Campbell v. State

• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
• Decided: October 2, 2025
• Docket: 2164/23
• Status: Published

Opinion

Deon T. Campbell v. State of Maryland, No. 2164, September Term, 2023. Opinion by Ripken, J.

CRIMINAL LAW — MIRANDA RIGHTS –– VITIATION OR NULLIFICATION Following a proper recitation of Miranda rights, when a person being interrogated asks for clarification regarding those rights, an officer cannot make an incorrect statement of law or intentionally mislead or trick the person being interrogated. Making such a statement vitiates or nullifies the previously proper Miranda advisement. Where an officer provides clarifying information in a legally correct fashion, the Miranda advisement and any subsequent waiver of those rights remains proper.

CRIMINAL LAW — BALANCING UNFAIR PREJUDICE WITH PROBATIVE VALUE — MD RULE 5-403 — JAIL UNIFORM To determine whether unfair prejudice of a video of a defendant wearing jail clothes outweighs the video’s probative value, trial courts should conduct the Rule 5-403 balancing test. Additionally, as part of the unfair prejudice prong of the balancing test, trial courts should examine: (1) whether the State has a demonstrable need to introduce the evidence; (2) if shown to the jury, whether the evidence implies that the defendant has a prior criminal record; and (3) when introduced at trial, whether the evidence was introduced in a manner such that it does not draw particular attention to the source or implication of the evidence.

CRIMINAL LAW — BALANCING UNFAIR PREJUDICE WITH PROBATIVE VALUE — MD RULE 5-403 — JAIL UNIFORM A video containing a defendant wearing a prison or jail uniform is not inherently prejudicial and does not raise the same concerns under the Sixth Amendment as when the defendant appears in the courtroom before the jury in jail or prison clothing.

CRIMINAL LAW — BALANCING UNFAIR PREJUDICE WITH PROBATIVE VALUE — MD RULE 5-403 — CRIME SCENE AND AUTOPSY PHOTOGRAPHS A trial court does not abuse its discretion in admitting crime scene or autopsy photographs, even when they depict graphic content, if the danger of unfair prejudice is not outweighed by the probative value of that evidence.

CRIMINAL LAW — EVIDENCE — AUTHENTICATION — VIDEO EVIDENCE Video evidence can be authenticated using a variety of methods, including self- authentication, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of methods.

CRIMINAL LAW — SUFFICICENCY OF THE EVIDENCE — PREMEDITATION FOR FIRST-DEGREE MURDER Circumstantial evidence which demonstrated the intensity of a victim’s killing at close range following brief conversation was sufficient to establish premeditation for first-degree murder. Circuit Court for Baltimore County Case No. C-03-CR-22-001477

REPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 2164

September Term, 2023

______________________________________

DEON T. CAMPBELL

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Berger, Nazarian, Ripken,

JJ.

Opinion by Ripken, J. ______________________________________

Filed: October 2, 2025

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.

2025.10.02 09:38:09 -04'00' Gregory Hilton, Clerk In June of 2023, Deon Tyvon Campbell (“Appellant”) was tried before a jury in the

Circuit Court for Baltimore County on multiple charges related to the murder of Tarik

Purcell (“Purcell”). Appellant was found guilty of first-degree murder among other

offenses, for which he was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Appellant

noted this timely appeal.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Appellant submitted the following issues for our review: 10F

I. Whether the circuit court erred in declining to suppress statements that Appellant made during an interrogation.

II. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion when it admitted a video of Appellant in a jail uniform and multiple pieces of evidence which depicted the murder and death of Purcell.

III. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion when it determined that video footage was authenticated.

1 Reorganized, consolidated, and rephrased from:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting unauthenticated videos purporting to show the shooting and events prior to it?

2. Did the trial court err by admitting [Appellant’s] statement following erroneous advice under Miranda?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting a prejudicial video of [Appellant] in jail clothes?

4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting numerous graphic pieces of visual evidence depicting [Purcell’s] injury?

5. Was the evidence insufficient to convict [Appellant] of first-degree murder? IV. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of first- degree murder.

For the reasons to follow, we shall affirm Appellant’s convictions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 1F

On May 16, 2021, Purcell was shot in the eye outside of The Spot Hookah Lounge

(“The Spot”) in Baltimore County at 1:48 a.m. Officer Carlone (“Ofc. Carlone”) 3 was the 2F

first officer to arrive at the scene. Ofc. Carlone arrived at The Spot approximately one

minute after receiving a call indicating that a shooting had occurred. Upon his arrival, Ofc.

Carlone described the scene as a “chaotic situation” in which everyone was “screaming

and yelling.” He also indicated that there was a large crowd of people surrounding Purcell

and that the people in the crowd were “irate” and “hostile.” Due to this behavior, Ofc.

Carlone worked with another officer to keep the crowd separated from Purcell, attempting

to secure the scene. Soon thereafter, the paramedics arrived. Again, due to the unruly

behavior of the people in the crowd, the paramedics immediately removed Purcell from the

scene—as opposed to the practice of stabilizing and treating a person before moving

them—and drove Purcell to the hospital while rendering aid and attempting to stabilize

him. Upon arriving at the hospital, Purcell was pronounced deceased.

2 The following facts were adduced at trial. 3 The record does not contain Ofc. Carlone’s first name.

2 Prior to the departure of the ambulance from The Spot, many patrons had quickly

left the scene. 4 Hence, the officers were unable to identify witnesses, and, additionally, 3F

limited pieces of physical evidence were recovered from the scene. 5 Due to the limited 4F

physical evidence, Detective Christopher Needham (“Det. Needham”)—who, as the lead

investigator on the case, was assigned to developing a suspect—began checking for

surveillance cameras that could aid in the investigation. Law enforcement officers

discovered multiple security cameras on the interior and exterior of The Spot and recovered

serial numbers from those cameras.

Approximately nine months passed. In June of 2021, following the issuance of a

search warrant, Det. Needham, his partner, Detective Eric Dunton (“Det. Dunton”), and

other Baltimore County police officers obtained electronic video footage from Nest, the

company that held the video footage of the surveillance cameras at The Spot (“the Nest

footage”). The Nest footage was comprised of multiple video clips: two video clips of the

interior of The Spot which portrayed people dancing, drinking, and smoking hookah; and

video footage of the exterior of The Spot which portrayed the murder itself and depicted

the death of Purcell. Based on the Nest footage, law enforcement obtained a photograph of

a license plate, searched the Motor Vehicle Administration’s records, and connected the

4 Ofc. Carlone confirmed that “there were people . . . running in and out of the Hookah lounge,” and that “some cars . . . were leaving rapidly[.]” 5 The only pieces of physical evidence recovered were: one shell casing, one bullet “jacketing,” one bottle of lotion, and one cellphone, which was later determined to be irrelevant to the investigation. No weapon was recovered.

3 license plate information to the registered owner of the vehicle, Kari Brown (“Brown”). 6 5F

In November of 2021, Det. Needham interviewed Brown which aided him and Det. Dunton

in developing Appellant as a suspect.

In February of 2022, Det. Needham conducted a recorded custodial interrogation

with Appellant at the Baltimore County Police Department. During the interrogation, Det.

Needham showed Appellant video clips of the Nest footage. The interrogation lasted

approximately two-and-a-half hours. Appellant identified himself to Det. Needham in the

interior video clips; however, while watching the exterior clips, he declined to identify the

individual who appeared to be the same person as himself. 7 6F

In April of 2022, Appellant was indicted by a grand jury for eight counts related to

the events that occurred at The Spot, including the murder of Purcell. Following multiple

motions hearings, the case proceeded to a four-day jury trial in June of 2023. At trial, the

6 Additionally, in June of 2021, Det. Needham received a call from the Baltimore City Police. This call prompted him and Det. Dunton to travel to the Baltimore City Police Headquarters Homicide Unit, and to interview Brandi Burrows (“Burrows”). Burrows provided Dets. Needham and Dunton with information that aided in their investigation and prompted them to seek an interview with Brown. 7 For example, in response to Det. Needham’s question, “Do you recognize that person?” Appellant responded that he did not, and also stated, “That’s not me, I can’t tell who it is. If you think it’s me, then (inaudible).” Det. Needham continued, “What did you just tell me? You are the third person in that car.” Appellant replied, “No, I am not.” Det. Needham then tried to ask the same question regarding whether the person who appeared to be Appellant, was in fact Appellant—as he was wearing the same clothes from the interior video—to which Appellant repeatedly replied, “I don’t know.”

4 State presented seven 8 witnesses; Appellant did not testify and called no witnesses. The 7F

jury found Appellant guilty of four offenses: first-degree murder (Count I); use of a firearm

in the commission of a crime of violence (Count III); wear, carry, and transport of a loaded

handgun upon a person (Count VI); and illegal possession of a regulated firearm after a

disqualifying conviction (Count VIII). 98F

Appellant moved for a new trial and requested a hearing. The State opposed

Appellant’s motion. In January of 2024, the court held a hearing on the motion. Following

arguments from both Appellant and the State, the court denied Appellant’s motion for a

new trial and proceeded to sentencing. The court sentenced Appellant to the following

periods of incarceration: life without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder,

twenty years for using a firearm in a commission of a crime of violence, and five years for

possessing a regulated firearm after having a disqualifying conviction. The second and

third sentences were to run concurrent with the first-degree murder sentence. This timely

appeal followed. 10 We incorporate additional facts as they become relevant to the analysis. 9F

8 Only six of the seven witnesses provided testimony at trial. Burrows had signed a plea agreement pertaining to a criminal case in Baltimore City in which she agreed to testify in Appellant’s trial as a witness for the State. When the State called Burrows as a witness, she invoked her Fifth Amendment right not to testify. 9 At the outset of the trial the court granted the State’s request, without objection from the defense, to enter a nolle prosequi as to counts II (first-degree assault) and IV (wear, carry, and transport a handgun in a vehicle upon public roads) of the indictment. 10 “In a criminal action, when a timely motion for a new trial is filed pursuant to Rule 4- 331(a), the notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after the later of (1) entry of the judgment or (2) entry of a notice withdrawing the motion or an order denying the motion.” Md. Rule 8-202(b). Here, the court entered the verdict on June 16, 2023. Appellant filed a

5 DISCUSSION

I. THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT DECLINED TO SUPPRESS THE STATEMENTS APPELLANT MADE WHILE BEING INTERROGATED.

A. Additional Facts

i. Det. Needham’s Custodial Interrogation of Appellant

In February of 2022, Det. Needham conducted a custodial interrogation of

Appellant. Det. Needham explained to Appellant that he wanted to speak with Appellant

regarding “something” with which Appellant “might be able to help” law enforcement.

Det. Needham retrieved a “Baltimore County Police Department Miranda Rights Waiver”

form (“the Miranda Waiver”) and placed it on the table in front of where Appellant was

seated. Det. Needham slid his chair closer to Appellant so that Appellant could read the

form as Det. Needham read Appellant his Miranda rights out loud from the form.

Subsequently, Det. Needham read aloud each of the five Miranda statements, pausing after

every statement to ensure Appellant understood. Det. Needham received a verbal

affirmation from Appellant as to each of the five rights. Det. Needham proceeded to read

the following statement, which appeared on the form in bolded uppercase text: “I have read

and understand this explanation of my rights. My decision to waive these rights and be

interviewed is free and voluntary on my part.” Det. Needham then asked Appellant, “Does

that make sense?” In response, the following colloquy ensued:

[Appellant]: So I’m waiving, like I’m waiving all these rights?

timely motion for new trial on June 23, 2023. The circuit court denied Appellant’s motion and sentenced him on January 10, 2024, and Appellant filed a notice of appeal that same day.

6 [Det. Needham]: Yes. But if at some point you want to stop --

[Appellant]: I still got these rights?

