Campbell v. Orchard Mesa Irr. Dist.

972 P.2d 1037, 1998 WL 643978
CourtSupreme Court of Colorado
DecidedSeptember 14, 1998
Docket97SA303
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 972 P.2d 1037 (Campbell v. Orchard Mesa Irr. Dist.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Campbell v. Orchard Mesa Irr. Dist., 972 P.2d 1037, 1998 WL 643978 (Colo. 1998).

Opinion

972 P.2d 1037 (1998)

Charles L. CAMPBELL, Harry C. Talbott, Ronald R. Crist, William R. Emblad, and Gary Crist, Plaintiffs,
v.
ORCHARD MESA IRRIGATION DISTRICT; Mutual Mesa Lateral Enterprise; Farm Services Administration (formerly Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service), an agency of the United States Department of Agriculture; the Natural Resources Conservation Service (formerly Soil Conservation Service), an agency of the United States Department of Agriculture; and the Colorado Water Conservation Board, an agency of the State of Colorado, Defendants.

No. 97SA303.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

September 14, 1998.

Bailey, Harring & Peterson, A Professional Corporation, James S. Bailey, Jr., Randall M. Livingston, Denver, for Plaintiffs.

Dufford, Waldeck, Milburn & Krohn, LLP, William H.T. Frey, Flint B. Ogle, Grand Junction, for Orchard Mesa Irrigation District and Mutual Mesa Lateral Enterprise.

Henry L. Solano, United States Attorney, Robert D. Clark, Assistant United States Attorney, Denver, for Farm Services Administration and Natural Resources Conservation Service.

Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Martha Phillips Allbright, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Richard A. Westfall, Solicitor General, Joseph C. Smith, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Lee E. Miller, First Assistant Attorney General, Linda J. Bassi, Assistant Attorney General, Natural Resources Section, Denver, for Colorado Water Conservation Board.

*1038 David W. Broadwell, Denver, Amicus Curiae for Colorado Municipal League.

Leavenworth & Tester, P.C., Loyal E. Leavenworth, Glenwood Springs, Amicus Curiae for City of Rifle. Amicus Curiae for Midvalley Metropolitan District.

David Hallford, Glenwood Springs, Leavenworth & Tester, P.C., Loyal E. Leavenworth, Glenwood Springs, Amicus Curiae for Colorado River Water Conservation District.

Williams Turner & Holmes, Mark Hermundstad, Grand Junction, Amicus Curiae for Ute Water Conservancy District.

Maynes, Bradford, Shipps & Sheftel, Janice C. Sheftel, Durango, Amicus Curiae for Dolores Water Conservancy District.

Fairfield and Woods, P.C., Stephen H. Leonhardt, Ilona L. Dotterrer, Denver, Amicus Curiae for Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District.

Ken Baker, P.C., Kenneth A. Baker, Salida, Amicus Curiae for Upper Arkansas Water Conservancy District.

Peterson, Fonda, Farley, Mattoon, Crockenberg & Garcia, P.C., William F. Mattoon, Pueblo, Amicus Curiae for Board of Water Works of Pueblo, Colorado.

Felt, Houghton and Monson, LLC, Steven T. Monson, Colorado Springs, Amicus Curiae for Security Water & Sanitation Districts.

Justice BENDER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We agreed to answer three questions certified by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (district court) concerning claims relating to the formation and funding of a water activity enterprise.[1] We hold that an irrigation district is not a "district" for purposes of Article X, Section 20 (Amendment 1) of the Colorado Constitution because it is not a local governmental entity thereunder.[2] Although an irrigation district is a public corporation that exercises limited public powers, its overall purpose is to provide ways and means of supplying water to lands for the benefit of landowners within the district. Due to our disposition of this initial issue, it is unnecessary to respond to the remaining certified questions.

I. BACKGROUND

As background for our legal analysis, we discuss the pertinent facts and legal issues stated by the district court in its certification order.[3] On March 7, 1904, the Orchard Mesa Irrigation District (irrigation district) was formed pursuant to the act of April 12, 1901, entitled "An Act to provide for the organization and government of irrigation district...." In 1955, the qualified electors of the irrigation district determined by election that the irrigation district would be governed by *1039 the Irrigation District Law of 1921. See §§ 34-42-101 to -141, 10 C.R.S. (1997).

On October 3, 1996, the board members of the irrigation district formed the Mesa Mutual Lateral Enterprise (enterprise).[4] The plaintiffs, who are landowners and taxpayers within the irrigation district, filed suit against the irrigation district and others, claiming that the irrigation district is a local governmental entity whose actions are subject to the restrictions of Amendment 1. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants' formation and funding of the enterprise violated Amendment 1.[5] The defendants counter that an irrigation district is not a local governmental entity within the meaning of Amendment 1 because it serves the private interests of landowners. The district court certified this issue to us based on its determination that there was no controlling Colorado precedent. With this background in mind, we now examine the first certified question of whether irrigation districts are "districts" subject to the limitations of Amendment 1.

II. ANALYSIS

The first step in reviewing an alleged violation of Amendment 1 is to examine the terms of the amendment itself and apply its provisions according to its clear terms. See City of Aurora v. Acosta, 892 P.2d 264, 267 (Colo. 1995). The provisions of Amendment 1 require "districts" to hold elections to obtain voter approval in advance for increases in taxes and spending and direct or indirect debt increases. See Colo. Const. art. X, § 20. "Districts" are defined in Amendment 1's express language to include "the state or any local government, excluding enterprises." Colo. Const. art. X, § 20, cl. (2)(b). Since both parties concede that a 1921 Act irrigation district is neither an enterprise nor an agency of the state,[6] our inquiry focuses on whether a 1921 Act irrigation district is a local governmental entity for purposes of Amendment 1.

Turning to the text of Amendment 1, we note that the term "local government" is not defined. In interpreting the meaning of "local government," we rely upon general rules of statutory construction. See Nicholl v. E-470 Public Highway Auth., 896 P.2d 859, 867 (Colo.1995); Bickel v. City of Boulder, 885 P.2d 215, 228 n. 10 (Colo.1994). Our duty in construing Amendment 1 is to give effect to the electorate's intent in enacting the amendment. See In re Interrogatories Propounded by the Senate Concerning House Bill 1078, 189 Colo. 1, 7, 536 P.2d 308, 313 (1975). We must, therefore, construe the term "local government" in light of the objective Amendment 1 sought to achieve. See Acosta, 892 P.2d at 267.

Amendment 1's objective is to prevent governmental entities from enacting taxing and spending increases above Amendment 1's limits without voter approval. See F.T. Havens v. Board of County Comm'rs, 924 P.2d 517

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