Campbell, Ronda A. v. Marten Transport, LLC

2020 TN WC 61
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedJune 29, 2020
Docket2019-05-0540
StatusPublished

This text of 2020 TN WC 61 (Campbell, Ronda A. v. Marten Transport, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Campbell, Ronda A. v. Marten Transport, LLC, 2020 TN WC 61 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2020).

Opinion

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

AT MURFREESBORO

RONDA A. CAMPBELL, ) Docket No. 2019-05-0540 Employee, )

V. )

MARTEN TRANSPORT, LLC, ) State File No. 32087-2019 Employer, )

And )

AGRI GENERAL INS. CO., ) Judge Dale Tipps Insurance Carrier. )

COMPENSATION HEARING ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This case came before the Court on Marten Transport’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The central issue is whether Marten is entitled to summary judgment on grounds that Ms. Campbell failed to present sufficient evidence that her injury arose in the course and scope of her employment. For the reasons below, the Court holds Marten is entitled to summary judgment.

Procedural History

Ms. Campbell works as a truck driver for Marten. On April 23, 2019, Ms. Campbell had completed her deliveries and stopped at a store in Chattanooga to buy her mother a gift. The store had not opened yet, so Ms. Campbell went into her sleeper compartment to rest. While Ms. Campbell slept, a tow-truck operator hooked onto the cab of her truck and raised the front of it off the ground.! He then pounded on the door to wake her up. Ms. Campbell was still groggy and did not realize the cab had been elevated. As a result, she fell when opening the door and injured her head, shoulder, and left wrist.

Marten denied Ms. Campbell’s claim on the grounds she deviated from her job duties to perform a personal errand, and she filed a Petition for Benefit Determination.

' The parking lot was posted, “No Truck Parking.” After an Expedited Hearing, the Court denied benefits because Ms. Campbell was not likely to prevail on proving that her injury arose out of the course and scope of her employment. Marten filed this Motion for Summary Judgment and a statement of undisputed facts. Ms. Campbell did not file a response, and the Court heard the Motion on June 18, 2020.

Marten’s Motion

Marten filed a statement of undisputed material facts with citations to the record in compliance with Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 56.03. Most of the “facts” were a recitation of the procedural history of the claim, along with some of the Court’s findings in the Expedited Hearing Order. The Court notes that procedural history and Expedited Hearing Order conclusions do not constitute facts upon which summary judgment may be granted. However, these material facts may be gleaned from the statement:

1. The sole reason for Ms. Campbell’s stop at the store was to purchase a gift for her mother. 2. Ms. Campbell contends she had permission to make the additional stop.

Marten contended these facts support summary judgment because they constitute affirmative evidence that Ms. Campbell cannot establish essential elements of her claim. Specifically, it argued she cannot prove that her alleged injury arose in the course and scope of her employment.

As stated, Ms. Campbell did not file a response, but she appeared for the hearing on this motion. She contended that she had returned to the course and scope of her employment at the time of her injury because she was trying to protect Marten’s truck from being towed.

Law and Analysis

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is NO genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 (2019).

As the moving party, Marten must do one of two things to prevail on its motion: (1) submit affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim, or (2) demonstrate that the nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101; see also Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 264 (Tenn. 2015). If Marten is successful in meeting this burden, the nonmoving party — Ms. Campbell — must then establish that the record contains specific facts upon which the Court could base a decision in her favor. Rye, at 265. Ms. Campbell filed no response opposing the motion for summary judgment and failed respond to Marten’s statement of undisputed material facts. Therefore, under Rule 56.04 and Tennessee Compilation Rules and Regulations 0800-02-21-.18(1)(c) (August 2019), the Court finds the motion unopposed and the facts admitted. The issue then is whether under Rule 56.06 summary judgment is “appropriate.”

Considering the merits of Marten’s motion, the Court finds it successfully demonstrated that Ms. Campbell’s evidence is insufficient to establish a causal connection between her injury and her employment, an essential element of her claim. Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102, Ms. Campbell must show that her injury arose in the course and scope of her employment.

Application of this course and scope requirement depends in part on the nature of an injured employee’s work. A traveling employee is generally considered to be in the course of employment continuously during the duration of the entire trip, except when there is a distinct departure on a personal errand. McCann vy. Hatchett, 19 S.W.3d 218, 221 (Tenn. 2000). As a truck driver, Ms. Campbell was a traveling employee. The question, therefore, is whether her trip to the store constituted a distinct departure on a personal errand.

Tennessee Courts have found that some personal acts of comfort and convenience, such as bathroom breaks or meal stops, are incidental to the employment. These contribute to the furtherance of an employer’s interest, and injuries that occur during these stops are deemed to have arisen out of the employment. See McCormick vy. Aabakus, Inc., No. M1999-01234-WC-R3-CV, 101 S.W.3d 60, 63 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Oct. 5, 2000). However, Ms. Campbell’s sole reason for this stop was to purchase a gift, not for food, fuel, or a bathroom break. Her decision to leave her route and park her truck was based on purely personal considerations. This differs fundamentally from a comfort stop; in that it provided no benefit to Marten. Therefore, it represents a distinct departure on a personal errand.”

Ms. Campbell contended that she had Marten’s permission to make the stop. Even if true, the Court is unaware of any authority that granting permission for a departure changes the McCann analysis. Instead, the focus remains on the question of whether Ms. Campbell’s deviation from her route provided any benefit to Marten. Ms. Campbell offered no evidence of any benefit. Similarly, Ms. Campbell provided no evidence to support her argument that her injury occurred in the course and scope of her employment because it arose out of her attempts to prevent towing of Marten’s truck.°

* The statement of undisputed facts does not establish whether the physical deviation from Ms. Campbell’s route was geographically significant, but the Court is unaware of any legal authority establishing a minimum required distance to constitute a distinct departure.

3 Even if proof of this contention had been admitted, the Court questions whether an employee’s actions to

3 In response to Marten’s motion, Ms. Campbell must “demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record which could lead a rational trier of fact to find in [her] favor[.]” Rye, at 265.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

McCann v. Hatchett
19 S.W.3d 218 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2000)
McCormick v. Aabakus Inc.
101 S.W.3d 60 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2000)
Michelle RYE Et Al. v. WOMEN’S CARE CENTER OF MEMPHIS, MPLLC Et Al.
477 S.W.3d 235 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2015)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2020 TN WC 61, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/campbell-ronda-a-v-marten-transport-llc-tennworkcompcl-2020.