Appellant to have the property tested. N.T.,
12/10/13 A.M. Session, at 51-52. Carmella argues that, instead of simply
having the test performed, however, Appellant negotiated and signed a
“paid-up oil and gas lease” with Chesapeake for the property without
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informing her. Id. at 79-80. Carmella claims that she had no knowledge of
the lease until she contacted Chesapeake. Id. at 58-62. Upon her inquiry
with Chesapeake, all royalty payments were halted and held in escrow
pending the outcome of the dispute.2
Appellant initiated the instant action in September of 2011 against
Carmella and Chesapeake. Appellant pled five separate counts including:
Count I - Quiet Title; Count II - Declaratory Judgment; Count III -
Interpleader (against Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC); Count IV - Breach of
Contract (against Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC); and Count V - Conversion.
Complaint, 9/12/11, at 1-10.
At a pretrial conference on December 9, 2013, the parties signed a
consent motion that released Chesapeake from the case. Order, 12/9/13, at
1. On December 10, 2013, Appellant filed a motion seeking to add the
following counts against Carmella: profit-a-prendre, breach of contract, and
unjust enrichment. The trial court granted the motion in part and denied the
motion in part, allowing only the count for breach of contract. Order,
12/11/13, at 1.
On December 11, 2013, after trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor
of Carmella. The jury specifically determined that a signature on the 1992
2 Evidence of record also establishes that Carmella executed a ratification of the oil and gas lease, in which she ratified and confirmed the lease. Ratification of the Oil and Gas Lease, 6/15/07, at 1-2.
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deed was not a forgery and that there was no oral agreement between
Appellant and Carmella regarding the division of the proceeds and royalties
of the oil and gas lease. Verdict Slip, 12/11/13, at 1. Judgment in favor of
Carmella was entered on the same date. Order, 12/11/13, at 1. Further,
the trial court determined that the title was quieted and the March 12, 1992
deed was operative and in full force and effect. Id.
Appellant filed a timely motion for post-trial relief pursuant to
Pa.R.C.P. 227.1. Motion for post-trial relief pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 227.1,
12/19/13, at 1-7. Appellant specifically argued three issues in that motion:
1) that the trial court erred in allowing the notary register to be entered into
evidence as a business record; 2) that the trial court committed an error of
law by prohibiting Appellant from using the consent motion during trial for
cross-examination and/or impeachment purposes; and 3) that Appellant was
entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“jnov”). Id. The trial
court denied these post-trial motions by order dated June 30, 2014.
Appellant filed a timely appeal on July 21, 2014. Appellant filed his court-
ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) statement. Judgment was entered on September 18, 2014.
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
(a) Whether the trial court erred when it admitted the notary register as a business record of George D’Ambrosio, Esquire without authentication by the notary public?
(b) Whether the trial court erred by failing to permit [Appellant] to cross-examine [Carmella] on the contents of the consent
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motion as agreed by the parties and filed previously with the court[?]
(c) Whether the trial court erred by failing to set aside the verdict when said verdict was against the weight of the evidence and the undisputed, uncontradicted testimony of [Appellant] and [Carmella] established that the 1992 deed lacked adequate consideration or any consideration at all?
(d) Whether the trial court erred by failing to set aside the verdict when said verdict was against the weight of the evidence and the undisputed, uncontradicted testimony of [Appellant] and [Carmella] established that an oral contract existed between [Appellant] and [Carmella] to divide the lease payments in a “50/50” manner?
Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.
In his first claim, Appellant argues that the notary register, maintained
by notary Alma Walters, should not have been admitted through the
testimony of Attorney D’Ambrosio. Appellant’s Brief at 17. Appellant asserts
that the trial court erred in admitting it as a business record of Attorney
D’Ambrosio’s. Id. Appellant contends that the Notary Public Law, 57 P.S. §
161, makes it clear that Ms. Walters’ notary register was not a business
record of Attorney D’Ambrosio’s, but rather, was the exclusive property of
Ms. Walters and was her “statutorily mandated record to keep and retain.”
Id. at 18. Thus, Appellant contends, Attorney D’Ambrosio was legally
incompetent and incapable of laying the proper foundation for its
admissibility. Id. Appellant further asserts that by admitting the notary
register through Attorney D’Ambrosio, Appellant was prejudiced and denied
the right to cross-examine Ms. Walters regarding the disputed deed
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transaction and whether Ms. Walters actually witnessed the disputed
signatures. Id. As a result, Appellant contends that the jury was unaware
that Ms. Walters had testified that she signed the notary book, indicating
that an individual had appeared before her, even if he or she did not actually
sign the document in her presence. Id. at 19. Appellant further maintains
that after allowing the introduction of the notary register through Attorney
D’Ambrosio, the trial court erred in prohibiting questioning of Attorney
D’Ambrosio about the deposition testimony of Ms. Walters. Id. at 17.