[Det. Needham]: Oh, yeah.

[Appellant]: Okay.

[Det. Needham]: Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. You have them, but you’re still going to -- you understand them and you’re still going to talk to me.

[Det. Needham]: That’s all that means.

[Appellant]: Okay. Yes.

[Det. Needham]: If at some point you don’t feel like talking any more and you want to go --

[Appellant]: Okay, yeah.

[Det. Needham]: I’ll still get you a cigarette.

[Appellant]: Okay. Yeah, I’m good.

[Det. Needham]: And then we’ll roll.

[Det. Needham]: I’m just going to get you to sign right there for me. Take your time.

Appellant signed the Miranda Waiver 11 and engaged in a conversation with Det. Needham 10F

regarding his whereabouts and the events that occurred at The Spot on May 16, 2021. Their

conversation lasted for approximately two-and-a-half hours.

11 The Miranda Waiver noted the following advisements: 1. You have the absolute right to remain silent. 2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. 3. You have the right to talk with a lawyer at any time before or during any questioning.

7 During the interrogation, Det. Needham showed Appellant portions of the video

clips from the Nest footage. The first video clip was from a camera in the interior of The

Spot; it was in color and depicted patrons dancing, drinking, and smoking hookah. The

second video clip was from a camera on the exterior of The Spot, facing the parking lot; it

was in black and white and depicted the murder of Purcell. While watching the first video

clip and talking with Det. Needham, Appellant identified himself and admitted to being at

The Spot on the night of the murder of Purcell. After Appellant identified himself in the

first video clip, Det. Needham identified Appellant in the second video clip based off

Appellant’s distinguishing characteristics, i.e., his hair and the manner in which he walked.

While watching the second video clip and talking with Det. Needham, Appellant did not

identify himself outside, stating, “That’s not me, I can’t tell who it is. If you think it’s me,

then (inaudible).” Appellant further explained that although he was at The Spot that

evening, he did not remember anything from that night because of the amount of alcohol

he consumed.

ii. Motion to Suppress and Subsequent Hearing

Prior to trial, counsel for Appellant filed a motion to suppress the statements he

made while being interrogated by Det. Needham and requested a hearing. Appellant sought

suppression because, he alleged, Det. Needham’s answer to his clarifying question

regarding his Miranda rights was an improper statement of the law. In particular,

4. If you want a lawyer and cannot afford one, you can request the court to appoint a lawyer prior to any questioning. 5. If you agree to answer questions, you may stop at any time and no further questions will be asked of you. 8 Appellant’s counsel took issue with the statement: “You have them, but you’re still going

to -- you understand them and you’re still going to talk to me.” Appellant’s counsel further

argued that Det. Needham’s remarks were an improper statement of the law that nullified

his prior Miranda advisement to Appellant, and thus the entirety of the recorded statement

had to be suppressed. The State opposed the motion.

In November of 2022, the court conducted a hearing (“the suppression hearing”).

At the suppression hearing, the court heard testimony from Det. Needham and received

evidence, including: the video recording of the interrogation, which was played for the

court, a transcript of the recording, and a photocopy of Appellant’s signed Miranda

Waiver.

The circuit court heard arguments from both counsel for Appellant and the State.

Appellant contended that Det. Needham’s words were a misstatement of law “because by

signing that [Miranda W]aiver” Appellant had “in fact abandoned” his Miranda rights, so

it was not a correct statement of the law to say “that he would still have these rights.” The

State contended that Det. Needham’s statement was not a misstatement of law because Det.

Needham was “clarifying that the waiver of the rights would mean that [Appellant] was

prepared to speak” with Det. Needham.

The court denied the motion to suppress. The court noted that a defendant “can

invoke the rights, even having waived them.” The court continued that in its estimation,

the detective read [Appellant] his rights properly per Miranda. [Appellant] asked a short clarifying question. The detective answered it in a legally appropriate fashion, indicating that [Appellant] could stop at any time. And [Appellant] having acknowledged understanding those rights[,] agreed to

9 waive [them] both orally and in writing, and only then did the detective begin questioning after a valid Miranda Warning.

At trial in June of 2023, the State sought to admit a video recording of the statements

Appellant made during the custodial interrogation. Appellant’s counsel stated that

Appellant was renewing his previous objections from the suppression hearing. The court

admitted the video, noting counsel’s “standing objection” to the previously raised issues.

The video was then played in open court.

B. Party Contentions

Appellant contends that the circuit court committed legal error in denying the

motion to suppress the video of the interrogation. Appellant does not contend that he was

improperly Mirandized. Rather, Appellant asserts that Det. Needham correctly read and

reviewed with Appellant his Miranda rights, yet upon Appellant asking a clarifying

question as to his rights, Det. Needham’s answer was a misstatement of law. Appellant

contends that when Det. Needham stated, “You have them, but you’re still going to -- you

understand them and you’re still going to talk to me[,]” Det. Needham improperly told

Appellant that “he still retained his rights even as he was speaking to [Det. Needham],

which indicated that he was not actually waiving the rights to silence and counsel[,] and

implied that he would therefore not be incriminated by statements he made.” Thus,

Appellant argues, pursuant to State v. Luckett, 413 Md. 360 (2010) and Lee v. State, 418

Md. 136 (2011), Det. Needham’s statement vitiated or nullified the previously legally

correct Miranda advisement.

10 The State contends that the circuit court did not commit legal error in denying the

motion to suppress. The State asserts that Det. Needham’s answer to Appellant’s clarifying

question “did not undermine the scope or validity” of Appellant’s Miranda rights because

Det. Needham’s statement was not an incorrect statement of the law. The State, also relying

on Luckett and Lee, argues that Det. Needham’s answer to Appellant’s clarifying question

did not render Appellant’s Miranda waiver constitutionally invalid.

C. Standard of Review

This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress using a blended

standard of review. In reviewing the factual findings from the suppression hearing, “[w]e

defer to the motion court’s factual findings and uphold them unless they are shown to be

clearly erroneous.” Madrid v. State, 247 Md. App. 693, 714 (2020) (quoting Gonzalez v.

State, 429 Md. 632, 647 (2012), in turn quoting Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 148 (2011))

(further citation omitted), aff’d 474 Md. 273 (2021). Factual findings are not clearly

erroneous so long as there is competent and material evidence in the record that supports

those findings. Givens v. State, 459 Md. 694, 705 (2018). In reviewing the motion court’s

legal conclusion as to the Miranda warning, we follow a de novo standard, “undertak[ing]

our own independent constitutional appraisal of the record by reviewing the law and

applying it to the facts of the present case.” Thomas v. State, 429 Md. 246, 259 (2012)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Madrid, 474 Md. at 309 (“[A]n

appellate court reviews without deference a trial court’s ultimate determination as to

whether Miranda was violated[.]”).

11 Our review of the denial of a motion to suppress is “limited to the record of the

suppression hearing.” Madrid, 474 Md. at 309 (quoting Thomas, 429 Md. at 259). “We

view the evidence and inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom in a light most

favorable to the prevailing party on the motion, here, the State.” Gonzalez, 429 Md. at 647

(quoting Lee, 418 Md. at 148).

D. Analysis

i. Legal background

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court of the United States

held that before law enforcement may interrogate a person in custody, they must advise

that person of their constitutional rights to “give force to the Constitution’s protection

against compelled self-incrimination[.]” Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 59 (2010). “[T]he

Court established in Miranda ‘certain procedural safeguards that require police to advise

criminal suspects of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments before

commencing custodial interrogation.’” Id. (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195,

201 (1989)). Although the Supreme Court has “not dictated the words in which the essential

information must be conveyed,” id. at 60, prior to any questioning, law enforcement must

inform the suspect that

he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.

12 The rights afforded by Miranda can be waived. See id. at 475. For a waiver to be

constitutional, the State “must show that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary[.]” State v. Luckett, 413 Md. 360, 379 (2010) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). When inquiring into the adequacy of the waiver, there are “two distinct

dimensions” we heed:

First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the totality of circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.

Lee, 418 Md. at 150 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

The Court in Miranda “recognized that a waiver of the rights afforded by the

warnings can be undermined by words or actions on the part of the police.” Id. Since

Miranda, courts have applied its principles and its progeny to hold that

after proper warnings and a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver, the interrogator may not say or do something during the ensuing interrogation that subverts those warnings and thereby vitiates the suspect’s earlier waiver by rendering it unknowing, involuntary, or both. Such action on the part of the police violates Miranda and, as a consequence, requires suppression of any statements the suspect makes thereafter during the interrogation.

Id. at 151–52. The Supreme Court of Maryland has had two occasions to address such an

issue. See Luckett, 413 Md. at 363; see also Lee, 418 Md. at 141. We briefly discuss each

case.

13 In Luckett, after properly advising the defendant of his Miranda rights, a detective

made “‘clarifications’ and ‘explanations’” of those rights. 413 Md. at 381. When the

detective advised the defendant of his right to speak with an attorney and to have an

attorney present while being questioned, the detective added, “‘that’s about this case,

specifically.’” Id. After providing the defendant with an example of the type of exchange

that would not be considered an interrogation afforded protection under Miranda, he then

continued, “‘Okay, if we discuss any matters outside of the case, you don’t need a lawyer

present at all period.’” Id. Rather than inform the defendant that anything he said during

the interrogation could incriminate him, the detective “repeatedly advised” the defendant

that “any of his statements that were not directly related to ‘the case’ . . . were outside the

purview of the right to counsel and, impliedly at least, not subject to being used against”

the defendant. Id. at 382. The defendant moved to suppress his post-waiver statements,

arguing that detective’s statements failed to convey to the defendant his right to have an

attorney present during an interrogation. Id. at 373–74.

The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the detective’s “repeated ‘explanations’

of what Miranda [did and did not] protect during interrogation were incorrect as a matter

of law.” Id. at 382. The Court explained that “a suspect is not properly informed of his or

her Miranda rights when a statement of those rights, however correct the statement may

be, is nullified by other incorrect statements concerning those rights.” Id. at 384. Thus, the

Court held that in the event of a nullification, “the Miranda advisements are

constitutionally infirm, a purported ‘waiver’ of those rights is constitutionally invalid, and

any statement the police obtain from the suspect during the ensuing interrogation violates

14 Miranda.” Id. Because the Court found that the defendant’s prior Miranda waivers were

vitiated by the detective’s misstatement of law, the Court affirmed the suppression of the

defendant’s statements. Id.

Luckett has factual similarities to Lee. In Lee, after a detective properly advised the

defendant of his Miranda rights, the detective interrogated the defendant. Lee, 418 Md. at

142–43. Approximately an hour into the interrogation, the defendant asked the detective

whether their conversation was being recorded. Id. at 144. The detective replied, “‘This is

between you and me, bud. Only me and you are here, all right?’” Id. The Court held that

the detective’s words “on their face impl[ied] confidentiality and thereby directly

contradict[ed] the advisement that ‘anything you say can and will be used against you in a

court of law.’” Id. at 156. The Court explained that in reviewing Miranda advisements,

“our focus is not on what the detective intended, but rather on what a layperson in [the

defendant’s] position would have understood those words to mean.” Id. (citing Burbine,

475 U.S. at 423–24).

The Court held that the detective’s affirmative misrepresentation of the defendant’s

Miranda rights nullified the defendant’s prior Miranda waiver. See id. at 157. Because the

circuit court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress and because the State “made

substantive use” of the defendant’s statements that “were taken in violation of Miranda,”

the Court ordered a new trial. Id. Expounding upon its holding in Luckett, the Court in Lee

explained that when a detective makes a statement that subverts the prior proper Miranda

advisement, such a statement undermines a defendant’s ability to knowingly and

15 intelligently waive the defendant’s rights, bringing into question the constitutionality of the

waiver. Id. at 156–57.

ii. The motion court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous

Here, the motion court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous because there

was competent and material evidence to support the court’s findings. See Givens, 459 Md.

at 705. The court found that after a proper advisement of the Miranda rights, Appellant

“asked a short clarifying question.” The court found that Det. Needham answered

Appellant’s question “in a legally appropriate fashion,” indicating that Appellant “could

stop [the interrogation] at any time.” The court found that Appellant, “having

acknowledged understanding [his Miranda] rights[,] agreed to waive [them] both orally

and in writing, and only then did [Det. Needham] begin questioning after a valid Miranda

warning.” In arriving at these factual findings, the motion court had heard testimony from

Det. Needham and received into evidence a photocopy of Appellant’s Miranda Waiver

signed by Appellant; the video of Det. Needham’s interrogation of Appellant; and a

transcript of Det. Needham’s interrogation of Appellant.

