Camp v. Inhabs. Of the Town of Shapleigh

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: March 30, 2007
• Docket: YORap-06-022
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION YORK, ss. DOCKET NO. AP-06-022 + t i -708..;ta:';:.. 2-7 ;

ELISHA EDWARD CAMP and JOYCE P. CAMP, Trustees of the Camp Management Trust of Kennebunkport, Maine,

Plaintiffs

THE INHABITANTS OF THE TOWN OF SHAPLEIGH, a Municipal corporation duly organized under the laws of the ORDER AND DECISION State of Maine,

Defendant

RICHARD GLIDDEN and ROSEMARY GLIDDEN, of Milton, New Hampshire,

The plaintiffs are the owners of Lot 48 with buildings on Treasure Island in

Square Pond in Shapleigh. Richard Glidden and Rosemary Glidden are the owners of

abutting unimproved Lot 51, which consists of about 7,500 square feet of land.

The Gliddens applied for and were denied a building permit for a seasonal home

because their proposed structure failed to meet the setback requirements for distance

from a right of way, sidelines and from the normal high water line. A variance was

requested and granted by the Shapleigh Board of Appeals. The plaintiffs have appealed from the granting of the variance. Their appeal has been briefed and argued. By state statute the Board "may grant a variance only when strict application of

the ordinance to the petitioner and the petitioner's property would cause undue

hardship. The term 'undue hardship' as used in this subsection means:

A. The land in question cannot yield a reasonable return unless a variance is

granted;

B. The need for a variance is due to the unique circumstances of the property and not to the general conditions in the neighborhood;

C. The granting of a variance will not alter the essential character of the locality;

and

D. The hardship is not the result of action taken by the applicant or a prior

owner." See 30-A M.R.S.A. §4353(4).

The Zoning Code of the Town of Shapleigh contains the identical provision at

g105-71(C)(2)(b).The Town of Shapleigh has enacted the optional relaxed standards for

set-back variances for single-family dwellings, 30-A M.R.S.A. @353(4-B) and Zoning

Code $105-71(C)(3),but those standards apply only to primary year-round residences

and not seasonal cottages.

After a hearing the Board found unanimously that requirements A, C and D

were met while a majority of the Board found that requirement B was met. This appeal

challenges the findings as to "reasonable return" and "unique circumstances."

In this case a combination of a small lot and zoning restrictions preclude the

construction of a single family home absent a variance. A deed restriction limits the

land to "single-family residential purposes'' and states that, "No tents, trailers, or

mobile homes shall be placed or maintained anywhere on Treasure Island ...." All of

these combine to prohbit construction and reduce the permissible uses such that the

strict application of the zoning ordinance "would result in the practical loss of all beneficial use of the land." Perrin v. Town of Kittery, 591 A.2d 861, 863 (Me. 1991),

Greenberg v. DiBiase, 637 A.2d 1177 (Me. 1994) and Marchi v. Town of Scarborough, 511

A.2d 1071,1073 (Me. 1986). The Board was correct in finding that "the land in question

cannot yield a reasonable return unless a variance is granted."

The more difficult question, which divided the Board, is whether "the need for a

variance is due to the unique circumstances of the property and not the general

conditions of the neighborhood." The exact reasoning of a majority of the Board is not

entirely clear. The variance was granted either because the Glidden lot was small or

because it was undeveloped. The second reason will always fail, while the first fails

based on the evidence in this case.

The fact that this lot is undeveloped does not mean that the need for a variance is

due to the "unique circumstance" of having an empty lot. First there are a small

number of other vacant lots on Treasure Island (R.20). Of far more importance is the

fact, even if h s was the only vacant lot on the entire Island, that the owners would not

be entitled to a variance for that reason. The absence of a building goes to the issue of

"reasonable return" not "unique circumstances." "Unique circumstances" has a very

different meaning.

The term "unique circumstances" is best understood through a review of three

decisions of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. In Sibley v. Inhabitants of the Town of

Wells, 462 A.2d 27,30 (Me. 1983) the Court stated, "However, the mere fact that the lot is

substandard is not a unique circumstance, all the undeveloped lots in that

neighborhood are of substandard size." In Waltman v. Town of Yarmouth, 592 A.2d 1079,

1080 (Me. 1991) the Court stated that, "They (the property owners) concede that the lots

in the Littlejohn Island subdivision are generally of substandard size, and hence share

the difficulty from which they seek relief by means of a variance. That circumstance, in itself, is sufficient to support the Board's finding that the hardship is not unique to their

lot; the Board properly concluded that, as the difficulty is one imposed by the zoning

ordinance on the neighborhood generally, relief must come by way of legislative action

- that is, amendment of the zoning ordinance by the town council - and not by

variance." Also see Barnard v. Zoning Board ofAppeals of Town of Yarmouth, 313 A.2d 741,

747,749 (Me. 1974).

The Gliddens had the burden of establishing their entitlement to a variance,

which includes demonstrating that "the need for the variance is due to the unique

circumstance of the property and not to the general conditions of the neighborhood." If

the variance was granted because their lot was empty, that is an error of law by the

Board. If the variance was granted because the lot was small, the evidence is

insufficient to establish that they have a unique circumstance of a too small lot rather

than owning one of many substandard lots which are of a size consistent with the

general con&tions in the neighborhood.

The Gliddens citation to Greenberg v. DiBiase, while it was persuasive as to the

"reasonable return" requirement, does not change the outcome regarding the "unique

circumstances" requirement. Greenberg stated at q[6 at page 1179 that, "The record

demonstrates that the only other lots in the vicinity of Lot 25 that are of a similar size

already contain residential structures or wetlands. All other lots in the area appear to

be of sufficient size to meet the setback requirements." That means that the variance

was granted not because it was for a rare unbuilt lot but because it, unlike the other lots,

was of insufficient size. The fact that an individual owner or even nearly all owners

have built on their substandard lots before a zoning change does not entitle someone

who comes after the zoning amendment to necessarily have the same opportunity unless all of the requirements for a variance, as properly and strictly interpreted, are

met.

The entry is:

Decision of the Shapleigh Board of Appeals granting a variance to Richard Glidden and Rosemary Glidden is reversed.

Dated: March 30,2007

/?d.+ aul A. Fritzsche Justice, Superior Court

PLAINTIFFS: BRUCE M READ ESQ SHEPARD & READ 93 MAIN ST KENNEBUNK ME 04043-7086

DEFENDANT & PI1 RONALD D BOURQUE ESQ BOURQUE & CLEGG PO BOX 1068 SANFORD ME 04073