NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
ANTHONY P. CAMPISI AND STEPHANIE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF A. CAMPISI, HIS WIFE : PENNSYLVANIA :
v. :
:
CHARIDIMOS G. SACARELLOS :
:
Appellant : No. 1778 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment Entered November 13, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Civil Division at No(s):
2023-SU-000056
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., LANE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 2, 2026 This is a dispute between neighbors over a ten-foot-wide strip of grass between their adjoining, multi-acre estates. Charidimos Sacarellos appeals from the judgment quieting title to the grass strip in Anthony and Stephanie Campisi. Mr. Sacarellos contends that the Campisis’ predecessors in interest lost title to the grass strip by building a fence that cut off the strip from the rest of their yard. He believes, once the fence went up and 21 years passed, he acquired the grass strip by the acquiescence of his prior neighbors. For the reasons below, we affirm.
On October 26, 1981, the Sheriff of York County sold real property in Springettsbury Township to Mr. Sacarellos and his then-wife, Theodora.1 See
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The record is silent as to when Mr. Sacarellos’ marriage to Theodora ended.
Sheriff-to-Sacarellos Deed, 10/26/1981, York County Deed Book Vol. 83V at 402. Five months later, the Sacarelloses purchased additional property next to that land. See Perkins-to-Sacarellos Deed, 4/1/1982, York County Deed Book Vol. 84E at 860. The two tracts, totaling 5.39 acres, became known as 1900 Memory Lane. See N.T., 11/13/2025, at 77.
Around the same time, Jay Crist purchased two tracts directly north of the Sacarelloses. See Lando-to-Crist Deed, 1/6/1982, York County Deed Book Vol. 83X at 226. His tracts, totaling 4.37 acres, became known as 1950 Memory Lane Extended.2 See N.T., 11/13/2025, at 4. That property changed hands several times. See Crist-to-Wilson Deed, 3/8/1984, York County Deed Book Vol. 87C at 871; Wilson-to-Leaman Deed, 12/13/1985, York County Deed Book Vol. 91D at 138; and Leaman-to-Rhein Deed, 10/2/1992, York County Deed Book Vol. 480 at 1105. Those deeds included the grass strip in their meets and bounds at the property’s southern edge.
When Robert and Cheryl Rhein bought 1950 Memory Lane Extended in October of 1992, it had a wooden fence, running north to south and separating the property’s front from its rear third.3 As the fence approached the southern boundary, it turned 90 degrees west but was set back from the property line.
Someone also planted a row of burning bushes4 that ran east from where the
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2 Memory Lane is at the eastern edge of the parties’ properties.
3 There is no evidence as to who built the wooden fence or when.
4 Native to East Asia, Euonymus alatus is an invasive species in Pennsylvania; it is a cold-hardy, deciduous shrub, known for bright-red foliage in autumn.
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wooden fence turned west. They grew in a line with the east-to-west fencing and, therefore, were similarly recessed from the southern property line.
At some unknown point during their ownership, the Rheins replaced the wooden fence with a plastic, white one. See N.T., 11/13/2025, at 68. The east-to-west section of the new fence was ten feet north of the property line. It therefore failed to enclose the western third of the grass strip (shaded green in the photograph below), and the eastern two-thirds of the grass strip was south of the burning bushes (shaded red below):
Parties’ Joint Ex. 6 (cropped; contrast enhanced; shaded areas added). The Rheins’ home was to the north of the grass strip; the Sacarelloses’ home and farm was to the south of the grass strip.
The Rheins assumed their new fence and row of burning bushes “marked the location of the [southern] property line . . . .” N.T., 11/13/2025, at 69.
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Even so, every summer for the 13 years that the Rheins owned the property, Mr. Rhein mowed the grass strip. See id. at 70-72.
On July 1, 2005, they sold 1950 Memory Lane Extended to Theodore and Mary Drabik. See Rhein-to-Drabik Deed, 7/1/2005, York County Deed Book Vol. 1736 at 2945. During the twelve years that the Drabiks owned the property, they did not maintain the grass strip. Mrs. Drabik “would only cut from the [burning] bushes towards [the Drabiks’] house, and [Mr. Sacarellos] always cut . . . up to the [burning] bushes . . . [H]e would weed whack on [his] side of the bushes, and [Mrs. Drabik] would weed whack and cut on [her] side . . . .” N.T., 11/13/2025, at 51.
Next, on June 7, 2017, the Drabiks sold the property to the Campisis.
See Drabik-to-Campisi Deed, 6/7/2017, York County Deed Book Vol. 2424 at 1795. Like the other deeds in the Campisis’ chain of title, their deed included the grass strip within its meets and bounds. They did not think the fence and burning bushes were on the property line, because “generally speaking, fences are not . . . exactly on the property line.” N.T., 11/13/2025, at 21.
Upon taking possession, the Campisis immediately hired a landscaping company to perform yardwork on the property. See id. at 6. The company resumed Mr. Rhein’s practice of mowing the grass strip by making “a single pass on the outside of those bushes,” with a five-foot-wide mower. Id. at 38. The landscapers also weed wacked south of the white fence and burning bushes. See id. During this period, Mr. Sacarellos “respect[ed] the line that [they] mow[ed]” by mowing “right on the same line as” the landscaping
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company. Id. at 39. Hence, for the first three years that the Campisis owned the northern property, the parties each maintained approximately one half of the ten-foot-wide grass strip.
In 2019, the Campisis removed the white fence. See id. at 11. In its place, they planted a row of pine trees near the southern boundary line. The next year, the Campisis had the property surveyed. Their surveyor located the ten-foot-wide grass strip as being part of the Campisis’ land and placed stakes in the ground. Mr. Sacarellos noticed the stakes at the northern edge of his property, “had a very adverse reaction, . . . and took a rather antagonistic position [by] disagreeing with that boundary line.” Id. at 10. Notably, he never hired anyone to survey the properties. See id. at 88-89.
On January 5, 2023, the Campisis filed a Writ of Summons against Mr.
Sacarellos and his wife, Catherine Sacarellos. Soon thereafter, Mr. Sacarellos and she divorced. See Sacarellos’ Pre-Trial Memorandum at 1 n.1. Hence, on September 6, 2023, the Campisis filed a complaint which only named Mr. Sacarellos as the Defendant. They alleged he was unlawfully encroaching on the ten-foot-wide grass strip. See Complaint at 5.
A few weeks later, Mr. Sacarellos filed an answer and new matter to assert that he maintained “exclusive possession of the [grass strip] since April 17, 1986, and [he] has cared for and maintained the [grass strip] in an open, continuous, and notorious manner since that date.” Sacarellos’ Answer and New Matter 3. Mr. Sacarellos also contended that the Leamans, Rheins, and Drabiks “did, at all times since April 17, 1986, acknowledge the [grass strip]
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as being part of the Sacarellos Property, and none of them ever asserted a claim to ownership of” the grass strip. Id. He brought a counterclaim to acquire title to the grass strip, but Mr. Sacarellos did not identify his legal theory for the counterclaim.
After discovery closed, Mr. Sacarellos identified two bases for claiming that he owned the grass strip. He claimed that he and his family “exclusively used, occupied, and maintained the [grass strip] for the entire 39 years of their ownership of their property, thus acquiring title by adverse possession and/or the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.” Sacarellos’ Pre-Trial Memorandum at 2.
The parties stipulated “that the [grass strip] is contained on the Campisi and their predecessors’ deeds.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/13/2025, at 1; see also N.T., 11/13/2025, at 109. The case then proceeded to a bench trial.
Mr. Campisi, his landscaper, Mrs. Drabik, and Mr. Rhein testified to the above facts. Mr. Sacarellos also testified to facts that we have excluded from our foregoing recitation. According to the trial court, “We must discount [Mr. Sacarellos’] testimony greatly. It was apparent that his memory has faded tremendously, as he simply could not recall the answer to many questions.” Id. at 2.
At closing arguments, Mr. Sacarellos relied entirely upon the doctrine of boundary line by consent. His attorney contended that a “boundary line may be proved by long standing fence without proof of a dispute, and its settlement by compromise.” N.T., 11/13/2025, at 102. “It cannot be disputed that
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occupation up to a fence on each side by a party or two parties for more than 21 years, each claiming the land on his side as his own, gives to each an incontestable right up to the fence.” Id. In Mr. Sacarellos’ view, the trial court needed to award him ownership of the grass strip “whether the fence [was] precisely on the right line or not, meaning the deeded line.” Id. In other words, because Mr. Sacarellos and the Campisis’ predecessors in interest had never disputed who owned the grass strip, the Campisis could not claim it based on their deed.