During Det. Needham’s testimony, the motion court heard Det. Needham testify

concerning the beginning of the interrogation wherein he advised Appellant of his Miranda

rights. After the video of the interrogation was admitted and played for the court, Det.

Needham testified that the video was an accurate representation of the Miranda advisement

and the colloquy that he had with Appellant when Appellant asked the clarifying question.

Det. Needham further testified that he had been a homicide detective for ten years, and that

this was not his first occasion advising a defendant of their Miranda rights. Moreover, Det.

16 Needham testified as to his understanding of how the Baltimore County Police Department

Miranda Rights Waiver form operates, explaining that when a defendant decides to not

waive their rights, they do not sign the form. It is clear from the record that the court relied

on this material and competent evidence in arriving at the factual finding, as the court

stated, “having viewed . . . that portion of the statement, as well as . . . having [had] the

opportunity to review the transcript, it is clear that [Appellant] was . . . advised strictly and

properly of his rights pursuant to Miranda.” Viewing this evidence in the light most

favorable to the State as the prevailing party on the motion, see Gonzalez, 429 Md. at 647

(quoting Lee, 418 Md. at 148), the motion court’s factual findings were not clearly

erroneous. 12 11F

iii. Appellant’s Miranda rights were not vitiated by Det. Needham’s answer to Appellant’s clarifying question

In performing our own independent constitutional appraisal, the totality of the

circumstances surrounding the interrogation supports the view that a reasonable layperson

in Appellant’s situation would have understood that he retained his Miranda rights and

12 In denying Appellant’s motion to suppress, the motion court found this case “akin” to Wimbish v. State, 201 Md. App. 239 (2011) because there, while law enforcement was reading the defendant his Miranda rights, the defendant asked “what about my lawyer.” The issue in Wimbish was whether the defendant’s requests for an attorney were unequivocal and unambiguous. 201 Md. App. at 256. Although that issue is distinct from the one Appellant raises here, the defendant in Wimbish also asked clarifying questions of the detective. See id. at 257–59 (asking questions regarding the meaning of “waiver”). In Wimbish, the detectives answered the defendant’s questions in a legally correct manner, making no misstatements of law. See id. Thus, although not directly analogous, we see no issue with the court’s comparison of the case sub judice to Wimbish. See Robeson v. State, 285 Md. 498, 502 (1979).

17 could stop the interrogation at any time. See Lee, 418 Md. at 148, 150. We therefore agree

with the motion court’s holding that Appellant’s Miranda rights advisement was not

vitiated or nullified. After being properly advised of his Miranda rights, Appellant asked a

clarifying question, inquiring whether in signing the Miranda Waiver he was waiving all

his rights. Det. Needham responded “Yes.” Det. Needham also explained that “if at some

point” Appellant wanted to stop the interrogation, Appellant could communicate that desire

to Det. Needham and that Appellant would still have his rights. Following this explanation,

Appellant signed the written Miranda waiver. We agree with the motion court’s finding

that Det. Needham’s statement “[y]ou have them, but you’re still going to -- you understand

them and you’re still going to talk to me” was not a misstatement of the law, but rather that

Det. Needham was answering Appellant’s question in a “legally appropriate fashion”

because it is true that a defendant still has Miranda rights while speaking with a detective.

Where a defendant waives Miranda rights, that waiver does not mean those rights are gone

forever; instead, the protections afforded by Miranda are only waived for the purpose of

that specific conversation or interrogation, and those protections can resume upon an

invocation from the defendant. See, e.g., Ballard v. State, 420 Md. 480, 483–85, 491 (2011)

(demonstrating that a defendant was properly Mirandized, agreed to waive his rights, and

then while later being interrogating, invoked his right to remain silent); In re Darryl P.,

211 Md. App. 112, 169 (2013) (“The common invocation procedure, moreover, applies in

the pre-waiver context precisely as it does in the post-waiver context.”). Thus, Det.

Needham’s answer to Appellant’s question concerning the concept of waiver did not vitiate

18 the constitutionality of Appellant’s earlier waiver because it was not an incorrect statement

of the law. Contra Lee, 418 Md. at 157; Luckett, 413 Md. at 382.

Additionally, the facts in this case are distinguishable from those in both Lee and

Luckett. In Lee, responding to a clarifying question, a detective made a misstatement of

law, one that directly contradicted the Miranda advisement. See Lee, 418 Md. at 156

(detective’s statement “This is between you and me, bud. Only me and you are here, all

right?” directly contradicted the advisement that “anything you say can and will be used

against you in a court of law”). In Luckett, responding to a clarifying question, a detective

provided an improper explanation concerning the scope of a defendant’s right to counsel

during an interrogation. See Luckett, 413 Md. at 382–83 (detective’s statement that the

defendant’s Miranda rights only covered topics regarding matters of “the case,” and that

the right to counsel applied only to a discussion of the specifics of “the case,” was incorrect

as a matter of law, because it implied limitations on the right to counsel). However, here,

Det. Needham’s statement—“You have them, but you’re still going to -- you understand

them and you’re still going to talk to me.”—did not directly contradict Appellant’s right to

remain silent, nor did it place a limitation on Appellant’s right to counsel. Thus, the court

was correct in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress.

II. THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ADMITTED THE VIDEO OF APPELLANT IN A JAIL UNIFORM AND THE PIECES OF VISUAL EVIDENCE DEPICTING PURCELL’S INJURIES.

i. Interrogation Video of Appellant in a Jail Uniform

19 In the same motion to suppress discussed supra, Appellant additionally moved to

suppress the video of his interrogation on a separate ground—that he was clothed in a

yellow jail uniform. At the suppression hearing, while testifying, Det. Needham described

the uniform as yellow in color, confirming that it appeared as a short-sleeve V-neck top

and a matching pair of pants, the material being akin to “scrubs style attire.” Det. Needham

also stated that Appellant was wearing a white T-shirt underneath his yellow shirt. At the

end of the interrogation video, when Appellant stood to leave the interrogation room,

“BCDC”—as in Baltimore City Detention Center—could be seen on the back of

Appellant’s shirt. Appellant moved to suppress the video on multiple grounds, that

allowing the jury to view Appellant in his jail uniform: (a) undermined the presumption of

innocence owed to him, and his right to a fair trial, violating his due process rights; (b)

contained inadmissible evidence of other bad acts, violating Maryland Rule 5-404(b); and

(c) was unfairly prejudicial, and that this unfair prejudice outweighed the video’s probative

value, violating Maryland Rule 5-403. 13 12F

Appellant requested and received a hearing on this matter. The State opposed the

motion.

During the suppression hearing in November of 2022, a video recording of the

interrogation was admitted into evidence and was played for the court. The circuit court

13 In Appellant’s motion, his arguments concerning prior bad acts and unfair prejudice centered on the statements he made while being interrogated by Det. Needham, rather than the issue of him wearing jail clothes. During the suppression hearing, Appellant extended those arguments to encompass the jail clothes as well.

20 then heard arguments from both Appellant’s counsel and the State. Appellant’s counsel

argued that the interrogation video should be suppressed on the grounds raised in the filed

motion to suppress. Appellant’s counsel requested that as a remedy, the State not play the

interrogation video as a video, but instead either play solely the audio recording from the

video or provide a printed version of the interrogation. The State argued that the video

should not be suppressed. The State asserted that it would not be obvious to the jury that

the uniform Appellant donned was a jail uniform, contending that because it was yellow,

it was not immediately identifiable as jail attire to the general public. The State noted that

there was “no case law indicating that it would not be permissible to show someone dressed

in this fashion during [an interrogation].” The State then offered to redact portions of the

interrogation video that depicted identifying institutional letters—BCDC—which appeared

on the back of Appellant’s shirt. Notably, the State did redact the end of the recording

which was the point at which the BCDC lettering was visible on the back of Appellant’s

shirt. Hence that lettering was never shown to the jury.

Subsequently, the court balanced the interrogation video’s probative value against

its prejudicial effect. In conducting the balancing test, the court noted that it could not find

authority supporting the proposition that a person being interviewed either while

“handcuffed or wearing some type of institutional attire [was] inherently prejudicial[.]”

The court distinguished the facts here from cases where defendants were in trial “wearing

either handcuffs visible to the jury or institutional attire[.]” In weighing the video’s

potential unfair prejudice, the court did not find Appellant’s yellow jail uniform to be

unfairly prejudicial because the uniform was “subject to a wide[] range of inferences,” for

21 instance, medical scrubs, or that Appellant had just been taken into custody, “which a juror

would expect given the nature of the interrogation.” The court also noted that Appellant’s

jail uniform was not a jumpsuit—it was a shirt and pants, as opposed to one singular piece

of clothing—which is more readily recognizable as prison attire.

The court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. The court found that there was

“nothing inherently prejudicial” were a jury to view the video, and that the probative value

of the video substantially outweighed any potential unfair prejudice. However, the court

ordered that to the extent that there was any institutional lettering on the back of

Appellant’s shirt, the State must ensure that the lettering “not be identifiable in any way.”

Appellant’s counsel noted a continuing objection. 14 13F

At trial in June of 2023, the State sought to admit the interrogation video where

Appellant wore the yellow jail uniform. Appellant’s counsel objected, stating that

Appellant was not waiving the prior objections made during the suppression hearing. In

renewing the objection, Appellant’s counsel requested that the video portion of the

interrogation be excluded and only the audio be played to avoid the jury viewing Appellant

in jail attire. Noting Appellant’s objection based on the previously raised issues, the court

admitted the video. The video was then played in open court.

14 In the interrogation video, in the context of the Miranda advisement, Det. Needham discussed with Appellant his highest level of schooling or education and gathered that Appellant had completed eleventh grade. The basis of Appellant’s counsel’s continuing objection was that it is not a logical presumption that someone with an eleventh-grade education could be a doctor or a nurse who might be wearing yellow scrubs.

22 ii. Pieces of Visual Evidence Depicting Purcell’s Injuries

In June of 2023, prior to trial, Appellant’s counsel filed a motion in limine regarding

the pictures and videos of Purcell’s injuries which Appellant contended to be graphic.

Appellant requested that the court either preclude the State from introducing such evidence,

or in the alternative, limit the number of photographs and the manner in which they were

to be presented at trial. Appellant argued that the pieces of visual evidence of Purcell’s

injuries were “highly prejudicial due to their graphic nature.” At a motions hearing in June

of 2023, Appellant’s counsel indicated that the three pieces of graphic evidence were: Ofc.

Carlone’s—the first responding officer to The Spot—body worn camera footage; three

photographs of Purcell taken by the forensic technician which depict Purcell’s injuries,

including blood; and autopsy photographs taken by an Assistant Medical Examiner of

Purcell’s injuries which depict the same wounds as the first set of pictures, cleaned up. The

court reserved ruling on the motion, determining that it was best to address the visual

evidence during trial, as exhibits were offered into evidence.

At trial, Appellant’s counsel objected to the admission of these pieces of visual

evidence on the grounds that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial to Appellant, and that

this unfair prejudice outweighed the evidence’s probative value. The court overruled each

of these objections.

