Campbell v. City of New York

U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York

Campbell v. City of New York

35 F. 14, 1888 U.S. App. LEXIS 2391

CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York

DecidedMay 22, 1888

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 35 F. 14 (Campbell v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Campbell v. City of New York, 35 F. 14, 1888 U.S. App. LEXIS 2391 (circtsdny 1888).

Pincite

Opinion

Wallace, J.

The theory upon which this supplemental bill proceeds

is that Campbell, the complainant in the original bill, since bringing the suit, has parted with his whole interest in the subject-matter, and that those for whom Campbell was trustee have transferred their whole interest in the subject-matter to Philbrook, or to Philbrook and Knibbs, and that'the title to any sum of money which may be recovered in the suit has by these transfers become vested in Philbrook, or in Philbrook and Knibbs. Upon such a state of facts the remedy of Philbrook is by an original bill in the nature of a supplemental bill, and not by a supplemental bill. This was distinctly stated in the opinion announced upon the hearing of the motion in which Philbrook applied for leave to be made a co-complainant. Although the distinction between supplemental bills and original bills seems to rest upon purely artificial reasons, it is well recognized, and is attended in practice with consequences which affect .the substantial rights of .parties. If the cesiuis que trust had not transferred all their interest in the subject-matter, and there had been simply a change of trustees by operation at law, or if there had been only a 'partial alienation of the title of Campbell, a supplemental bill might lie. As it is, the demurrer must be sustained. Mitf. Eq. PI. 85, 98; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr. 66, 84; Story, Eq. PI. 349; Tappan v. Smith, 5 Bis. 73. The third ground of objection assigned in the demurrer sufficiently raises the point.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Wallace, J.

The theory upon which this supplemental bill proceeds

is that Campbell, the complainant in the original bill, since bringing the suit, has parted with his whole interest in the subject-matter, and that those for whom Campbell was trustee have transferred their whole interest in the subject-matter to Philbrook, or to Philbrook and Knibbs, and that'the title to any sum of money which may be recovered in the suit has by these transfers become vested in Philbrook, or in Philbrook and Knibbs. Upon such a state of facts the remedy of Philbrook is by an original bill in the nature of a supplemental bill, and not by a supplemental bill. This was distinctly stated in the opinion announced upon the hearing of the motion in which Philbrook applied for leave to be made a co-complainant. Although the distinction between supplemental bills and original bills seems to rest upon purely artificial reasons, it is well recognized, and is attended in practice with consequences which affect .the substantial rights of .parties. If the cesiuis que trust had not transferred all their interest in the subject-matter, and there had been simply a change of trustees by operation at law, or if there had been only a 'partial alienation of the title of Campbell, a supplemental bill might lie. As it is, the demurrer must be sustained. Mitf. Eq. PI. 85, 98; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr. 66, 84; Story, Eq. PI. 349; Tappan v. Smith, 5 Bis. 73. The third ground of objection assigned in the demurrer sufficiently raises the point.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

35 F. 14, 1888 U.S. App. LEXIS 2391, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/campbell-v-city-of-new-york-circtsdny-1888.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack