Camper v. Shelby Mutual Insurance

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Camper v. Shelby Mutual Insurance

332 S.E.2d 923, 175 Ga. App. 169, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2050

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedJune 18, 1985

Docket70162

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 332 S.E.2d 923 (Camper v. Shelby Mutual Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Camper v. Shelby Mutual Insurance, 332 S.E.2d 923, 175 Ga. App. 169, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2050 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).

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Opinion

Benham, Judge.

Appellant fell off the motorcycle he was driving and was injured when he was struck by an automobile driven by his wife, who was following him. Appellee was the insurer of the automobile, and the policy, written in appellant’s name, included $25,000 of “no-fault” personal injury protection (PIP). Appellant filed suit to obtain the insurance proceeds; appellee contested the action and filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, finding that appellant was “occupying” his motorcycle within the meaning of OCGA § 33-34-2 at the time of the collision and therefore was not entitled to recover under OCGA § 33-34-7. Appellant enumerates the judgment as error. We affirm, since this case is clearly controlled by our decision in Partridge v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co., 172 Ga. App. 466 (323 SE2d 676) (1984), in that appellant had not been removed to a neutral zone.

Judgment affirmed.

Banke, C. J., and McMurray, P. J., concur.

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Benham, Judge.

Appellant fell off the motorcycle he was driving and was injured when he was struck by an automobile driven by his wife, who was following him. Appellee was the insurer of the automobile, and the policy, written in appellant’s name, included $25,000 of “no-fault” personal injury protection (PIP). Appellant filed suit to obtain the insurance proceeds; appellee contested the action and filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, finding that appellant was “occupying” his motorcycle within the meaning of OCGA § 33-34-2 at the time of the collision and therefore was not entitled to recover under OCGA § 33-34-7. Appellant enumerates the judgment as error. We affirm, since this case is clearly controlled by our decision in Partridge v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co., 172 Ga. App. 466 (323 SE2d 676) (1984), in that appellant had not been removed to a neutral zone.

Judgment affirmed.

Banke, C. J., and McMurray, P. J., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

332 S.E.2d 923, 175 Ga. App. 169, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2050, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/camper-v-shelby-mutual-insurance-gactapp-1985.

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