Regarding Ofc. Carlone’s body worn camera footage, Appellant’s counsel objected

to the admission of this evidence and renewed the arguments from the motion in limine.

Appellant requested that the court limit the number of times, and manner in which, the

video was played for the jury. The court first found that the body worn camera footage was

23 relevant because it depicted both the nature and mechanism of Purcell’s injuries and

because it demonstrated the chaotic nature of the scene, which both parties discussed in

opening statements. The court then engaged in the probative value versus unfair prejudice

balancing test and found that “the visual representation of real-time imagery of what

happened on this particular day [was] both relevant and admissible, and highly probative

of all of the issues for which the fact finder . . . should reach a conclusion[.]” The court

overruled the objection and confirmed with the State that it was going to stop displaying

the body worn camera footage when Ofc. Carlone had finished testifying to limit the jury’s

viewing. The video was then admitted and played for the jury.

Regarding the photographs taken by the forensic technician of Purcell soon after he

was pronounced deceased, Appellant’s counsel objected to their admission at trial and

renewed the arguments from the motion in limine. Appellant added that the photographs

were also not relevant. The court disagreed, finding that because the photographs portrayed

the cause and manner of death, they were relevant as to the potential degree of murder. The

court then balanced the three photographs’ probative value against the potential for unfair

prejudice, finding that the probative value substantially outweighed the potential for unfair

prejudice because the evidence was limited to three photographs. The court overruled the

objection, admitted the photographs into evidence, and they were displayed for the jury.

As to the autopsy photographs taken by an Assistant Medical Examiner of Purcell’s

injuries, Appellant’s counsel objected at trial, renewing a previous objection that the

photographs were unfairly prejudicial. Appellant’s counsel sought to exclude all of the

photographs that Appellant contended were graphic, particularly one picture that showed

24 a pair of medical scissors pulling Purcell’s eyelid approximately two inches off of his face

to illustrate exactly where Purcell was shot. Neither party argued that the photographs were

irrelevant; accordingly, the court addressed solely the photographs’ probative value and

potential prejudice. In overruling Appellant’s objection, the court found that photographs

were “limited in nature” and were probative of the manner and cause of the injury. Thus,

the court held, there was no danger of unfair prejudice outweighing the photographs’

probative value. The pictures were then admitted into evidence and published to the jury.

Regarding the interrogation video, Appellant contends that the circuit court abused

its discretion by admitting the video, because the video depicted him in jail clothing, and

thereby prejudiced the jury against Appellant. 15 Conceding that there is no Maryland case 14F

on this precise issue, Appellant raises the parallel issue of unfair prejudice resulting from

the jury viewing a defendant in police identification (or mug shot) photos. Appellant relies

on Straughn v. State, 297 Md. 329 (1983) in asserting that a court must carefully conduct

a Maryland Rule 5-403 balancing test of mug shot photos before admitting such evidence,

contending that we should follow the same process here for the interrogation video.

Appellant further contends that the circuit court then improperly balanced the interrogation

15 In his brief, Appellant contends that “Exhibit 14”—the Miranda Waiver—contained inadmissible evidence of other bad acts by indicating that Appellant had a criminal record, violating Maryland Rule 5-404(b). We first note that this was potentially a typographical error, and surmise that Appellant intended to reference Exhibit 15—the video of his interrogation. Appellant contends that the State failed to meet its burden to demonstrate the relevance of the interrogation video other than as evidence of “criminal character.” We do not find this argument persuasive for the reasons explained infra.

25 video’s probative value against its potential for unfair prejudice because the video implies,

due to the presence of the jail uniform, that Appellant had a prior criminal history.

Appellant disputes the State’s argument that because Appellant’s prison uniform was

yellow it was not readily apparent as jail attire. 16 15F

As to the multiple pieces of visual evidence, Appellant contends that the circuit

court abused its discretion when the contended graphic evidence was admitted: Ofc.

Carlone’s body worn camera footage, the bloody photographs of Purcell’s injures taken by

a forensic technician, and the cleaned-up autopsy photographs of Purcell’s injuries taken

by an Assistant Medical Examiner. Appellant asserts that these pieces of evidence were

more prejudicial than probative due to their gruesome nature, citing images which depict

Purcell lying in a pool of blood and Purcell’s eye propped open via medical scissors.

The State contends that the circuit court correctly admitted the interrogation video.

The State asserts that because Appellant’s jail uniform was not clearly identifiable as prison

attire, the jury’s viewing of the video did not carry the danger of unfair prejudice. The State

also asserts that it was entitled to have the jury see Appellant’s “demeanor, expression, and

body language during his statement” to the police, and thus a video format was preferable.

16 Appellant also contends that this error was not harmless. The State contends that were we to find the court abused its discretion in admitting the video, any potential error was harmless because Appellant was restrained for the duration of the trial and did not object to the restraints. Because we determine that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in conducting the Rule 5-403 balancing test, as will be discussed infra, we need not reach this contention.

26 As to the multiple pieces of visual evidence, the State contends that the circuit court

properly exercised its discretion in admitting them. The State argues that the pieces of

evidence were “unquestionably relevant,” and probative regarding the degree of murder,

which Appellant has challenged both at trial and on appeal. The State asserts that the circuit

court correctly determined that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any

potential unfair prejudice because although the evidence may have been inherently

prejudicial as inculpatory evidence, Appellant failed to identify what exactly was unfairly

prejudicial.

“Our review of the trial court’s decision to admit evidence involves a two-step

analysis.” Akers v. State, 490 Md. 1, 24 (2025). First, we determine whether the evidence

is relevant; this is a legal conclusion which we review de novo. Id. (citing Montague v.

State, 471 Md. 657, 673 (2020)) (further citation omitted). If we determine that the

evidence was relevant, then we proceed to the second step, and decide “whether the

evidence is inadmissible because its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice[.]” Id. at 25. The second inquiry “is subject to the abuse of discretion standard[,]”

id. (citing Montague, 471 Md. at 673–74), because the “final balancing between probative

value and unfair prejudice is something that is entrusted to the wide discretion of the trial

judge.” Newman v. State, 236 Md. App. 533, 556 (2018) (quoting Oesby v. State, 142 Md.

App. 144, 167 (2002)). An abuse of discretion occurs only when “no reasonable person

would take the view adopted by the circuit court.” Montague, 471 Md. at 674 (quoting

Williams v. State, 457 Md. 551, 563 (2018)) (further citation omitted). The abuse of

27 discretion standard is highly deferential, so, “[t]he fact that we might have struck the

balance otherwise is beside the point.” Newman, 236 Md. App. at 556 (quoting Oesby, 142

Md. App. at 167).

“A central evidentiary principle in our legal system is that only relevant evidence is

admissible.” Akers, 490 Md. at 25; Md. Rule 5-402 (“[A] ll relevant evidence is admissible.

Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.”). “Evidence is relevant if it has ‘any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’”

Montague, 471 Md. at 674 (quoting Md. Rule 5-401). “Having any tendency to make any

fact more or less probable is a very low bar to meet.” Williams, 457 Md. at 564 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). However, relevant evidence may be excluded when

its “probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice[.]” Md.

Rule 5-403. When weighing the probative value of evidence against the danger of unfair

prejudice, “this Court is mindful that prejudicial evidence is not excluded under Rule 5-

403” merely because it hurts one party’s case. Montague, 471 Md. at 674. Rather, the

probative value of evidence “is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice when the

evidence ‘tends to have some adverse effect . . . beyond tending to prove the fact or issue

that justified its admission.’” Id. (quoting State v. Heath, 464 Md. 445, 464 (2019)) (further

citation omitted).

28 i. Interrogation Video of Appellant in a Jail Uniform

1. Relevance

“A [video][ 17] is relevant if it assists the jury in understanding the case or aids a 16F

witness in explaining his testimony.” Thompson v. State, 181 Md. App. 74, 95 (2008)

(internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). Here, the interrogation video

is undoubtedly relevant; Appellant even concedes so in his brief. The video had a “tendency

to make the existence of” the fact that Appellant identified himself at The Spot on the night

of Purcell’s death, which was a “fact that is of consequence” in the case, more probable.

Montague, 471 Md. at 674 (quoting Md. Rule 5-401). Further, this video assisted Det.

Needham in explaining his testimony concerning his interrogation of Appellant and could

have assisted the jury in understanding how a suspect was developed after nine months.

See Thompson, 181 Md. App. at 95.

2. Probative Value and Risk of Unfair Prejudice

Maryland has yet to consider a case in which an appellant has challenged the

admission of an interrogation video as unfairly prejudicial due to the defendant wearing

prison or jail attire in the video. Because of this, Appellant compares this issue to a parallel

one: whether unfair prejudice results from the admission of mug shot photographs. See

generally Straughn v. State, 297 Md. 329 (1983). Appellant contends that admission of this

17 The evidence discussed herein is in the form of both photographs and videos. Maryland law treats the evidentiary requirements for photographs and videos as essentially the same. See Covel v. State, 258 Md. App. 308, 323 (2023); Jackson v. State, 460 Md. 107, 116 (2018). Accordingly, we apply the law regarding photographs. 29 video was unfairly prejudicial because, like the appellant in Straughn, it could have

“impl[ied] to the jury that he [had] a prior criminal record.” 297 Md. at 333.

In Straughn, the Supreme Court of Maryland determined whether a trial court

abused its discretion when it admitted a mug shot as substantive evidence of an

extrajudicial photographic identification. Id. at 331. The Court held that when a trial court

exercises its discretion, it “must balance the probative value of the mug shot[] against [its]

prejudicial impact on the defendant.” Id. at 334; see Md. Rule 5-403. In conducting this

Rule 5-403 balancing test, the Court in Straughn rejected the defendant’s proposal to apply

a three-prong test as a set of “rigid prerequisites,” as adopted by numerous federal courts 18, 17F

and instead, opted to apply the three-prong test “as part of [the] balancing test to determine

whether the prejudicial impact of the mug shots outweighed their probative value.”

Straughn, 297 Md. at 335–36. The three factors articulated in Harrington are: (1) that the

State must “have a demonstrable need to introduce the photographs”; (2) if they are shown

to the jury, the photographs “must not imply that the defendant has a prior criminal record”;

and (3) when introduced at trial, the manner of introduction “must be such that it does not

draw particular attention to the source or implications of the photographs.” United States

v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 487, 494 (2nd Cir. 1973).

The Court in Straughn held that the circuit court’s admission of the mug shot

photographs into evidence was not an abuse of discretion. 297 Md. at 336. The Court

applied the Rule 5-403 balancing test—including the Harrington factors as part of its

18 See, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 487, 494 (2nd Cir. 1973).

30 analysis—weighing the mug shot photographs’ probative value against their potential for

unfair prejudice. Id. In conducting this balancing test, the Court found persuasive that: there

was a real need for evidence; the photographic array of mug shots were introduced in an

effort to corroborate a witness’ in-court identification of the defendant, and not in an

attempt to prejudice the defendant; the pictures were not referred to as “mug shots” in the

presence of the jury; sanitizing 19 of the photographs took place outside of the presence of 18F

the jury; the jury was instructed to give no weight to the sanitizing of the photographs and

“not to speculate about the kind of information that might be concealed”; and that when

the mug shots were introduced, nothing about that introduction “called any particular

attention to them.” Id. at 336–37.

