Campbell v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In Re Campbell)

20 B.R. 42, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 4284
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. South Carolina
DecidedApril 20, 1982
Docket19-01159
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 20 B.R. 42 (Campbell v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In Re Campbell)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Campbell v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In Re Campbell), 20 B.R. 42, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 4284 (S.C. 1982).

Opinion

ORDER

J. BRATTON DAVIS, Bankruptcy Judge.

FACTS

On May 26, 1978, the debtors signed an installment sales contract (the contract) with Greenbriar Toyota, Inc. (Greenbriar) for the purchase of an automobile. By the terms of the contract, Greenbriar retained a purchase money security interest in the automobile. Greenbriar assigned its right, title and interest in the contract to the defendant, General Motors Acceptance Corporation (G. M. A. C.).

After the debtors defaulted in their payments, G. M. A. C., on November 5, 1981, repossessed the automobile.

On November 13, 1981, the debtors filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 1301, et seq.).

On December 10, 1981, the debtors filed, under 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) 1 , a complaint to *43 compel G. M. A. C. to turn over the automobile to them, claiming that they have equity in the automobile which is exempt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) 2 and S.C.Code § 15-41-200(2) (Supp.1981). 3

Contending that the debtors have no right to relief under § 542, G. M. A. C. moved for a dismissal of the complaint.

ISSUE

The issue is whether the automobile repossessed by G. M. A. C. is property of the estate as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) 4 from which the debtor may claim an exemption pursuant to § 522(b)(1) and S.C. Code § 15-41-200(2) (Supp.1981), and, as such is subject to turnover pursuant to § 542(a).

Since the parties have not raised the issues of whether a Chapter 13 debtor may bring and maintain an action under § 542(a) or whether G. M. A. C. is a custodian subject to the trustee’s turnover powers under 11 U.S.C. § 543(b)(1) 5 , this court will not address those issues.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Whether property, seized by a creditor prior to a debtor’s filing for relief under the Bankruptcy Code, is subject to the turnover provisions of the Bankruptcy Code is an issue which this court has previously decided. Ford v. Southern Bank and Trust Company, Case No. 81-01575, Complaint No. 81-0227 (B.Ct.D.S.C.1982):

In Ford, this court, based on the decision in Cross Electric Company v. United States, 664 F.2d 1218 (4th Cir. 1981), held that since property levied upon by a sheriff prior to the debtors’ filing their petition for relief was no longer property of the estate as defined in § 541, therefore, not subject to turnover, the debtors’ only rights in the seized property were those provided by state law.

In this case, as in Ford, the debtors’ only rights in the property following the repossession by G. M. A. C. are those provided by state law, in this case the South Carolina Commercial Code.

Under South Carolina law, the debtors have the right to redeem the collateral. S.C.Code § 36-9-506 (1976). 6 If they choose not to redeem the collateral, it may be sold by G. M. A. C. but the sale must be “commercially reasonable”, S.C.Code § 36- *44 9-504(3) (1976) 7 ; and the debtors are entitled to any surplus. S.C.Code § 36-9-504(2). 8

Relying on Ford and the pertinent eases cited therein, this court concludes that since the automobile was lawfully repossessed prior to the debtors’ filing their petition for Chapter 13 relief, it is no longer property of the estate subject to turnover and administration by the trustee; therefore, G. M. A. C. is free to pursue its state law remedies for the collection of its debt.

It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice, and judgment is granted to the defendant.

1

. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a): Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this section, an entity, other than a custodian, in possession, custody, or control, during the case, of property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under section 363 of this title, or that the debtor may exempt under section 522 of this title, shall deliver to the trustee, and account for, such property or the value of such property, unless such proper *43 ty is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.

2

. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b): Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate either — (1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection specifically does not so authorize; * * *.

3

. S.C.Code § 15-41-200: The following real and personal property of a debtor domiciled in this State shall be exempt from attachment, levy, and sale under any mesne or final process issued by any court or bankruptcy proceeding: * * * (2) The debtor’s interest, not to exceed one thousand two hundred dollars in value, in one motor vehicle.

4

. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a): The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located: * * * (1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.

5

. 11 U.S.C. § 543

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Bluebook (online)
20 B.R. 42, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 4284, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/campbell-v-general-motors-acceptance-corp-in-re-campbell-scb-1982.