Campbell v. Campbell, No. Fa93 0305420 (Mar. 11, 1994)

1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 2662
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedMarch 11, 1994
DocketNo. FA93 0305420
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 2662 (Campbell v. Campbell, No. Fa93 0305420 (Mar. 11, 1994)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Campbell v. Campbell, No. Fa93 0305420 (Mar. 11, 1994), 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 2662 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] MEMORANDUM OF DECISION This limited contested dissolution action was heard on February 9 and 14, 1994. Both parties were represented by counsel and testified at trial.

The plaintiff, hereinafter referred to as the wife, and the defendant, hereinafter referred to as the husband, were married on February 24, 1968 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. There are two sons issue of the marriage who have reached their majority. John, now 24, has graduated from college and is supporting himself. Jeffrey is 21 and expects to graduate from Southern Connecticut in December, 1995. The parties have lived in Connecticut since 1980, more than one year prior to the commencement of the action; therefore, the court has jurisdiction.

From their own testimony, the court finds that the marriage has broken down irretrievably with no hope of CT Page 2663 reconciliation; therefore, a decree of dissolution is granted pursuant to 46a-40 (c)(1) of the Connecticut General Statutes.

The wife testified that they had a happy and stable marriage for the first twenty years. In 1988 they learned that the husband's mother had developed Alzheimer's disease, and she moved from out of state to an apartment in Bridgeport to be closer to them. Her illness lasted for over a year, and she died on June 8, 1989. This disease placed a great deal of emotional stress on both of them. The wife stated that the mother's illness and death devastated the husband. He began to drink alcohol more than usual, and their arguments grew stronger and more frequent. The husband drew inward and they stopped communicating. They tried marriage counseling for about six months but their marriage did not improve. The husband moved into a separate room, and they lived as strangers.

The court finds that the mother's illness and death caused both parties severe emotional stress and that each party bears some responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage and finds neither of them at fault.

In their claims for relief, and in the excellent briefs filed by the respective attorneys the parties agree that there are two primary issues for the court to decide: (1) the division of the marital home, the only substantial marital asset; and (2) alimony. The parties agree that the home, which has been on the market for three months, should be sold as soon as possible. The husband requests that the net proceeds from the sale be divided equally. The wife requests 65 percent for her and 35 percent for her husband. As to the alimony, the husband requests a mutual, nominal order of $1.00, nonmodifiable for five years. The wife requests lifetime alimony of $225.00 a week.

I. MARITAL HOME

The court may assign to either party all or any part of a marital asset after it has considered all the criteria in46b-81 (c) of the Connecticut General Statutes. The division of property is to give to each party what is fair and equitable. Rubin v. Rubin, 204 Conn. 224, 228 (1987).

In assigning property rights under 46b-81 of the Connecticut General Statutes, the court must consider the length of the marriage, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and CT Page 2664 sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each party, Leo v. Leo, 197 Conn. 1, 5, (1985), and the opportunity of each for the future acquisition of capital assets and income and the contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of the asset.

By agreement, and from their testimony, the court finds that the wife was the primary caretaker for their two sons and the husband for about the first twenty-three years of the marriage. The husband worked full time selling cars during this period. The court finds that they purchased their first home in 1971 in Pennsylvania for $22,000, with a down payment of $2,500 from joint family funds and that about $1,200 in closing costs came from the husband's parents. They completed the purchase with a $20,000 mortgage loan. In 1980 they purchased their second home in Shelton, Connecticut with the equity from the sale of the first home and a mortgage of $50,000. Their present home in Trumbull was purchased in 1988 for $334,900, using the equity from the sale of the Shelton home and a mortgage of $235,000.

The parties estimate the total net equity in the present home to be between $83,000 and $86,000. By mutual agreement, the house has been listed on the market for sale approximately three months. The price has been reduced three times. The parties have agreed to cooperate in selling it as soon as possible. The wife vacated this large home in December, 1993, and the husband is living there alone at present.

It is also undisputed that the husband paid the mortgage, taxes, insurance and maintenance on all three homes entirely from his earnings, since the wife had no earnings during these twenty-three years. She remained at home to care for the children and the husband. Based on these facts, the court finds that the wife's efforts as mother and homemaker were at least equal to his monetary contributions.

In O'Neill v. O'Neill, 13 Conn. App. 300 (1988), at page 311, the court stated as follows:

"A property division ought to accord value to those nonmonetary contributions of one spouse which enable the other spouse to devote substantial effort to paid employment which, in turn, enables the family to acquire tangible marital assets. The investment of CT Page 2665 human capital in homemaking has worth and should be evaluated in a property division incident to a dissolution of marriage. We hold, accordingly, that an equitable distribution of property should take into consideration the plaintiff's contributions to the marriage, including homemaking activities and primary caretaking responsibilities."

The husband has been an independent car salesman/contractor with Dragone Motors of Bridgeport for the past fourteen years. From the husband's income tax returns from 1988 to 1992, his testimony and the testimony of Mr. Thomas Dragone, President of Dragone Motors, the court finds his gross earnings were between $67,000 and $87,000, and after expenses, averaged about $57,000 for these five years.

In August, 1993, the wife was hired for a full time position by American Frozen Foods at a gross annual salary of $31,000 with a net annual salary of $22,567. On February 10, 1994, the president of the company told her that her annual gross salary would be reduced $5,000 to $26,000. At age 49, and having been out of the work force for about twenty-three years, the wife's prospects for promotion and higher earnings are improbable. As a secretary, her ability to acquire future capital assets is unlikely because her earning power is limited. From 1988 to 1992, the husband earned between $67,000 to $77,000 and is much more likely to regain this earning capacity and acquire future capital assets. Venuti v. Venuti, 185 Conn. 161.

After considering all the statutory criteria under46b-81, the following orders may enter:

1. Real estate — 18 Sky Top Drive, Trumbull, Connecticut (marital home):

a. The property shall continue to be listed on the market for sale at $334,900, and by agreement, the parties may accept any lesser price.

b. After deducting all debts, expenses and normal closing costs, the net proceeds from the sale shall be divided equally, fifty (50%) percent to each party. CT Page 2666

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Related

Cariseo v. Cariseo
459 A.2d 523 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1983)
Valante v. Valante
429 A.2d 964 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1980)
Venuti v. Venuti
440 A.2d 878 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1981)
Tobey v. Tobey
345 A.2d 21 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1974)
Dubicki v. Dubicki
443 A.2d 1268 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1982)
Leo v. Leo
495 A.2d 704 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1985)
Rubin v. Rubin
527 A.2d 1184 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1987)
Blake v. Blake
560 A.2d 396 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1989)
O'Neill v. O'Neill
536 A.2d 978 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1988)
Roach v. Roach
568 A.2d 1037 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1990)
Emanuelson v. Emanuelson
602 A.2d 609 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1992)
Ippolito v. Ippolito
612 A.2d 131 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1992)

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Bluebook (online)
1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 2662, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/campbell-v-campbell-no-fa93-0305420-mar-11-1994-connsuperct-1994.