Here, we conclude the circuit court did not abuse its discretion; we determine this

by independently conducting the same balancing test from Straughn, weighing the

interrogation video’s probative value against its potential unfair prejudice. To be sure, both

the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Maryland have long recognized

the harmful effect that presenting a defendant in prison or jail attire can have on a

defendant’s right to a fair trial. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976); see also

Knott v. State, 349 Md. 277, 286 (1998). However, we do not find that such harm was

19 In cases concerning the admissibility and Rule 5-403 balancing of a mug shot photograph, courts have discussed the concept of “sanitizing.” See, e.g., Arca v. State, 71 Md. App. 102, 104 (1987). Sanitizing is the process by which, prior to showing a mug shot to the jury, pieces of the photograph are edited so as not to display carceral or penitentiary information or implications. For example, in Arca, a mug shot picture was “sanitized” to cover up a “chestplate containing identification numbers.” Id. at 104.

31 present here. Just as in Straughn, there was a real need for the evidence. The interrogation

video was the sole piece of identification evidence that placed Appellant at The Spot on

the night of Purcell’s death; during the interrogation, while Appellant and Det. Needham

were watching the interior Nest footage, Appellant identified himself. There were no

eyewitnesses, the gun was not recovered, and there was no DNA found at the scene other

than Purcell’s; therefore, Appellant’s identification of himself at the scene of Purcell’s

murder carried significant probative value. Moreover, the video was introduced not only

to show that Appellant identified himself at The Spot on the night of Purcell’s murder, but

also to provide the jury the opportunity to observe Appellant’s demeanor, appearance, and

level of comfort while being interrogated. This was important because whether Appellant’s

post-Miranda statements, including his self-identification, were voluntary was a question

of fact submitted to the jury. Additionally, prior to trial, the State performed its own version

of “sanitizing” akin to Straughn. See 297 Md. at 336–37. The State cut and redacted all

portions of the interrogation video in which Appellant mentioned anything related to his

then-current state of incarceration while awaiting trial, and the State redacted the end of

the recording when Appellant stood up to exit the interview room; thus, the BCDC lettering

on the back of Appellant’s shirt was never shown to the jury. As in Straughn, the

conversation regarding the redaction took place outside the presence of the jury, months

prior to trial at the suppression hearing. See id. Therefore, the circuit court did not abuse

its discretion in finding that the probative value of the video showing the interrogation of

Appellant outweighed any potential unfair prejudice.

32 Additionally, other courts throughout the country have found evidence in which a

defendant was wearing jail or prison attire to be admissible following a determination that

the evidence’s probative value outweighed its risk of unfair prejudice. 20 One such case— 19F

which is strikingly analogous to the present case—is People v. Thames, 467 P.3d 1181

(Colo. App. 2019). A jury convicted Thames of first-degree murder, among other offenses.

Thames, 467 P.3d at 1185. One of the issues that Thames raised on appeal was that the trial

court erred in permitting the jury to view a video of his interrogation, “because it showed

20 See Early v. State, 872 S.E.2d 705, 709–10 (Ga. 2022) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the probative value of a video of a defendant in a cell in which the defendant was wearing an orange jumpsuit and restrained by handcuffs, and then stated “I’m a murderer,” was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice when the statement was probative of the crime charged); see also Commonwealth v. Gallaway, 283 A.3d 217, 221, 234–35 (Pa. 2022) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the probative value of a videotape showing the defendant in “bright red” prison clothing was not outweighed by the video’s prejudicial effect because it showed the defendant making numerous false statements to the police which “evidenced” the defendant’s “consciousness of guilt”); Bramlett v. State, 422 P.3d 788, 794–95 (Okla. Crim. App. 2018) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the probative value of a video where the defendant was wearing an orange jumpsuit and handcuffs which appeared to be fastened to his body, was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, so that the jury could have the opportunity to observe the defendant’s demeanor while being Mirandized); State v. Taylor, 240 S.W.3d 789, 795–97 (Tenn. 2007) (holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value of a video where the defendant was “wearing prison garb”—an “inmate’s jumpsuit”—outweighed the potential of unfair prejudice because the video was probative towards assisting the jury in assessing a witness’s credibility); Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706, 716, 718–19 (Ind. 2007) (holding that counsel for the defendant’s failure to object to the admission of the defendant’s media interview videos—where he was wearing jail clothing and wrist and ankle shackles—was not ineffective assistance of counsel because the defendant failed to establish how the videos’ admission created actual prejudice against him). Additionally, all the defendants in these cases were charged with either murder or felony murder. Early, 872 S.E.2d at 710; Gallaway, 283 A.3d at 221; Bramlett, 422 P.3d at 791; Taylor, 240 S.W.3d at 791; Ritchie, 875 N.E.2d at 713.

33 him wearing prison garb.” Id. at 1186. Thames contended that the publication of the video

to the jury was an abuse of discretion because it “invited the jury to speculate about his

criminal history because of his attire.” Id. at 1191. The Colorado Court of Appeals

disagreed, affirming the trial court’s admission of the video into evidence. Id.

In the opinion, the court initially addressed a factual contention: “For purposes of

this analysis, we assume the jury believed Thames was wearing a prison uniform during

the [i]nterrogation, although the People contest this factual issue. The video showed him

wearing green scrubs.” Id. (parentheses omitted). As we discussed above, the same

inferences were made here, that Appellant’s yellow jail uniform resembled medical scrubs.

The Thames court held that “[t]he risk of prejudicing the defendant due to his

clothing is not present when the jury is shown a video depicting the defendant in a prison

uniform.” Id. at 1191–92. The court contrasted Thames’ interrogation video, which lasted

one hour and fourteen minutes, with “the visual impact” of a defendant appearing in a

prison uniform throughout trial, stating that the video “will not be a constant reminder of

the defendant’s condition or create a prejudicial, continuing influence in the jurors’ minds.”

Id. at 1192 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The court also found persuasive

that in the video of the interrogation, Thames was not restrained or handcuffed and was

seated in what appeared to be a conference room. Id. Finally, the court did not find

persuasive Thames’ argument that the interrogation video was unfairly prejudicial because

the prosecution modified the video “to blur [Thames’] prison identification badge and

thereby improperly highlighted his incarceration[.]” Id.

34 The same holds true here. In the interrogation video, Appellant was not restrained

or handcuffed, and Appellant was seated in what appeared to be a conference room. Due

to redactions, the video that was published to the jury lasted one hour and sixteen minutes,

nearly identical in length to the video in Thames. Id. Further, rather than blur an

identification badge as occurred in Thames, here the State fully redacted the portions of the

video in which either Appellant or Det. Needham mentioned Appellant’s then-current state

of incarceration and the end of the video where BCDC can be seen on the back of

Appellant’s shirt. Therefore, as in Thames, we agree that here, “[t]he risk of prejudicing

the defendant due to his clothing is not present when the jury is shown a video depicting

the defendant in a prison uniform.” Id. at 1191–92.

Finally, Appellant argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing the

interrogation to be played as a video, rather than just as an audio recording—which

Appellant’s counsel offered as an alternative to excluding the video—to avoid the jury

witnessing of Appellant in his yellow jail uniform. We disagree. “[T]he State is not

constrained to forego relevant evidence and to risk going to the [factfinder] with a watered

down version of its case.” Oesby, 142 Md. App. at 166. Thus, we are satisfied that the

circuit court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the video of Appellant’s

interrogation.

ii. Pieces of Visual Evidence Depicting Purcell’s Injury

Maryland courts have routinely found crime scene and autopsy photographs of

homicide victims to be relevant towards a broad range of issues, “including the type of

35 wounds, the attacker’s intent, and the modus operandi.” State v. Broberg, 342 Md. 544,

553 (1996); see, e.g., Clarke v. State, 238 Md. 11, 21–22 (1965); Grandison v. State, 305

Md. 685, 729–30 (1986); Roebuck v. State, 148 Md. App. 563, 600 (2002), cert. denied

374 Md. 84 (2003). Although inherently cumulative, the rationale for allowing

photographic evidence to be presented in conjunction with verbal testimony is that in some

cases, photographs present “more clearly than words” what a witness is describing. See

Broberg, 342 Md. at 553–54 (quoting Reid v. State, 305 Md. 9, 21 (1985)); see, e.g.,

Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 503 (1985) (“We have previously held that photographs of

the deceased are admissible even where the location of injuries was previously described

and conceded by the defendant.”).

Here, Ofc. Carlone’s body worn camera footage, the photographs taken by the

forensic technician of Purcell’s bloody injuries, and the autopsy photographs of Purcell’s

injuries were relevant. The State’s theory of the case was that Appellant and Purcell became

involved in an argument inside of The Spot, which then continued outside of The Spot at

the time when the two men exited the building, with Appellant so enraged that he shot

Purcell one time, at pointblank range. These pieces of evidence assisted the jury in

understanding the State’s timeline of events and allowed the jury to visualize “the

atrociousness” of Purcell’s murder. See Johnson, 303 Md. at 502; Thompson, 181 Md. App.

at 95–96 (holding that even cumulative photographs are admissible to assist the jury by

illustrating relevant evidence or making it more tangible).

Additionally, the pieces of evidence also aided the witnesses’ testimony. See

Thompson, 181 Md. App. at 95. Ofc. Carlone’s body worn camera footage aided his

36 testimony regarding his description of the scene as “chaotic” and regarding the state of

Purcell’s injuries when he arrived at the scene. The photographs taken by the forensic

technician of Purcell at the hospital after he was pronounced deceased aided the forensic

technician’s testimony regarding the severity of Purcell’s injuries. The autopsy

photographs of Purcell’s injuries, taken by the Assistant Medical Examiner, aided the

Assistant Medical Examiner in explaining how he arrived at his ultimate conclusion in his

report—that Purcell was shot at very close range. 21 This was relevant as to the degree of 20F

murder, because it depicted Purcell’s injuries—particularly, that he was shot in the eye,

and that the bullet exited his body through the back of his brain—which the State argued

was evidence of premeditation, a necessary element of first-degree murder. Because the

three pieces of evidence presented “more clearly than words,” Broberg, 342 Md. at 553–

54, the chaotic nature of the scene as described by Ofc. Carlone and Purcell’s injuries as

described by the forensic technician and the Assistant Medical Examiner, they satisfy the

“low bar” of relevance. Williams, 457 Md. at 564.

21 At trial, the Assistant Medical Examiner, Dr. Russell Alexander (“Dr. Alexander”) testified that when the trigger of a gun is pulled, “other things,” like gunpowder particles or burned gunpowder particles, will exit the barrel alongside the bullet. Dr. Alexander further testified that, “[i]f the end of the barrel of the gun is close enough to the person at the time the trigger is pulled, sometimes those gunpowder particles can strike the body around the entrance wound and make little red marks[,]” called stippling. According to Dr. Alexander, stippling was present in this case; it is also plainly visible to the untrained medical eye in the photographs taken by the forensic technician.

37 2. Probative Value and Risk of Unfair Prejudice

“[P]hotographs may be relevant and possess probative value even though they often

illustrate something that has already been presented in testimony.” Broberg, 342 Md. at

553; see Grandison, 305 Md. at 730; Roebuck, 148 Md. App. at 598. Additionally,

“photographic evidence may be highly probative of the degree of murder.” Roebuck, 148

Md. App. at 597; Johnson, 303 Md. at 502 (“On certain occasions, photographs have also

been admitted to allow the jury to visualize the atrociousness of the crime—a circumstance

of much import where the factfinder must determine the degree of murder.”). Because

circuit courts are vested with wide discretion in conducting a Rule 5-403 balancing test,

the circuit court’s decision “‘will not be disturbed unless “plainly arbitrary,” . . . because

the trial judge is in the best position to make this assessment.’” Ayala v. State, 174 Md.

App. 647, 679, cert. denied 401 Md. 173 (2007) (quoting Broberg, 342 Md. at 552).