The trial court asked Mr. Sacarellos’ counsel to discuss the testimony of Mr. Rhein, namely that, “at least at points during his ownership, he did, in fact, mow on the other side of the line” of burning bushes and fence. Id. at 105-06.
Mr. Sacarellos’ attorney replied:
Sure. And he also [ad]mitted that and colored that testimony by saying that he was being a good neighbor, which . . . contrasted against I’m claiming the other side for my own. I’m being a good neighbor. I’m cleaning up the grass and the leaves on [the southern] side as a good neighbor would do, not to claim that as my land that I own.
And that’s an important distinction, and I think it’s clearly supported by the context of [Mr. Rhein’s] testimony that the - - and in other statements that he made, he was very clear that the understanding was that that was the line, and that he crossed it was this neighborly gesture, assisting with mowing or whatever. But, yes, I think [Y]our [Honor’s legal] test is correct.
Id. at 106.
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The Campisis’ counsel responded that Mr. Sacarellos did not prove “that for 21 years, he has continuously held, to the exclusion of anybody else” the grass strip. Id. at 107. “Pennsylvania courts do not like to usurp land from [the record owner] and give it to another person without clear, definitive, and credible proof that, for a period of 21 years, they have exclusively used, maintained, and otherwise cultivated the land.” Id. at 107-08. “We have no date in which the wooden fence was actually put up. We have very specific dates that, between 1992 and 2005, the Rheins maintained the property, whether they knew it was their property or not . . . .” Id. at 108. “I just don’t think [the trial court] heard clear, credible, definitive proof today that would warrant usurping [the Campisis’] property [rights] that [they] paid taxes on, that [they are] the title owner[s] to, and giving it to Mr. Sacarellos.” Id.
The trial ended. A few hours later, the trial court entered its non-jury decision, an opinion in support thereof, and a judgment quieting title to the grass strip in the Campisis. It framed the issue as “whether, having stipulated to the area of land contained in [the] Campisis’ deed, [Mr.] Sacarellos has met his burden of proving he acquired the [grass strip] through adverse possession or boundary by acquiescence.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/13/2025, at 2. The court “concluded that he [did] not.” Id.
In reaching its decision, after quoting various cases, the trial court explained its rationale as follows:
Here, we have no evidence of a dispute which was resolved by agreement. Thus, the Niles [v. Fall Creek Hunting Club, Inc., 545 A.2d 926 (Pa. Super. 1988),]
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criteria for establishing a consentable line has not been met.
We must then evaluate whether the criteria set forth in Moore [v. Moore, 921 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 2007),] has been met for boundary by acquiescence. Again, we determine it has not.
The keystone in our determination is that the land in question must have been “previously claimed and occupied by the grantor and is taken by the grantee as successor in such interest.” Moore, supra . . . Said differently, in order for there to be a boundary by acquiescence, there must be acquiescence. As unreliable as [Mr.] Sacarellos’ testimony is, he clearly communicated that he believed the property line to be the fence and line of bushes since he took possession of the property in 1982. We heard no testimony that a previous owner of the Campisi property asserted ownership beyond the fence and line of bushes which was abandoned after [Mr.] Sacarellos asserted his claim of ownership. Thus, there was no acquiescence, but only a mutual mistake as to the location of the property line.
Further, we do not believe [Mr.] Sacarellos met his burden to show that he continuously occupied the disputed property for 21 years. [He] has two potential claims for ownership: 1) the area he fenced in which extends into the Campisi property; and 2) the area he claims to have maintained between the Campisi fence and line of bushes and the deeded property line.
[Mr.] Sacarellos did not elicit testimony that the fenced area [for Mr. Sacarellos’ chickens] which extended into Campisis’ deeded property existed continuously for 21 years before [this] action commenced in 2023. [Mr.]