Our standard of review is well settled: “When we review a trial court
ruling on admission of evidence, we must acknowledge that decisions on
admissibility are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion or misapplication of law.”
Commonwealth Financial Systems, Inc. v. Smith, 15 A.3d 492, 496 (Pa.
Super. 2011).
An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.
Id.
Hearsay is defined as “an extra judicial declaration offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.” Keystone Dedicated Logistics, LLC v. JGB
Enterprises, Inc., 77 A.3d 1, 12 (Pa. Super. 2013). A document itself
qualifies as hearsay when it contains such hearsay statements. Id.
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Anything qualifying as hearsay is inadmissible as evidence unless an
exception applies. Pa.R.E. 802.
The business records exception is found in Pa.R.E. 803, which
provides, in pertinent part:
Rule 803. Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay Regardless of Whether the Declarant is Available as a Witness
***
(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record (which includes a memorandum, report, or data compilation in any form) of an act, event or condition if,
(A) the record was made at or near the time by— or from information transmitted by—someone with knowledge;
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a “business”, which term includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit;
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;
(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting certification; and
(E) neither the source of information nor other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
Pa.R.E. 803(6). While a qualified witness need not have personal
knowledge, the individual must be able to “provide sufficient information
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relating to the preparation and maintenance of the records to justify a
presumption of trustworthiness.” Keystone Dedicated, 77 A.3d at 13
(citing Boyle v. Steiman, 631 A.2d 1025, 1032 (Pa. Super. 1993)).
Additionally, the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, codified at
42 Pa.C.S. § 6108, provides:
A record of an act, condition or event shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business at or near the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the tribunal, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6108. We have stated the following regarding the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act:
The purpose of [the] Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act is to create an additional exception to the hearsay rule in circumstances where a record of an act, a condition or an event was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition or event and where the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission. The question of whether documents should be admitted under the “business records” exception to the hearsay rule is within the discretionary power of the trial court provided such discretion is exercised within the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act. It is not essential under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act to produce either the person who made the entries or the custodian of the record at the time the entries were made. Moreover, the law does not require that a witness qualifying business records even have a personal knowledge of the facts reported in the business record. As long as the authenticating witness can provide sufficient information relating to the preparation and maintenance of the records to justify a presumption of trustworthiness for the business records of a company, a sufficient basis is provided to offset the hearsay character of the evidence.
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Boyle, 631 A.2d at 1033 (internal citations omitted).
At trial, Attorney D’Ambrosio was questioned regarding the notary
register maintained by his employee, Ms. Walters. Attorney D’Ambrosio
testified that he was an attorney with his own general practice located in
West Chester, Pennsylvania, and had been practicing, at the time of the
trial, for forty-four years. N.T., 12/10/13, at 3-4. He estimated that he had
represented the Campisi family over the course of twenty-five to thirty years
in various legal matters. Id. at 4. During his years of practice, he employed
a secretary named Ms. Walters, who worked for him for twenty-six years.
Id. at 10. Ms. Walters was also a Notary Public. Id. Attorney D’Ambrosio
testified that there were typically three notaries employed at his office. Id.
at 19. During his testimony, counsel presented Attorney D’Ambrosio with
Ms. Walter’s notary register. Id. at 17. Attorney D’Ambrosio testified that
the notary register was maintained at his office. Id. Attorney D’Ambrosio
explained that the notary register reflected an entry for the following:
“deed, Campisi, Joseph, Sr., Carmella V., . . . and Joseph, Jr. to Campisi,
Joseph Sr. and Carmella.” Id. at 18. Attorney D’Ambrosio testified that the
entry was dated March 12, 1992. Id. Appellant’s counsel objected to any
reference to and admission of this evidence, but the trial court permitted it
under the business records exception. Id. at 16.
The evidence of record reflects that this notary register was properly
admitted into evidence under the business record exception. The record was
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made at the time of the transaction by Ms. Walters. The record was kept in
the course of Attorney D’Ambrosio’s regularly conducted business of his legal
practice. Making record of legal documents notarized was a regular practice
of that business. Further, all of these conditions were established by
Attorney D’Ambrosio, who was obviously intrinsically involved in the
workings of his own legal practice. Attorney D’Ambrosio’s testimony
regarding the regular business activity of notarizing legal documents
provided “sufficient information relating to the preparation and maintenance
of the records to justify a presumption of trustworthiness.” Keystone
Dedicated, 77 A.3d at 13. Moreover, no factors were established that
would indicate a lack of trustworthiness. As such, the notary register was
properly introduced under the business records exception. Additionally, for
the same reasons, the admission of the notary register was permitted
pursuant to the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §
6108(b).