Here, the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in determining that the

probative value of the pieces of contested evidence outweighed any potential unfair

prejudice. Each piece of evidence was highly probative as to the degree of murder because

the degree of murder was a question of fact sent to the jury. See Roebuck, 148 Md. App. at

597. As to the unfair prejudice that Appellant alleges he suffered, we acknowledge that the

contested evidence could be considered graphic. Ofc. Carlone’s body worn camera footage

depicts his arrival on the scene, his attempts to secure the scene, and his rendering of aid

to Purcell. The photographs taken by the medical examiner of Purcell at the hospital depict

Purcell’s wounds and show a significant amount of blood. The autopsy photographs of

Purcell depict Purcell’s injuries, particularly where the bullet entered his eye and where the

38 bullet exited the backside of his skull. However, even considering the nature of these three

types of evidence, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the

probative value of the contested evidence did not unfairly prejudice Appellant.

The circuit court properly exercised its discretion when it balanced the probative

value of Ofc. Carlone’s body worn camera footage against its potential for unfair prejudice.

The circuit court explained that body worn camera footage was “a real-time” video of the

crime scene, and that it depicted both the nature and mechanism of Purcell’s injuries. The

circuit court explained that the “visual representation of real-time imagery” of what

occurred was “highly probative of all of the issues” which the jury had to decide. We find

no error in the circuit court’s balancing. The body worn camera footage was probative on

the issue of Ofc. Carlone’s attempts to provide life-sustaining support to Purcell while

awaiting the arrival of the paramedics. Ofc. Carlone’s body worn camera footage was also

probative as to his testimony regarding the “chaotic” scene that immediately followed the

shooting of Purcell. Further, the body worn camera footage was probative as to the nature

and severity of Purcell’s injuries; in the video, Ofc. Carlone and other responding officers

discussed where exactly in the parking lot of The Spot they believed Purcell to be shot,

their thoughts on the type of gun used, the physical state of Purcell’s eye when they

arrived—particularly that it was coming out the socket and that there was some of Purcell’s

brain matter visible at the scene.

The circuit court properly exercised its discretion when it balanced the probative

value of the photographs taken by the medical examiner of Purcell at the hospital against

their potential for unfair prejudice. Relying on Grandison v. State, the circuit court

39 explained that photographs of a deceased victim are probative and that they do not unfairly

prejudice Appellant solely because they depict bloody images of his injuries. 305 Md. at

729–30. The court further stated that because the State’s theory of Purcell’s death was “an

execution with one shot at pointblank range,” the specific photographs of the injury to

Purcell’s eye were probative. Finally, the court explained that because the evidence that

depicted the bloodied injuries was limited to three photographs—out of the total of the nine

admitted into evidence—rather than a larger amount, such as thirty, the photographs were

not unfairly prejudicial. See Roebuck, 148 Md. App. at 597, 600 (holding that the circuit

court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the probative value of bloody

photographs that depicted the victim’s stab and gunshot wounds outweighed potential

unfair prejudice).

The circuit court also properly exercised its discretion when it balanced the

probative value of the autopsy photographs taken by an Assistant Medical Examiner of

Purcell’s injuries against their potential for unfair prejudice. The circuit court explained

that several of the photographs were “representative of the person in terms of

identification,” and that they did not have “anything prejudicial about them.” The court

further stated that the autopsy photographs were “probative of the manner and cause of the

injury,” which was at issue for the jury, and that the autopsy photographs were also limited

in nature. We find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s determination. See Ayala,

174 Md. App. at 681 (holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in

determining that the probative value of autopsy photographs of the victim outweighed any

40 potential unfair prejudice because the autopsy photographs depicted the nature and severity

of the victim’s injuries).

Appellant asserts that because the identification of Purcell as the victim and the

manner of Purcell’s death were not contested issues, the medical examiner and autopsy

photographs lacked relevance, and that their probative value was “minimal at best.”

Appellant’s assertion is of no consequence. “[P]hotographs do not lack probative value

merely because they illustrate a point that is uncontested.” Broberg, 342 Md. at 554; see

also Evans v. State, 333 Md. 660, 693, cert. denied 513 U.S. 833 (1994) (holding that

autopsy photos were admissible despite a prior stipulation by the defendant to the facts).

Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the three pieces of evidence.

III. THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THE NEST VIDEO FOOTAGE WAS AUTHENTICATED.

At trial, and while Det. Needham was testifying, the State sought to admit two

exhibits related to the Nest footage. The first exhibit was a communication from Nest in

response to the search warrant from the Baltimore County Police Department which

included a letter describing the process that a Nest custodian of records took to adequately

and accurately respond to the search warrant, a Certificate of Authenticity (“the Nest

Certificate”), and an attachment, which contained a list of hash values corresponding to the

Nest footage.

The Nest Certificate was signed by a “Records Custodian,” Joel Osagie (“Osagie”).

In the Nest Certificate, Osagie certified:

41 1. I am authorized to submit this affidavit on behalf of Google LLC (“Google”), located in Mountain View, California. I have personal knowledge of the following facts, except as noted, and could testify competently thereto if called as a witness.

2. I am qualified to authenticate the records because I am familiar with how the records were created, managed, stored[,] and retrieved.

3. Nest provides hardware products to its customers, including the Nest Learning Thermostat, the Nest Protect Smoke + CO Detector, and the Dropcam Wi-Fi Video Monitoring Camera (which may include cloud video recording services).

4. Attached is a true and correct copy of records pertaining to Nest account(s) identified as 641666E0929E/7LVU0E, with Internal Ref. No. 5911726 (“Document”). Accompanying this Certificate of Authenticity as Attachment A is a list of hash values corresponding to each file produced in response to the Search Warrant.

5. The Document attached hereto is a record made and retained by Nest. Nest servers recorded the information provided by Nest automatically at the time, or reasonably soon after, it is entered or transmitted by the user, and this data was kept in the course of this regularly conducted activity and was made by regularly conducted activity as a regular practice of Nest.

6. The Document is a true duplicate of original records that were generated by Nest’s electronic process or system that produces an accurate result. The accuracy of Nest’s electronic process and system is regularly verified by Nest.

7. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

The second exhibit which the State sought to admit was the Nest footage, 22 which 21F

contained two video clips from the interior of The Spot and one video clip from the exterior

22 These were some of the same videos shown to Appellant when he was interrogated by Det. Needham, as previously discussed. See supra, I.

42 of The Spot. The interior clips depicted people dancing, drinking, and smoking hookah,

and the exterior clip depicted the murder of Purcell. When introducing this exhibit, the

State asked Det. Needham questions to lay the foundation for the admission of the Nest

footage. In response to those questions, Det. Needham testified that during his

investigation, he returned to The Spot and discovered multiple surveillance cameras, from

which he and other officers sought to obtain footage, to aid in developing a suspect. Det.

Needham explained that he directed Detective Scott Young (“Det. Young”) to go to The

Spot and obtain serial numbers from the surveillance cameras located on the interior and

exterior of The Spot, a task which Det. Young completed. Det. Needham further testified

that, with the serial numbers obtained by Det. Young, a search warrant was obtained from

the court. Det. Needham testified that the search warrant was issued to Nest, as it was the

company that held the surveillance footage for The Spot. Det. Needham testified that Nest

responded to the search warrant and provided electronic video footage, which he personally

received.

Appellant’s counsel objected to the admission of both the Nest Certificate and the

Nest footage. Appellant’s counsel argued that the Nest Certificate could not be

authenticated because there was no witness to testify concerning its authenticity, and that

the Nest footage could not be authenticated by Det. Needham. 23 Appellant’s counsel 22F

argued that although the Nest Certificate explained that “Nest had provided video footage”

23 Appellant is not challenging the Nest Certificate’s authenticity on appeal. However, we discuss the Nest Certificate because it was used to authenticate the Nest footage.

43 and corresponding serial numbers, there had “been no testimony admitted about the

significance of [each] serial number.” Counsel further argued that there was nothing in the

Nest Certificate that stated that the Nest Certificate pertained to the surveillance cameras

from The Spot at its address, location, date, or time. Appellant’s counsel then noted that

there was no one scheduled to testify regarding who had maintained or installed the Nest

cameras, and thus no one could connect the cameras to the address of The Spot.

The State responded that it intended to move to admit the Nest Certificate and

footage as self-authenticating documents pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-902(12) because it

complied with both Rules 5-902(12) and 5-803(b)(6). The State explained it provided to

Appellant’s counsel a notice of its intent to use the Nest Certificate as required by Rule 5-

902 with its initial discovery in May of 2022, and again with the Nest footage as

supplemental discovery in June of 2022.

The court held that because the State provided timely notice to Appellant’s counsel

of its intent to use the Nest Certificate as a self-authenticating document pursuant to Rule

5-902(12), the first requirement had been “complied with,” and the only question left for

the court to consider was whether the Nest Certificate met all the requirements of Rule 5-

803(b)(6) as a business record. 24 The court then reviewed each requirement of Rule 5- 23F

803(b)(6) and ruled that the Nest Certificate complied with those factors, and was thus self-

24 Although the circuit court stated that its determination of self-authentication was made pursuant to Rule 5-902, it did not specify that the rulings were made pursuant to 5-902(12) or (13). Based on the legal standards stated by the court and the procedure used in reaching its ultimate determination, we infer that the court was referencing each of these rules.

44 authenticating and admissible. Having determined that the Nest Certificate was self-

authenticating, the court then determined that the Nest footage was authenticated under

Maryland Rule 5-902(13). The court admitted both the Nest Certificate and footage, and

both were published to the jury.

Appellant contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting the Nest

footage because the footage was not properly authenticated. Appellant further contends

that the State “failed to adequately connect the three videos” to the case, and that the Nest

Certificate “was simply not enough to overcome these gaps in the record.” Finally,

Appellant contends that this error was “decidedly prejudicial” due to the absence of other

eyewitnesses or forensic evidence.

The State responds that the circuit court properly admitted the Nest footage. The

State also contends that the three video clips—which comprise the Nest footage—were all

a part of the same exhibit, and that that exhibit was supported by the Nest Certificate. The

State asserts that Appellant relies “on a narrow view of the process for authenticating video

footage,” which has undergone substantial change since this trial due to the Supreme Court

of Maryland’s recent decision in Mooney v. State, 487 Md. 701 (2024). The State explains

that under Mooney, video footage can be authenticated by circumstantial evidence.

In Appellant’s reply to the State’s brief, Appellant acknowledges Mooney but argues

that Mooney does not “foreclose this issue on appeal, as there was insufficient evidence to

authenticate the videos . . . even using circumstantial evidence.”

45 C. Standard of Review

“We review the trial court’s authentication of evidence for an abuse of discretion.”

Covel v. State, 258 Md. App. 308, 322, cert. denied, 486 Md. 157 (2023) (citing Gerald v.

State, 137 Md. App. 295, 304 (2001)). “A trial court abuses its discretion when ‘no

reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court,’ or when the ruling is

‘clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court.’” Prince v.

State, 255 Md. App. 640, 652 (2022) (quoting King v. State, 407 Md. 682, 697 (2009)).

Evidence must be authenticated as a condition precedent to its admissibility. Md.

Rule 5-901(a). As we previously explained, our case law applies the same evidentiary

requirements for photographs and videos. See Covel, 258 Md. App. at 323; Jackson v.

State, 460 Md. 107, 116 (2018). “Because . . . videos are ‘easily manipulated,’ courts

require authentication ‘as a preliminary fact determination, requiring the presentation of

evidence sufficient to show that the evidence sought to be admitted is genuine.’” Reddick

v. State, 263 Md. App. 562, 579 (2024) (quoting Washington v. State, 406 Md. 642, 651–

52 (2008)); see also Md. Rule 5-901(a) (explaining that the authentication requirement is

“satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its

proponent claims”).

i. Self-authentication

Some types of evidence are self-authenticating. See Md. Rule 5-902. When evidence

is self-authenticating, it does not require testimony or other extrinsic evidence of its

authenticity to be admitted. Id. One type of self-authenticating evidence is a certified record

46 that is generated by an electronic process or system, which is a record that “produces an

accurate result, as shown by a certification of a qualified person[.]” Md. Rule 5-902(13).

