Campbell v. Roadway Express, Inc.

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedJanuary 16, 2003
DocketI.C. NOS. 012986, 962511
StatusPublished

This text of Campbell v. Roadway Express, Inc. (Campbell v. Roadway Express, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Campbell v. Roadway Express, Inc., (N.C. Super. Ct. 2003).

Opinions

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The Commission has reviewed the prior Opinion and Award based upon the record of the proceedings before Deputy Commissioner Chapman and the briefs and oral arguments before the Full Commission. The appealing party has shown good grounds to reconsider the evidence. The Full Commission reverses the Opinion and Award of the Deputy Commissioner and enters the following Opinion and Award.

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The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which were entered into by the parties as:

STIPULATIONS
1. At the time of the onset of the alleged occupational disease, the parties were subject to and bound by the provisions of the N.C. Worker's Compensation Act.

2. At the time of the onset of the alleged occupational disease, an employee-employer relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant-employers as follows:

a. Signal Delivery Service/Leaseway Transportation — August 1970 through May 1992.

b. Roadway Express — June 16, 1992, through April 12, 1997.

c. UPS — June 10, 1997 through the present.

3. The carriers for the defendant-employers are as follows:

a. Signal Delivery Service/Leaseway: Old Republic Insurance/Gallagher Bassett Services.

b. Roadway Express, Inc.: self-insured.

c. UPS: Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.

4. In addition, the parties stipulated into evidence a notebook of medical records and reports.

5. Following the Deputy Commissioner hearing, the parties also agreed to stipulate that plaintiff's average weekly wage would yield the maximum compensation rate of $512.00 per week. The parties did not stipulate to an average weekly wage amount.

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The Full Commission rejects the findings of fact found by the Deputy Commissioner and finds as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff, who was forty-seven years old on the date of the Deputy Commissioner hearing and who is a high school graduate, has worked as a truck driver since August 1970 when he began working for defendant Signal Delivery Service (Signal Delivery). In that employment he drove tractor-trailers within a three-hundred-mile radius of the truck terminal and made five to ten stops along the route, mostly at Sears stores. In addition to the road work, approximately ten to twenty percent of his working hours were spent at the truck terminal because he was assigned the job of driving switchers, which were small tractors used to move trailers around the terminal yard. Like the truck tractors, the switchers had diesel engines but, unlike the trucks which vented exhaust through a stack at the top rear of the cab, the switchers vented their exhaust at the bottom rear of the vehicle, below a platform. The drivers assigned to work in the yard left the switchers running while they connected and disconnected the trailers.

2. Occasionally plaintiff was also required to shuttle trailers to the Sears mail order facility which was three to four miles away from the terminal. For this task, he drove cab-over tractors which also vented exhaust at the bottom rear of the vehicle. Like the switcher job, if assigned to shuttle trailers, plaintiff performed the task for a full ten to twelve-hour workday.

3. Plaintiff lost his job in May 1992 when Signal Delivery went out of business. The next month plaintiff began working for defendant Roadway Express (Roadway) as a casual driver. Within the year, however, plaintiff became a full time driver and drove routes of varying length. The longest route extended approximately five hundred miles from the terminal. Although all of the truck tractors used by the company vented exhaust at the top rear of the cab, plaintiff and other drivers noticed a smell which appeared to be diesel exhaust within the cab in some of the trucks as they were driving along the road. The drivers reported the problem but, after performing a study, the company concluded that the smell was coming from a different substance called blow-by which has a distinctive smell. Plaintiff and his coworkers Daniel Hill and Jerry Ring testified that they knew the difference between diesel exhaust and blow-by. Plaintiff's testimony regarding the smell of diesel exhaust fumes in the cabs of the trucks was corroborated by Mr. Hill and Mr. Ring, as well as by plaintiff's wife who testified that when plaintiff worked for Roadway his clothes reeked of the smell of diesel exhaust.

4. While working for Roadway, plaintiff generally did not have to drive switchers. However, there were several layoffs when truckers were offered switcher work on a temporary basis and plaintiff drove the switchers during those periods. However, most of the switchers had smoke stacks and did not vent exhaust near the ground.

5. Plaintiff was laid off by Roadway in April 1997 and during the layoff period obtained a job with defendant United Parcel Service (UPS) beginning June 10, 1997. Plaintiff was still employed by UPS on the date of hearing before the Deputy Commissioner. Plaintiff works as a feeder driver and drives tractor-trailers within a two hundred-mile radius of the facility. In addition, approximately twenty percent of plaintiff's time at work is spent driving switchers at the terminal, but all of the switchers have smoke stacks to vent the exhaust above the cab. However, plaintiff operates the switchers on the same lot where other diesel-powered vehicles are being operated. At the terminals, plaintiff backs his trailer up to the docks, connects and disconnects trailers on a daily basis, and builds doubles by connecting trucks to trailers. When plaintiff is at the UPS terminals, he can smell diesel exhaust.

6. In June 1995 plaintiff went to Dr. Sigmund Tannenbaum, a urologist, for complaints of urinary dripping, dysuria and a feeling of retention. Dr. Tannenbaum previously treated plaintiff for prostatitis, which was also Dr. Tannenbaum's assessment of the described symptoms at that time. The doctor performed a cystoscopy in July 1995 which revealed a normal bladder but swelling and inflammation in the prostatic urethra. Consequently, plaintiff was treated for prostatitis.

7. By May 1997 plaintiff was again having difficulty urinating and was subsequently referred by his family doctor back to Dr. Tannenbaum who examined him on July 31, 1997. By that time plaintiff was having severe voiding difficulties. Another cystoscopy and a biopsy were ordered at that time. The cystocopy revealed cystitis glandularis in a pre-cancerous state. Dr. Tannenbaum prescribed medication at that time. Plaintiff had an episode in early September 1997 where he could not void at all so he went to the emergency room. A catheter was inserted in order to drain plaintiff's bladder. Subsequently, Dr. Tannenbaum ordered a cytologic urine analysis. The test report was not issued until November 7, 1997. The laboratory found evidence of grade III urothelial cell carcinoma. Dr. Tannenbaum then ordered another cystoscopy and biopsy. This time the findings revealed invasive poorly differentiated transitional cell carcinoma, an aggressive cancer which originates in the superficial layer of the bladder but which can metastasize elsewhere in the body.

8. On December 15, 1997 Dr. Tannenbaum performed surgery to remove plaintiff's bladder, prostate, appendix and adjacent lymph nodes. Dr. Tannenbaum then used a section of small intestine to form a pouch which served as a bladder.

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Bluebook (online)
Campbell v. Roadway Express, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/campbell-v-roadway-express-inc-ncworkcompcom-2003.