Campbell v. State of Nevada

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 CHANSE CAMPBELL, Case No.: 2:23-cv-00410-APG-DJA

4 Petitioner ORDER 5 v.

6 STATE OF NEVADA,

7 Respondent

8 9 Chanse Campbell has filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition. ECF No. 1. 10 Campbell’s claims are unexhausted and federal abstention is appropriate. So I dismiss the 11 petition without prejudice. 12 Background1 13 In 2019, a Clark County, Nevada grand jury indicted Campbell on numerous charges of 14 child abuse, neglect, or endangerment. He is in custody at Clark County Detention Center. His 15 case, State of Nevada v. Chanse Campbell, remains pending before the state district court; the 16 scheduled trial date of April 24, 2023 was recently vacated. 17 In his petition for federal habeas relief, Campbell claims, among other things, that his 18 appointed trial counsel is ineffective for failing to investigate and file motions, and that 19 prosecutors have committed misconduct, including withholding exculpatory evidence. 20 21

22 1 The procedural history in this section is derived from Campbell’s allegations as well as his criminal matters in the Eighth Judicial District Court for Clark County, Nevada. I take judicial 23 notice of the online docket records of the state district court, which may be accessed by the public online at: https://www.clarkcountycourts.us. 1 Because a federal habeas petitioner incarcerated by a state must give that state’s courts a 2 fair opportunity to act on each of his claims before he presents them in a federal habeas petition, 3 federal courts will not consider a petition for habeas relief until the petitioner has properly 4 exhausted available state remedies for all claims raised. See Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124,

5 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). A claim remains unexhausted until the petitioner has given the highest 6 available state court the opportunity to consider the claim through direct appeal or state 7 collateral-review proceedings. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844–45 (1999); Peterson v. 8 Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). To properly exhaust state remedies on 9 each claim, the habeas petitioner must “present the state courts with the same claim he urges 10 upon the federal court.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). The federal constitutional 11 implications of a claim, not just issues of state law, must have been raised in the state court to 12 achieve exhaustion. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2014); Castillo v. 13 McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2005) (fair presentation requires both the operative facts 14 and federal legal theory upon which a claim is based). A claim is not exhausted unless the

15 petitioner has presented to the state court the same operative facts and legal theory upon which 16 his federal claim is based. Bland v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 17 1994). Here, Campbell states that he submitted a pro se state pretrial habeas corpus petition but 18 it was stricken or rejected because he is or was represented by counsel.2 So his bare assertion 19 that he has exhausted his claims is belied by the record. 20 21

2 While not entirely clear, it appears that Campbell moved to dismiss his first two appointed 22 attorneys, which the state district court granted. While represented by a third appointed attorney, Campbell tried unsuccessfully to file a pro se state pretrial habeas petition. He then moved to 23 dismiss his third attorney. The state district court told him it would not keep appointing new counsel, so Campbell elected to represent himself. See ECF No. 3 at 7-11, 16-21. 1 But even if I assume Campbell has exhausted his remedies, his petition seeks federal 2 judicial intervention in a pending state criminal proceeding, which is simply not available to him. 3 Cf. e.g., Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983); Carden v. Montana, 626 F.2d 4 82, 83–85 (9th Cir. 1980). The Younger abstention doctrine prevents federal courts from

5 enjoining pending state court criminal proceedings, even if there is an allegation of a 6 constitutional violation, unless there is an extraordinary circumstance that creates a threat of 7 irreparable injury. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53–54 (1971). The Supreme Court of the 8 United States has instructed that “federal-court abstention is required” when there is “a parallel, 9 pending state criminal proceeding.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013) 10 (emphasis added); Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004) (federal courts generally 11 abstain from granting any relief that would interfere with pending state judicial proceedings). 12 Injuries are only irreparable if the threat to a petitioner’s federally protected rights cannot be 13 eliminated through his defense of the criminal case. Younger, 401 U.S. at 46. 14 This case does not present extraordinary circumstances. Campbell challenges his

15 attorney’s investigation of his case and argues that he is the victim of judicial bias and 16 misconduct by the prosecution, including intimidating his co-defendant into making misleading 17 statements. Defendants in state criminal proceedings routinely allege that criminal proceedings 18 violate their constitutional rights, including fundamental rights, which makes this a regular 19 occurrence, not an extraordinary circumstance. Campbell’s situation is no different in substance 20 from that of any criminal defendant facing the potential loss of constitutional rights—including 21 the most fundamental right, to liberty—in a pending criminal prosecution. In addition, pretrial 22 motion practice or defenses at trial may possibly ameliorate any threat to his federally protected 23 rights. Campbell thus faces no extraordinary or irreparable injuries, so federal abstention is 1}}required. Because the charges against Campbell are still pending, dismissal of this action without prejudice will not materially impact the analysis of any issue in a later-filed habeas proceeding or otherwise result in substantial prejudice. Thus, this petition is dismissed without prejudice. Reasonable jurists would not find this determination to be debatable or wrong, so I decline to issue a certificate of appealability. 6 Conclusion 7 I THEREFORE ORDER that the petition for writ of habeas corpus [ECF No. 1] is 8] DISMISSED without prejudice. 9 I FURTHER ORDER that a certificate of appealability is denied. 10 I FURTHER ORDER that the Clerk of the Court: 1] e DIRECT INFORMAL ELECTRONIC SERVICE upon the respondents by 12 adding Nevada Attorney General Aaron D. Ford as counsel for respondents and 13 sending a notice of electronic filing to his office for the petition [ECF No. 1] and 14 this order. No response is required from the respondents other than to respond to 15 any orders of a reviewing court. 16 e ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT dismissing this action and CLOSE THIS 17 CASE. 18 □□□ U.S. District Judge Andrew P. Gordo 19 April 18, 2023 20 21 22 23