The certification must comply with the certification and notification requirements of

Maryland Rule 5-902(12). Id. Maryland Rule 5-902(12) refers to a certified record of a

regularly conducted activity. See Md. Rule 5-902(12). The Rule states:

The original or a copy of a record of a regularly conducted activity that meets the requirements of Rule 5-803(b)(6)(A)–(D) and has been certified in a Certification of Custodian of Records . . . provided that, before the trial or hearing in which the record will be offered into evidence, the proponent (A) gives an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to offer the record and (B) makes the record and certification available for inspection so that the adverse party has a fair opportunity to challenge them on the ground that the sources of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.

Id. The term “certification” as employed in Rule 5-902(12) means a “written declaration

under oath subject to the penalty of perjury.” State v. Bryant, 361 Md. 420, 428 (2000)

(quoting Md. Rule 5-902(b)).

We next turn to Maryland Rule 5-803 as directed by Rule 5-902(12). Rule 5-803

provides exceptions to the rule precluding hearsay. One exception is a record of a regularly

conducted business activity. Md. Rule 5-803(b)(6). The rule explains that a “memorandum,

report, record, or data compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses” is a

record of a regularly conducted business activity if:

(A) it was made at or near the time of the act, event, or condition, or the rendition of the diagnosis, (B) it was made by a person with knowledge or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge, (C) it was made and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and (D) the regular practice of that business was to make and keep the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation.

47 Id. The purpose underlying this exception is that because a business relied on the accuracy

of its records during its daily operations, “the court may accept those records as reliable

and trustworthy.” Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Serv.’s v. Cole, 342 Md. 12, 30 (1996).

However, “[a] record of this kind may be excluded if the source of information or the

method or circumstances of the preparation of the record indicate that the information in

the record lacks trustworthiness.” Hall v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 398 Md. 67, 84

(2007) (quoting Md. Rule 5-803(b)(6)).

The Nest Certificate

The Nest Certificate was a self-authenticating document. The circuit court properly

exercised its discretion in determining that the Nest Certificate complied with Rule 5-

902(12). The court inquired of the attorneys whether the Nest Certificate was provided in

advance, both the day the State sought its admission and in advance of trial. The State noted

that it provided Appellant’s counsel with a notice of intent to use the Nest Certificate

pursuant to Rule 5-902 as part of the State’s initial discovery in May of 2022, and again

with the Nest footage as supplemental discovery in June of 2022. Appellant’s counsel

conceded that she received the Nest Certificate and notice of the State’s intent to use the

Nest Certificate prior to trial. Therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when

it determined that the first requirement of Rule 5-902(12) had been “complied with.” See

Md. Rule 5-902(12) (stating that the proponent must “(A) give[] an adverse party

reasonable written notice of the intent to offer the record and (B) make[] the record and

certification available for inspection”). The circuit court then explained that, as required by

48 Rule 5-902(12), a review of the requirements of Rule 5-803(b)(6) was warranted to ensure

that the Nest Certificate was properly excepted from being hearsay.

The circuit court did just that. The court first stated that the Nest Certificate did “in

fact” meet each of the requirements to demonstrate that the Nest Certificate certified that

the Nest footage was a regularly conducted business activity. See Md. Rule 5-803(b)(6).

The court explained that the Nest Certificate certified that the cameras at The Spot “record

the information at the time or reasonably soon thereafter” the recording occurs. See Md.

Rule 5-803(b)(6)(A) (a video recording is a record of a regularly conducted business

activity if “it was made at or near the time of the act, event, or condition”). The court next

stated that the Nest footage was a “record[] retained by Nest[.]” See Md. Rule 5-

803(b)(6)(B) (a video recording is a record of a regularly conducted business activity if “it

was made by a person with knowledge or from information transmitted by a person with

knowledge”). Moreover, the Nest Certificate provided that Osagie was “qualified to

authenticate the records” because he was “familiar with how the records were created,

managed, stored[,] and retrieved.” The court explained that the Nest footage was collected

“in the course of [a] regular[ly] conducted activity” in the regular practice of the business.

See Md. Rule 5-803(b)(6)(C) (a video recording is a record of a regularly conducted

business activity if “it was made and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business

activity[.]”). Finally, the court explained that it was Nest’s regular “practice” and

“conducting of business” to make and keep the footage. See Md. Rule 5-803(b)(6)(D) (a

video recording is a record of a regularly conducted business activity if “the regular practice

of that business was to make and keep” the recording). The court also noted that the records

49 were transmitted approximately one year ago; that the Nest footage was “a true duplicate

of the original records that [were] generated”; and that the Nest Certificate was made by

“the custodian of records . . . at or near the time of the activity.” Thus, the court properly

exercised its discretion when it determined that the Nest footage was self-authenticating

and thus admissible.

The Nest footage

Moreover, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the

Nest footage was authenticated as a self-authenticating record pursuant to Maryland Rule

5-902(13). The Nest cameras are generated by an electronic process or system, as they are

recording devices. The Nest footage was offered with the Nest Certificate. See Md. Rule

5-902(13) (an electronic process which produces a record must be “shown by a certification

of a qualified person” to produce an accurate result). As directed by Rule 5-902(13), the

court appropriately addressed Rule 5-902(12), which we discussed above. Thus, the circuit

court properly exercised its discretion in determining that the Nest footage was self-

authenticating under the procedure required by Rule 5-902(13).

The circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it decided that the video footage

was properly authenticated. Just as the Supreme Court of Maryland has explained that

video footage can be authenticated in “different ways under the rules governing

authentication,” including a “combination” of methods, the same holds true here. Mooney,

487 Md. at 730. The Nest footage was sufficiently authenticated by a combination of (1)

the self-authenticating Nest Certificate and (2) the Nest footage, which was itself self-

authenticating.

50 ii. Mooney v. State

Although we are satisfied that the Nest footage was properly admitted as self-

authenticating, because both Appellant and the State present argument regarding Mooney,

we briefly address it herein. 25 In Mooney, the defendant alleged that a video of a shooting, 24F

which was recorded by a Ring camera, was not properly authenticated because there was

no witness from Ring who testified at trial and because the victim-witness did not observe

the entirety of the assault depicted in the video. Mooney, 487 Md. at 712, 716. The Supreme

Court of Maryland held that “[t]here need not be a witness with personal knowledge of

every single event depicted in a video for the video to be authenticated.” Id. at 730. It held

that “[v]ideo footage can be authenticated in different ways under the rules governing

authentication, including through the testimony of a witness with knowledge under

Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(1), circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4), or

a combination of both[.]” Id. The Court stated that “[w]hat matters is that the proponent of

the video must demonstrate that the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable juror to find by

a preponderance of the evidence that the video is what it is claimed to be.” Id.

We note that here, Det. Needham testified regarding the circumstances under which

the Nest footage was obtained, including: that he identified Nest cameras at The Spot which

contained serial numbers; that the Nest footage was obtained based on a search warrant;

25 Mooney was not yet decided at the time of Appellant’s trial. However, “in the overwhelming majority of cases, a judicial decision sets forth and applies the rule of law that existed both before and after the date of the decision[.]” State v. Daughtry, 419 Md. 35, 77 (2011) (quoting James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535 (1991)). Thus, we may rely on Mooney. 51 that the Nest footage had not been altered in any way by him or any other police personnel;

that the Nest footage was in the same form as the form in which he received it; and that the

Nest footage contained “multiple video clips from inside and outside of The Spot[.]” Det.

Needham also testified that once he obtained the Nest footage from The Spot, he reviewed

the footage to “identify the subjects that were depicted on the video surveillance.” 26 Thus, 25F

there was sufficient evidence “for a reasonable juror to find by a preponderance of the

evidence that the video is what it [was] claimed to be” 27—i.e., surveillance footage from 26F

The Spot on the night Purcell was shot. 28 27F

iii. Other assertions of unreliability

Finally, we address an issue that is a primary concern of Appellant regarding

authenticity. Appellant claims that there were “gaps in the record” which prevent a

connection from the Nest cameras to the footage. Appellant emphasizes that Det. Needham

did not testify regarding the serial numbers found on the cameras at The Spot, and thus,

there was a lack of connection between the cameras at The Spot and the Nest footage.

26 Although not discussed by the trial court in its authentication analysis, we note that during his interview with Det. Needham, Appellant identified himself in portions of the Nest footage. 27 Mooney, 487 Md. at 730. 28 While we conclude that the Nest footage was authenticated under Mooney, we are cognizant of the caution raised by Chief Justice Fader’s concurrence that “[c]ourts should be alert to claims that evidence has been altered by the use of artificial intelligence[.]” 487 Md. at 735 (Fader, C.J., concurring). As in Mooney, “the record in this case does not contain any hint that artificial intelligence may have played a role[;] nor was there any suggestion that the video may have been altered in any way.” Id. at 735–36 (Fader, C.J., concurring). 52 Further, Appellant asserts that the two video clips from the interior of The Spot were

“especially problematic” because, Appellant argues, the two clips lack a visible date and

time stamp, and because there was a dearth of testimony regarding the collection of the

video clips. Overall, Appellant alleges reliability and trustworthiness, as to the Nest

footage, were not sufficiently established.

We disagree. The Nest footage was authenticated via the Nest Certificate, itself

through self-authentication, and circumstantial evidence from Det. Needham’s testimony.

As we explained supra, both were admitted pursuant to Maryland Rules 5-902(12)–(13)

and 5-803(b)(6). A trial court may deny a business record’s admission into evidence, if the

business record, here the Nest footage, is established to be unreliable or untrustworthy. See

Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 114–15, cert. denied 506 U.S. 871 (1992).

Factors included in a reliability and trustworthiness determination include the following:

whether the records were made in anticipation of litigation; whether there was motive to

falsify the records; how “routine or non-routine” the record was; “how much reliance the

business places on the record for business purposes”; and if the record contains opinions

and conclusions, whether those opinions and conclusions are valid or speculative. Jun v.

State, 265 Md. App. 459, 480 (2025) cert. granted, No. 29, Sept. Term 2025 (Md. Aug.

20, 2025) (quoting Armstrong, 326 Md. at 115).

Applying those factors to the case before us, we see no basis to conclude the Nest

footage was untrustworthy or unreliable. Nest is not a party to the litigation. There is no

evidence in the record to suggest that Nest had a reason to falsify the recordings. As

explained in the Nest Certificate, Nest records and saves the footage nearly

53 contemporaneously to the time footage is recorded by a Nest camera. The Nest footage was

produced by Osagie, a custodian of records for Nest, who declared under the penalty of

perjury that everything discussed in the Nest Certificate regarding the Nest footage was

true and correct to the best of his knowledge. The Nest footage was produced in response

to a search warrant requesting the recordings from The Spot’s cameras on May 16, 2021.

Despite Appellant’s assertions that the Nest footage was untrustworthy and unreliable, the

record does not support such a conclusion. Accordingly, the circuit court properly

exercised its discretion when it determined that the Nest footage was authenticated.

IV. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT APPELLANT OF FIRST-DEGREE MURDER.

Appellant’s jury trial began in June of 2023. Following opening statements, the

State proceeded with its case in chief, during which it called seven witnesses. 29 28F

i. Evidence Presented at Trial

First, the State called Ofc. Carlone. Ofc. Carlone was the first responding officer to

The Spot. Ofc. Carlone testified regarding the “chaotic” nature of the scene when he

arrived, and the steps he took to try to secure the “irate” crowd and preserve the crime

scene. Ofc. Carlone also testified concerning the paramedics’ arrival and departure from

the scene and to the condition in which he found Purcell. During Ofc. Carlone’s testimony,

29 Although the State called seven witnesses, only six of those witnesses provided testimony. See supra n.8.

54 on the State’s motion, the court admitted Ofc. Carlone’s body worn camera footage and

Ofc. Carlone testified regarding the events depicted therein.