We find no merit to Appellant’s claim that pursuant to the Notary
Public Law, the notary register could not be admitted through the testimony
of Attorney D’Ambrosio because it was not a business record of Attorney
D’Ambrosio’s. Appellant’s Brief at 17. Although the Notary Public Law
provides that the notary register is the responsibility and property of the
notary, we cannot agree that such explanation of the maintenance of the
notary register precludes admittance of the notary register under the
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business records exception or under the Uniform Business Records as
Evidence Act.
Further, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Appellant’s
request to question Attorney D’Ambrosio about Ms. Walters’ deposition
testimony.3 These out-of-court statements made by Ms. Walters were
properly precluded under the rule against the admission of such testimony
which constitute hearsay. Pa.R.E. 802. Appellant’s counsel did not argue
any exception to the general hearsay rule that would allow introduction of
this testimony either at the time of trial or in his brief. Furthermore,
Appellant’s counsel failed to call Ms. Walters as a witness during the trial, at
which time she could have arguably testified to the information Appellant
was seeking to admit.4 Accordingly, Appellant’s first issue lacks merit.
In his second claim, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in
prohibiting him from “questioning [Carmella] on the substantive factual and
legal averments regarding the key documents in this case as set forth in the
Consent Motion to Dismiss [Chesapeake] as a party to this action.” ____________________________________________
3 Although Appellant makes reference to statements made in Ms. Walters’ deposition, that deposition is not part of the certified record; therefore, we cannot consider any such evidence or testimony. Ruspi v. Glatz, 69 A.3d 680, 691 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[F]or purposes of appellate review, what is not in the certified record does not exist.”). 4 We note references made to Ms. Walters’ possible unavailability in Carmella’s brief. We discern no reference in the trial transcript to Appellant’s request that the trial court deemed Ms. Walters as being unavailable, nor does Appellant direct us to such a request.
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Appellant’s Brief at 20. Appellant maintains that he should have been
permitted to use the consent motion to cross-examine and impeach
Carmella on false or contradictory statements she made under oath while
testifying before the jury. Id. Appellant contends that Pa.R.E. 607 permits
the credibility of a witness to be impeached by any evidence relevant to that
issue, “except as otherwise provided by statute or these rules.” Id.
Appellant further asserts that pursuant to Monaco v. Gula, 180 A.2d 893
(Pa. 1962), “prior statements within a pleading that contradict the testimony
of that party at trial are substantive evidence and admissible at trial.” Id. at
20. Appellant contends that, as a result, the verdict should be set aside and
a new trial ordered to remedy this error. Id. at 21.
As noted previously, “[a]dmission of evidence is within the sound
discretion of the trial court and we review the trial court’s determinations
regarding the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.”
American Future Systems, Inc. v. BBB, 872 A.2d 1202, 1212 (Pa. Super.
2005). “To constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only
be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party.” Id.
“For evidence to be admissible, it must be competent and relevant.” Id.
Additionally, Pa.R.E. 607 provides as follows: “The credibility of a witness
may be impeached by any evidence relevant to that issue, except as
otherwise provided by statute or these rules.”
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A review of Appellant’s argument, however, reveals his failure to
develop it with any specificity. We note the following legal principles
regarding appellate briefs:
This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant. When deficiencies in a brief hinder our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be waived. Pa.R.A.P. 2101. It is not this Court's responsibility to comb through the record seeking the factual underpinnings of [a] claim.
Irwin Union Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Famous, 4 A.3d 1099, 1103 (Pa.
Super. 2010) (some internal citations omitted). The brief must support the
claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record, and with
citations to legal authorities. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (b), (c).
In this case, Appellant has failed to sufficiently develop his argument
for our review. Appellant has set forth a vague, one-page argument on this
issue. Although Appellant cites to some legal authority, he fails to support
his claim with pertinent discussion or references to the record. Most
notably, Appellant fails to identify which statements in the consent motion
would be used to impeach Carmella, or how use of those statements would
result in impeachment of her credibility. Moreover, we are unable to discern
from Appellant’s limited discussion what trial testimony is being challenged.