Sacarellos himself could not remember when he erected the fenced in area [for his chickens]. While [Mrs.] Drabik testified it existed during her period of ownership beginning in 2005, [Mr.] Rhein could not remember whether the [chicken] fence existed during his period of ownership.
Thus, [Mr.] Sacarellos only established the existence of the [chicken] fence from 2005, which is only 18 years before 2023 and short of the required period of time.
Further, [Mr.] Sacarellos only claimed possession of the land between the Campisi fence and line of [burning]
bushes and the deeded property line comes from his
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maintenance of that area. Again, [Mr.] Sacarellos could not explain what maintenance he actually performed in the [grass strip]. The photographs of the properties only show grass in this area. Thus, we must assume [Mr.] Sacarellos’
claim of possession relates to mowing grass. However, [Mr.] Rhein testified that he also mowed the grass [strip]
between 1992 and 2005. Thus, [Mr.] Sacarellos has failed to show continuous possession for a period of 21 years.
Id. at 3-5.
Mr. Sacarellos filed post-trial motions, which the trial court denied. This timely appeal followed.
He raises one appellate issue: “Whether the trial court erred in stating and applying the doctrine of consentable line by recognition and acquiescence to conclude that [Mr. Sacarellos] did not establish with credible evidence the existence of a boundary by consent . . . .” Sacarellos’ Brief at 4.
Mr. Sacarellos contends that the trial court misapplied the doctrine of consentable line by recognition and acquiescence. He asserts that the trial court erroneously required proof that one party previously claimed ownership beyond the east-to-west portion of the fence and row of burning bushes and thereafter abandoned that claim as the prerequisite for establishing the boundary by acquiescence. See id. at 14-15. In his view, the doctrine only requires that each party claimed and occupied the land on their respective side of the fence and burning bushes as their own for a continuous period of 21 years. See id. at 15.
In doing so, Mr. Sacarellos relies upon his own testimony, which the trial court deemed incredible, as well as the testimony of Mr. Rhein and Mrs.
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Drabik, whom he called as witnesses during his case in chief. See id. at 11- 13. Furthermore, he omits any mention of the remainder of the trial court’s opinion, wherein it found, as a factual matter, that Mr. Sacarellos did not prove that he occupied the grass strip for the required 21-year period. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/13/2025, at 4-5. Instead, Mr. Sacarellos assumes facts that the trial court rejected as untrue – namely, that he and his witnesses “occupied the land on their respective sides of the fence line and bush line as their own . . . for a period of more than 21 years (24 years and eight months, from October 1992 through July 1, 2017).” Sacarellos’ Brief at 15.
Quiet title is a legislatively created action that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has incorporated into the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Pa.R.C.P. 1061-1067. “Although of statutory origins, a suit to quiet title is actually an equitable proceeding ‘descended from two suits in chancery — the bill of peace and the bill to remove cloud.’” Calisto v. Rodgers, 271 A.3d 877, 881 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc) (quoting Enhancing the Marketability of Title: The Suit to Quiet Title, 68 YALE L.J. 1245, 1266 (1959)). When reviewing an equitable decision, such as “a quiet-title action, our scope and standard of review are deferential.” Id. at 881.
“We will reverse only where the trial court was palpably erroneous, misapplied the law, or committed a manifest abuse of discretion. Where there are any apparently reasonable grounds for the trial court’s decision, we must affirm it.” Id. Our “function . . . on an appeal from an adjudication in equity is not to substitute our view for that of the lower tribunal; we are to determine
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whether a judicial mind, on due consideration of all the evidence, as a whole, could reasonably have reached the conclusion of that tribunal[. W]hen reviewing the results of a non-jury trial, we are bound by the trial court’s findings of fact, unless those findings are not based on competent evidence.” Id. (some punctuation omitted).
“The establishment of a boundary line by acquiescence for the statutory period of 21 years has long been recognized in Pennsylvania.” Zeglin v. Gahagen, 812 A.2d 558, 561 (Pa. 2002). A party asserting ownership of land under that doctrine has the burden of proving two elements: “1) each party must have claimed and occupied the land on his side of the line as his own; and 2) such occupation must have continued for the statutory period of 21 years.” Id. Critically, whether those elements exist is a pure question of fact.