The State next called Chelsea Bradenburg (“Bradenburg”), an EMT with the

Baltimore County Fire Department. Bradenburg testified concerning the nature of the

crowd, and the steps that she and other EMTs and paramedics took to render aid to Purcell.

Bradenburg testified that Purcell was pronounced deceased upon arrival to the hospital.

The State then called Jacquelyn Wright (“Wright”), a Forensic Services Technician

who was employed at the time by the Baltimore County Police Department’s crime lab.

Wright testified as to the procedures she followed when she analyzed the scene at The Spot

and testified regarding how she collected evidence. Wright also testified concerning the

photographs she took at the hospital of Purcell. 3029F

The State next called Dr. Alexander, the Assistant Medical Examiner who

completed the autopsy report concerning Purcell. Dr. Alexander was qualified as an expert

in the field of forensic pathology. He testified regarding the autopsy photographs he took

of Purcell. 31 Dr. Alexander testified as to his professional opinion regarding Purcell’s 3 F

injuries; he explained that the injuries around Purcell’s eye indicated “stippling,” a process

in which gunpowder particles—which come out of the barrel of a gun when it is fired—

can strike the body and make “little red marks” if the barrel of the gun is close enough to a

30 These include the same hospital photographs that are the subject of our discussion in Issue II. 31 These are the same autopsy photographs that are the subject of our discussion in Issue II.

55 person at the time the trigger is pulled. Dr. Alexander further testified that in his expert

opinion, because Purcell had stippling around his eye, the gun had to be “anywhere from a

fraction of an inch or so out to three to five feet” from Purcell when it was fired. Dr.

Alexander also testified that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, his opinion was

that the manner of Purcell’s death was homicide.

The final witness called by the State was Det. Needham. Det. Needham testified

regarding the crime scene photographs captured by Wright and identified Purcell as the

victim. Det. Needham further testified concerning the steps of the investigation into the

murder of Purcell that ensued following the initial response to The Spot. Det. Needham

explained that upon leaving the scene, he went to the hospital to see Purcell; left the hospital

and returned to police headquarters; and performed investigatory steps on his computer at

headquarters. Det. Needham testified regarding the physical evidence that was recovered

from the scene which included one shell casing, one “jacketing,” and one bottle of lotion.

Det. Needham testified that during the investigation, law enforcement never recovered the

weapon used to shoot Purcell.

Det. Needham additionally testified regarding his interrogation of Appellant, the

facts of which we explained in detail above. See supra I.A. The video of the interrogation

was admitted and played for the jury. In the recording of Det. Needham’s interrogation of

Appellant, Det. Needham played the Nest footage from the interior and exterior of The

Spot for Appellant. While watching the interior Nest footage, Appellant identified himself;

however, while watching the exterior Nest footage, Appellant declined to identify the

individual who appeared to be the same person that he earlier identified as himself.

56 ii. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

On the fourth day of trial, the State completed the presentation of its case in chief.

Outside the presence of the jury, counsel for Appellant moved for judgment of acquittal. 3231F

The thrust of Appellant’s counsel’s argument was that the State did not prove beyond a

reasonable doubt the element of premeditation. Appellant’s counsel noted to the court that

for a killing to be premeditated, the State must establish that the killing was “not a merely

impulsive act.” Appellant’s counsel commented on the absence of evidence of motive on

the part of Appellant, and on the absence of other forms of evidence, stating that “there

[was] really sparse evidence about what the circumstances were when this occurred,” and

that there were no eyewitnesses.

In response, the State emphasized that “there is not a particular length of time to be

attributed to premeditation.” The State noted that one of the exhibits—an interior video of

The Spot—depicted Appellant entering The Spot, Appellant and Purcell interacting,

Purcell exiting The Spot, and then Appellant exiting The Spot, following Purcell. The State

argued that Appellant was already “performing his premeditation at that point.” The State

highlighted that Appellant was armed and that he followed Purcell out to the sidewalk,

continuing a conversation with him. The State further contended that “[a]ll of [that was]

plenty of time for [Appellant] to consider his next move, [to] decide whether or not to kill”

32 Appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal as to all counts. On appeal, Appellant only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the first-degree murder conviction.

57 Purcell. Subsequently, the State requested that the court deny the motion for acquittal and

that the count of first-degree murder be forwarded to the jury.

The court denied Appellant’s motion, stating: “At the particular stage where we are

currently and given the evidence that has been generated, the [c]ourt does find that a prima

facie case has been [met] to submit the issues to the [j]ury for the factual determinations[.]”

Appellant did not testify and called no witnesses. The defense rested and renewed

the motion for judgment of acquittal as to all counts and with the arguments previously

stated. The court denied the renewed motion. Consequently, the count for first-degree

murder was sent to the jury. The jury found Appellant guilty of that offense.

Appellant contends that no reasonable juror could have found him guilty of first-

degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt because, even taking the evidence in the light

most favorable to the State, there was no evidence of premeditation. 33 Appellant further 32F

contends that: there was no evidence of his motive; there was no evidence of him having

any relationship with Purcell; and there was no evidence in the form of witness testimony

as to his intentions or the course of his actions. Appellant asserts that the only evidence

available to the jury that could have supported his conviction was the Nest footage, but that

“the videos by themselves do not prove premeditation.”

33 Appellant does not address the other elements of first-degree murder, limiting his contention to premeditation alone. As such, from here forth, we only address that element of first-degree murder.

58 The State contends the opposite; the State asserts that “the evidence sufficed to

support a first-degree murder conviction.” The State asserts that—contrary to what

Appellant argues—it was not required to prove motive. The State also argues that it

established premeditation, explaining that ahead of the shooting, Appellant formed an

intent to shoot, not from a mere momentary lapse in judgment, but rather “an ahead-of-

time decision after the men argued” in The Spot. The State acknowledges that the encounter

between Appellant and Purcell was “fleeting,” lasting only three minutes and six seconds,

but that this was legally sufficient for Appellant to form an intent to kill.

“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view

the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and assess whether any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

State v. Krikstan, 483 Md. 43, 63 (2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“Our role is not to review the record in a manner that would constitute a figurative retrial

of the case.” Id. This is because the factfinder is in the “unique position” to view the

evidence and the witnesses firsthand and assess their credibility. Id. (citing Walker v. State,

432 Md. 587, 614 (2013)). Accordingly, “we do not re-weigh the credibility of witnesses

or attempt to resolve any conflicts in the evidence[,]” id. at 63–64 (quoting Walker, 432

Md. at 614), and we give deference to “reasonable inferences drawn by the factfinder . . .

because ‘[w]e do not second-guess the jury’s determination where there are competing

rational inferences available.’” Id. at 64 (quoting Smith v. State, 415 Md. 174, 183 (2010)).

This standard “applies to all criminal cases, including those resting upon circumstantial

59 evidence, since, generally proof of guilt based in whole or in part on circumstantial

evidence is no different from proof of guilt based on direct eyewitness accounts.” State v.

Smith, 374 Md. 527, 534 (2003); see Pinkney v. State, 151 Md. App. 311, 329 (2003)

(explaining that circumstantial evidence alone can provide a sufficient basis for a factfinder

to find guilt, “even for [first-degree] murder”).

First-degree murder is “a deliberate, premeditated, and willful killing[.]” Md. Code

(2002, 2021 Repl. Vol.), Criminal Law Article § 2-201(a)(1). The legal definitions of these

words are “well settled.” See Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 717 (1980); see also Evans v.

State, 28 Md. App. 640, 658 (1975).

For a killing to be [“willful”] there must be a specific purpose and intent to kill; to be “deliberate” there must be a full and conscious knowledge of the purpose to kill; and to be “premeditated” the design to kill must have preceded the killing by an appreciable length of time, that is, time enough to be deliberate.

Tichnell, 287 Md. at 717. “As to the elements of ‘premeditation’ and ‘deliberation,’ this

Court has noted that the two elements are often reviewed together.” Wood v. State, 209

Md. App. 246, 318 (2012); see also Pinkney, 151 Md. App. at 335 (explaining that the

elements of deliberation and premeditation are often “treated as a single endeavor”).

“[I]f the killing results from a choice made as the result of thought, however short

the struggle between the intention and the act, it is sufficient to characterize the crime as

deliberate and premeditated murder.” Pinkney, 151 Md. App. at 335 (quoting Willey v.

State, 328 Md. 126, 133 (1992)); cf. Mitchell v. State, 363 Md. 130, 149 (2001) (holding

that a murder “committed solely on impulse—the immediate offspring of rashness and

60 impetuous temper—is not one committed with deliberation and premeditation”) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “[P]remeditation may be established circumstantially from the

facts of a particular murder.” Wood, 209 Md. App. at 318 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). In fact, premeditation usually “is not established by direct evidence.”

Hagez v. State, 110 Md. App. 194, 206 (1996).

Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was

sufficient for a rational juror to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant acted

with premeditation in killing Purcell. Krikstan, 483 Md. at 63. The record reflects the

following pieces of evidence were submitted to the jury: the Nest footage; the interrogation

video of Appellant; Det. Needham’s testimony; Ofc. Carlone’s body worn camera footage;

Dr. Alexander’s testimony; Wright’s crime scene photographs of Purcell; and Dr.

Alexander’s autopsy photographs of Purcell.

We first address the Nest footage. In the interior Nest footage, Appellant can be seen

having a conversation with Purcell, and then subsequently following Purcell outside. When

they appear outside, Purcell and Appellant have a brief conversation, lasting less than two

minutes, before Appellant retrieves a gun and shoots Purcell one time in the eye at

pointblank range. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational

juror could have found that the time from Purcell’s and Appellant’s exit from The Spot to

the time just prior to Appellant’s reach for the gun—approximately three minutes—was

sufficient time for Appellant to premeditate the shooting of Purcell. Tichnell, 287 Md. at

717–18 (“It is unnecessary that the deliberation or premeditation shall have existed for any

particular length of time.”); see Hounshell v. State, 61 Md. App. 364, 373 (1985) (stating

61 that for a killing to be premeditated, there need not have been an appreciable space of time

between the intention and the act: “they may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts of

the mind”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Wood, 209 Md. App. at 318

(explaining that premeditation may be established circumstantially from the facts of a

particular murder).

Additionally, Ofc. Carlone’s testimony and body worn camera footage, Dr.

Alexander’s testimony and autopsy photographs of Purcell, and Wright’s hospital

photographs of Purcell likewise demonstrate the element of premeditation and deliberate

choice. This evidence illustrates the intensity of Purcell’s injuries and depicts or explains

the “intensity” of Purcell’s wounds and “brutal manner” in which Purcell’s wounds were

inflicted, which can provide sufficient evidence of deliberation and premeditation. Purnell

v. State, 250 Md. App. 703, 715 (2021) (citing Kier v. State, 216 Md. 513, 523 (1958)).

For example, Dr. Alexander’s testimony, particularly his statements regarding

“stippling,”—which is an injury only suffered when a victim is shot by a gun as far as five

feet away and as close as a fraction of an inch away—was sufficient evidence for a

reasonable juror to conclude that the “brutal manner” in which Appellant shot Purcell

demonstrated premeditation and deliberate choice. Ofc. Carlone’s body worn camera

footage, Wright’s hospital photographs, and Dr. Alexander’s autopsy photographs also

depict the intensity of Purcell’s injuries—specifically that he was shot in the eye and that

the bullet exited through the back of his skull, and that Purcell died almost instantaneously

due to the type of gunshot wound and amount of blood lost. The evidence was sufficient

for a rational juror to conclude that Appellant had premeditated the murder of Purcell.

62 JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.