As a result, we are unable to determine whether statements in the consent
motion are relevant to Carmella’s trial testimony and her credibility. This
Court will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant. Irwin Union
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Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 4 A.3d at 1103. Because these defects impede
our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we find this issue waived.
In his remaining two issues, Appellant argues that he is entitled to
jnov because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict.
Appellant’s Brief at 21. This Court has stated the following standard of
review in an appeal from the trial court’s decision to deny jnov:
[W]e must consider the evidence, together with all favorable inferences drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the verdict winner. Our standard of review when considering motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict are identical. We will reverse a trial court’s grant or denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict only when we find an abuse of discretion or an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case. Further, the standard of review for an appellate court is the same as that for a trial court.
Drake Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Polyflow, Inc., 109 A.3d 250, 258-259 (Pa.
Super. 2015).
Appellant first argues that the jury failed to give adequate deference to
the undisputed testimony showing lack of consideration in the 1992 Deed
transfer.5 Appellant’s Brief at 23. Appellant asserts that both he and
Carmella testified that the property was originally purchased for $21,000
and that Appellant had contributed one-half of that amount. Id. at 24. ____________________________________________
5 We note that in his Statement of Questions Involved, Appellant lists this as his third issue. In his argument section, however, Appellant has developed this issue as his fourth claim. We have addressed this issue in accordance with the order set forth in the Statement of Questions Involved.
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Appellant maintains that he did not receive any compensation for the alleged
1992 Deed transfer, and Carmella testified that although the Deed indicates
$1.00 of consideration, nominal in and of itself, Appellant was not paid $1.00
or any other consideration for the transfer. Id. Appellant maintains that the
jury’s failure to give due deference to this uncontroverted fact entitles
Appellant to a jnov. Id.
In addressing this issue, the trial court provided the following
discussion:
[Appellant] contends that the nominal consideration for the 1992 deed was never received. Specifically, [Appellant] argues that the jury failed to take this into consideration. However, as [Carmella’s] brief points out, [Appellant] did not cite to the record in any way to support this claim, nor did [he] make this claim at trial. Moreover, it is clearly established in the record that the jury was asked to determine whether or not the 1992 deed was a forgery, not whether or not [Appellant] did receive nominal consideration. [Appellant] has failed to establish any reason for this court to grant JNOV.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/2/14, at 6.
A review of the trial transcript supports the trial court’s analysis.
Indeed, the basis upon which Appellant proceeded at trial in support of his
claim was that the signature on the deed was forged. We cannot agree that
Appellant pursued the theory that the deed was invalid on the basis of his
failure to receive consideration for the transfer. In fact, the two questions
placed on the jury slip were: 1) whether the 1992 deed signature of
Appellant was forged, and 2) whether Appellant and Carmella Campisi had
an oral contract whereby Appellant is to receive fifty percent of the gas
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profit. Verdict slip, 12/11/13, at 1; see also N.T., 12/11/13, at 60, 104,
110. Issues raised for the first time on appeal are deemed waived.
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); See also Rivera v. Home Depot, 832 A.2d 487, 491 (Pa.
Super. 2003) (quoting Commonwealth v. York, 465 A.2d 1028, 1032 (Pa.
Super. 1983) (new or different theory of relief may not be advanced for first
time on appeal).6
In his final issue, Appellant asserts that the testimony presented at
trial by both Carmella and Appellant establishes an oral contract,
independent of any lease document, that payments under the lease would
be split evenly between the two parties. Appellant’s Brief at 22-23.
Appellant contends that the testimony established a binding and enforceable
contract between the parties, “under Pennsylvania law, irrespective of any
issues with regard to the ownership of the Property and the forgery on the
1992 Deed.” Id. at 23. Accordingly, Appellant argues, he is entitled to jnov
as to this issue. Id.
After reviewing the testimony presented at trial, we cannot agree with
Appellant’s assertion that the testimony established the existence of an
6 We note that although Appellant raised the claim that the contract was invalid on the basis of lack of consideration in his post-trial motion, he did not pursue this theory of liability at trial. The issue is waived for Appellant’s failure to raise it until post-trial motions. Goods v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 912 A.2d 226, 234 (Pa. 2006) (citing Commonwealth v. Lopez, 318 A.2d 334, 336 (Pa. 1974)) (appellant waived his claim by failing to raise it until post-trial motions.).
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agreement between the parties to split payments evenly. The record
supports the jury’s verdict that no such agreement to split the profits
existed. As such, we cannot conclude that the trial court committed an
abuse of discretion in denying Appellant’s request for jnov.
Judgment affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 5/28/2015
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