For example, Reiter v. McJunkin, 33 A. 1012 (Pa. 1896), involved two adjoining farms. James McJunkin inherited one farm, which his ancestors had settled in 1773 based on a land warrant from the colonial government.5 Seventeen years later, in 1790, another family established a neighboring farm. At some point, someone built a fence between the two properties, but it was not exactly on the property line as described in the warrant of 1773.
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5 A land warrant (a.k.a. a land certificate) is a “document entitling a person to
receive from the government a certain amount of land by following prescribed legal steps. • It contains an official description of the land, as well as the name and address of the person receiving the entitlement, and is prima facie evidence of the truth of the matters it contains. — Also termed land warrant.” Land Certificate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024).
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According to Mr. McJunkin, “for more than half a century, both farms had been continuously occupied by their respective owners, and [the] fence had been maintained as a division or line fence between them, up to which each had claimed and occupied without the slightest objection on the part of the other.” Id. Then, in 1890, George Reiter acquired ownership of the 1790 farm. He had his land surveyed and learned that the 1773 line was on Mr. McJunkin’s side of the fence. Mr. Reiter filed an action in ejectment against Mr. McJunkin over “a very narrow strip of land lying along the boundary line between” the farms and sought to have the fence relocated to the line in the 1773 warrant. Id.
The trial court submitted one question to the jury: “Where was the line of 1773 actually run?” Id. The jury found that the 1773 line was, in fact, on Mr. McJunkin’s side of the fence. The court entered judgment ejecting him from the very narrow strip of land, and Mr. McJunkin appealed. He argued that the trial court erred by failing “to submit to the jury the question whether the owners of these farms had . . . by their treatment of the line fences established for themselves the location of the line.” Id. (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that:
maintenance of a line fence between owners of adjoining lands by their acts, up to which each claims and occupies, is a concession by each of the open, adverse possession by the other of that which is on his side of such division fence, which, after 21 years, will give title, though subsequent surveys may show that the fence was not exactly upon the surveyed line. There was evidence given by both the parties upon which the defendant was justified in asking the submission of this question of the jury; and if the fact had
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been found to be that a division fence had been maintained by the owners of these farms for more than 21 years before this suit was brought, which had been built and maintained as a line fence, extending over that part of the line now in controversy, we think the verdict should have been in favor of [Mr. McJunkin].
Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial for the jury to decide whether the parties had demonstrated their acquiescence to the fence line for over 21 years.
Here, the trial court performed the factual analysis that the Reiter Court expressly committed to the finder of fact. Plainly, the trial court found Mr. Sacarellos’ evidence of mutual acquiescence to be unpersuasive. See Trial Court Opinion, supra.
On appeal, Mr. Sacarellos does not contend, much less convince us, that the trial court’s factual findings lack support in the record or that the trial court capriciously disregarded his evidence. Rather, Mr. Sacarellos relies exclusively upon his own testimony and that of his witnesses, presumes that his and their testimony was true, and asks us to make legal conclusions based upon that now-discredited testimony.
Had we been the finders of fact below, we may well have made different factual findings than the trial court. However, given our deferential standard of review in equitable proceedings, we may not substitute Mr. Sacarellos’ view of the facts, or even our own, for those of the trial court. See Calisto, supra. Indeed, the trial court was “free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and [was] likewise free to make all credibility determinations and
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resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73–74 (Pa. Super. 2004).
Our review of the trial court’s opinion reveals that it simply found Mr.
Sacarellos’ evidence unpersuasive, because, in its view of the facts, Mr. Sacarellos failed to prove that he continuously and exclusively occupied the grass strip for 21 years. As an appellate court, we may not second guess that factual finding, because it is based, at least partly, on the trial court’s disbelief of Mr. Sacarellos’ testimony. “We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible evidence.” Id. at 73. At trial, Mr. Sacarellos could not recall dates and facts pertaining to his counterclaim; thus, the trial court’s discrediting of his testimony was rational. The trial court found that Mr. Sacarellos failed to prove that he possessed the grass strip for 21 consecutive years, and that finding, standing alone, is fatal to his counterclaim.
Mr. Sacarellos’ appellate issue warrants no relief.
Judgment affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 09/02/2026